

KĀRIKĀ 24

1. It refers to the order of creation in Kārikā 22.
2. Vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi are the technical terms denoting the three states of egoism as it dominates in sattva, rajas and tamas aspect respectively. These are roughly stated to be three kinds, though really they are the three aspects or states of one and the same entity.
3. The source of the quotation is not known. The particular characteristics refer to the particular states above. The activity of the constituents refers to that at the time of evolution from the cosmic aspect of egoism.
4. There are the five organs of knowledge, five organs of action and the mind.
5. The objector means that the giving of the different name to the state of dominance of a particular constituent would lead to the indefinite objects due to the dominance of each constituent in different objects.

KĀRIKĀ 25

(Evolution from the sattva dominating Egoism)

आह, यद्येवमिदं तहि वक्तव्यममुष्य कार्यविशेषस्यैवं संज्ञकादहंकारात्प्रवृत्तिरिति ।

Opponent : If it is so, it should be stated that there is the evolution of this particular effect from the egoism bearing this name.

उच्यते—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।

सर्ग इत्यनुवर्तते । एकादशेन्द्रियाणि सत्त्वबहुलानि वैकृतादहंकारात्प्रवर्तन्ते निष्पद्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । एकादशाभिधानादेव चेन्द्रियप्रतीतिः, पूर्वसूत्रे तत्सामानाधिकरण्यात् । अतो न पुनरिन्द्रियग्रहणम् ।

Proponent : THE GROUP OF ELEVEN ABOUNDING IN SAT-TVA EVOLVES FROM THE VAIKARIKA (SATTVA DOMINATING) FORM OF EGOISM.

The word 'evolution' follows here also.¹ The meaning is that the eleven senses abounding in Sattva proceed or evolve from the Sattva-dominating form of egoism. Through statement of eleven there arises the knowledge of the senses because in the preceding aphorism they (two words) have the grammatical agreement in the same case. Therefore, there is no mention of the senses again.

(Evolution from tamas dominating egoism)

आह, तन्मात्रसर्गः पुनः किं गुणः, कस्माच्चाहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते इति ?

Opponent : What are the qualities of the subtle elements and from what form of egoism do they evolve?

उच्यते—

भूतादेस्तान्मात्रः स तामसः

भूतादेर्भूतादिसंज्ञकात्तमः प्रधानात्तान्मात्रः सर्गः । तान्मात्रस्तु तमोबहुलो भूतादिसंज्ञ-
गदहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । तत्र पुनस्तान्मात्रग्रहणात्संख्या शस्यत इति नोच्यते ।

Proponent : THE GROUP OF SUBTLE ELEMENTS, WHICH ABOUNDS IN TAMAS, PROCEED FROM THE TAMAS DOMINATING FORM OF EGOISM.

The subtle elements evolve from the egoism named bhūtādi and abounding in Tamas. The group of subtle elements abounding in Tamas proceed from the form of egoism termed bhūtādi. Here also the number is told by mentioning the subtle elements only and, hence, is not explicitly stated.

आह, प्रकृतिविशेषनिर्देशानर्थक्यम् । प्रागुक्तं सत्त्वादीनामहङ्कारावस्थितानां वैकारिकाद्याः संज्ञा उच्यन्ते । तद्यदि सत्त्वं वैकारिकशब्देनोच्यते वैकारिकाणि चैन्द्रिय एकादशकः सर्गः प्रवर्तत इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतत् सात्त्विकोऽसौ, भूतादेस्तान्मात्र इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतत् तामस इति । कस्मात् ? न ह्यस्ति सम्भवो यत्सत्त्वात्तमोबहुलः सर्गः स्यात्तमसश्च स्वबहुल इति ।

Opponent : The mention of a particular nature is meaningless. It is already stated that the names vaikārika, etc., are applicable to Sattva, etc., present in the form of egoism. If the Sattva is denoted through the word vaikārika, and if the group of eleven organs evolves as vaikārika in nature, it becomes known that they abound in Sattva. When it is stated that the subtle elements (evolute) from the form of egoism called bhūtādi, it becomes known that they abound in Tamas.

