

14. The analogy suggests that the knowledge in the conscious entity is not real but apparent. The conscious entity does not undergo any change in the empirical state also.
15. The sense is that the knowledge of one object cannot lead to the knowledge of the other different from it. Similarly, if the knowledge and the object would be different, to have the knowledge would not mean to know the object.
16. The Samkhyas consider the difference between grahana and pratyaya. The former refers to taking the form of the objects without the awareness of them, while the latter emphasises the awareness of the object, though the fact of its taking the form of the object is not denied.
17. The context demands the reading akasasya smatpakse instead of akasay atmapakse.

## KĀRIKĀ-18

(Multiplicity of the conscious entity)

आह, गृह्णीमहे तावदस्त्ययमात्मेति । इदानीमनेकोऽथैक इति विचार्यम् । कुतः संशय इति चेत्, सम्बन्धिनामुभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । इह कस्यचिदनेकस्यानेकेन । सम्बन्ध उपलभ्यते । तद्यथा श्रोत्रादिना शरीरस्य । कस्यचिदेकस्यानेकेन । तद्यथाऽकास्य घटादिना । अयमपि चात्मा कार्यकारणसम्बन्धीत्यतः संशयः किं श्रोत्रादिवदनेकः, आकाशवदेको वेति ? किं चान्यत् । आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । औपनिषदाः खलु एक आत्मेति प्रतिपन्नाः । काणादाक्षपा-  
दार्हतप्रभृतयः पुनरनेक इति । यथा चैकानेकत्वं प्रत्यात्मनो विप्रतिपत्तिरेवं साक्षित्वौदासीन्य-  
द्रष्टृत्वाकर्तृत्वेषु । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं कथमेते धर्माः पुरुषेऽवतिष्ठन्त इति ?

Opponent : We admit that the soul exists. Now it should be thought upon whether the soul is one or they are many. If you ask why does such a doubt arise, (we reply), *because the relatives are observed in both the ways*. In some cases, there is found the contact of many with many, for example, that of the body with ears, etc. In some cases the contact of one with many is found, just as that of the space with pot, etc. The soul is related to bodies. Hence, arises the doubt whether it is many like ears, etc., or one like space. *Moreover, because of the controversy among the authorities*. The followers of the Upaniṣads consider that the soul is one. Kaṇāda, Gautama and the Jainas, etc., hold them as many. As there is the controversy about the oneness or many-ness of soul, similarly there is the controversy about its nature of being a witness, indifferent, seer and non-agent.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it should be told as to how these qualities exist in the conscious entity.

(Definite adjustment of birth, death and organs)

उच्यते- यत्तावदुक्तं सम्बन्धत्वादात्मपदार्थे सन्देहः किमनेकोऽथैक इति, अत्र ब्रूमः-  
बहवः पुरुषा इति प्रतिज्ञा । कस्मात् ?

जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्



जन्मेति महदादेः सूक्ष्मशरीराश्रितस्य लिङ्गस्य यथासंस्कारं बाह्येन शरीरेण सम्बन्धः । मरणमिति पूर्वकृतस्य कर्मणः फलभोगपरिसमाप्तेः साम्प्रतस्य च फलभोगस्य प्रत्युपस्थाने लिङ्गस्य पूर्वशरीरत्यागाः । करणं त्रयोदशविधमिति (का. ३२) वक्ष्यति । जन्म च मरणं च करणानि च जन्ममरणकरणानि । तेषां प्रतिपुरुषं नियमः एतस्माल्लिङ्गादात्मनो बहुत्वमवसीयते । एतदुक्तं भवति—जन्मलक्षणं च मरणलक्षणं च कार्यकारणस्यावस्थान्तरम् । परस्परविरोधिनी तमप्रकाशवत् । तत्र यद्येक आत्मा स्यात् तेन यथैकं द्रव्यं तमप्रकाशावेकप्रदेशोपनिपातिनौ न शक्नोत्यनुभवितुमसम्भवात्, एवमयं जन्ममरणे अपि न शक्नुयादुपभोक्तुम् । अस्ति चायं केनचित्कार्यकरणेन जन्मोपभोगः केनचिन्मरणोपभोगः । तेन मन्यामहे नाना आत्मानः, येषां विरोधिधर्मोपभोगसामर्थ्यमिति । तथा करणानां प्रकाशातिशयो विषयग्रहणलक्षणा शुद्धतिशयश्चाष्टाविंशतिधा शक्तिः, तयोः परस्परविरोधादेकेनात्मना युगपदुपभोगो नोपपद्यते । न हि शक्यमेकेनात्मना प्रकाशातिशयो विषयग्रहणलक्षणोऽशुद्धयतिशयश्चाशक्तिलक्षणो विरोधिधर्माद्युगपदुपभोक्तुम् । अस्ति चायं करणनिमित्तः प्रतिपुरुषं नियमः । तेन मन्यामहे नाना आत्मान इति ।

Proponent : As regards your statement that there is the doubt with reference to the (number of) soul whether it is one or many on account of its being a correlative, we reply the conscious entities are many, is the assertion.

Why ?

### BECAUSE OF THE DEFINITE ADJUSTMENT OF BIRTH, DEATH AND ORGANS.

Birth means the contact of the internal organs like intellect supported by the subtle body with the external body in accordance with the impressions of the past deeds. Death means the giving up of the earlier body by the internal organs when the experience of result of deeds done earlier is over and when the enjoyment of the result of the deeds done recently is present (near). The organs are thirteen—this will be stated (by the author) later on (Ka 32). The compound birth, death and organs is dissolved as birth and death and organs. There is the definite adjustment of them with each conscious entity. From this probans is deduced the multiplicity of souls. What is meant is this. Birth and death are the other states of the body. They are mutually opposite like darkness and light. If there would have been one soul only, just as a single object cannot experience the falling of darkness and light on it at a time because it is impossible, similarly, one soul cannot experience birth and death at the same time. And, it

is observed that there is the experience of birth by some body and the experience of death by others. Therefore, we admit that there are many souls in case of whom there is the capability of experiencing opposite qualities (separately). Similarly, there is the excess of light which grasps the objects in case of the senses and also the incapability (Ka 47) of twenty eighth kinds in the form of the excess of impurity. Their experience by one soul only is not possible since they are opposite in nature. It is not possible to experience in case of one soul only the excess of light in the form of (causing) knowledge of the objects and the incapability in the form of the excess of impurity because both of them are opposite in nature. This adjustment in case of every conscious entity regarding (or caused by) senses does exist. Therefore, we hold that there are many souls.

(Non-simultaneity of action)

किं चान्यत् ।

अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्

कस्मात् ? अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेः प्रधानस्येति शेषः, यस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते ।

Moreover,

**BECAUSE OF THE NON-SIMULTANEITY OF ACTIVITIES THE PLURALITY OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY IS ESTABLISHED.**

Why ?

Because of the non-simultaneity of activities. 'It is) of the cosmic matter' remains (to be said), in case of which only the activity is possible (or justified).

कस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते ?

Opponent : Whose activity is justified (or possible)?

प्रधानस्य ।

Proponent : Of the cosmic matter.

कथमिति ?

Opponent : How ?



उच्यते—यद्येक आत्मा स्यात्तेनैकपुरुषाधिकारनिबद्धं प्रधानम् । शक्तश्चासौ युगपद-  
नेकानि शरीराणि उपभोक्तुमित्यतो यावद्धिः शरीरैरपचितासु कालमात्रस्वस्मिन्भवपरिवर्ते  
भवितव्यं सर्वेषामुत्पत्तेः प्रति युगपत्प्रवर्तेत । दृष्टा तु प्रधानस्याऽयुगपच्छरीरभावेन—प्रवृत्तिः ।  
तस्मादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च नाना आत्मान इति ।

If there would have been only one soul, cosmic matter would have bound (or attached to the province of) conscious entity only. This is capable of enjoying many bodies at a time and, hence, the cosmic matter would have been active at a time in the production of all the bodies which should have been born in one cycle when the period of time respectfully incites (requires them).<sup>2</sup> However, the activity (modification) of cosmic matter in the form of various bodies is observed to be non-simultaneous. And, from that non-simultaneous activity of cosmic matter with reference to many bodies is proved the many-ness of the soul.

(Another interpretaion of non-simultaneity of activities)

अन्ये पुनराहुः—बहिष्करणामेवाऽयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेः । कथम् ? यद्येक आत्मा स्यात्तेन तत्सं-  
स्कारोपनिबद्धान्येव सर्वाणि करणानीत्यतः प्रतिपिण्डमवस्थितैः करणैर्युगपद्विषयान्गृह्णी-  
यात् । बाधिर्याद्युपघाते वा सति पिण्डान्तरसम्बन्धिना करणेनान्यस्य शब्दादिकरणमप्रतिषिद्धं  
स्यात् । न तु तथा भवति । तस्मात्करणानामयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेर्नाना आत्मान इति । तदयुक्तम् ।  
कस्मात् ? पूर्वेणाऽविशेषात् । करणानां प्रतिनियमादित्यनेनायमुपसंगृहीतोऽर्थः । तस्माद्यथो-  
क्तमेवास्तु ।

The others say (interpret it) like this. *Because of the non-simultaneous activity of the external organs only.*

How?

If there would have been one soul only, since all the organs are arranged to accomplish the purpose of the soul, would acquire all the objects simultaneously with the organs situated in each body. In case of some disease like deafness the organ of (hearing) etc., would have been unobstructed means of cognising sound, etc., because sound,<sup>3</sup> etc., would be heard through the organ related to some other body. This is, however, not the case. Therefore, on account of the non-simultaneous activity of the organs also there are many souls. This (interpretaion) is, however, wrong.

Why ?

Because this (argument) does not differ from the former. This meaning is included in the argument 'on account of the definite adjustment of the senses.' Therefore, let the argument be as it is interpreted by us.

(Opposition to the qualities of the manifest)

किं चान्यत् ।

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

इह त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मीत्येते धर्माः प्रतिपिण्डमुपलभ्यन्ते । यथा चैते तथा तत्प्रतियोगिनो नैर्गुण्यादयः पुरुषधर्माः । तत्र यथैव गुणस्वभावविपरीतस्वभावस्योपलम्भादेकस्मात्पिडादेकपुरुषसिद्धिः एवं प्रतिपिण्डं गुणस्वभावविपरीतस्वभावस्योपलम्भात्पुरुषानानात्वमवसेयम् । तस्मादवस्थितमेतन्नानात्मान इति ॥ १८ ॥

Moreover,

**BECAUSE OF THE OPPOSITION TO THREE CONSTITUENTS, ETC.**

The qualities of being composed of three constituents, indiscriminative, objective, general, unconscious and productive are found in all the bodies.<sup>4</sup> As are these, so are their opposites like absence of constituents, etc., the qualities of the conscious entity. Then, there is the proof for one conscious entity from one body because of the deduction of the existence of the one possessed of the nature opposite to the nature of the constituents. Similarly, on account of the availability of the one of different nature from constituents in each body is deduced the multiplicity of the conscious entity.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it is established that the souls are many.



## KĀRIKĀ 18

1. These qualities are stated with reference to the conscious entity in the next karika.
2. The sense is that if the conscious entity would have been one and thus would have been enjoying all the bodies at a time, the cosmic matter would create all the beings required at a time.
3. The sense is that deafness, etc., would not cause obstruction in knowledge because the soul, being one according the above theory, would cognise sound through the ears of others if there is the defect in one particular body.
4. Cf. Karika 11
5. Since in each body there is the one entity having the opposite nature to the constituents, there is a separate conscious entity in each body.

## KĀRIKĀ-19

(Nature of Conscious entity)

आह, सिद्धमात्मनो नानात्वम् । साक्षित्वकैवल्यमाध्यस्थ्यद्रष्टृत्वाकर्तृत्वानामिदानीं कस्माद्धेतोः प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent : The multiplicity of the soul is established. For what reason now arises the knowledge of witness-hood, isolation, neutrality, seeress and non-agency of the conscious entity ?

उच्चते-

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

तस्मादित्यनेन हेतुसामान्यमाचष्टे । चशब्दोऽवधारणे । विपर्यासादिति सामान्येन हेतुमुपात्तं विशेषेऽवस्थापयति । सिद्धंसाक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्येत्येवमादिना साध्यघर्मनिर्देशं करोति । तत्र साक्षित्वमित्यनेन गुणानां प्रवृत्तावस्वातन्त्र्यं ख्यापयति, प्रधानस्य तदर्थनिबन्धनत्वात्प्रवृत्तेः ।

Proponent : AND, THEREFORE, FROM THAT CONTRAST IS ESTABLISHED THE WITNESS-HOOD OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY AS ALSO ITS ISOLATION, NEUTRALITY, SEERNESS AND NON-AGENCY.

With the word 'from that' is expressed the reason in general. The word 'and' (*ca*) is in the sense of restriction (or specification). The author puts in a specific case the reason which is employed in general (here); (the reason is) that through that contrast, etc. The author mentions the probandum through 'is established the witness-hood of conscious entity', etc.

Through the expression witness-hood, etc., he (the author) suggests the non independence of the constituents with reference to their activity because the activity of cosmic matter depends upon his purpose.

अधिष्ठातृत्वं कथमिति ?



**Opponent :** How is there the controllership in conscious entity?

उच्यते- यथा हि क्रियासाक्षिणि कस्मिंश्चिदवस्थिते कर्ता तदिच्छानुविधायी कार्यं निर्वर्तयति, न स्वतन्त्रः, एवं प्रधानमपि । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योर्यथेते पुरुषस्यार्थः सिध्यति तथा महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रिय भूतदेवमनुष्यतिर्यक्स्थावरभावेन व्यूहते, न यदृच्छातः । तस्मात्पुरुषस्तदर्थपरतन्त्रत्वात्प्रधानप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योः साक्षी । कैवल्यमित्यनेन संसर्गधर्मत्वमात्मनो निर्वर्तयति, न यथा सत्त्वादीनां परस्परेण प्रकाशादिधर्मपेक्षाणां संसर्गः, एवं पुरुषस्य तैर्भवति । माध्यस्थ्यमित्यनेनातिशयनिहासनपपत्तेः पुरुषस्य गुणैः सह बाधानुग्रहानुपपत्तिं स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तौ चापक्षपातं दर्शयति । द्रष्टृत्वमित्यनेनोदासीनस्य कार्यकारणपिण्डव्यूहसमकालं चैतन्यशक्तिसद्भावात्सुखदुःखमोहस्वभावानां गुणचेष्टानामनिवृत्तार्थानां सन्निधानमात्रादुपलब्धिमात्रं प्रतिजनाति । अकर्तृभावश्चेत्यनेन सप्तविधमकर्तृत्वमाश्रयति । न ह्ययं विषयेषु बाह्यान्तःकरणसन्निध्येऽध्यवसायं कुरुते । न च सत्त्वादीनां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण प्रवर्तमानानां स्वेन चैतन्यलक्षणेन धर्मेणङ्गभावं प्रतिपद्यते, नाप्यङ्गिभावम् । एवं सह गुणैः कार्यं न कुरुते स्त्रीकुमारवत् । स्थितप्रयोगं न कुरुते रथकटयन्त्रप्रेरकवत् । न स्वात्मनो मृत्पिण्डवत् । न परतः कुम्भकारवत् । नाप्यदेशान्मायाकारवत् । नोभयतो मातृपितृवत् । तदेवमनेन सूत्रेणार्च्यः पुरुषस्याधिष्ठातृत्वं नैर्गुण्यमौदासीन्यं भोक्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च साध्यतामापाद्य त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययं साधनत्वेनोपन्यति । तैः पञ्चभिस्त्रिगुणादिविपरीतैः कर्मभिः पञ्चानामेषां यथासंभवं प्रवृत्तिरवगन्तव्या ।

**Proponent :** When someone stands as a witness of the activities, the agent performs the acts according to his will and not independently. In the same way acts the cosmic matter. The intellect, egoism, subtle elements, senses and the gross elements arrange themselves into the form of god, men and animal in the way as the purpose of the conscious entity is fulfilled by their activity and the cessation of activity; but not as they desire. Therefore, conscious entity is the witness because the activity and the cessation of activities are dependent upon the purpose of conscious entity.

