

Moreover, because of impossibility (or lack of) power of doing. Even while making this contact, he may cause the contact of the soul with merely the body or with the cause of to body (i.e., the cosmic matter).

Why do you ask so ?

It does not relate the soul merely with the body .

Why ?

Because there is no cause of forming the body for the one who has no desire. Nor does it do so (relate the soul) with the cause of the body because of all-pervasiveness (of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity). The contact of the bull and the cart is made by some other because they are limited in magnitude. The cosmic matter and the conscious entity are all-pervasive. *Moreover, because of being meant for other.* The contact of the bull and the cart is observed to be meant for others. The contact of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity, on the other hand, is not meant for Īśvara (we reply) no, because we have already refuted. This is stated in discussing that the visible or invisible purpose is not justified (or possible) in case of Īśvara in the theory of the pāśupatas.

वैशेषिकाणां चायं दोषः । किं च द्रव्यादिपदार्थान्तरभावाभावपरिकल्पनाऽनुपपत्तिश्च । तैरीश्वरो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायभूतो वा परिकल्पमानः परिकल्प्यते, पदार्थान्तरभूतो वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावद् द्रव्यादिभूतः । कस्मात् ? द्विविधं हि द्रव्यं अनेकद्रव्यम-द्रव्यं च । तत्र नाऽनेकद्रव्यमीश्वरः, कृतकत्वादितोषप्रसंगात् । नाऽद्रव्यं, परिसंख्यानात् । पृथिव्यादीनि मनःपर्यन्तानि नवैव द्रव्याणीति वः सिद्धान्तः । इतिकरणस्य परिसमाप्यर्थत्वात् । किंच गुणकर्मनिर्देशात् । सति चास्य द्रव्यत्वे वैशेषिकगुणनिर्देश आचार्येण कृतः स्यात् । कारणान्तरप्रयोगसमर्थस्य च कर्म निर्दिष्टं स्यात् । न तु तथा । तस्मान्न द्रव्यगुणादयः । आश्रयपरतन्त्रा हि गुणादयः परार्थाः । एवं न द्रव्यादिभूतो नापि पदार्थान्तरभूतः । पदार्थत्वे हि सति द्रव्यादिवल्लक्षणमुक्तमभविष्यत् । आचार्येण तु नोक्तम् । तस्मात्सूत्रकारमते नास्तीश्वरः । लिंगादिति चेत्, स्यान्मतम्—संज्ञाकर्मत्वमस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वाद्वा संज्ञाकर्मण इत्येतस्माल्लिंगादीश्वरपरिग्रह आचार्यस्य सिद्ध इति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभिप्रेताऽसिद्धेः । सत्यनेन लिङ्गनास्मदादिभ्यो विशिष्टशक्तेः कस्यचिदेव माहात्म्यशरीरस्याऽन्यस्य वा प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । संज्ञामात्रं तु यथा भवद्भिः सर्वकारणानां सृष्ट्युपसंहारप्रवृत्तिहेतुरेकः स्वतन्त्र इष्यते । तथा चास्माल्लिङ्गात्प्रतिपत्तिः । किं चान्यत् । प्रागनुपदेशेऽकौशलप्रसंगात् । ईश्वरपरतन्त्रे चेदणूनां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातां तमेव प्रागुपदिशेत् । धर्मवत्प्रधानपदार्थस्य वा प्रागनुपदेशादकुशलः सूत्रकार इत्येतदापद्यते । न चैतदिष्टमुभयम् । किं चान्यत् असंकीर्तनात् । शास्त्रप्रदेशे चायमीश्वरो न कस्मिंश्चिदप्याचार्येण संकीर्तितः । न चास्य वध्वा इव श्वशुरनामसंकीर्तने दोषोपपत्तिः स्यात् । दोषसंविभागार्थमिदमाचार्यस्याऽनिष्टमध्यारो-

प्यते, न तु मतमस्यैतत् । एवं काणादानामीश्वरोऽस्तीति पाशुपतोपज्ञमेतत् । तस्मादीश्वरोऽप्यकारणम् ।

This is the fault in the theory of the vaiśeṣikas. *Moreover, there is no propriety in the postulation (of Īśvara) as different from or identical with the entities like substance etc.* Whether Īśvara is postulated by them as postulating it as of the form (i.e. identical with) substance quality, activity, generality particularity and inherence or as a different entity?

It is not as the substance, etc.

Why ?