Why ?

It is not possible that there may be the evolution (of objects) abounding in Tamas from the Sattva and that (of the objects) abounding in Sattva from the Tamas.

उच्ये- न, अप्रसिद्धत्वज्ञापनात् । यस्यैवार्थस्य ज्ञापनार्थमेवमिह क्रियते, कथं गम्यते सत्त्वं वैकारिकशब्देनोच्यते, तमो भूतादिशब्देन, रजस्तैजसशब्देन ? अप्रसिद्धार्था हि तान्त्रिकी परिभाषेयमनिर्णीता न गम्यत इति ।

Proponent : No, because it suggests the unfamiliar nature. How is it known that Sattva is known through the word vaikārika, Tamas through the word bhūtādi and Rajas through the taijas, for the suggestion of which it is done so here. The technical definition is not familiar and is not known without deciding (discussing).

(Taijas form of Egoism)

आह, तैजससंज्ञानर्थक्यमिति ।

Opponent : The name taijas serves no purpose.

उच्यते न,

तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

उभयत्र तत्सामर्थ्यात् । स्यादेतदेवं यद्यस्य कार्यसामर्थ्यमेव न स्यात् । अस्मात् तैजसादुभयमप्येतत्तन्मात्रेन्द्रियसंज्ञकं प्रवर्तत इत्युनुवर्तते । कथम् ? यदा हि वैकारिकोऽहङ्कार इन्द्रियभावेन प्रवर्तते तदा निष्क्रियत्वात्तैजसं प्रवर्तकत्वेनाकांक्षति, भूतादि भेदकत्वेन । कस्मात् ? तेनैव तद्भेदात् । तद्यथाऽग्निनग्नौ प्रक्षिप्तोऽग्निरेव भवति, आपो वाऽप्सु प्रक्षिप्ता आप एव भवन्ति, एवं सत्त्वमेव सत्त्वे तु भेदं जनयति गुणान्तरसंसर्गमपेक्षते । भूतादिलक्षणस्य तु तमसः संसर्गाद् भिद्यमानं तैजसेन च रजसा क्रियात्मकेनाऽनुगृहीतमेकादशेन्द्रियभाजमपेक्षते । तथा भूतादिलक्षणं तमोऽहङ्कारात्तन्मात्रभावेन प्रवर्तमानं प्रवृत्त्यर्थं तैजसमाकांक्षति, वैकारिकं भेदकत्वेन । कस्मात् ? तेनैव तस्य भेदादिति योज्यम् । शास्त्रं चैवमाह-“तदेतस्मिन्वैकारिके स्तृक्ष्यमाणे एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं वैकारिकमभिधावति । तथैव तस्मिन्भूतादौ स्तृक्ष्यमाणे एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं भूतादिमभिभवति ।” इत्यनेन न्यायेन तैजसादुभयनिष्पत्तिरिति व्याख्यातोऽहङ्कारः ॥ २५ ॥

Proponent : NO BOTH PROCEED FROM THE TAIJAS FORM OF EGOISM.

*Because of its capability with reference to both, it is at both the places.*² It would have been so (purposeless) if there would have been no capability for functioning in it. It follows from the preceding that from this taijas form of egoism proceed both types of evolutes called the senses and the subtle elements.

How ?

When the vaikārika form of egoism evolves in the form of the senses, because of its being inactive it requires taijas as the im-
perator; (it requires) bhūtādi as causing difference.

Why ?