Through the statement of isolation the author negates the contact of the conscious entity. There is no contact of the conscious entity with the constituents in a way there is the mutual contact of the sattva, etc., which stand in need of each other's qualities like light. Through the statement of neutrality the author shows the impropriety or impossibility of extending trouble or favour to the constituents and the absence of taking the side (by the conscious entity) in their activity because there is no increase or decrease in conscious entity.<sup>1</sup>



Through the statement of seer-ness the author confirms merely receiving the form of the object merely through the contact with the activity of the constituents<sup>2</sup> which have not yet accomplished the objects and which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, because the power of consciousness exists (in body) from the very time of formation of body (composed of the effects and causes).<sup>3</sup>

*Through the statement of non-doership the seven kinds of non-doership is resorted to.* It does not ascertain the objects in its contact with the external and the internal organs. It does not attain the state of subordination or principal through his quality in the form of consciousness, to the Sattva, etc., which proceed to activity through their qualities of light, motivation and restraint, and through favouring each other. Similarly, he does not act with the qualities as the woman and a boy. He does not employ others to activity while itself situated at one place just as the one who sets the charriot, a cart or a machine in motion. He does not create something from his own self like a lump of clay. Nor does he do something with something else like a potter. Nor does he do something through mere order just as a juggler. Nor does he work jointly like mother and father. Thus, through the present aphorism having made controllership, state of having the absence of the constituents neutrality, enjoyership and non-doership as the probandum the author puts forth the contradiction to three constituents, etc., as the probans. The application (as probans) of those five acts opposed to those of the three constituents should be understood in a way it is possible to do so for the establishment of these five.<sup>4</sup>

(Witness-hood due to absence of constituents)

यस्मादयं सुखाद्यम्योऽर्थान्तरभूतः तस्मादयं तत्क्रियासाक्षी । तत्र नैर्गुण्यात्साक्षि-  
क्वम् ।

There, from absence of constituents (results) the witness-hood. Since it is different from pleasure, etc., it is the witness of their activities.<sup>5</sup>

आह, तदसिद्धेः । नैर्गुण्यासिद्धेः । यद्यस्य सुखादिधर्मत्वमात्मनः प्रसिद्धं स्यादत एतद्य-  
ज्जते वक्तुम् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । विशेषाऽनभिधानगदितरात्सिद्धिरपीति चेत्  
स्यान्मतम्, आत्मगुणाः सुखादयो न शब्दगुण इत्यत्रापि भवता विशेषो नाऽभिधीयते । तस्मा-  
देतदप्यसिद्धम् । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अहंकरेणैकवाक्यत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणत्वं स्यात् ।  
दृष्टं तु सुखितोऽहं दुःखितोऽहमिति । तस्मात्सुखदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्तः ।

Opponent : (It is not right) because it is not well known as his nature of being devoid of the three constituents is not proved. If the



state of non-possessing the pleasure, etc., in case of the soul would have been established, it is right to say. That is however, not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

If it is argues that without stating it particularly, it is proved through otherwise ? It may be like this. You have also not given a particular reason to say that the pleasure, etc., are the qualities of the soul and not those of the word etc., Therefore, it is also not established.

This is a also wrong.

Why ?

It would involve the difference of location even when there is single sentence through the use of 'I'. It is observed as used that 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy'. Therefore, it is not right to consider the pleasure and pain, etc., as forming the nature of word, etc.

उच्यते- न, गौरादिष्वनेकान्तात् । तद्यथा गौरः कृष्णोऽहमिति शरीरधर्मेरात्मनो भिन्नाधिकरणत्वमहङ्कारेण एवं सुखदुःखयोरपि स्यात् । न चात्मगुणत्वं स्यादिति ।

Proponent : It is not so. *It (i.e., the reason) is not conclusive with refermce to white complexion*, etc. Just as there is the difference of location of the qualities of body and soul even in a single sentence through the use of 'I' as 'I am white' and 'I am black', similar would be the caswe with pleasure, pain, etc. Those would not be the qualities of the same self (inspite of the use of 'I')

आह, पृथगुपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । यद्यपि गौरादीनामविभक्तमहङ्कारेण ग्रहणं तथापि पृथगयं प्रागेतानात्मनो गृहीत्वा पश्चादविभक्तान्गृह्णन्शक्नोति व्यवस्थापयितुममुष्यैते न पुनरमुष्यैति । न त्वेवं सुखदुःखयोः पृथगुपलब्धिः । तस्मादसदेतदिति ।

Oppnent : It is wrong becuse of their being found separately (at different locations ). Though there is the knowledge of white complexion etc., as non-separated from body through the expression 'I', yet after perceiving them earler as not belonging to the soul and after perceiving them after wards as associated with the soul one can ascertain that these belong to this and not to this. There is no congntion of pleasure and pain separately (without soul). Therefore, it (your argument) is wrong.

उच्यते-नैवमुपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरगमनात् । अहङ्कारेणाऽविभक्तग्रहणादात्मगुणत्वमिति प्रगपदिष्टम् । इदानीं तु सत्यपि तस्मिन्पृथग्रहणादछभावं ब्रुवतो मार्गान्तरगमन-



मनैकान्तिकस्य चाऽपरिहारः । किं चान्यत्, संशयाऽव्यतिरेकात् । यत एव गौरादयः पृथगुपलभ्यन्ते न सुखादयोऽत एव संशयः । न च यत एव संशयस्तत एव निर्णयो युक्तः तस्माद्युक्तमेतद् गौरादिवदहङ्कारेणाप्यभिन्नग्रहणाच्छब्दाद्यात्मभूताः सुखादयः । किं चान्यत् । स्वभावाऽनवधारणादनुपादानप्रसंगात् । सुखाद्यात्मकाः शब्दादय इत्येवं ब्रुवतः शब्दादीनां स्वभावानवधारणादनुपादप्रसंगात् । । निमित्तत्वेपादानादग्निवददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मत्, यथाऽग्निः पाकजनिमित्तमुपादीयतेऽथ चैषां पार्थिवत्वमेवं शब्दादयोऽपि सुखादिनिमित्तत्वेनोपादीयेरन्य अथ चैषामात्मगुणत्वमेव स्यादिति । तदप्यनुपपन्म् । कस्मात् ? सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् । यथा निमित्तस्याग्नेर्न पाकजैः सामानाधिकरण्यं पक्वोऽग्निः पच्यतेऽग्निरिति एवं शब्दादीनां निमित्तत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यं स्यात् । सुखशब्दो दुःख इति दृष्टं तु । तस्मान्न तेषां निमित्तार्थेनोपादानमिति

Proponent : It is not justified.

Why ?

*Because you have adopted the other way.* Earlier you have given the reason as it is the quality of the soul because it is known as non-separate through the use of 'I'. At present there is the use of 'I' on the ground of its knowledge as different; thus you are adopting a different way and there is no alleviation of the non-conclusiveness. *Moreover, it (the established reason given by you) is not different from the doubt.*<sup>6</sup> The doubt arises since the white complexion etc., are perceived as different and the pleasure, etc., are not so. It is not right to take the decision on the basis of the doubt itself. Therefore, it is right that even though through the 'I' notion pleasure, etc., are not separately perceived like the white colour, etc. *Moreover, because of the involvement of undesirable contingency of not selecting them because of the non-determination of their nature.* In the case of one who speaks that the word, etc., are of the nature of pleasure, etc.,<sup>7</sup> there would arise the undesirable contingency of not selecting the word etc., because their nature is not fully determined.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because those are selected as the efficient cause (and not the material cause) just as the selection of fire ? It may be like this. As the fire is selected as the cause of the atoms produced by warmth, though they are of the nature of earth, the word, etc., and in this way those (pleasure, etc.,) would be the qualities of the soul.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the perception of having the same locus.* There is no identity of locus between the fire which serves as a cause and the



atoms produced by warmth in the form 'the fire which is already heated is cooking' Similarly, there would have been no identity of location between word, etc., and pleasure, etc., because word, etc., are supposed to be the cause of that. It is also perceived that the pleasing word also (sometimes) causes misery. Therefore, there is no selection of them because of their being the cause.<sup>8</sup>

आह, एवमपि सुखादीनां शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्तः । कस्मात् ? विप्रतिपत्तेः । यथा हि शब्दाः शब्दात्मका इतः सवः शब्दरूपेण गृह्यन्ते, एवं सुखात्मकोऽयमिति सवैस्तद्रूपेण गृह्यते । दृष्टा तु विप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्मादात्मगुणा इति ।

Opponent : In this way also it is not right to take the pleasure, etc., as of the nature of word, etc.

Why ?

Because of the controversy. Just as the word is known by all in the form of word because the word is of the form of the word, the pleasurable object also would be known by all as having that form (pleasurable). However, there is the controversy in this case. Therefore, they are the qualities of the soul only.

उच्यते-न, संस्कारविशेषनिमित्तत्वात् । तद्यथा पित्तादिसामर्थ्यान्माधुर्यादिषु विप्रतिपत्तिः । न चैषामशब्दादिगुणत्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात्सुखादिषु विप्रतिपत्तिः । न चैषामशब्दादिगुणत्वमिति । किं चान्यत् । निमित्तनैमित्तिकयोर्विप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । तद्यथा प्रदीपप्रकाशयोः । ततश्च विप्रतिपत्तेर्निमित्तत्वमपि शब्दादीनामकल्पनीयं स्यात् । यश्च द्वयोर्दोषो न तमेकश्चोद्यत इति । आत्मगुणाकांक्षित्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् निमित्तमप्रधानत्वादप्यपरिपाकवशेन सुखदुःखेनोत्पादयत्यामनः । तन्मयत्वे तु निराकांक्षत्वात्प्रधानस्य व्यवस्थाभेदो न युक्त इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । तन्मयत्वेऽपि गुणभावान्माधुर्यादिषु विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यादावेवोक्तमेतत् । तस्मात्तन्मयत्वे प्राधान्यमिति चानिश्चिताभिधानमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, because it is caused by a particular past impression.

There is the difference of opinion with reference to sweetness, etc., because of the power of bilious humour (bile). There is no controversy of their being associated with a particular impression of the absence of quality of word, etc. It is not that these are not having the quality of word, etc., *Moreover, the same would involve even if they are considered to be the cause.* This is similar in case of them who consider them to be the cause. There is no controversy in case of the cause and the result,<sup>9</sup> just as in the case of the lamp and the light. Thereby, the causality



of word, etc., would also not be postulated on account of controversy.<sup>10</sup> The fault belongs to both, the one only does not state it (for other).<sup>11</sup>

If it is argued that the fault does not arise when they are intended to be the qualities of the soul ? It may be like this. The cause being secondary through the fruition of some other (pleasure or pain) produces them with reference to the soul. If they are identical with the cosmic matter, their different adjustment would not be proper as they do not depend upon the cosmic matter.

This is also not so.

Why ?

Because of the statement already made. It is already stated in the beginning that even though they are identical, there is the controversy with reference to sweetness, etc., as they are subordinate (to each other). Therefore, the statement that they are prominent even when they are identical with cosmic matter, is not settled.<sup>12</sup>

आह, एवमप्ययुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? अतीतानागतेष्वपि तु दृष्टेः । तस्मात्सुखादीनां शब्दाद्यात्मभावो न युक्त इति ।

Opponent : This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because they are observed in case of past and future as well.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, it is not correct to consider pleasure, etc., as of the nature of word, etc.

उच्यते-न, स्मृतिनिमित्तत्वाद् बुद्धेः । अयमतीतानागतेष्वपि शब्दादिषु स्मार्तसु-  
खदुःखयोगी भवति तत्संपर्कात् पुरुषेण तथाऽनुभूयते । पुरुषगुणत्वे तु पाकजवन्निमित्तादुत्प-  
न्नानां सुखादीनां विशेषभावात्तीव्रमन्दताऽनुपपत्तिः स्यात् । तस्मात्सुखदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्म-  
भावो न युक्तः । किंचान्यत् अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । द्रव्यस्य गुणैरविप्रयोगात्सुखदुःखयोरात्मगु-  
णत्वे सत्यात्मनस्ताभ्यामनिमोक्षप्रसंगः । तस्मात्तयोरात्मगुणत्वमयुक्तमिति । श्यामादिवत्तद्वि-  
निवृत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा स्यामगुणत्वे सत्यणोरग्निसम्बन्धात्तद्विनिवृत्तिः, शब्दादिगु-  
णत्वे चाकाशस्याशब्दकस्यावस्थानमेवमात्मनोऽपीति । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विशेषोपा-  
दानप्रसंगात् । साध्यत्वाच्च, यथा ह्यणुः श्यामतां परित्यज्य रूपविशेषमेव रक्तलक्षणमुपादत्ते,  
न रूपवत्तां त्यजति, एवमात्मापि बाह्यनिमित्तसामर्थ्यात्सुखात्सुखान्तरं दुःखाद् दुःखान्तरमुपा-  
ददीत । न ते अत्यन्तं जह्यात् । तथा आकाशं शब्दलक्षणं कस्यांचिदवस्थायामशब्दकं भव-  
तीत्यस्मान्नति साध्योऽयमर्थः । भेर्यादिशब्दास्तु तदुण एवेति प्रतिपादयिष्यामः तस्मात्सु-  
खदुःखयोः शब्दाद्यात्मभावो युक्तः । एवमनामिश्ररूप आत्मा । ततश्चेच्छद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्मज्ञानसं-



स्काराणामनेकस्वभावानां परस्परविरोधिनां च तदुणत्वमनुपपन्नम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतन्निर्गुण आत्मा नैर्गुण्याच्च साक्षिमात्र इति केवलो विविक्तत्वात् ।

Proponent : *Because the knowledge is the cause of memory.* The association of remembered pleasure, pain, etc., takes place in case of past and future word, etc., as well. And it is experienced so by the conscious entity due to its association with that. When they are considered to be the qualities of the soul, there would be no possibility of their being severe or slight since there is no particularity in the results which are born of some cause, as is the case with the baked atoms. Therefore, there is no impropriety in considering pleasure and pain as forming the nature of word, etc.<sup>14</sup> *Moreover, because it would involve the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation.* Since the qualities can never be dissociated from the substance, there would arise the undesirable contingency of non-dissociation of them from the soul when pleasure and pain, etc., are taken to be the properties of the soul. Therefore, their nature of being the qualities of the soul is not right.

If it is argued that their dissociation takes place like black colour, etc.? It may be like this. As the black quality, even though forming a quality dissociates with the contact of fire, and as the sky even though having the word, etc. As quality, remains without word etc., also, similar, will be the case with the soul also.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of taking up the other particular (qualities), and because it is still to be proved. Just as an atom takes up the particular new red quality after giving up the blackness and, thus, does not give up the colour (absolutely), similarly, the soul also would acquire the new pleasure after giving up the old and new pain after giving up the old due to the capacity of the external cause. They would not be given up absolutely. This is still to be proved for us that the sky having sound as the quality remains qualitless in some stage. We shall establish that the sound of the drum, etc., are the qualities of that . Therefore, it is correct to consider pleasure and pain as forming the nature of word, etc.<sup>15</sup> The soul is not of a mixed nature. Therefore, it is wrong to suppose the



qualities like desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, knowledge and past impression, which are mutually contradictory and of varied nature, as the qualities of that (soul). Therefore, it is right that the soul is qualitiess and it is merely the witness on account of its being qualitiess and, hence, is isolated on account of its being devoid of (all the qualities).

(Isolation of the conscious entity)

तस्मादयं गुणेभ्यः पृथग्भूतः तस्मात्केवलः न तैः सह संसर्गेण वर्तते ।

Since it is devoid of all the constituents, it is isolated; it does not remain associated with them.

आह, कः पुनरस्यात्मनो गुणेभ्यः पृथग्भावोऽभिप्रेत इति ?

Opponent : What (type of) dissociation from the constituents is intended in case of the soul?