The substances (experienced by us) are (a combination of) many substances and of the form of non-substance. Īśvara is not (a combination of) many substances because otherwise it would involve the undesirable contingency of its being created (non-eternal).⁴⁰ Nor is it of the form of non-substance because (this kind of objects) are enumerated (by the Vaiśeṣikas themselves). Your theory is that the substances are nine only viz., earth to mind because the term *iti* (used in the enumeration of the substances) denotes the completion. Moreover, because the qualities and the activities are mentioned (as belonging to each substance but not to the Īśvara). If it would have been substance, the present authorities would have mentioned its qualities according to the Vaiśeṣikas. And in case it is capable of using a different cause, there would have been the mention of its activities. However, it is not done. Therefore, Īśvara is not any of the substance, quality, etc. The qualities, etc., which are meant for others are dependent upon their substratum. In this way, it is neither of the form of substance, etc., nor some different entity. If it would have been an entity, its definition (or peculiar characteristic) would have been stated by the author as is the case with substance, etc. It is, however, not stated by the author. Therefore, there is no Īśvaras in the opinion of the writer of the Vaiśeṣika aphorism. If it is argued that it is proved through the probans, it may be like this, The name and activity in our bodies is the probans to prove the soul or from the probans in the form of name and activity which are directly perceived as proving the acceptance of Īśvara by the authority. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it does not prove as to which is intended (by you). It is true that through the above probans there would have been the knowledge of one qualified by the power more than ours, or as

having magnificent body or some other. The one you have accepted as an independent instigator of the activity of all the causes leading to destruction is merely a name. And, similar is the knowledge arising of this probans. Moreover, there would arise the undesirable contingency of unskilfulness (of the author of the aphorisms) in not mentioning it earlier. If the activity and stopping of the activity of the atoms would be governed by Īśvara, the author of the aphorism would have mentioned it earlier. On account of not mentioning the main category, like virtue it comes to mean that the author of aphorisms is unskilled. The two are undesirable. *Moreover, because of the non-mention.* The Īśvara is not mentioned by any of the authorities in the scope of the scriptures. There would not be possibility of defect, as it is by mentioning the name of the father-in-law by the daughter-in-law. To share the defect the view is imposed upon the author of the aphorisms though the view is undesirable to him. This is, however, not the view of the author of the aphorisms. It is accepted by the followers of the Pāśupata school that there is Īśvara in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, Īśvara also is not the cause of the universe.

(Atoms of actions cannot be cause)

कर्माणुभिर्व्याख्यातम् । कथम् ? यथा कृतकत्वात् जगत्कारणमणवः, एवं कर्मापि न शरीरनिमित्तं, तस्मात्तदप्यकारणम् । इतरेतरनिमित्तत्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथाऽन्तरेण शरीरं कर्म नोत्पद्यमानं दृष्टमेवमन्तरेण कर्म शरीरस्यापि कारणान्तरशक्यं कल्पयितुमिति परस्परनिमित्तत्वान्नाऽस्य परिवर्तस्य पूर्वकोटिः प्रज्ञायते । तस्मान्नास्त्यनयोः कारणान्तरमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अनवस्थानामवस्थानपूर्वकत्वदर्शनात् । तद्यथा शुक्रशोणिताच्छरीरं शरीराच्छुक्रशोणितमित्यस्य परिवर्तस्य पूर्वकोटिरदृष्टा, प्रतिज्ञायते चाऽयोनिजत्वमीश्वरशरीराणामादिसर्गे च । तथा च बीजादङ्कुरादयोऽङ्गुरादिभ्यो जमीत्यनवस्था । भवति चात्रादिसर्गे परमाणुमात्रादपि बीजप्रादुर्भावंस्तथा शरीरकर्मणोरनवस्था । इदानीमपि चादिसर्गे चाधिकारमात्रवशाच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः स्यात् । साधारणविग्रहत्वप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यद्यधिकारनिमित्ता शरीरोत्पत्तिरादिसर्गेऽभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तमेकेन शरीरेणसर्वपुरुषाणामभिसम्बन्धो नियमहेत्वभावात् । ततश्च शरीरान्तरानर्थक्यम् । तेनैव सर्वेषामुपभोगसामर्थ्यादिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् । सत्यमेतदनुमानतः । प्रत्यक्षतस्तु शरीराणि प्रतिपुरुषम्, तस्मान्नायं प्रसंगः । अपवर्गनियमप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतं यद्यधिकारमात्रवशाच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः परमर्षेरेवापवर्गसाधनं शरीरादुत्पद्येतेति । उच्यते—न तस्यैव, किं तर्हि सर्वेषां गुणानां प्राधान्यात्तन्निमित्तानि शरीराण्यादिसर्गे सांसिद्धिकान्युत्पद्यन्ते । तत्र यस्य सत्त्वप्रधानं कार्यकरणं स परमर्षिः । यस्य सत्त्वं रजोबहुलं स माहात्म्यशरीरः । एवं गुणसम्पर्काद् गुणप्रधानाप्रधानभावेन यावत्स्थावरशरीरप्रादुर्भाव इत्यतो नास्ति गुणानां शरीरविनियोगपक्षपातः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्कृतकत्वात् कर्म जगत्कारणमिति । एतेन चैवं व्याख्याम् । तदपि हि कर्मणामेव