Because that (Sattva) is differentiated by that (bhūtādi) only. Just as the fire thrown in fire becomes fire only, water thrown in water becomes water only. In this way, the Sattva requires the association of the other constituents while bringing out the difference in the Sattva. He looks for the state of the eleven organs being differentiated through the association of the Tamas which is in the form of bhūtāda form of the egoism and favoured (or assisted) by the Rajas in the form of taijas, which is of the nature of activity. Similarly, the tamas in the form of bhūtādu form of egoism evolving in the form

of the subtle elements from the egoism requires taijas form of egoism for activity and vaikārika form of egoism for differentiation.³

Why ?

It should be added here that because the differentiation in that (sattva) is caused by that (tamas) only. The scriptures also state like this. When the vaikārika form of egoism creates, this bhūtādi form of egoism activated by the taijas form of egoism joins the vaikārika form of egoism. Similarly, when the bhūtādi form of egoism creates, the bhūtādi activated by taijas dominates the vaikārāika form.⁴ Through this maxim there is the evolution of both from the taijas. Thus is explained the egoism.

KĀRIKĀ 25

1. It follows from the last Kārikā.
2. It works at both the states of egoism because it is capable of working at both the states. Sattva and tamas are inactive in themselves. The activity for evolution in both the states is caused by rajas.
3. This brings out the fact that the difference in the nature of various objects is caused by the proportion of the three constituents. Even in the objects abounding in sattva, the mutual differentiation is brought about the proportion of tamas in them. The quality of rajas causes activity, mobility or change in an object.
4. The context demands the reading vaikarikāmabhibhavati in place of bhūtādimabhibhavati.

KARIKA 26

(Sense organs)

आह, प्रागपदिष्ट ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारादिति, तत्सामान्याभिधानात् प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कानीन्द्रियाणि भवतोऽभिप्रेतानि ?

Opponent : It is stated earlier that the group of eleven organs proceed from the sattva-dominating form of egoism. We do not understand it through the general statement. Therefore, it should be stated as to which organs are intended by you here.

(Organs of knowledge)

उच्यते - द्विविधानीन्द्रियाणि, बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च । तत्र

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि ।

कर्णौ त्वक्चक्षुषी च रसनं च नासिका च कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाः । आख्यानमाख्या प्रत्यायनमित्यर्थः । एतैः शब्दैराख्या येषां तानीमानि कर्णत्वक्चक्षूरसननासिकाख्यानि । अधिष्ठानभेदाद् द्विवचनेन विग्रहः क्रियते । एतानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रत्यवगन्तव्यानि । बुद्धेरिन्द्रियाणि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : THE ORGANS ARE OF TWO KINDS : THE ORGANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THOSE OF ACTIVITY.

The organs of knowledge are called ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The compound term ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose mean the ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose. Calling or saying is the name which means to convey or giving for understanding. Those which are conveyed through these words are ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose.¹ The compound form of the word is dissolved in dual (in case of ears and eyes) due to the difference of locations. These should be understood as the organs of knowledge. The organs of knowledge are the senses related to knowledge.

किं पुनरेतानि बुद्धेरिति ?

Opponent : What are they to the knowledge ?

उच्यते—शब्दादिविषयप्रतिपत्तौ द्वारम् । कस्मात् ? अबहिर्वृत्तित्वात् । अन्तःकरणस्य नास्ति बहिर्वृत्तिरित्यतो नाऽलमेतत्साक्षाच्छब्दादीनर्थान्प्रतिपत्तुम् । तस्माच्छ्रोत्रादिलक्षणं साक्षाद् बाह्यविषयप्रकाशनसमर्थं कारणान्तरमपेक्षते । तत्रणालिकया तस्य विषयग्रहणम् । तस्माद्युक्तमुक्तं बुद्धेर्बाह्यविषयप्रतिपत्तौ द्वारभूतत्वाद् बुद्धीन्द्रियाणीति ।

Proponent : They serve as the gate for the knowledge of the objects like word.

Why ?