उच्यते—तदुपकारनिरपेक्षाणां सत्त्वादीनां स्वकार्यसामर्थ्यपृथग्भावः । न हि सत्त्वादयः प्रकाशादिभिर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण वर्तमानाः पुरुषकृतमुपकारमपेक्षन्ते । प्रकाशादिधर्मसन्निधानमात्रादेव तु प्रवर्तन्ते । तथा च वार्षगणाः पठन्ति “प्रधानप्रवृत्तिरप्रत्यया पुरुषेणाऽपरिगृह्यमाणाऽदिसर्गे वर्तन्ते” इति । यस्माद् गुणास्तदुपकारनिरपेक्षाः प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादसावपि तत्संसर्गं नाऽनुभवति । दृष्टा तु लोकेऽप्येककार्यत्वापृथग्भावपरिकल्पना । तद्यथा इमे भ्रातरः पृथक्, एषां नैकं कार्यम् । न पृथगिमे येषामेकमिति ।

Proponent : *It is the capacity of performing their function by sattva, etc., who do not stand in need of his help.* The Sattva, etc., which exist helping one another through their qualities like light<sup>16</sup> do not require the favour from the conscious entity. They perform their activities merely through their association with the qualities like light. So read the followers of Varsaganya : The activity of the cosmic matter without understanding<sup>17</sup> proceeds in the initial state of creation without being controlled by the conscious entity. Since the constituents proceed to activity without requiring his favour, this (conscious entity) also does not experience the contact with them. The postulation of considering them different on the basis of working separately<sup>18</sup> is experienced in the world too. For example, the brothers are separated, these have no common activity. These are not separate, their activity is common.



## (Neutrality of the conscious entity)

मध्यस्थो विषयित्वात् । यस्मादयं पुरुषो विषयी तस्मान्मध्यस्थः । किं कारणम् ? विषयाणां ह्यतुल्यबलत्वात्, न्यूनातिशयोपपत्तेश्च परस्परेण बाधानुग्रहावुपत्रौ । विषयी चायम् । तस्मान्नास्ति न्यूनताद्युपपत्तिः । ततश्चेतनाभावः । न चाऽमिश्ररूपत्वात्सङ्गद्वेषौ गुणविषयौ, अतो मध्यस्थः ?

It is neutral because it is the subject of experience. Since the conscious entity is subject of experience, it is neutral.

What is the reason here ?

Because of inequality of power. Because of the possibility of less and more there is a possibility of the mutual obstruction and mutual favour. But, the soul is the subject of experience. Therefore, there is no possibility of less etc., (in it). Hence, the consciousness. The neutrality (of the conscious entity) is proved because on account of its being unmixed it has no attachment or aversion which are the objects of the constituents.

## (Seeriness of the conscious entity)

द्रष्टृत्वं चैतन्यात् । प्रकृतिवकारभूतत्वात् सत्त्वादिभ्यश्चैतन्यमपोद्धृत्य पुरुषे व्यवस्थापनीयम् । न चाचेतनानां द्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्यते इत्यतः पुरुष एव चैतन्याद् दृष्टा नान्यतत्त्वान्तरम् ।

The seeriness of the conscious entity (is) because of its being conscious. The consciousness should be placed in the conscious entity after eliminating it from the Sattva, etc., because of their being the modification of the cosmic matter.<sup>19</sup> The seeriness is not possible in case of the non-conscious objects and, hence, the conscious entity only is the seer because of consciousness, and not any other entity.

## (Non-doership of the conscious entity)

अकर्तृभावः, अप्रसवधर्मित्वात् । प्रसवार्थो धर्मः प्रसवधर्मः सोऽस्यास्तौति प्रसवधर्मौ ।

The non-doership of the conscious entity is because of his being non-productive. The nature of production is that which leads to production. The productive is one who has the nature of production.

## (Non-agency of the active agency)

कः पुनरसौ प्रसवार्थो धर्म इति ?

Opponent : What is that nature required for production ?

उच्यते-प्रस्पन्दनपरिणामौ । निष्क्रियत्वादकर्तेति यावत् । तदिदमप्रसवधर्मित्वादकर्तेति । कथमस्य निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत् ? चैतन्यात् । अचेतनानां हि क्षीरादीनां क्रियावत्त्वमुप-

लब्धं, चेतनस्य न कस्यचिदित्यतो निष्क्रियः पुरुषः। किंच अनामिश्ररूपत्वात्। अनामिश्ररूपं हि क्रियादिमत्स्वीरादि। अनामिश्ररूपश्चायम्। तस्मान्निष्क्रियः। विभुत्वादिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा विभुत्वे सति प्रधानस्य सक्रियत्वमेवं पुरुषस्य इति विभुत्वे सक्रियात्वेन भवितव्यमिति। तच्च नैवम्। कस्मात्? धर्मद्वयसहितस्य साहचर्योपलब्धेः। तद्विभुत्वमाचेतन्यानेकरूपत्वसहितं क्रियावति द्रष्टुं, न केवलम्। न तु तथा पुरुषे। तस्माद्विषमेतत्। एवं निष्क्रियः पुरुषः निष्क्रियत्वाच्च प्रधानात्कार्यकरणं न कुरुते। कस्मात्? क्रियावतः कुम्भकारस्य मृत्पिण्डात्कार्यनिष्पत्तिसामर्थ्यदर्शनात्। स्यादेतत्। उत्पादितस्यान्येन स्थितिं कुरुते, धात्रीकुमारवत्। स्थितस्य वा प्रयोगं रथशकटयन्त्रप्रेरकवदिति। एतदप्यनुपपन्नं, पूर्वस्मादेव हेतोः अथापि स्यात्स्वतः पुरुषः कार्यकरणं कुरुत इति तदप्युक्तम्। चेतनाचेतनयोरत्यन्तभेदात्प्रकृतिविकारभावानुपपत्तेः। अथ मतमुभयत इति तदपि नैव संभवति, उभयदोषप्रसंगात्। स्यात्पुनरैतत् अव्यपदिश्य योनिं पुरुषोऽभिधानमात्रेण कार्यकरणं कुरुते इत्यसदेतत्। कस्मात्? अनुत्पत्तावभिधानानुपपत्तेः। ईश्वरकारणप्रतिषेधेऽभिहितं प्राक् प्रधानविपरिणामाद् बुद्धिमतो बुद्धिर्नास्ति। न च बुद्धिमन्तरेणाभिधानमुपपद्यते, तद्वत्तिभूतत्वात् तथा बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकसृष्टिप्रतिषेधः कृतः। स इहापि योज्यः, अध्यवसायकर्तृत्वं च प्राक्प्रतिषिद्धम् एवं सप्तविधेनाकर्तृत्वेनाऽकर्ता पुरुषः। उक्तं च

नाऽध्यवसायं कुरुते पुरुषो नैव स्थितिं प्रयोगं वा।

न स्वात्मनो न परतो न व्यपदेशान्न चोभयतः ॥

तद्युक्तमेतत्

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य।

कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ इति ॥ १९ ॥

Proponent : The nature of production consists of movement and modification. It implies that he is non-doer because of his being devoid of activities. It is non-doer because of its being non-productive. If it is asked how is its nature of being devoid of activity possible, (we reply), because of its being conscious. The nature of possessing the activities is observed with reference to the milk, etc., which are unconscious in nature and not in case of any conscious entity. Hence, conscious entity is inactive. Moreover, because of its being pure (non-mixable) in nature



entity is active? It may be like this. Cosmic matter being all-pervasive is active, conscious entity also should be active on account of its being all-pervasive.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because the association of (both the activity and all-pervasiveness is observed in case of one which is in association with two qualities.*<sup>20</sup> The all-pervasiveness in the active object is associated with forms of non-consciousness<sup>21</sup> and many other forms, i.e., composed of three constituents, etc., and not in isolated (all-pervasiveness). It is, however, not the case with conscious entity. Therefore, the example is dissimilar. In this way the conscious entity is non-active and thus being inactive in nature does not produce the body from the cosmic matter.

Why ?

Because the capability of producing some effect from the lump of clay is observed in case of potter who is active.

It may be argued that it sustains the object produced by other as a nurse supports the baby, or, there may be his activity by employing others to activity though himself situating inactive only just as the one who sets the chariot, the cart or the machine in motion.

It is also wrong because of the reason stated above.

If it is said to be like this that the Conscious entity produces the body from himself.

This is also wrong. Since the conscious and non-conscious are entirely different (in nature), there is no possibility of being material cause or its modification in case of conscious entity.

If it is argued that from both of them (the creation is produced)?

That is also not possible because it would involve the undesirable contingency of both the faults.

It may be like this that the conscious entity produces the body merely through thinking without naming the state (genus) of birth.

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of thinking in the absence of production. It is already stated in the context of refuting the causality of Īśvara<sup>22</sup> that the intellect of the one possessing intellect does not

exist earlier to the evolution (modification) of cosmic matter. There is no possibility of thinking without intellect because thinking is the function of that intellect only. The creation by some intelligent creator is already refuted. That should be connected here also. And its doership of determination is also refuted earlier. Thus, through the non-doership of seven kinds, it is proved that the conscious entity is no-doer. It is stated also :

The conscious entity does not determine, nor does it sustain or sets the other object in motion. It does not create the object from himself, nor from other objects, nor through calling the name only nor through the both the cosmic matter and himself.

Therefore, it is right that

"And therefore, from that contrast is established the witnesshood of the conscious entity as also its isolation, neutrality, seerlessness and non-agency."



## KĀRIKĀ 19

1. The sense is that which increases or decreases and thus is aspiring for some benefit cannot be neutral, but the conscious entity is not affected by anything.
2. The conscious entity is not an agent of knowledge, but a mere spectator. Knowledge in the conscious entity is actually apparent. Vijñanabhikṣu brings out the difference between witness and the seer. The former is directly related to the object while the latter may be with intervention.
3. This is to stress the idea that consciousness is the nature of the soul itself and is not produced in him by the association with the constituents.
4. In karika 11 Iśvarakṛṣṇa enumerates six points of opposition between worldly objects and the constituents. The Yuktidīpikā considers five of them leaving *aviveki*. From these should be deduced the five points about the nature of the conscious entity. However, there is no sequence or fixation as to which point should be deduced from which point of contrast. They should be understood as they may be possible. For example, the witnesshood and isolation of the conscious entity are deduced from his being devoid of the three constituents, neutrality from his being the subject, seerhood from consciousness, non-doership from non-productivity.
5. The witness should not be actively involved in the activity witnessed by him. Since the conscious entity is different from pleasure, pain, etc., he can be their witness.
6. The cause of the doubt, viz., finding together, itself is accepted to be the conclusion.
7. The context demands the negative particle *na* in the beginning of the sentence.
8. The experience of pleasure and pain depends upon many factors. If a particular object is the cause of pleasure only, it should not cause pain. But, it goes against our common experience. It can, however, be explained on the basis of Sāṃkhya theory. Due to the dominance of a particular constituent at a particular time towards a man having particular impression, the object is said to be of the nature of pleasure or pain or indifference in those circumstances.



9. It cannot be contradicted that the cause invariably gives rise to its effect.
10. The controversy refers to the experience of pleasure, etc., differently by different persons.
11. Pleasure, etc., are considered to be the nature of the cause of objects by both the upholders of different theories. However, in both the cases it cannot be explained satisfactorily as to how the same object is sometimes experience to be pleasurable and sometimes painful.
12. The sense is that they are identical with the cosmic matter and one of them is prominent at a time. However, it is not a fixed rule as to which of them is prominent. Anyone of them may be prominent at the same time.
13. The meaning is if the pleasure, pain, etc., are identical with words, etc., they should be experienced at the present only because the same word, etc., were not in the past and would not be in the future. Consequently, there would be no memory of the past. Pleasure, etc., and no intuition of the future pleasure etc.
14. The context demands that the reading should be without na.
15. The reading *atmabhavo yuktah* given by Chak., is more appropriate than that of Pandeyas's reading *ayuktah*.
16. Cf. Karika 12-13.
17. It implies that it is not thoughtful but is spontaneous.
18. The context demands the reading *anekakaryatvat* as against *ekakaryatvat*.
19. The word *praktivikarabhutatvat* is confusing. It may be interpreted as the constituents are the *vikara* (modification) of the *prakrti* which will contradict the Samkhya position itself, because in Samkhya the constituents are not product or modification of the cosmic matter.
20. The qualities here refer to the activity and all-pervasiveness and prove the nature of the object as possessed of the two qualities.
21. The reading should be *vibhutvamacetanya....* in place of *vibhutvamacetanya...*
22. See YD on the karika 14.



## KĀRIKĀ 20

(False appearance of qualities in the conscious entity)

यतश्चेतनाशक्तिसम्बन्धात्पुरुष एव द्रष्टा नान्यत्तत्त्वान्तरं गुणाश्च कर्तारो, न पुरुष :

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावद्विव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ 20 ॥

पुरुषसम्पर्काद् हि ग्रहणधारणविज्ञानवचनोहापोहक्रिया यथान्यायाभिविवेशानां करणधर्माणां प्रत्ययरूपाणामिवोपलब्धेश्चेतनाशक्तेश्चाऽध्यवसायवृत्तिमनुरुध्यमानायास्तद्भावसन्निवेशिनां सत्त्वादीनां व्यापारवतामभिसम्बन्धाद् व्यापाराविष्टाया इवोपलब्धिः । यतस्तत्राऽयमनेककालप्रवृत्तिमिथ्याप्रत्ययाभ्यासवासनापेक्षो भवबीजहेतुर्ज्ञानविशेषः प्राणभूतामवभासते । श्रोत्रमुपलभ्यते त्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वा घ्राणमित्यादि । तथा पुरुषः कर्मणां कर्ता, पुरुषः सुखदुःखयोरिति । तस्मात्करणस्य ग्रहणरूपता पुरुषस्य च कर्तृरूपता, सम्बन्ध्यन्तरसम्पर्कादन्यगताऽन्यत्रोपलभ्यमाना भक्त्याऽध्यवसातव्या, न परमार्थः । उक्तं च

चेतनाऽधिष्ठता बुद्धिश्चेतनेव विभाव्यते ।

कर्तृष्ववस्थितश्चात्मा भोक्ता कर्तेव लक्ष्यते ॥

Since the conscious entity only is the seer due to its association with the power of consciousness and not any other entity<sup>1</sup> and the agents are the constituents only and not the conscious entity.

**THEREFORE, DUE TO THE ASSOCIATION WITH THAT THE INTELLECT THOUGH UNCONSCIOUS (ESSENTIALLY) APPEARS LIKE HAVING CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY THOUGH (ESSENTIALLY) NEUTRAL APPEARS LIKE AN AGENT, WHILE (REALITY) THE DOERSHIP BELONGS TO THE CONSTITUENTS.**

Since the activities like seizing, retaining, knowing, speaking, deliberating and reasoning belonging to the organs situated at their respective places, due to the association of the conscious entity appears in the form of the consciousness, as also the power of consciousness which follows the function like determination due to its contact with the intellect, etc., which are arranged in that form and active, seems to be as if encircled by (or full of) activities. (It is



known so) because this kind of particular knowledge<sup>2</sup> which is the cause or the seed of the universe and is in turn caused by the impressions of the practice of wrong knowledge for a long time appears in case of the living being in the form that the senses like ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose know. Thus the conscious entity is the agent of the acts. The conscious entity is also (experiencer) of pleasure, pain, etc. Therefore, the knowledge in the senses and the agency in the conscious entity appear as located in the other, though (really) invested in other, due to the association of the correlative and as such it should be understood metaphorically and not in reality. It is stated also:

“The intellect which is governed by consciousness is (wrongly) taken as if conscious. And the soul which is (essentially) an enjoyer only while located in the agents appears to be an agent.”