प्राप्तपरिपाकानामभिधानमर्थान्तरमेवेति चेत्साध्यम् । तस्मादप्यकल्पनीयमिति ।

The view (that the creation is caused by the atoms of action is already explained (refuted).

How ?

Just as the atoms being product cannot be the cause of the universe, similarly the actions are not the cause of the body. Therefore, the actions also are not the cause of the universe.⁴¹ If it is argued that the defect does not arise because of their-dependence? It may be like this. As the act is not observed to take place without body, similarly it is not possible to postulate some other cause than the acts for the body. And, since they serve as the cause for each other, the first of them which revolves in a cycle is not known. Therefore, there is no other cause for them. This is also wrong, because those which have endless series of cause and effect are also observed to be caused from a final point. For example, the body is produced from the semen and blood, and the semen and blood originate from the body and thus the first of these which revolves in this type of cycle is not observed. It is, however, declared that it in the initial creation as also the bodies of Īśvara were produced without womb. Similarly, the sprout, etc. originate from seed and the seed from the sprout etc., thus leading to the endless series of cause and effect. In the initial creation, however, the seed originates from merely the atoms. Similarly, there can be explained the endless series of cause and effect with reference to the body and the acts. Now as well as in the initial creation there would be the body merely due to potency of constituents. If it is argued that it would involve the undesirable contingency of a common body (for all the souls)? It may be like this. If in the initial creation the production of the body is admitted as caused by potency, it would imply the contact of all the conscious entities with a single body only because there is no cause for restriction. Then, there will be no use of the other bodies because the enjoyment of all conscious entities is possible through that only. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it goes against perception. It is right through inference. Through perception, however, the bodies are proved as differently located with each conscious entity. Therefore, this undesirable contingency does not arise.

If it is argued that it will again involve the undesirable contingency of the restriction with reference to liberation? It may be like

this. If the production of the body is due to potency, the means of liberation would arise from (the body of the) great seers only. To this the reply is not him only. On the other hand, on account of the predominance of all the constituents over each other the bodies causing that (means of liberation) are naturally born in the initial creation. Out of those whose mode of action abounds in Sattva, is the great seer. He whose sattva is mixed with more Rajas is the magnificent body. In this way, through the association of the constituents and through the relation of dominant and non-dominant among the constituents the bodies upto the immovable (beings) are born. And, thus, there is no partiality of the constituents towards assuming (making up) a particular body. Therefore, it is right that the actions being caused are not the cause of the universe. Through this only is this explained. If it is argued that that is the other name for the acts which are matured for fruition, it is still to be proved. From this reason also it should not be postulated so.

(Time is not the cause)

यदप्युक्तं कालाज्जगदुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यतीति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? कारणपरिस्पन्दस्यैव तदभिधानसन्निवेशात् । न हि नः कालो नाम कश्चिदस्ति, किं तर्हि क्रियमाणक्रियाणामेवादित्यगतिगोदोहघटास्तनितादीनां विशिष्टावधिसरूपप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वम् । परापरादिलङ्गसद्भावात्प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेन्न, अकृतकेषु तदनुपपत्तेः । यदेव कृतकं तत्रैव परमपरमित्यादिः प्रत्ययो दृष्टः । स यदि क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तः स्यादविशेषान्नित्येभ्यः स्यात् । क्वचित्सामर्थ्यादपाकजवददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्— यथाऽग्निसंयोगः पाकजहेतुः तथा चाविशेषेऽपि पृथिव्यामेव पाकजोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं भवति नाकाशादिषु । एवं कालोऽपि परापरादिहेतुरथ चाऽनित्येष्वेव स्यान्न नित्येष्विति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विशेषोपपत्तेः । रूपादिविक्रियाहेतुरग्नस्तद्युक्तं यदसौ तद्वति द्रव्ये पाकजानादद्यात्, तद्वत्याकाशादौ । कालस्तु सम्बन्धमात्रोपकारी न विक्रियाहेतुः । तस्मादसदेतत् । एवं यदि क्रियाभ्योऽन्यः काल इष्यते कारणपरिस्पन्दस्य जगत्कारणत्वमथान्यत्साध्यम् ।

The statement that the universe will be produced by Time is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that name is included in the motion of the causes. There is nothing called Time in our theory. On the contrary, it is the cause of the knowledge of the identity of a particular duration in the acts in the form of the thundering of the cloud.