Because of the absence of the functioning externally in case of internal organ. There is no function of the internal organ outside (the body) and, hence, it is not capable of knowing the objects like word, etc., directly. Therefore, some other means in the form of ear, etc., which are capable of illuminating (grasping) the external object directly are required. The knowledge of object of that (internal organ) arises through the medium of that. Therefore, it is rightly stated that senses of knowledge are so because they serve as the gate for knowledge of external objects by the intellect.

(Organs of action)

आह, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पुनः कानीति ?

Opponent : What are the organs of action ?

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

वाक्च पाणी च पादौ पायुश्चोपस्थश्च वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः । एतानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुराचक्षते । कर्मार्थानीन्द्रियाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि । किं पुनः कर्म ? वचनादि वक्ष्यमाणम् । एतद्विकुर्वत् इति कर्मेन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : THE SPEECH, HANDS, FEET, ANUS AND GENERATIVE ORGAN ARE THE ORGANS OF ACTION.

The compound speech, hands, feet, anus and generative organ means speech, hands (two) feet (two) anus and the generative organ. These are stated to be the organs of action. The organs of action are those meant for action.

What is the action ?

That is to speak, etc., which will be stated later on. Since they perform these actions particularly, they are the organs of action.

(Difference of the senses from their locus)

आह, कथमेतदुपलभ्यते अधिष्ठानादर्थान्तरभूतानीन्द्रियाणि, न पुनरधिष्ठानमात्र-

मिति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the senses are different from their locus and are not the locus itself ?

उच्यते—अधिष्ठानादिन्द्रियपृथक्त्वम्, शक्तिविशेषोपलम्भात् । यथा शरीरासम्भविनो विषयव्यवसायलक्षणस्य शक्तिविशेषस्योपलम्भादर्थान्तरं बुद्धिरनुमीयते, एवमधिष्ठानासम्भविनो विषयग्रहणलक्षणस्य शक्तिविशेषस्योपलम्भादर्थान्तरमिन्द्रियमिति ।

Proponent : There is the distinction of the organs from their location because some particular power is observed. Just as the intellect is inferred to be a distinct object due to (through) the observation (experience) of a particular power in the form of ascertaining the objects, which is not possible in the case of the body (physical), similarly, the organs as distinct (from locus) are inferred from the observation of a particular power in the form of grasping the objects, which is not possible in the case of the location.

आह, न, असम्भवाऽसिद्धेः । अधिष्ठानमात्रस्य विषयग्रहणं न सम्भवित, अर्थान्तरस्य च सम्भवति इत्येतदुभयमपि चाऽप्रसिद्धमिति ।

Opponent : No, because the impossibility is not yet established. Both of the facts that the grasping of the object is not possible in the case of the locus and is possible in case of some other object only, are unfamiliar.

उच्यते—नैतदप्रसिद्धम् । तुल्यजातीयेषु तदनुपपत्तेः । यस्माद् भौतिकेष्वन्येषु घटादिषु विषयग्रहणसामर्थ्यासम्भवः आहंकारविकारवत्तत्सामर्थ्याप्रतिषेधान्नेन्द्रियाणां नस्तत्प्रतिषेधोऽनुमातव्य इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? शक्तिभेदापत्तेः । वैकारिकं सत्त्वमाहङ्कारिकं प्रकाशरूपं, तच्छक्तिविशेषादिन्द्रियाणि उत्पद्यन्ते । भूतादिलक्षणस्य तमसः सामर्थ्यात् तन्मात्राणि परस्य, पृथिव्यादीनामेकरूपत्वात् । तस्मादयमसमः समाधिरिति । एतेन भौतिकत्वं प्रत्युक्तम् ।

Proponent : It is not unfamiliar because that (grasp of an object) is not justified in case of the objects which are of the similar genus (to their locus). Since the grasping of the object is not possible in case of the material objects like pot.²

Since the capability is not generated in the case of the objects originating from the egoism, the negation of that in the case of our senses also should not be inferred.³