(Transference of qualities)

आह, संयोगात्पररूपतापत्तावतिप्रसंगः, अविशेषात् । यदि चेतनसंयोगाद् बुद्ध्यादीनां प्रत्ययवदुपचारः व्यापित्वादस्य घटादिभिरपि संयोग न प्रतिषिध्यत इत्यतः प्राप्तस्तेषामपि प्रत्ययवदुपचारः । अथ संयोगाऽविशेषात्करणानामेव प्रत्ययवदुपचारो न घटादीनां, विशेषस्तर्हि वक्तव्य इति ।

Opponent : In (the theory of) attaining other form through association is involved the undesirable contingency of over-pervasiveness, because there is no specification. If the intellect, etc., are metaphorically taken to be possessed of knowledge (or consciousness) due to their association with the conscious entity, the contact of it (i.e., conscious entity) with the pot, etc., is not negated for it is all-pervasive and, hence, the secondary transference of consciousness to them also becomes contingent. Hence, the restrictive principle should be mentioned through which the secondary transference of consciousness is to the senses only and not to the pot, etc., even though there is no speciality in the contact (of both of them with the soul).

उच्यते—तदप्रसंगः । शक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् स्फटिकादिवत् । यथोपधानसंयोगविशेषे सत्याकाशस्फटिकयोः स्फटिकमेवोपधानसरूपं प्रत्यवभासते शक्तितो नाकाशम्, एवं पुरुषसंयोगविशेषे बुद्धिघटयोः शक्तितो बुद्धिरेव चेतनारूपापन्नेवोपलभ्यते, न घटः ।

Proponent : That undesirable contingency does not arise, because it (transference) needs the capacity as is found in the case of a



crystal, etc. When the space and the crystal are equally associated with a particular object placed near, only the crystal appears as (having) the form of the object due to its capacity, and not the sky. Similarly, when the contact of the conscious entity is common to both the intellect and the pot, the intellect only due to its capacity appears as having the form of consciousness, and not the pot.

(Transference of qualities of the intellect and the conscious entity due to mutual contact)

आह, पुरुषस्य विकार्यत्वप्रसंगः, रूपान्तरोपादनात् । यदि तर्हि करणसम्बन्धात्पुरुषः कर्तृत्वोपचारं विषयसरूपतां च प्रतिपद्यते, प्राप्तमस्यापि स्फटिकवद्रूपान्तरोपादानाद्विकार्यत्वम् । अथ नाऽस्य विषयरूपापत्तिः, न तर्हि करणस्वरूपः पुरुष इति ।

Opponent : It involves the undesirable contingency of the conscious entity's being modifiable because of taking the other form. If the conscious entity gets the agency and the form of the object metaphorically as also the form of the object, it will also be modifiable like crystal on it would be an effect account of attaining other form. If you argue that it does not attain the form of the object, the conscious entity will not be of the form of the organs also.

उच्यते-न, भक्तितोऽभ्युपगमात् । बुद्धिरुपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्युपनिपातात्तद्रूप्यं प्रतिपद्यते । बुद्धिरूपं तु सन्निधानमात्राच्छक्तिविशेषयोगात्फलभोक्तृत्वाच्च राजनि भृत्यजयपराजयोपचारवत्पुरुष उपचर्यते । न त्वसौ बुद्धिसंपर्कात्तद्रूपो भवति । अत एवास्य सत्यां चेतनाशक्तौ व्यवसायकर्तृत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, मा भूत् विषयरूपापत्तौ सत्यामनेकस्वभावत्वादिकार्यत्वप्रसंगः । तस्माद्विषयसम्पर्कादप्यविकार्यः पुरुषः, न ह्यस्य नित्यत्वात्किंचिदनुग्रहाय नाऽपघाताय । आह च

मुष्टिर्यथा विकीर्णः सूच्यग्रे सर्षपादीनाम् ।

तिष्ठति न सूक्ष्मभावात्तद्वद् द्वन्द्वानि सर्वज्ञे ॥

इति । चेतनाशक्तियोगात्तु द्रष्टृत्वमस्य स्वाभाविकम् । एवं चेद्यदुक्तं

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।

चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्समः ॥

इति तदयुक्तम् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मादविकार्यरूपस्याकाशस्य सन्निधानमात्रान्मेषपयोरजोधूमप्रभृतिभिरभिव्रदे शत्वादत्यन्तशुद्धस्यापि मलिनमिव रूपमुपलक्ष्यते, न च विकार्य-



त्वम्, एवमात्मनऽपि स्यात् । तद्युक्तमेतत्पुरुषसंयोगात्करणस्य प्रत्ययोपचारः, पुरुषस्य च गुणसंयोगात्कर्तृत्वोपचार इति ।

Proponent : *No, because it is accepted in a metaphorical way.* The intellect attains the form of the object through (following) the function of the sense which is in association with the object. The form of the intellect, however, is falsely attributed to the conscious entity due to its mere contact, due to conscious entity having the capacity for that and due to his being the enjoyer of the fruits, just like the attribution of the victory and the defeat of the servant on the king.<sup>3</sup> It is not that it becomes of the form of the intellect on account of the contact with the intellect.<sup>4</sup> That is why its agency of determination is negated even when it has got the power of consciousness so that there may not be the undesirable contingency of its being a product attaining many natures after assuming the form of the object. Therefore, the conscious entity is non-modifiable even though it has the contact with many objects. Since it is eternal, there is nothing to favour or to hurt. It is stated also:

“As a handful of mustard seeds thrown about at the forepart of the needle do not remain there due to the subtle size, the mutually contradictory experiences also do not remain in the all-knowing person.”

And, due to its being possessed of power of consciousness, the seerhood of the conscious entity is natural. When it is so, the following statement comes to be false.

“What effect do the rains and the sun cast on the sky ? Their effect is cast on the skin only. If that (conscious entity) is like skin, it would be non-eternal and if it (the conscious entity) is like sky, it would be like a non-existing entity.”

What is the reason (for calling it false) ?

Because even the form of sky which is absolutely pure and immodifiable in nature seems to be impure on account of its mere association with the cloud, water, dust, smoke, etc., due to oneness of location. And there is no modifiableness in the sky. In this way is the position of the soul also.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it is right to say that the understanding is metaphorically spoken as belonging to the organs due to



their contact with the conscious entity. And the agency is metaphorically spoken as belonging to the conscious entity due to the contact with the constituents.

(The contact is metaphorical)

आह, अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? संयोगानुपपत्तेः । पुरुषस्य हि गुणानां च संयोगः परिकल्प्यमानोऽन्यतरकर्मजो वा परिकल्प्यते यथा स्थणुश्येनयोः, उभयकर्मजो वा मेषयोः, संयोगजो वा द्वयङ्गुलाकाशयोः, स्वाभाविको वा यथाऽङ्ग्यौष्ण्योः, शक्तिनिमित्तो वा यथा चक्षूरूपयोः, योग्यतालक्षणो वा यथा ऽङ्गुष्ठोपानद्द्रव्ययोः, यादृच्छिको वा यथा श्वघ्नतत्पातिनोः, विषयविषयिनिमित्तो वा यथा मत्स्योदकयोरिति ? तत्र तावदन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्च संयोग एषामुपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? विभुत्वात् । परिच्छिन्नदेशानामप्राप्तौ सत्यामदृष्टः, यथोदाहृतम् । न चैतद् गुणानां पुरुषस्य च सम्भवति, विभुत्वात् । न स्वाभाविकः अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । यथाऽग्नेः स्वाभाविकादौष्ण्यान्मोक्षो न भवति एवमात्मनः स्वाभाविकत्वाद् गुणसंयोगादनिर्मोक्षप्रसंगः स्यात् । शक्तिनिमित्तश्च । किम् ? अनिमोक्षप्रसंगादेव, स न भवतीत्यनुवर्तते । स्वस्वामिशक्तिनिमित्ते हि संयोगे परिकल्प्यमाने शक्त्योः सततावस्थानादनिर्मोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत । योग्यतालक्षणः शक्तिमात्ररूपत्वादसंवेद्योऽतस्तदसिद्धिः । किंच प्रयोजनान्तरानुपपत्तेः । प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणं हि योग्यमित्युच्यते । तस्या एव तु प्रवृत्तेः पुरुषार्थमपोह्य निमित्तान्तरं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । आकस्मिकत्वे च नियमद्वैतानुपपत्तिः । तस्मादयुक्तं पुरुषस्य गुणानां च योग्यतालक्षणः सम्बन्धः । न यादृच्छिकः । मोक्षकारणनियमाऽनुपपत्तेः । संयोगकारणप्रतिद्वन्द्वं कैवल्यकारणम् । यदि च यादृच्छिको गुणपुरुषसंयोगः स्यात्तस्याऽज्ञानान्निवृत्तिर्नास्तीति तदर्थस्याभ्युत्थानस्याऽनर्थक्यं प्राप्तं विशेषानुपपत्तेश्च कारणान्तरं कल्पयितुम् । अत एतदप्ययुक्तमिति । न वैषयिकः, अनिमोक्षप्रसंगात् । सततमेव हि पुरुषस्य विषयित्वमव्यावृत्तं गुणानां च विषयत्वमित्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग एव स्यात् । एतावांश्च संयोगः परिकल्प्यमानः परिकल्प्येत । सर्वथा च नोपपद्यते । तस्मात्तत्संयोगादित्युक्तमभिधातुमिति ।

Opponent : That is wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of contact. The supposed contact of the conscious entity with the constituents may be postulated as caused by the activity of one of the relata as that of a eagle bird and the log; or it may be caused by the activity of both the relata as that of the two rams, or caused by the contact as that of the two fingers with the space, or natural as that of the fire and the warmth, or caused by the power as that of eye and the form, or in the form of the capability as that between the thumb (of the foot) and the shoe, or accidental as that of the hole and the one fallen in it, or that caused through the objectivity and the experiencer as that of the fish and the water. There is no possibility of the contact caused by the ac-



tivity of one and that caused by the activity of the two case of them.

Why ?

Because of their being all-pervasive. The contact is not observed (to take place) between two objects of limited magnitude unless they do not come together as exemplified above. This is, however, not possible in case of the conscious entity and the constituents because they are all-pervasive. Nor is this contact natural because in that case there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. As there is no dissociation of fire from the warmth which is natural, similarly, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation (dissociation) of soul from constituents because in this case the contact is natural. The contact caused by power also does not take place.

Why ?

*Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation.* 'That (contact) also does not take place' follows here also. If the contact is supposed to be caused by the power of being owned and the owner, there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation because the power will always be there. The contact in form of capability being identical with power only should not be considered (lit. is not worth considering here). Hence, it is not applicable (in the present case). Moreover, there will not be the possibility of some other purpose. The capable is one which is suitable (capable) for activity. When that (capability) is itself the cause of activity, some other cause of activity can be postulated setting aside the purpose of the conscious entity. But when the activity is accidental, there is no possibility of restriction of the two. Therefore, the contact of the conscious entity and the constituents in the form of capability does not hold good. There is no accidental contact also because the rule regarding the cause of liberation will not hold good. The cause of contact in opposite (in nature) to that of liberation. And, if the contact of the conscious entity and the constituents would be accidental, that would not be dispelled through knowledge and, hence, the efforts for its attainment will be useless and, there remains no possibility of some speciality to postulate some other reason. Therefore, it is also wrong. The contact is not caused by the subject-object relation also because it will also involve the undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. The nature of being a subject is never taken away from the conscious entity and, similarly, the nature of being an object from the constituents. In this way, there would be undesirable contingency of absence of liberation. If some contact is to be postulated, that can be



postulated in some above form, only. In no case, however, it is possible. Therefore, it is wrong to say 'through that contact'.

उच्यते—संयोगानित्यत्वादिह चौपचारिकपरिकल्पनाददोषः। इहाऽनेकविधः संयोगः। तद्यथा प्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः। यथोदाहृतं अन्यतरज उभयकर्मजः संयोग इत्यादि। यत्रासौ न संभवति तत्र सन्निधमात्रसामान्याद् भक्त्या कल्प्यते। तद्यथाऽऽकाशस्य गवादिभिः। प्रदेशैरिति चेन्न अभावात्। तेऽपि हि निरवयवत्वादाकाशस्य भक्त्या कल्प्यन्ते, मा-भूत्कृतकत्वाऽनित्यत्वदोषप्रसंगः। तस्मात्प्रदेशोपचारात्कार्यमप्युपचरितम्। अन्यस्तु शास्त्रीयः संयोगोऽर्थनिमित्तः। तत्रानेकसंयोगोपपत्तेरिह पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरभिन्नदेशत्वात्सन्निधमात्रसामान्याद् भाक्तं संयोगं परिकल्प्यैवमुच्यत इत्यदोषः ॥ २० ॥

Proponent : The defect does not arise because the contact in this case is non-eternal and because of the postulation of its metaphorical nature. The contact is of many kinds just as the contact through (i.e., caused by) association exemplified as the contact caused by the activity of one or of both. Wherever, this type of contact is not possible, there the contact is secondarily postulated just through the proximity in general as in the case of the contact of sky with cow, etc.<sup>6</sup> If it is argued that the contact of the cow, etc., is with the parts of sky, it is not right *because of the absence (of the parts in sky)*. Those parts are also metaphorically postulated in the sky which has (really) no part, so that there may not be undesirable contingency of the defect of its being caused and non-eternal.<sup>7</sup> Since the parts are metaphorically postulated, the effect is also metaphorical.

Other contact postulated in a particular sastra through some purpose. Since many types of contacts are possible there, here (in the present case) it is stated so after postulating the contact secondarily just through the proximity in general because the conscious entity and the internal organs are located at the same (non-different) place, hence no defect.

## KĀRIKĀ 20

1. The conscious entity is not different from consciousness; the statement of his association with consciousness should be understood as a way of saying, and hence, does not mean that the conscious entity is different from consciousness.
2. As a matter of fact the statement that the conscious entity knows or acts should be understood as these acts falsely appear as located in the conscious entity and are, thus, metaphorically spoken so.
3. The victory and defeat actually belong to the soldiers but are metaphorically attributed to the king because the result of victory and defeat is experienced by the king; similarly the agency and knowledge really belonging to the intellect are attributed to the conscious entity because the latter is the experiencer of their results.
4. The agency of knowledge in the conscious entity is metaphorical and not real. The knowledge is to attain the form of the object, the conscious entity does not attain the form of the object actually.
5. The argument is also employed by Gauḍapāda in his kārīkā to establish the non-attached and inactive nature of the soul.
6. The contact between sky and the cow is metaphorical in so far as it is not caused and is not prompted by some purpose.
7. In the theory of the Sāṃkhyas partite objects are non-eternal. Therefore, sky is not considered to be partite.



## KĀRIKĀ 21

(Purpose of the contact between cosmic matter  
and the conscious entity)

आह, विज्ञातं संयोगद्वयम् । अयं त्वन्योऽर्थनिमित्तः शास्त्रीयः संयोगो भवता परिभाष्यते । तत्र वक्तव्यं किमर्थोऽसाविति ?

Opponent : The two types of contact are understood. The present one is of second type defined by you as the contact known in the sastra as prompted by some purpose. Then, it should be stated as to for what is it meant hear.

(Perception of the conscious entity)

उच्यते

**पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः**

दृष्टिर्दर्शनम् । अर्थशब्दो निमित्तवचनः । दर्शनमर्थोऽस्यासौः दर्शनार्थः । दर्शनानिमित्तो दर्शनहेतुः दर्शनकारण इत्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—सन्निधानाऽविशेषे सति आत्मन आकाशादेश्च यस्माद् दृक्छक्तियुक्तः पुरुषः तस्मात्कार्यकारणतामापात्रेन प्रधानेन सह भोक्तृत्वेन संबध्यते, नाऽचैतन्यादाकाशादय इति । अथवा अर्थशब्दः फलवचनः । यथा तृप्तयर्था भुजिक्रिया तृप्त्यौ सत्यां निवर्तते प्राप्तयथा गमिक्रिया प्राप्तौ सत्याम्, एवं पुरुषस्य प्रधानेन दर्शनार्थः संयोगः दर्शने सति निवर्तते । तथा च वक्ष्यति दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरतैकेति (का. ६६) ।

Proponent : FOR THE PERCEPTION OF (THE COSMIC MATTER BY THE) PURUṢA.