If it is argued that the time is known through the existence of the probans in the form of (the knowledge of) later and earlier, (we reply) it is not applicable in case of the objects which are not created.

The notion of earlier and later, etc., is observed in case of the created objects only. If that would have been caused by something else than activity, it would be found commonly in both—the eternal and the non-eternal objects. If it is argued that the defect does not arise since the capacity is found in some cases only as some atoms are not baked with fire? It may be like this. The contact of fire is the cause of production of baked atoms but still inspite of lack of particularity it becomes the cause of the baking of atoms in the earth only and not in the case of space, etc. Similarly, the time is also the cause of earlier and later, but still it would be applicable to the non-eternal objects only and not to the eternal. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is the possibility of particularity. The fire is the cause of bringing change in form, etc. Hence, it is right that it brings about the production of the baked atoms in the substance possessed of that (form) and not in the one possessing it, like space. The time is, however through serviceable (helpful) through mere association and not a cause of bringing out the change. Therefore, the above argument is wrong. In this, if time is accepted to be something else than the activity, the movement of the cause comes to be the cause of the universe. Hence, it should be proved as something else.

(Accidence or chance is not the cause)

यदृच्छाऽपि न कारणं कर्मवत् कार्यकारणभावात् । कार्यकारणभूतं हीदं व्यक्तमिति प्राग्व्याख्यातम् । स च कार्यकारणभावः प्रेक्षापूर्वकृतानां शयनादीनामुपलब्धौ यादृच्छिकेषु चानुऽपलब्धौ न तस्या लिङ्गमिति शक्यं वक्तुम् ।

Accidence is also not the cause of the universe because there is the relation of cause and effect (in the products) just as in the case of activity. It is explained earlier that the manifest is composed of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect being available in the case of bed, etc., which are the creation of some intelligent being and are absent in the objects originating accidentally, there is no possibility of the mention of probans for accidence (for the establishment of that as the cause of the universe).

(Negation is not the cause)

अभावोऽप्यकारणम्, परिमाणादिदर्शनात् । न हि तत् उत्पन्नानां परिमाणमुपपद्यत इत्यतो नाप्यन्वयः । सात्मकनिरात्मकयोरत्यन्तजातिभेदात् ।

The negation also is not the cause because of the observation of the limited magnitude, etc., (in the universe). The magnitude is not possible in the case of the objects produced out of that (negation)

and, hence, there is no possibility of homogeneity also because there is complete opposition of genus between the objects having the nature and those having no nature.⁴³

(Power, Favour and Separation are not the causes)

नापि शक्तिस्तदभावात् । नोपकारोऽनवस्थानात् । न विभागो निरात्मकत्वात् ।

Nor is the universe caused by power because it does not exist at all.⁴⁴ Nor is the favour (the cause of the universe) because it will involve infinite regress.⁴⁵ Nor is the separation (the cause of the universe) because it has also no nature of its own.⁴⁶

तस्मान्न परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मदैवकालस्वभावयदृच्छाऽभावेभ्यो व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते । न चेदेभ्यः, परिशेषतः प्रधानस्यैवास्तित्वलिङ्गमिदम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् भेदानां परिमाणादिभ्यः कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ॥१५॥

Therefore, the manifest is not produced from atoms, Puruṣa, Īśvara, actions, luck, time, nature (of the objects), chance and negation. If it (the universe) is not produced from these, it is the probans for the existence of the cosmic matter through residual. Therefore, it is right that the unmanifest is the cause of the universe because of the finite nature of the products. etc.