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of differentiation of power (even in your theory). In our theory the *vaikārika* state of *sattva* is of the nature of light and the senses originate due to that particular power. In the case of other kinds of egoism subtle elements are born on account of the power of *tamas* in the form of *bhūtādi* type of egoism because those (subtle elements) are identical in nature to the earth, etc. Therefore, the above solution is not based upon similarity of cases. Through this is refuted the elemental nature of the senses.⁴

(Refutation of considering the sense as one)

आह, कथमवगम्यते बहूनीन्द्रियाणि, न पुनरेकमेवेन्द्रियं मनोवत्सर्वार्थमनेकाधिष्ठानं स्यादिति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the senses are many and would a single sense meant for all types of knowledge would not be located at many organs as is the case of mind ?

उच्यते—न, युगपत्प्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसंगात् । यद्येकमेवेन्द्रियं मनोवत्सर्वार्थमनेकाधिष्ठानं स्यादेकविषयप्रतिपत्तौ वा सर्वविषयप्रतिपत्तिः । दृष्टस्तु ग्रहणभेदस्तस्मान्नैकमिन्द्रियमिति । भौतिकैरनुग्रहोपघातदर्शनादिन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, इह भौतिकानां घटादीनां भौतिकैर्मृददण्डचक्रसूत्रोदकमुद्रादिभिरनुग्रहोपघातो दृष्टः । यदि च भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि न स्युः नैषां भौतिकैरञ्जनादिभिरनुग्रहः क्रियते, उपघातश्च रजःप्रभृतिभिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा भौतिकैर्वदनादिभिरन्तःकरणस्य ग्रहणधारणस्मृतिलक्षणोऽनुग्रहः क्रियते, उपघातश्चोपलादिभिः । न चास्य भौतिकत्वम् । एवमिन्द्रियस्यापि स्यात् । वैशेषिकगुणव्यञ्जकत्वाद्विकारप्रतीतिरिति चेत् अथ मतम् — पृथिव्यादिवैशेषिको गन्धो ध्राणेनाऽभिव्यज्यते । औदको रसे रसनेन च । आग्नेयं रूपं वीक्षणेन । वायवीयः स्पर्शस्त्वचा आकाशीयः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण । येन च यस्य वैशेषिकगुणाभिव्यक्तिस्तस्य तद्विकारत्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा प्रदीपस्य रूपाभिव्यञ्जकत्वे सति तैजसत्वमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनिष्टाप्रसंगात् । वैशेषिकगुणव्यञ्जकानां तद्विकारत्वमिच्छतः प्राप्तमपां गन्धाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वात् पार्थिवत्वम् । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तत्त्वैकान्तिकौ हेतुरिति । तत्र यदुक्तं वैशेषिकगुणाभिव्यञ्जकत्वाद् भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति एतदयुक्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

Reply : No, because there will arise the undesirable contingency of activity or the absence of activity (of all the senses) simultaneously. If there is only one sense for all knowledges (or located at many points) as is the case with mind, there

would arise the knowledge of all the objects with the knowledge of one object. However, the difference in knowledge is experienced. Therefore, the sense is not one. If it is argued that the senses are material in nature because of the observation of favour or injury to them by the material objects? It may be like this. Here, the favour or injury to the material objects like pot is caused by the material object like clay, stick, wheel, thread (rope), water and a hammer. If the senses would not be material in nature, the favour to them would not be rendered through the collyrium, etc., and the injury by dust, etc., which are material in nature. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of its being non-conclusive. The favour in respect of grasping (or seizing), retaining and remembering to the internal organ is rendered through face, etc., which are elemental in nature and the injury to that also is rendered by stone etc., which are also material in nature. And, it is not material in nature. In the same way, the case may be with the senses also. If it is argued that the knowledge of the modification (from the material element) arises through the manifestation of the particular quality ? The smell which is particular quality of earth is manifest through nose, the taste belonging to the water through tongue, the form or colour belonging to the fire by the organ of sight, the touch actually belonging to air, through skin, and the word actually belonging to the sky through the ear. The object is observed to be the modification of the one the quality of which is manifested by it. For example, the lamp which is the manifestor of the form is of the nature of the Light.⁵

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because it would involve the undesirable result. In the view of those who intend that the manifestor is the modification of the manifested element, there arises the undesirable contingency of earthly nature (origin from the earth) of the water because the water causes the manifestation of smell.⁶ If this is undesirable, the reason is not conclusive. Thus, the statement that the senses are material in nature because of being the manifestor of the particular quality of the material elements, is wrong.