Perception is the act of perceiving. The word 'purpose' is used in the sense of prompting (cause). The compound ('for the perception') means 'the prompting cause of which is the perception, i.e., caused by perception, having perception as the cause. This is meant here : even though the proximity (of cosmic matter) is common to both the soul and the sky, etc., yet since the conscious entity is endowed with the power of perceiving, he is related as an enjoyer to the cosmic matter which has attained the state of body, and not (so related with the cosmic matter) are the sky, etc., because they are



non-sentient.<sup>1</sup> Or, the word 'purpose' denotes the result. As the act of eating for getting satisfied comes to an end at the time of getting satisfaction, and as the act of going meant for reaching comes to an end after reaching that place, similarly, the contact of the conscious entity with the cosmic matter is meant for the perception and when the perception (of cosmic matter by the conscious entity) takes place, it comes to an end. The author will state so afterwards that one thinks that 'she is seen by me' and hence gets disinterested, and the other thinks that 'I am seen by him' and stops the activity (K. 66).

(Cosmic matter's purpose isolation of the conscious entity)

आह, एवमपि शब्दाद्युपलब्धिसमकालमेव निवृत्तिप्रसंगः । किं कारणम् ? तस्यामप्यवस्थायां शक्यं वक्तुं दृष्टा प्रकृतिरिति ।

Opponent : In this case also, there arises the undesirable contingency of conscious entity desisting from activities (of perception) at the time of knowing the word etc., only.

What is the reason ?

In that case also it can be stated that the cosmic matter has been perceived.

उच्यते यद्यप्येतदेवं तथापि यथा पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः संयोगः

**कैवल्यार्थस्तथा प्रधानस्य ।**

कैवल्यमिति विवेकपरिच्छिन्नं सत्त्वादिभिरसंसर्गधर्मित्वमात्मनः, सोऽर्थोऽस्य सोऽयं कैवल्यार्थः । सत्यपि हि दर्शनाविशेषे प्रधानं पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थं प्रवर्तते । यदाऽस्य बुद्धिस्तमसोऽङ्गित्वाद्ये गुणाः कार्यरूपापन्नाः शिरःपाण्यादय आध्यात्मिका, बाह्याश्च गवादयः, कारणरूपापन्नाश्चालोचनक्रियासंकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायलक्षणः, सोऽहमित्यविशिष्टप्रत्ययोपसंहारं करोति तदा प्रवर्तते एव । यदा त्वन्ये गुणाः प्रकृतिभूता विकारभूताः कार्यभूताः कारणभूता अचेतनाः परार्था अन्योऽहं न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिर्न कार्यं न कारणं नाचेतनः स्वार्थ इति भिन्नप्रत्ययोपसंहारं करोति तदा निवर्तते । सोऽयं पुरुषस्य दृक्छक्तिनिमित्तः प्रधानस्य च कैवल्यावधिपरिच्छिन्नः पुरुषार्थः ।

सत्यपि पारिभाषिकत्वे

**पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगः**

एतदुक्तं भवति । प्रागपि कार्यकारणसम्बन्धात्पुरुषे चैतन्यमवस्थितम् । तद्यथा अग्नेर्दहनं परशोच्छेदनमसति दाहो छेद्ये च न व्यज्यते । तत्सन्निधानसमकालमेव तु व्यज्यते ।



इत्यतः प्रधानमपेक्षते । तथा प्रधानप्यन्तरेण पुरुषोपकारं स्वकादसमर्थमनिष्पन्नकार्यसमं चेति-  
तमनर्थकं स्यादित्यतः पुरुषमपेक्षते । तत्र उभयोरितरेतरापेक्षा तं संयोगमधिकारबन्धमाहुरा-  
चार्याः । पङ्गवन्धदृष्टान्तस्तु नान्तरीयकमात्रं 'प्रदर्शनार्थम् । यथा पङ्गुर्नान्तरेणान्धं दृक्छक्तया  
विशिष्टेनार्थेनार्थवान्भवति अन्धश्च नान्तरेण पङ्गुं विशिष्टेनार्थेन, एवं प्रधानं नान्तरेण पुरुषं  
कृतमपि कार्यं द्रष्टुं शक्तमनवधिकं च प्रवर्तमानं विशेषाभावाच्चैव निवर्तते । तथा पुरुषः  
सत्यपि चेतनत्वे नान्तरेण प्रधानमुपलब्ध्याभावादुपलब्ध्या भवेदिति प्रधानमपेक्षते । तस्मादित-  
रेतरापेक्षया संयोगत्वे कल्प्यमाने यदुक्तं

विना सर्गेण बन्धो हि पुरुषस्य न युज्यते ।

सर्गस्तस्यैव मोक्षार्थमहो सांख्यस्य सूक्तता ॥

इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्यसौ विना सर्गेण न युज्यत इति । आह च

दृश्यदर्शनभावेन प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।

अपेक्षा शास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैर्बन्ध इत्यभिधीयते ॥

एवं विनापि सर्गेण यस्माद्बद्धः पुमान्गुणैः ।

तस्माद्विफलतां यातु मनोरथमनोरथः ॥

इति सिद्धः संयोगः ।

Proponent : Though it is like this, yet as there is the contact for  
the perception of the conscious entity :

#### AND FOR COSMIC MATTER'S PURPOSE OF ISOLATION (OF THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY)

Isolation is the detachment through discriminative knowledge, a state of soul having no contact with the sattva, etc.; one whose purpose is this, is the one having the purpose of liberation. Even though the perception is common, the cosmic matter proceeds to activity for the liberation of the conscious entity. When the intellect of the conscious entity possessing tamas entertains the idea of non-separation as the constituents which have attained the form of the effect like the bodily objects like head, feet, etc., and external objects like cow, and also those which have attained the form of the cause like the act of reflection, determination, 'I' notion are 'I' only, the cosmic matter does proceed for the act. And when the conscious entity entertains the idea of separation that the constituents which are the cosmic matter, modifications, effects and cause are non-sentient, meant for others are different and 'I' who is not a source, modification, effect,



cause, non-conscious, and is meant for his own self, am different, then the cosmic matter desists from activities. Thus, the purpose of the conscious entity is caused by his power of seeing and continues in case of the cosmic matter upto the time of isolation.

Though it is in the technical sense :

### THE CONTACT OF THE TWO IS LIKE THAT OF THE LAME AND THE BLIND.

This is meant here. The consciousness exists in the conscious entity even earlier to his relation with the body. Just as the power of burning in fire and the cutting in an axe is not manifest in the absence of something to be burnt and cut, it (i.e. consciousness) is manifested only at the time of the contact with that (body); therefore, the cosmic matter is needed. Similarly, the cosmic matter also incapable of doing anything by itself and as if not having performed its activity will be useless without the favour to the conscious entity and, hence, needs the conscious entity. The authorities call this contact in the form of mutual expectancy as potential bondage. The example of blind and the lame is only to show that the one cannot function without the other.<sup>2</sup> Just as the lame with the power of seeing does not attain any particular purpose without the blind and the blind also without the lame (does not attain) any particular purpose, the cosmic matter also without the conscious entity is not capable of showing the effect produced and does not desist from its activities for indefinite period without particular reason (for desisting).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the conscious entity also inspite of its being conscious would not be the subject in the absence of the object without the cosmic matter and, hence, stands in need of the cosmic matter. Hence, when the contact is postulated in form of mutual expectancy, the following statement comes to be wrong :

“The bondage of the conscious entity is not justified without creation and the creation is for the purpose of his liberation only. Oh! what a fine statement by the Samkhya.

Why ?

Because it is not that it is not justified without the creation. It is stated also :

“ The (mutual) expectancy of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity in the form of the object of perception and the subject of perception is said to be the bondage by the knower of the scrip-



tures. In the way, the desire of Manoratha is foiled because the conscious entity is bound by the constituents even without creation.

Thus is proved the contact.

### THE CREATION IS CAUSED BY THAT (CONTACT).

The creation of the elements like intellect, etc., the creation of the mental modes like virtue, etc., and the creation of the physical beings like Brahma etc. proceed as it is caused by the mutual expectancy of the cosmic matter and conscious entity in form of the enjoyer and the enjoyed. That expectancy is not fulfilled due to the infinite number of the conscious entities and, hence, there is no desisting from activity in case of the cosmic matters which are still purposeful, without fulfilling that (expectancy).

Here ends the fifth discourse and the second chapter of the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.

## KĀRIKĀ 21

The contact is caused by conscious entity's perceiving the cosmic matter. Perceiving stands for enjoyment. Since the conscious entity has such a power, it is related to the cosmic matter. The other things like sky though all-pervasive are not related to the cosmic matter as the enjoyer because being non-sentient, they have no capacity to enjoy.

2. The term *mātra* (only) suggests that the analogy should not be stretched too much as the critics of Sāṃkhya like Sāṃkara have done.
3. Though the cosmic matter is active by its very nature and proceeds to activity itself, yet the purpose is postulated to put a check on the activity.
4. The meaning is that in fact bondage is the mutual expectancy and it may exist with or without creation. The conscious entity is in bondage as long as he needs the cosmic matter, and the cosmic matter is in bondage as long as it needs the conscious entity. Such a mutual expectancy prompts creation and is satisfied by creation itself. Without such an expectancy the conscious entity is not bound even he may be present with the constituents. Therefore, the statement of Manoratha that the conscious entity is bound by the very presence of the constituents is falsified. As regards the identity of Manoratha R. C. Pandey (p. 90) thinks that he may be identified with Manorathanandin a Buddhist ācārya.



## KARIKA 22

(Evolution of the universe)

(Different views of the authorities)

एवं कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात्प्रकृतेः पुरुषार्थोऽयं व्यक्तभावेन विपरिणाम इति स्थितम् । तत्रेदानीं विप्रतिपत्तिराचार्याणाम् । केचिदाहुः प्रधानादिनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरमुत्पद्यते । ततो महानिति । पतञ्जलिपञ्चाधिकरणवार्षगणानां तु प्रधानान्महानुत्पद्यत इति । तदन्येषां पुराणेतिहासप्रणेतृणां महतोऽहङ्कारो विद्यत इति पक्षः— महतोऽस्मिप्रत्ययकर्तृत्वाऽभ्युपगमात् । अहंकारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणीति सर्वे । महतः षड्विशेषाः सृज्यन्ते पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति विन्ध्यवासिमतम् । तथा अहंकारादिन्द्रियाणीति सर्वे । भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति पञ्चाधिकरणमतम् । एकरूपाणि तन्मात्राणीत्यन्ये । एकोत्तराणीति वार्षगण्यः । इन्द्रियाणि संस्कारविशेषयोगात्परिगृहीतरूपाणीति केचित् । परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणानीत्यपरे । विभूनीति विन्ध्यवासिमतम् । अधिकरणमपि केचित्त्रयोदशविधमाहुः । एकादशकमिति विन्ध्येवासी । तथाऽन्येषां महति सर्वार्थोपलब्धिः, मनसि विन्ध्यवासिनः । संकल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायनानात्वमन्येषाम्, एकत्वं विन्ध्यवासिनः । तथा करणं निर्लिखितस्वरूपं शून्यग्रामनदीकल्पम्, प्राकृतवैकृतिकानि तु ज्ञानानि प्रेरकाङ्गसंगृहीतानि प्रधानादागच्छन्ति । चेति पञ्चाधिकरणः न तु तथेत्यन्ये । कारणानां महती स्वाभावातिवृत्तिः प्रधानात्, स्वल्पा च स्वत इति वार्षगण्यः । सर्वा स्वत इति पञ्जालिः । सर्वा परत इति पञ्चाधिकरणः । बुद्धिः क्षणिकेति च कालान्तरावस्थायिनीत्यपरे । एवमनेकनिश्चयेष्वाचार्येषु ये तावत्प्रधानमहतोरन्तराले तत्त्वान्तरमिच्छन्ति तत्प्रतिक्षेपायाचार्यः स्वमतमुपन्यस्यति ।

Thus, on account of the negation of some other cause it is established that the modification of cosmic matter in manifest objects is meant for the conscious entity. In this regard there is the difference of opinion amongst the authorities. Some say that some other element of undefinable form arises from the cosmic matter, and then the intellect out of that. According to patanjali, pancadhikarana and varsagana, the intellect comes out of the cosmic matter. The theory of some other authors of the puranas and itihasa is that the I-notion belongs to intellect because theory accept the agency of I-notion in the intellect.<sup>1</sup> All the authorities believe that the subtle elements come out of the I-principle. The view of vindhyavasin is that the six non-specific objects, viz., the five subtle elements and the I-principle are created out of intellect. Similarly, all the authorities hold that the



organs come out of the I-principle. The view of Pancadhikarana is that the organs are elemental in nature (i.e. are produced from the elements).<sup>2</sup> The other authorities hold that the subtle elements are of one form. According to Varsaganya, they are of more than one form. Some Authorities hold the senses have assumed the form due to the particular type of past impressions. The others believe that they (the senses) are of limited magnitude. The view of Vindhyavasin is that they are all-pervasive. Some authorities say that their locations are also thirteen. According to Vindhyavasin they are eleven. According to other authorities the knowledge (or experience) of all the objects is in intellect but according to Vindhyavasin, it is in the mind. According to the other authorities discernment, ego-sense and determination are different but according to Vindhyavasin they form a single act (belonging to single organ).<sup>3</sup> According to Pancadhikarana the organs are like the deserted village and dry rivers and the innate or acquired knowledge which is collected together as (or in) the limbs of the instigator comes from the cosmic matter. The others hold that it is not so. Much surpassing their nature in case of the organs is from cosmic matter, according to Varsaganya, the less and comes from within themselves.<sup>4</sup> According to Patanjali it is from within. According to Pancadhikarana it is with an influx from outside. Some hold that the intellect is momentary while the others hold that it exists for some more time. Thus, amongst the authorities having many decided views the present authority puts forth his own view to refute the view of those who intend some other element between cosmic matter and intellect.

(Process of evolution)

**प्रकृतेर्महान्**

प्रकृतेर्महानुत्पद्यते । महान्बुद्धिर्मतिर्ब्रह्मापूर्तिः ख्यातिरीश्वरो विखर इति पर्यायाः । स तु देशमहत्त्वात्कालमहत्त्वाच्च महान् । सर्वोत्पाद्येभ्यो महापरिमाणयुक्तत्वान्महान् । अन्यस्य तु पक्षे नैवाहंकारो विद्यत इति प्रतिषेधविवक्षयेदमाह

**ततोऽहङ्कारः**

तस्मान्महतोऽहंकार उत्पद्यते ।

यः पुनराह, महतः षडविशेषाः सृज्यन्ते पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति तन्निरासार्थमाह

तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादहंकारात्षोडशको गण उत्पद्यते, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि च । अनेनैव च भौतिकेन्द्रियवादी प्रतिक्षिप्तो बोद्धव्यः



**तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूताति ॥ २२ ॥**

तस्मादपि षोडशकाद् गणाद्यः पञ्चको गणस्ततः पञ्च महाभूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते । पूर्वपदलोपे-  
नात्र महाभूतानीति वक्तव्ये भूतानीत्युच्यते । भूतसंज्ञा हि तन्मात्राणां न पृथिव्यादीनामत्र तु  
सांख्याचार्याणामविप्रतिपत्तिः भूतकौटस्थ्यवादिनस्तु मीमांसका आर्हताश्च । तत्रतिक्षेपेणेद-  
मुच्यत इति ॥ २२ ॥

### **INTELLECT COMES OUT OF THE COSMIC MATTER.**

The intellect is born from the cosmic matter. Mahat, Buddhi, Mati, Brahmā, Apurīti, Khyati, Isvara, Vikhara, etc., are synonyms. That is great due to the greatness of space and that of time (occupied by it). It is also great because it has more magnitue than all the other evolutes.

In the theory of others, egoism does not exist. With an intention to refute the view, the present authority states:

### **FROM THAT ISSUES THE EGOISM.**

From that cosmic intellect is born the cosmic I-principle. To refute the view that from the intellect is born the six non-specific objects—the five subtle elements and the egoism, the present authority states:

### **FROM THAT COMES OUT THE SET OF SIXTEEN .**

From that egoism is born the set of sixteen—five subtle elements and eleven organs. From this only the one who holds the elemental nature of the senses should be understood as refuted.

### **FROM FIVE OF THAT SET OF SIXTEEN COME OUT FIVE GROSS ELEMENTS**

Out of that set of sixteen, from the set of five are born the five gross elements. When the first part of the compound is dropped, instead of saying the gross elements they are called the elements. There is no difference of opinion among the authorities of Samkhya that the subtle elements are technically termed as 'bhuta' and not the (gross elements) earth, etc. The Mimamsakas and the Jainas hold the theory of eternity of the elements. Refuting that, it is stated like this.<sup>5</sup>

## KĀRIKĀ 22

1. In their opinion egoism is not different entity from the intellect. And the first evolute is the combined form of intellect and egoism.
2. The view is near to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
3. This is again due to the fact that the internal organ is one.
4. Surpassing the natural power may refer to the extra-ordinary power of the senses observed in our daily life.
5. Since the elements are product, they are destructible and consequently non-eternal.



## KARIKA 23

(Nature of intellect)

आह, उक्तं प्रधानाद् बुद्धिरुत्पद्यत इति । तत्र वक्तव्यं किलक्षणा पुनर्बुद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : You have stated that the intellect is born from the cosmic matter. Here, it should be stated as to of what nature the intellect is.

उच्यते

**अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः**

कोऽयमध्यवसायः ? गौरैवायं, पुरुष एवायमिति यः प्रत्ययो निश्चयोऽर्थग्रहणं सोऽध्यवसायः ।

Proponent : THE INTELLECT IS DETERMINATION.

What is determination?

The determined knowledge of an object as 'this is the cow only' or 'This is the man only' is the determination.

(Momentariness of the intellect)

अत्र क्षणिकवाद्याह यद्यर्थग्रहणं बुद्धिः, अनित्या । कस्मात् ? हेत्वपेक्षणात् । अर्थग्रहणं हीन्द्रियादिविषयसन्निधानमावरणाद्यभावं चापेक्षते । न च नित्यस्य कारणापेक्षोपपद्यते । तस्मादनित्या बुद्धिः । अभिव्यक्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यादेतत्लेन्द्रियसन्निधानादिभिरर्थग्रहणं जन्यते किं तर्ह्यभिव्यज्यत इति । तच्च नैवम् । द्विधा दोषात् । साह्यभिव्यक्तिः स्वरूपलाभो वा स्यात् ग्रहणप्रतिबन्धव्युदासो वा । किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावत्स्वरूपलाभः क्रियतेऽर्थग्रहणमिति प्राप्तम् । अर्थग्रहणप्रतिबन्धस्यान्धकारस्य व्युदासस्तदप्ययुक्तम् । विप्रतिषेधात् । ग्रहणं च स्यात्तत्प्रतिबन्धश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । किंच भेदात् । व्यङ्गायं हि घटादि चन्द्राकौषधिमणिरत्नप्रदीपभेदान्न भिद्यते । अस्ति बुद्धीनामर्थभेदाद् भेदः । वृत्तिभेदाददोषो मृद्वदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा मृद्द्रव्यस्य घटादिसंस्थानवृत्तिभेदेऽप्यभेद एवं बुद्धेरिति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । अनन्यत्वात् । यदा बुद्धिरनन्या वृत्तिभ्यः, प्राप्तस्तद्भेदे बुद्धिभेदः । किंच दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः । साध्यं चैतत् किं तदेव मृद्द्रव्यं घटादिवृत्तिभेदमनुभवति आहोस्वित्यत्यान्तरवशादन्यच्चान्यच्चोत्पद्यते इति ? अवयवभेदाच्च । उपेत्य वाऽनुवृत्तिं ब्रूमः — न हि तदेकं मृद्द्रव्यम्, किं तर्हि बहवो मृत्परमाणवोऽनेकदेशावच्छिन्नवृत्तय इति । किं चान्यत् । निवृत्तिविभक्तिग्रहणात् ।

तद्धि मृदद्रव्यं संस्थानमपेक्ष्यापि गृह्यते, न त्वर्थग्रहणमनपेक्ष्य बुद्धेर्ग्रहणमस्ति । तस्माद्विषयो दृष्टान्तः । परिणामाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमात्तेन तेनार्थग्रहणात्मना विपरिणामो वृत्तिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । उभयकल्पने दोषप्रसंगात् । यदि धर्मान्तरोपादानपरित्यागौ व्यक्तव्यक्ती, दत्तौत्तर एष पक्षः । अथ नाशोत्पादौ तेन धर्मधर्मिणोरनन्यत्वादधर्माणां नाशोत्पादाद् बुद्धेरपि नाशोत्पादप्रसंगः । तदनभ्युपगमे वाऽन्यत्वमिति दोषः । आह च

नष्टोत्पन्नमनन्यत्वादन्त्यं नित्यमेव वा ।

नष्टोत्पन्नाऽविनष्टानां नित्यं तो नास्ति चैकदा ॥

यदप्युक्तम् — सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमादिति, तदयुक्तम् । अतएवानित्यत्वसिद्धेः । तुल्यानां गुणप्रधानभावाऽनुपपत्तेः । सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावाऽभ्युपगमात् वृद्धिक्षयावभ्युपगन्तव्यौ । ततश्च बुद्धिरनित्येति प्राप्तम् । तेभ्योऽनन्यत्वात् । अथ मतं तदवस्थाप्यसौ नित्येति, न तर्हि सत्त्वद्यात्मभूता बुद्धिरिति प्राप्तम् । ततश्च कार्यकारणयोरविवेक इत्यस्य विरोधः । तस्मादनित्या बुद्धिरिति ।

Opponent : Here the upholders of the theory of momentariness object if the intellect is the knowledge of an object, it is non-eternal.

Why ?

Because it requires a cause. The knowledge of an object requires the proximity of the senses, etc., with the object and absence of cover, etc., (over the object). The expectancy of the cause, etc., is not justified (possible) in the case of an eternal object. Therefore, the intellect is non-eternal.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the manifestation ? It may be like this. The knowledge of the object is not produced by the proximity of the senses. On the contrary, it is manifested (only) *This is also not so, because it involves twofold defect.* That manifestation may be either the attainment of its essential form or removal of obstruction in knowledge.<sup>1</sup> What difference does it make? If it is considered to be the attainment of the essential form, it comes to mean that the knowledge of the object is produced. If you consider it to be the removal of the darkness which obstructs the knowledge of the object, that will also be wrong, because it involves contradiction. It is contradictory to say that it is knowledge and has an obstruction at a time. *Moreover, because of the difference.* The revealed object, viz., a pot does not change due to the difference of moon, sun, medicinal herbs, a gem, a pearl or a lamp. However, there is the difference in knowledge due to the difference of object.



If it is argued that the defect does not arise because the difference is caused by the function ? It may be like this. Just as the earth does not change even when there is the change in its modifications in the form of the arrangement like a pot, there may be no change in the intellect also. That is also wrong, *because of their being identical*.<sup>2</sup> When the intellect is identical with the modifications the difference in modification comes to be the difference in that also.<sup>3</sup> *Moreover, the example is not established.* It is still to be proved as to whether the same earth undergoes the difference of modifications like pot, etc., or it is produced a fresh in case of each modification, because the knowledge arises as different. *Moreover, because of the difference of the components.* Or granting the continuity, we say that the earth is not one. On the contrary they are earth-atoms occupying many spaces. *Moreover, because of the knowledge without the help and with the help.* That earth substance is known with the help of particular arrangement also, but there is no knowledge of the intellect without the help of the knowledge of the objects.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the example is dissimilar.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the modification? It may be like this. Because of the rule of relationship of being principal and subordinate in case of Sattva, etc., the modification in the form of the knowledge of the object (in the form of those various states) is called the modification. This is also wrong. There arises the defect in both types of the postulations. If the manifest and the unmanifest (forms) are the acquisition and the giving up of the other attributes respectively, theory has already been refuted. If they mean the destruction and origination (of the other attributes), since the attribute and its locus are one, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the destruction and origination of the intellect with the destruction and the origination of attributes. Or, If it (the identity) is not accepted, there would be the defect of their being different. It is stated also: (The object) being identical with the one destroyed and produced will be either non-eternal or eternal. And in our theory there is eternity of the objects destroyed and produced as also not destroyed at a time.<sup>5</sup>

Your statement that 'on account of the rule of relationship of subordinate and principal in respect of sattva, etc.', is also wrong, *because the non-eternity is proved consequently.* Because there is no possibility of the relationship of principal and subordinate in the case of those which are equal. Through the acceptance of the state of subordinate and principal, the increase and decrease should be ac-



cepted in the sattva, etc. Through this, the intellect comes to be non-eternal because it is not different from them.<sup>6</sup> If you hold that the intellect situated in that state also is eternal, it comes to mean that the intellect is not of the form of sattva, etc. Then will be the contradiction with the theory of non-distinction between the effect and the cause. Therefore, the intellect is non-eternal.

उच्यते—यतावदुक्तं हेत्वपेक्षणादनित्या बुद्धिरिति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सिद्धसाधनात् । कस्याऽत्र विप्रतिपत्तिरनित्या वा बुद्धिः स्यान्नित्या वेति ? किं तर्हि हेतुमदनित्यं व्यक्तमिति वचनादनित्यैव । तस्मादिष्टमेवैतत्सङ्गृहीतम् । अतएव क्षणिकत्वमिति चेत्, अथापि स्याद्धेतुपेक्षा हि संस्कृतत्वम् । संस्कृतं च क्षणिकम् । तद्यथा प्रदीप इति । तस्मादनित्ये सत्येपि विशेषाऽनभिधाने क्षणिकत्वमेवानेन हेतुना बुद्धेः प्रतिपाद्यत इति । कस्मात् ? उत्तरवचनविरोधप्रसंगात् । एवमपि यदुत्तरं क्षणिकत्वप्रसिद्धयर्थमुच्यते प्रत्यर्थग्रहणाऽन्यत्वादनित्येत्यादि तस्यानर्थक्यम् । तस्मात् पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धत्वात्सकलमेवेदं प्रकरणं नाध्ययनं, न प्रत्याख्यानमर्हति । परेषां त्वभिनिष्ठा बुद्धिरत्रेत्यसंगतार्थोत्तरापवाददोषमनपेक्ष्यापि प्रत्येकमप्येतदसाधनम्, वृत्तिविषयत्वात् । स्वकारणपरिनिष्पन्नाया हि बुद्धेर्यापारोऽर्थग्रहणसंज्ञक इन्द्रियादिसन्निधानापेक्षो न बुद्धिः । तदनन्यत्वात्संगनिवृत्तिरिति चेदथमतम्, वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरनन्यत्वादित्यमपि कल्पयित्वाऽयं प्रसंगो न निवर्तते । तथा चोक्तम्—स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्वयस्येति (का. २९) । तदप्यबाधकम् । कस्मात् ? उपचारात् । सत्यमनन्या, वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोर्भेदेनाऽग्रहणात्, तथाप्युपरतव्यापारस्यापि परश्वादेवृत्तिमतः स्वरूप नोपरमतीति भेदमुपचर्य व्यवहारो नानाकार्यविषयः प्रवर्तते । अतएवाऽन्यत्व प्रसंग इति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यतो वृत्त्युपरमे वृत्तिमतोऽनुपरमः कार्यनानात्वं च अतएवाऽन्यत्वमपि स्यादिति तदयुक्तम्, एकान्तात् । तद्यथा सेनापङ्क्तिसेनाकुण्डलाद्युपरमे न तत्सन्निवेशिनामुपरमः कार्यभेदश्च, न चाऽन्यत्वम् । एवं वृत्तितद्गतोरपि च स्यात् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतद्धेतुपेक्षणस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वात् बुद्धेरनित्यत्वमिति । एतेन व्यक्तिविकल्पः प्रत्युक्तः, सोऽपि वृत्तिविषय इति कृत्वा तदप्युक्तमिन्द्रियादिभेदे भेदादिति । तदप्यनेनैवोक्तम् । वृत्तिभेदोऽत्र न भेद इति । किं चानेकान्तात् । यथोदकादिभेदात्प्रतिबिम्बभेदो न चाऽव्यङ्ग्यत्वमेवमन्यत्रापि स्यात् । द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम्, उदकस्याननसंयोगाद् द्रव्यान्तरमेव प्रतिबिम्बलक्षणमुत्पद्यते न तु मुखं भिद्यते इति असदेतत् । कस्मात् ? उभयोः कारणत्वेन कल्पनाऽनुपपत्तेः । न हि मुखं निमित्तं शक्यं वक्तुम्, विप्रकृष्टत्वान्नासादयो मुखापगमेऽप्युपलब्धिप्रसंगात्पाकजवत् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं वृत्तिभेदाददोषो मुद्वतिदि तथा तदस्तु । यत्तूक्तमनन्यत्वाद् दृष्टान्ताऽसिद्धेश्चेति वृत्त्यनन्यत्वमिदानीमेव प्रत्युक्तम् । क्षणभङ्गप्रतिषेधे चोक्तं न पृथिव्यादीनामन्यथा चान्यथा चोत्पत्तिः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं नैकं मृदद्रव्यमिति तत्र बुद्धिः प्रमाणम् । यदेकबुद्धिनिमित्तं तदेकं, तत्र यदि मृदोऽनेकत्वेन प्रयोजनं बुद्धिरुपलभ्यते—वयमिति । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्, मृदद्रव्यस्य संस्थानव्यतिरेकेण स्वभावोऽवधार्यते न तु बुद्धेरर्थग्रहणमन्तरेण स्वरूपग्रहणमिति, तदयुक्तम् । अभावस्याऽरूपत्वात् । उपेत्य वा



यथा बाह्यादयवस्थासु व्याकारा चित्तसन्ततिः ।

विद्यते बीजमात्रा वस्तथा धीरिति गृह्यताम् ॥

यथा बाह्यार्थाकारवच्चित्तसन्ततिरथ च सुप्तमूर्छितविरोधसमापन्नानामर्थरूपादुते बीजमात्राऽस्तीत्युपगम्यते सा चिति कापि बाऽवस्थेति वचनात्, न च गृह्यते तथा बुद्धिरपीति कस्मात् परिकल्प्यते ? यत्सुनरेतदुक्तम् यदि धर्मोन्तरोपादानपरित्यागौ व्यक्तव्यक्ती दत्तोत्तर एष पक्ष इति । तदितरत्र तुल्यम् । अस्माभिरपि तर्ह्यसत्कार्यप्रत्याख्याने दत्तोत्तर एष पक्षो व्यक्तितर्न क्रियते इति । नाशोत्पादौ तु अनिष्टावेवेति न परिहारं प्रत्यादरः क्रियते । यदप्युक्तं नष्टादुत्पन्नाच्चाऽनष्टमनुत्पन्नं चान्यत्रास्तीति तदयुक्तम्, अनभ्युपगमात् । नाशोत्पादौ कः प्रतिजानीते यं प्रत्येतदर्थवत्स्यात्, किं च त्वत्पक्षप्राप्तेः । भवत एव नष्टोत्पन्नेभ्यः स्कन्धेभ्यो नान्या सन्ततिरथ च नास्ति दोषः । कयाऽपि युक्तया स्यादेतदन्यैवासाविति ततश्चैका सन्ततिरिति हीनम् । यदप्युक्तं गुणवृद्धिक्षयेऽनित्यत्वमिति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? रूपान्तराप्यायनात् । सत्त्वं हि प्रकर्षमनुभवद्रजस्तमसी च न्यूनतां धर्मादिरूपां बुद्धेराप्याययन्ति, नार्थान्तरं कुर्वन्ति नो खल्वप्यभावम्, एवं रजस्तमो वा प्रकर्षमनुभवत्सत्त्वं च न्यूनताधर्मादिरूपां बुद्धेराप्याययन्ति, नार्थान्तरं कुर्वन्ति नाभावम् । एवं गुणवृद्धिक्षयेऽपि रूपान्तराप्यायनान्नास्ति क्षयो बुद्धेः । तत्र यदुक्तं हेत्वपेक्षणादनित्या बुद्धिरिति एतदयुक्तम् । यत्सुनरेतदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षग्रहणान्यत्वात्प्रतिक्षणं दीपादितैलधारासु शब्दभेदाच्च क्षणिकेति, अत्र ब्रूमः—ग्रहणान्यत्वे चोक्तं वृत्तिभेदो न वृत्तिमद्भेदः । किं चान्यत् । भिन्नार्थग्रहणैकत्वात् । उपेत्य वा ब्रूमः—यदि प्रत्यर्थमन्यदन्यद् ग्रहणं कल्प्यते, विकल्पबाधसमुच्चयसंशयद्वित्वातिशयनिवारणेषु, तथा कल्माषं शबलं चित्रमित्यनेकार्थरूपमेकं ग्रहणं न स्यात् । दृष्टं तत् । तस्मान्नाऽयं क्षणकत्वे हेतुः । एवमवस्थितमिदं—अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्न च क्षणिकेति ।

Proponent : Your statement that the intellect is non-eternal because it requires a cause, is wrong.