KĀRIKĀ 26

1. The senses are actually the powers of sight, etc., in the body, yet are located at various points in our body.
2. The senses are the product of egoism while their locations in the body are material in nature. The material objects like pot are not observed as grasping the objects.
3. This seems to be the statement of the objector.
4. This is a reply to the above contention that all the products of egoism do not grasp the objects and, hence, the senses need not necessarily grasp the objects.
5. This seems to be the argument of the Naiyāyikas to establish the material nature of the senses.
6. The meaning is that sometimes the piece of earth does not give smell but does so when sprinkled with water. In that case water helps the manifestation of smell and, hence, would be considered as the product of earth.

KĀRIKĀ 27

(Definition of mind)

आह, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि अहङ्कारादुत्पद्यन्त इति प्रागपदिष्टम् । इदानीं बुद्धीन्द्रियकमेन्द्रियाणि दशापदिश्यन्ते । तदिदं पदार्थन्यूनमिति ।

Opponent : It is stated earlier that the eleven senses originate from egoism. Now the senses of knowledge and of action are mentioned as ten only. Hence, the one entity is less.

उच्यते— स्यादेतदेवम्, यद्येतावदिन्द्रियपर्व स्यात् । किं तर्हीति—

सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः

अत्रेन्द्रियपर्वणि मनो भवद्भिः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्र संकल्पकमिति लक्षणमाचक्ष्महे । संकल्पोऽभिलाष इच्छातृष्णेत्याद्यनर्थान्तरम् । संकल्पयतीति संकल्पकम् । एतन्मनसो लक्षणम् ।

Proponent : It would be this only if the phase of senses would be this much only. What then,

IN THESE, MIND IS THE DESIRING PRINCIPLE.

Here, mind should also be accepted in the phase of the senses. There, we speak 'desiring principle' as the definition.¹ Samkalpa, abhia, iccha, tṛṣṇā, etc., are synonymous. The desiring principle is that which desires. This is the definition of mind.

(Separate existence of mind)

तस्मादस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलभ्यमानस्यास्तित्वमवसीयते । कस्मात् ? व्यस्तसमस्तानामिन्द्रियान्तराणां तदसंभवात् । अपोह्य हि मनः संकल्पं व्यस्तानामिन्द्रियान्तराणां भवान्परिकल्पयेत् समस्तानां वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावद्व्यस्तानामिन्द्रियाणां संकल्पो भवति । किं कारणम् ? अनियतविषयत्वात् । नियतो हि श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिविषयः । अनियतविषयश्च संकल्पः । किंच त्रिकालविषयत्वात् । वर्तमानविषया श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः त्रिकालविषयश्च संकल्पः । तस्मात्र व्यस्तानां नाऽपि समस्तानाम् । बधिरादिषु तदभावप्रसंगात् । यदि समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः संकल्पः स्यात्प्राणादिवदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिः, न

चान्यतरवैकल्ये तदभावः, एवं समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः संकल्पः स्यान्नचान्यतरवैकल्ये तदभावः स्यादिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । विशेषितत्वात् । निर्विषया प्राणादिवृत्तिः । शब्दादिविषयस्तु संकल्प इति विशेषितम् । तस्माद् व्यस्तसमस्तानामिन्द्रियाणां संकल्पानुपपत्तेर्मनसो लिङ्गमेतदस्तित्वे इति सिद्धम् ।

From that is ascertained the existence of it though it is not directly perceived.