Why ?

Because it proves the thesis already established. Whose difference of opinion is there as to whether the intellect is non-eternal or eternal? On the contrary, it is non-eternal on account of the statement that the manifest caused and non-eternal (Ka. 10). Therefore, you have stated which is acceptable also to us.

If you argue that it is momentary on account of the very reason (of the fact of being non-eternal)? It may be like this . The created is one which requires a cause. And, whatever is created, is momentary just as the lamp. Therefore, though it is non-eternal, yet in the absence of a specific statement the momentariness is established through this reason.

Why ?



There will arise the undesirable contingency of the contradiction with the latter statement. Even in this way there will be the meaninglessness of the reason adduced to establish the momentariness, viz., since the knowledge of every object is different, it (the intellect) is non-eternal.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, due to its involving contradiction earlier and later, the whole section deserves neither to be studied nor to be refuted. Each of the argument in the theory of the existence of the intellect does not prove (the momentariness of the intellect even after ignoring the defect of irrelevance of the matter and removal of further arguments, because it is relating to the modifications. The function of the intellect (viz., the knowledge of the objects) requires the proximity of the senses and not the intellect.

If you argue that the undesirable contingency is not alleviated because of the theory of non-difference of that (function)? It may be like this. Even postulating like this the undesirable contingency is not alleviated because of your theory of non-difference between the function and the agent. It is stated also 'this is the individual function of the three' (k. 29). This also does not obstruct.

Why?

*Because of the metaphorical expression.* It is true that the function is non-different from the agent because the two are not cognised separately, but still, the practice regarding various activities goes on after attributing the difference just as the real nature of the axe which is an instrument is not destroyed when its activities are over. If it is argued that with a consequence of this there arises the undesirable contingency of their difference? It may be like this. Since there is no destruction of the agent when the functions are over and there is the multiplicity of the activities (performed by the same agent), there may be the difference between the two. That is also wrong, because it is not conclusive. Just as there is no destruction of the objects involved (viz., army) when the queue or the circle of the army is destroyed, there is the difference in activity also, and there is no difference (between the two).<sup>8</sup> The same may be the case between the function and the functioning agent. Therefore, it is right that since the object which requires a cause is applicable to the function, there is no non-eternity of the intellect. Through this only is replied the alternatives regarding individuals. That is also applicable to the function only and, hence, it is also said that it differs due to the difference of the senses, etc. This is also refuted through this only; the difference relates to the functions and there is no difference in it. Moreover, because of its being non-conclusive. Just as the reflection



differs due to the difference of water etc., and it is not that there is no reflectable object, similar may be the case at other places also.

If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of the production of other fresh object ? It may be like this. There is the production of the other fresh object in the form of the reflection, but the face does not differ. It is wrong, because there is no justification of the postulation of both as the cause. The face cannot be said to be a cause because since nose, etc., dominate, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the knowledge of face even when the face is removed away from the mirror as is the case with the atoms produced from warming. The statement that the defect does not arise due to the difference of the function as is the case with the clay may be accepted as it is the statement that the function is non-different because they are not differently cognised and the example is not yet established is refuted just now. It is stated while refuting the momentariness also that the earth, etc., are not born a fresh every moment. As regards the statement that the substance, viz., the earth is not one, the knowledge serves as the proof there. That which causes a single knowledge is single ..... The statement that the nature of the earth is determined without its different arrangement but the nature of the intellect is not known without the knowledge of the object, is wrong because there is no definite form of the negation.

You have stated as :

“As the continuous flow of thought when not transformed into the external situations exists in the form of seed only in your theory, similarly, should be known the intellect .”

Even granting this statement (we have to state as follows). Just as it is admitted that the continuous flow of thought which is possessed of (or is like) the external object exists in the form of the seed without the form of the object in the case of them who have attained the state of sleep, infatuation or contradiction (i.e., when some contradictory knowledge arises in them) because you have stated that that also is some form in the consciousness. And, that (form) is not known. How is the same case not postulated with the intellect ? As regards your statement ‘if the states of manifestation and non-manifestation refer to acquirement or giving up of the qualities’, the view is already replied to ; (we say) that is common at other place also (i.e., in our theory also). The theory is replied by us in the context of refuting the theory of prior non-existence of the effect, that the manifestation is not produced. The destruction and production



are not desired by us also and there is required no effort to alleviate the objection. Your statement that the non-destroyed and non-produced is not different from destroyed and produced, is wrong because it is not accepted by us. Who admits destruction and origination to him it would be meaningful. Moreover, because it is applicable to your theory. In your theory only the continuous flow of thought is not different from the created object but still there is no fault (admitted by you). If by any argument it is proved that this is different from that, then the theory that there is only one continuous flow, will be abandoned. Your statement that it is non-eternal due to the increase and decrease in the constituents, is wrong.

Why ?

Because they get some other form. When Sattva dominates and the Rajas and the Tamas become less, they attain, the form of the intellect which is of the nature of virtue, etc. Neither do they create some other object nor do they come to an end. Similarly, when the Rajas and Tamas become dominant and the Sattva as dominated, they attain vice as form of the intellect; neither they create something fresh nor do they destroy it. In this way, since there is the attainment of another form, there is no destruction of the intellect even when the constituents are decreased or increased. The statement that intellect is non-eternal as it requires a cause, is also wrong. To the statement that intellect is non-eternal because in the case of the lamp and continuous line of oil, the difference at every moment is directly perceived and because the word differs (in each case), we reply we have already stated that in case knowledge differs, it is the difference in function and not in the agent. Moreover, because of the non-difference while knowing many objects. Even accepting it, we state if the knowledge is postulated to be different in respect of every object, there would not be a single knowledge having many things as object in case of alternative, condition, contradiction, collection (of many objects of knowledge) doubt, two-ness, excellence and negation, as in the case that the deer is spotted and having variegated colours This is, however, perceived. Therefore, this is not a reason to prove momentariness. In this way, it is settled that the intellect is determination and it is not momentary.

बुद्धेस्तु त्रिगुणात्मकत्वात्तस्य तस्य गुणस्य प्रकर्षे तत्तद्रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इति ।

Since the intellect is composed of three constituents, particular form with the dominance of particular constituents is produced (in it).



(Form of Intellect with the dominance of sattva)

आह, कस्य गुणस्य प्रकर्षे बुद्धेः किं लक्षणं रूपान्तरमुपजायते ?

Opponent : With the dominance of which constituent what kind of form of intellect is produced?

इत्युच्यते

धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।

सात्त्विकमेतद् रूपम्

अत्र त्वेतद्रूपमिति सत्यपि धर्मादिभेदे बुद्धिरित्यभेदविवक्षाविषय एकवचननिर्देशः क्रियते । एतदुक्तं भवित यदा रजस्तमसी वशमापाद्य बुद्धिगतं सत्त्वमुत्कृष्टं भवति तदा धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यमित्येतद्रूपं भवति । तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितानां कर्मणामनुष्ठानाद् बुद्धयवस्थः सत्त्वावयव आशयभूतो धर्म इत्युच्यते । स तु द्विविधः । ब्रह्मादिस्थानेष्वभिप्रेतशरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपभोगनिर्वर्तको ज्ञानाद्यङ्गभूतश्च प्रथमः । अग्निहोत्रहवनादिक्रियानुष्ठानसाधनो यमनियमसाधन इतरः । तत्राऽहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयमकल्कता ब्रह्माचर्यमिति पञ्च यमाः । अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवमप्रमाद इति पञ्च नियमाः । एतेषामविलोपेनाऽनुष्ठानाद्यतेरेवंविधोत्तरणे सत्त्वधर्म आशयतां प्रतिपद्यते, पो ज्ञानादीनां रूपाणामप्यायनं करोति । एतदभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसयोः सोपानभूतं प्रथमं पर्व । यत्राऽयमवस्थितो यतिरितरेषां पर्वणामनुष्ठाने योग्यो भवति । ज्ञानं द्विविधं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च । तत्र शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानागमरूपम् । गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च द्विविधं अपूर्वमभ्यासजं च । तयोरपूर्वम्— ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनमिति (का. ५१) सिद्धिकाण्डाऽनुपतितानि प्रमाणानि । अभ्यासजं पुनः वैराग्यपूर्वावजयपृष्ठलब्धं शान्तममलं ध्रुवं सकलभवाऽभप्रतिपक्षभूतम् । यदाचार्यो वक्ष्यति—

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नाऽस्मि न मे नाऽहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानमिति ॥ (का. ६४)

विरागस्तु रागप्रतिपक्षभूतो ज्ञानाभ्यासोपजनितो बुद्धेः प्रसादः । तस्य तु यतमानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियवशीकारलक्षणाश्चतस्रोऽवस्था भवन्ति । तत्रेन्द्रियाणां विषयाभिलाषलक्षणकषायपाचनं प्रति यः प्रयत्न उत्साहः सा यतमानसंज्ञा । यतमानको ह्ययमस्मिन्पर्वण्यवस्थितो यतिर्भवति । यदा तु केषांचिदिन्द्रियाणां परिपक्वं सा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । व्यतिरिच्यन्ते हि तदा यतेरिन्द्रियाणि परिपक्वाण्यपरिपक्वेभ्यो विशिष्टतराणि भवन्तीत्यर्थः । विपरिपक्वसर्वेन्द्रियस्तु संकल्पमात्रावस्थिकषायो यदा भवति तदैकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । निवृत्तसर्वेन्द्रियविषयेच्छस्य यतेरेकमेव मनोलक्षणमिन्द्रियं तदा परिपक्वं भवति । संकल्पमात्रावस्थितस्यापि परिपाको वशीकारसंज्ञा । संकल्पमूलोच्छिन्नविषयमृगतृष्णो हि अयं यतिरिन्द्रियाणामन्तःकरणस्य च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरीष्टे । एकाग्र एकारामोऽविद्यापर्वणोऽतिक्रान्तः, परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रत्यनन्तरो भवति । तदेवं चतुरवस्थं वैराग्यपर्वं विज्ञाय तदनुष्ठानाय यतिः प्रयतेत ॥ तस्योपायो दृष्टानु



श्रविकविषयप्रत्याख्याने य उपदिष्टो यश्च तुष्टिषु वक्ष्यमाणस्तमेकीकृत्योत्तरोत्तरां । तत्त्वभूमिं विज्ञानस्य विषयीकुर्वन्पूर्वस्यां तत्त्वभूमौ मध्यस्थः स्यात् । ऐश्वर्यमप्रतिघातलक्षणम्, यत्पुनरष्टविधं अणिमा महिमा लघिमा गरिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यमीशित्वं वशित्वं यत्रकामावसायित्वमिति । अत्राणिमा, महिमा, लघिमा, गरिमेति भूतवैशेषिकम् । बुद्धेस्तु प्राप्यादि । एवमेतच्चतुर्विधं महतः सात्त्विकं रूपमिति ।

Proponent : VIRTUE, KNOWLEDGE, NON-ATTACHMENT AND LORDLY POWERS—THIS IS THE FORM (OF THE TELLECT) WHEN SATTVA DOMINATES.

In the expression 'this is form, etc.', the mention is through singular to suggest that even though the virtue, etc., differ, the intellect is the object desired to be one. This is to be stated. When the sattva present in the intellect dominates after controlling the rajas and tamas, the intellect becomes of the form of virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and lordly powers.<sup>9</sup> The virtue is the sattva situated as a component in the intellect when it has become the impression of the performance of the acts prescribed in the śruti and the smṛti. That is of two types. The first is that which causes the enjoyment of the desired body, senses and the objects in the world of Brahmā, and is the part of or is secondary to the knowledge.etc., and the other is that which is accomplished through the performance of the ritualistic acts like offering oblation to the sacrificial fire and is accomplished through restraints, and observance. The restraints are five, viz., non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, non-meanness or non-wickedness and sexual restraints.<sup>10</sup> The observations are five, viz., absence of anger, service to the preceptor, purity, eating less and non-carelessness.<sup>11</sup> Through the uninterrupted practice of these the quality of sattva comes to be an impression and it causes the attainment of forms of intellect like knowledge. This is the first phase serving as a first step to worldly prosperity and liberation. A monk situated at this phase becomes able to practise for the other phases. Knowledge is of two kinds; of the nature of knowledge of word, etc., and of the nature of knowledge of discrimination between constituents and conscious entity.<sup>12</sup> That of the nature of knowledge of word, etc., is of the form of perception, inference and verbal testimony. The knowledge in the form of discrimination between conscious entity and constituents is also of two kinds : innate and generated through practice. Out of them the innate is—the means of knowledge falling under the discussion (chapter) of attainments as 'reasoning, oral instruction and study' etc. That generated through practice is caused by non-attachment, is calm, pure, everlasting and



contradictory to all the worldly (produced) and non-worldly (non-produced) objects. The authority will himself state it as:

“Thus, through the repeated practice of truth there arises the knowledge in the form ‘I am not’, ‘nothing is mine’, and ‘not I’—the knowledge which is pure on account of absence of contradiction and is absolute.”<sup>13</sup>

Non-attachment is opposite to attachment. It is the limpidity of intellect brought about by the practice of knowledge. There are four states of it, viz., effort, discrimination, pertaining to a single sense and control. The state of effort is the effort or resolution to bring to maturity the passion in the form of the desire for the object of senses. The person engaged in this effort and present at this phase becomes an ascetic. When there is the abandonment (lit. maturity) of the objects of some senses only, the state of non-attachment is called discrimination. Then, the senses of an ascetic which are warded off (from some objects) discriminate i.e. become more particular towards (warding off) the objects which are not given up. When one attains the state in which all the senses are warded off (from their objects) and the passion remains in the form of thought only, that state is called pertaining to a single sense. Then, the only sense called mind is warded off in case of an ascetic who has given up the desires for the objects of all the senses. The abandonment of the attachment present in the thought also is the state called control. The ascetic in this state has cut as under the mirage of the object from the root which is the thought and becomes lord of the activities and cessation of the activities of the senses as well as the internal organs. (In this state) non concentrates at one, rejoices in one, goes beyond (crosses) the phase of ignorance and becomes identical with the supreme Brahman.<sup>14</sup> Thus, knowing the phase of non-attachment having four states an ascetic should try for accomplishing it. The means of it is like this. Combining the means taught (prescribed) for renouncing the objects—perceptible and taught in the scriptures and those taught (prescribed) in respect of the contentment which will be explained later on, one should make the higher state of Reality as the object of knowledge and should become indifferent to the earlier (lower) one. The lordly power is of the nature of non-obstruction which is of eight forms : atomic character, grandeur, buoyancy, gravity, approach, fulfilment of desires, sovereignty or superimacy and infallibility of desires. Here, atomic character, grandeur, buoyancy and gravity are the particular qualities of the elements and of the intellect are the approach, etc. In this way is the fourfold form of in-



telleet abounding in Sattva.

(Form of intellect of tamas with dominance)

आह अथ गुणान्तररूपं किम् ?

Opponent : What is the form of the intellect with the dominance of the other constituents ?

उच्यते

तामसमस्माद् विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

एतत् अस्माद्धर्मदिः सत्त्वरूपाद्विपर्यस्तं तामसं तमप्रकर्षोपजनितमित्यर्थः । अत्र शास्त्रचोदितानुष्ठानादाशयनिष्पन्नसत्त्वावयवो धर्म इत्युक्तम् । शास्त्रचोदितस्य नित्यस्य च कर्मणोऽनुष्ठानाद् बुद्ध्यवस्थस्तमोऽवयव आशयतां प्रतिपन्नोऽधर्मः । स चापि द्विविधः—अनिष्टशरीरेन्द्रियविषयोपभोगनिर्वर्तकः, ख्यातिवारकश्च । यथा च ज्ञानं द्विविधं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं चैवमज्ञानमपि विपर्ययेण वाच्यम् । यथा च चतुरवस्थं वैराग्यं तथा यतमानादिकश्चतुरवस्थो रागः यथा चाऽष्टगुणमैश्वर्यमणिमादि तथाऽष्टगुणमनैश्वर्यमेवमेतत्तामसं महतो रूपम् । यच्चैतदधर्मादिनिमित्तभूतमुत्कृष्टं तमोरूपं तद्रजसा सहाऽविरोधादेकतामिवापन्नमशुद्धिरित्याचार्यैः पठ्यते । सत्त्वरूपं तु प्रकाश इति । अनयोश्चाभिधानाद्यः पञ्चाधिकरणपक्षः प्राकृतवैकृतानां ज्ञानानां प्रधानवच्छुष्कनदीस्थानीयान्तकरणे बाह्ये च प्रेरकज्ञानांशककृत उपनिपातः तथा सात्त्विकस्थित्यात्मककृतमप्रत्ययस्याऽवस्थानमिति तत्रतिक्षिप्तं भवति । किं कारणं ? यस्मादशुद्धिरेव प्रकाशमलमतिप्रवृत्तं निवर्तयितुं प्रकर्षापन्नाऽन्याभूता च प्रवर्तयितुम् । इत्येवमष्टरूपा बुद्धिर्व्याख्याता ॥ २३ ॥

Proponent : THE FORM WHEN THE TAMAS DOMINATES IS REVERSE TO IT.

This is reverse to the virtue, etc., which are of the form of sattva, and is abounding in tamas which means that it is born by the dominance of tamas. Here, virtue is said to be the parts of the sattva brought about (to dominance) by the impressions of the acts prescribed in the scriptures.<sup>15</sup> Vice is the part of tamas present in the intellect (and) brought (to dominance) by the impressions due to non-performance of the daily duties and the acts prescribed in the scriptures. That is also of two kinds : that which causes the undesirable body, senses, objects, and that which wards off (or puts an impediment to) the discriminative knowledge. As the knowledge is of two kinds of the form of the knowledge of the word, etc., and of the form of the discriminative knowledge of the constituents and the conscious entity; the absence of knowledge should also be stated as reverse to it . Just as the non-attachment is in four states called ef-



fort, etc., the attachment also is of four states. Just as the lordly power is of eight kinds, the absence of lordly powers is also of eight kinds. Thus, it is the form of the intellect dominated by *tamas*. The form in which *sattva* dominates is called light. Due to the mention of these the following view of *Pañcādhikarapa* is refuted. The innate and the acquired knowledges are laid down by the part of the knowledge of the imperator in the internal and external organs which like cosmic matter are like the dry river, and thus is made the situation abounding in *sattva* for the principle which is (really) benefit of cognitions.

What is the reason here ?

Because the impurity itself is enough to obstruct the light in its increased form and to induce the other (opposite) dominant form. Thus is explained the intellect having eight forms.



## KĀRIKĀ 23

1. The first can be exemplified as the production of a pot, and the second as the removal of darkness, etc. , which obstruct the knowledge of the pot.
2. The sense is that the modification does not bring some change in the substratum. For example, in various types of pots the clay remains the same.
3. This objection is based upon the distortion of Sāṃkhya view about the mutual relation of modification and its substratum. They are not absolutely identical as implied in the argument, but there is in fact, the relation of identity-cum-difference between them.
4. The meaning is that the modification and its substratum are separately observed in case of earth and, hence, their distinction can be known while such a distinction is never observed in case of the intellect and its modification because the intellect is never observed without modification so that the two may be distinguished.
5. Avinaṣṭa should be understood in the sense of existing objects which are liable for destruction though are not yet destroyed.
6. The increase or decrease in the constituents would imply the change and destruction of the intellect.
7. The sense is if the intellect is proved to be momentary through its being non-eternal only, the other reason to prove the momentariness of the intellect would be purposeless.
8. The actions of the army when arranged in a queue and when arranged in a circle are different.
9. Thus, knowledge, virtue, etc. , are the forms of the intellect and are located in it.
10. Cf. Yogasūtra 2.30. In the Yogasūtra we find non-hoarding in the place of akalkatā.
11. A different list of observances is found in the Yogasūtra 2.32.
12. The division is based upon the object to be cognised. The first cognised the worldly objects while the latter cognises the metaphysical truth.



13. S. K. 64.
14. The statement is indicative of the upanisadic influence on this text. It does not correspond to the Sāṃkhya terminology.
15. The virtue is neither the performance of scriptural act nor the impressions of these acts, but the sattva which dominates as having the impressions.

## KĀRIKĀ 24

(NATURE OF EGOISM)

यस्त्वसावनन्तरमुक्तोऽहङ्कारस्तं व्याख्यास्यामः ।

Now we shall explain the egoism which is mentioned after (the intellect)<sup>1</sup>

आह, यद्येवं तस्मादिदमेव तावदुच्यतां किमस्याहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमिति ?

Opponent : If it is so, you should state at this state only what is the definition of egoism.

उच्यते -

**अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः**

कर्तुं स्वात्मप्रत्ययमवमर्शात्मको योऽयमहमिति प्रत्यय उत्पद्यते स खल्वहङ्कारः, महतस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? तस्य सर्वविषयाध्यवसायरूपत्वात्, अस्य तु स्वात्मप्रत्ययमवमर्शात् । न त्वर्थान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? प्रकृतिविकारयोरनन्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमात्, न हि नः प्रकृतेरर्थान्तरभूतो विकार इति प्राग्विस्तरेण प्रतिपादितम् । स च मूर्तिप्रत्ययाभ्यां महतः स्थूलतरः । कस्मात् ? अविभागात्, विभागनिष्यत्तेः कालादिवत् । त्रिगुणस्य च महतो विकारत्वादसावपि त्रिगुणः । कस्मात् ? प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारे दृष्टात्वात् तन्तुपटवत् । तद्भावसन्निविष्टास्तु ये सत्त्वा दयस्य आचार्यैवैकारिकतैजसभूतादिशब्देनाख्यायन्ते । तथा च शास्त्रमाह “एतस्माद्धि महत आत्मन इमे त्रय आत्मानः सृज्यन्ते वैकारिकतैजसभूतादयोऽहङ्कारलक्षणाः । अहमित्येवैषां सामान्यलक्षणं भवति । गुणप्रवृत्तौ च पुनर्विशेषलक्षणमिति” ।

Proponent : THE EGOISM IS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Egoism is the cognition ‘ I am ’ in the form of reflecting upon his own self arising in the agent.

It is a different category from intellect.

Why ?

Because the intellect is of the nature of ascertainment of all the objects and this (egoism) reflects upon its own self. However, it is not (essentially) different (in nature) from the intellect.

Why ?



Because of the acceptance of the identity of the cause and its modification. It is established in detail earlier that the modification is not totally a different object (in essence) from the cause. That is more gross than the intellect in respect of form and knowledge.

Why ?

*Because of the non-separation.* Because the separation is not possible in time, etc. Since it is a modification of intellect which is composed of three constituents, it is also possessed of three constituents.

Why ?

Because the nature of the cause is observed in the modification as in the case with the threads and the cloth.

The sattva, etc., present in the form of that egoism are technically called by the authorities to be the Vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi.<sup>2</sup> The scripture states, "From this great self are born these three selves.....vaikārika, taijas and bhūtādi in the form of egoism. The general characteristic of these is the notion 'I am' and when the constituents (composing that) become active, (they attain) the particular characteristics."<sup>3</sup>

(Evolution from egoism)

आह, का पुनर्गुणप्रवृत्तिर्यस्यामस्मिप्रत्ययैकरूपस्याऽहङ्कारस्य विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति ?

Opponent : What is the activity of the constituents in which there arises the particular and different (type of) knowledge concerning the egoism which is (actually) of a single form, i.e., the notion 'I am'.

उच्यते - योऽयं

तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

द्विविध इन्द्रियलक्षणस्तन्मात्रलक्षणश्च । सा गुणप्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते । कस्मात् ? तत्कार्यत्वात् । गुणप्रवृत्तिकार्यो हि सर्गः । दृश्यते च खलु लोके कार्यकारणमुपचर्यमाणम् । तद्यथा शालीन्मुङ्क्त इति ।

Proponent : FROM THAT PROCEEDS THE EVOLUTION OF TWO KINDS.

That of two kinds is in the form of the senses and in the form of the subtle elements. That (evolution) is called the activity of the

constituents.

Why ?

Because of being the effect of that. The evolution is the effect of the activity of the constituents. The cause is observed in the world as metaphorically spoken as effect; for example, in the expression like 'he eats the unhusked rice'.

आह, प्रागुक्तमहंकाराद्योडशको गण उत्पद्यते । इदानीं पुनरुच्यते तस्मादद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः । तदिदं पूर्वोत्तरव्याघातादयुक्तमिति ।

Opponent : Earlier you have stated that the group of sixteen originates from egoism. Now it is stated that two kinds of evolution proceeds from that . It is wrong because of the contradiction involved in earlier and latter (statements).

उच्यते—न, सामान्येन विवक्षितत्वात् ।

अभेदविवक्षायां हि कृत्वा कार्यकारणलक्षणमेवमस्माभिरुपदिष्टं द्विविधः सर्ग इति । भेदविवक्षायां पुनः

**ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तान्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥**

इन्द्रियाणामयमैन्द्रियः एकादश परिमाणमस्य एकादशकः । एवं तन्मात्रेषु वक्तव्यम् । तन्मात्राणां शब्दस्पर्शादीनामयं तान्मात्रः सर्गः । पञ्चकश्च पञ्च परिमाणमस्येति पञ्चकः । अस्य तु षोडशकस्य विकारस्य संज्ञालक्षणप्रयोजनान्युत्तरत्र वक्ष्यति । एषा गुणप्रवृत्तिर्व्याख्याता । यस्यामस्मिप्रत्ययस्य विशेषग्रहणं भवति— शब्देऽहं स्पर्शेऽहं रूपेऽहं रसेऽहं गन्धेऽहमिति ।

Proponent : No, because it is desired to be stated in general . With an intention of speaking without (further differentiation it is stated by us here that there are two kinds of evolution in the form of effect and cause. And, when the differentiation is intended to be stated:

**THE SET OF ELEVEN CONSISTING OF THE SENSES, AND THE GROUP OF THE FIVE SUBTLE ELEMENTS.**

The term 'consisting of the senses' denotes 'of the senses'. The term 'set of eleven means that which is of the measurement (number) of eleven.<sup>4</sup> The same should be stated in case of the subtle elements. The evolution of the subtle elements in that of the subtle elements of sound, touch, etc. The group of five means the measurement (or number) of which is five. The author will speak of the name, charac-



teristics (definition) and purpose of the group of sixteen evolutes later on. Thus is explained the activity of the constituents, in which is particularly cognised the notion of 'I am' as I am in word, I am in touch, I am in sight, I am in taste and I am in smell.

(Significance of three forms of Egoism)

आह, अहङ्कारे सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तरावचनम्, आनर्थक्यात् । यदिदमहङ्कारे सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तरमारभ्यते वैकारिकस्तैजसो भूतादिरिति, तत्र वक्तव्यम् । कस्मात्, ? आनर्थक्यात् । व हि तत्त्वान्तरसन्निवेशिनां सत्त्वादीनां संज्ञान्तराभिधाने किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमस्तीति, संज्ञाभूयस्त्वात् । अथायं निर्बन्धस्तत्त्वान्तरम्, संज्ञाभूयस्त्वं प्राप्नोति । प्रयोजनाऽभिधानं वा । विशिष्टयत्नानामनाकस्मिकत्वात् । अथवा प्रयोजनं वक्तव्यम्— एवमर्थमहङ्कारे संज्ञान्तराभिधानमिति । कस्मात् ? न हि विशिष्टयत्नानामाकस्मिकत्वमुपपद्यत इति ।

Opponent : In the egoism no other name of the Sattva, etc., should be mentioned because it is purposeless (meaningless). The different name for Sattva, etc., in egoism which comes to be as Vaikarika, taijas and bhutadi, should not be mentioned.

Why ?

Because it is purposeless (i.e., meaningless). There is no purpose in giving some other name to the Sattva, etc., occurring in some other object, because there would be many names. If it is insisted upon that this is a different element, there would certainly be many names.<sup>5</sup> Or, the purpose should be mentioned, because the acts done with particular effort are not accidental. Or, the purpose should be stated as to with this sort of purpose is given a different name in the egoism.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of accidental nature in the objects which are accomplished with a particular effort.

उच्यते — न, कार्यविशेषहेतुत्वात् । महदादिलक्षणानां हि गुणानामनेकरूपस्तत्त्वारम्भ इति हि न संज्ञान्तरमारभ्यते । अहङ्कारस्तु सत्त्वतमोबहुलयोरिन्द्रियतन्मात्रपर्वणोः प्रकृतिः, तदर्थमाचार्याणां यत्नविशेषः । धर्मादिविशेषाभ्युपगमान्महति प्रसंग इति चेत् न विशेषितत्वात् । तत्त्वान्तरारम्भ इति विशेषितम्, न तु धर्मादयस्तत्त्वान्तरमतो न महति प्रसंगः । विशेषाऽनभिधानादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, कः पुनरत्र विशेषो येन धर्मादि न तत्त्वान्तरम्, तत्त्वान्तरं तु श्रोत्रादीति ? एतच्च नैवम् कुतः ? वृत्तिमात्रे तदुपचारात् । वृत्तिमात्रे हि महतो धर्माद्युपचारः । तथा च तन्त्रान्तरेऽप्युक्तम् “प्रकाशवृत्तिर्धर्मः” इति । वृत्तिनिष्पादितस्तु संस्थानविशेषो वृत्तिमतस्तत्त्वान्तरमित्यनयोर्विशेषः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् कार्यविशेषहेतुत्वमिति ॥२४॥

Proponent : *No, because of its being a cause of particular kinds of effects.* There proceed elements of many forms (nature) from the constituents (situated) in the form of the intellect and, hence, no different name is given for that. The egoism, on the other hand, is the cause of the phases of the senses and the subtle elements which abound in Sattva and Tamas respectively. Therefore, there is a particular effort of the authorities (to give particular name). If it is argued that there arises the undesirable contingency (many names) in case of intellect because of the acceptance of the particulars like virtue, etc., (we reply) *no, because it (particular name) is qualified.* It is qualified by 'rise of another element'. The virtue, etc., are not different elements and, hence, there is no undesirable contingency (of different names) in the intellect.

If it is argued that it is wrong because the particularity is not stated ? It may be like this. What is the particular reason that the virtue, etc. are not different (independent) element, and the ear, etc., on the other hand, are different (independent) elements ?

It is not so.

Why ?

That is metaphorically stated in the case of function. The virtue, etc., are metaphorically spoken with reference to merely the function of the intellect. It is stated in the other system also: 'the virtue is the function of the light'. The particular arrangement brought out by the function of the possessor (or location or the function) is stated to be a different element. This is the difference between the two cases. Therefore, it is right that the reason is to be a cause of particular effects.