How ?

Because that (desire) is not possible in case of the other senses individually and collectively. Keeping aside the mind will you postulate desire as an act of the other senses individually or collectively ?

What difference does it make ?

Because the objects of desire are not fixed (restricted).² The objects of the senses like ear, i.e., the word, etc., are fixed. The objects of desire, however, are not fixed. Moreover, because its objects belong to three periods of time. The function of the ear, etc., has its object existing at present, but the objects of desire belong to the three periods of time. Therefore, desiring is not the act of the senses individually or collectively. Moreover, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of that (act of desire) in case of deaf persons.

If it is argued that the act of desire may be the function of senses collectively as is the case with vital air, etc?³ It may be like this. As the vital airs, etc., are the function of the senses collectively and when one sense gets damaged, they do not come to an end, similarly, the act of desiring also may be the activity of all the senses collectively and it would not come to an end when any one of them is damaged.⁴

This is also wrong because of the particularity (or distinction). The circulation of vital airs is without object. The act of desiring, however, has word, etc., as its object. This is the particularity. Therefore, since the act of desiring is not possible in case of the senses individually or collectively, it is proved that it (act of desiring) is a probans for the existence of the mind.

(Mind is both sense of knowledge and action)

आह, तदवधारणीयम्, इन्द्रियद्वैविध्यात् । द्विप्रकाराणिहीन्द्रियाणि पुरस्तादुपदिष्टानि । तत्र मनोऽप्यधारणीयं किं बुद्धीन्द्रियम् अथ कर्मेन्द्रियमिति ?

Opponent : It is yet to be decided because the senses are of two kinds. Two kinds of senses are mentioned earlier. Hence, it

should be decided whether the mind is a sense of knowledge or a sense of action.

उच्यते—

तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समारख्यातम् ।

ह्यर्थे चः पठितः । तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथेत्यर्थः । मनो न केवलं बुद्धीन्द्रियमपि तु कर्मेन्द्रियमपि ।

Proponent : : IT IS STATED TO BE THE SENSE OF BOTH THE KINDS.

The word *ca* is used in the sense *hi* (certainly). That is certainly both kinds of sense. This is what is meant here. The mind is not only the sense of knowledge but also the sense of action.

नियमहेत्वभावादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यात्पुनरेतत्, कोऽत्र नियमहेतुः यदिन्द्रियत्वाविशेषे-
मनस एवोभयप्रचारत्वमभ्युपगम्यते, नान्येषामिति ?

Opponent : If it is argued that it is wrong because of the absence of the reason for such a restriction? It may again be like this. What is the reason for restriction that even when the nature of being a sense is common, yet the application of being of both the kinds is to the mind only and not to the others ?

उच्यते

अन्तस्त्रिकालविषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ॥ २७ ॥

त्रिकालविषयत्वात् । इह यस्यान्तस्त्रिषु च कालेषु करणस्य वृत्तिस्तदुभयचारम्, तद्यथा बुद्धिः । साक्षात् विषयाऽनभिषन्धानादतीतानागतवर्तमानविषयत्वाच्च मनोऽन्तस्त्रिकालविषयम् । तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तदिति सिद्धम् ॥ २७ ॥

॥ युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ षष्ठमाह्निकम् ॥

Proponent : SINCE IT IS INTERNAL (AND HENCE) HAVING THE OBJECTS OF THREE PERIODS OF TIME AS ITS OBJECT, THEREFORE, THE APPLICATION OF 'BEING OF BOTH THE KINDS' IS TO THAT.

Because it has the objects of the three periods of time as its objects. Here, what is internal and the function of which is with reference to the objects of three periods of time, that is said to be of both the kinds, just as the intellect. The mind is internal because it is not

related to the objects directly and has the objects of three periods of time as it has the objects the objects of past, future and present. Therefore, it is proved that the appellation of being of both the kinds is applicable to it.

Here ends the sixth discourse in the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.