KĀRIKĀ 15

1. The qualities which do not contradict should be accepted as existing in both the cause and the effect while the others which are opposite in nature should not be considered to be common in both.
2. Both of these are merely the statement without reason and, hence, no side can claim superiority over the other.
3. The meaning is that there is no specific cause of these objects. Therefore, there is no restriction of cause-effect relation in them.
4. If they would be finite in magnitude in the past and the future states as well, there would arise the undesirable contingency of their being finite in all periods of time and consequently it would imply the rejection of the theory of origination from an object unlimited in magnitude.
5. The bodies of the beings like gods, men and animals are innumerable and, hence, they cannot be easily known to be intelic limited and in number.
6. The Samkhyas do not consider generality as an independent category, but the similarity of form. The form is not different from the substance.
7. Though the Samkhyas do not accept generality as a distinct category, but at the same time they do not discard the similarity in objects as also the world dealings through that.
8. Like manifests like Sattva manifests sattva. Since sattva is of the nature of pleasure, it raises the feeling of pleasure in accordance with the past impression of a being. Thus, it is proved that sattva is of the nature of pleasure.
9. It is accepted even by the Samkhyas that the sound is not a modification of drum. The drum is merely an instrumental cause in the production of sound. There is, therefore, no harm if the sound is not of the drum.
10. The word *Ca* in the text presents difficulty in interpretation. The sentence may be interpreted as the activity of potter and the arrangement of the instruments like stick for producing the pot are due to the potency.
11. The sense is that the manifest objects like intellect proceed to their activity which is caused by the potency in the form of non-

manifest.

12. The argument proceeds from effects to the causes. The effects are many. Consequently there must be many potencies in cosmic matter.
13. If the power would be one, it would give rise to a single effect only.
14. The argument would lead to the existence of potencies and not to the existence of cosmic matter which is supposed to be different from potencies.
15. The Samkhyas maintain that the cause perform its activity due the potency inherent in it. The selection of the material as well as instrumental causes is prompted by the potency. If the potency would not be there, the agent would not have selected them.
16. The objection based upon oneness or manifoldness of cosmic matter was raised against the non-difference of the potencies from the cosmic matter. The alleviation of the former objection alleviated the latter.
17. It refers to the gross elements which act for mutual benefit. For example, earth gives support, water helps in collecting together and giving shape while space helps others to exist together.
18. The state of constituents giving rise to the other state is called cause while the latter is the effect.
19. Consequently, there is no proof that it is due to subservience in the state of manifestation.
20. It is so since the Samkhyas hold that the worldly objects are nothing but the particular arrangement of the three constituents in different proportion.
21. Cf. samanvayat as a reason to establish the existence of cosmic matter.
22. The sense is that the nature of atoms is found in the gross elements also just as the nature of the atoms of earth is observed in the earth as well.
23. The causality of the atoms is negated on the ground of homogeneity between the subtle elements and the earth, etc., we object to the causality of cosmic matter on account of considering pleasure, etc., as the qualities of the soul, and the earth, etc., as their manifestor and consequently both are homogeneous to the soul.

24. Though the subtle elements are also limited in magnitude, yet the meaning intended here is that they are more in magnitude than the earth, etc. This is, however, not the case with atoms.
25. To avoid the infinite regress the ultimate cause should be taken to be uncaused.
26. Possessing the form, etc, should be understood as having the form, etc., manifested because some form, etc., exist in unmanifest state in cosmic matter.
27. The meaning of thadhara is not clear. Chakravarti suggests vad-hara which is also not clear.
28. It could be argued that the cosmic matter also gives rise to other objects. Hence, the same argument may apply there also. Therefore, the argument could possibly be interpreted as that which gives rise to similar object is non-eternal. Cosmic matter gives rise to the objects dissimilar in nature.
29. The reading should be *ate evakrtakatvam* in place of *eva evakrtakatvam*.
30. The reading should be *evakrtakah* in place of *eva krtakah*.
31. The reading should be *sarirakrtakatvam* in place of *sarira krtakatam*.
32. The backed atome are considred to be non-eternal even by the Vaisesikas.
33. Since the atoms are caused and non-eternal they would not exist as the cause at the time of dissolution, and hence, in absence of any other cause the universe will not originate again.
34. The non-active object cannot be the cause of the universe.
35. The sense is that Isvara is like Puruṣa in nature. Like conscious entity it is also composed of consciousness. The entity composed of consciousness is, however, inactive and hence cannot be the cause of universe.
36. The context demands that the reading should be *ayamabud-dhipurvakam*.
37. The implication of the alternate explanation is not clear from the Samkhya point of view. It may be the case when it is not understood as an alternate cause but is taken together with the first itself. The text in that case would mean the intellect is born at the time of creation of the body from cosmic matter when the soul also comes in contact with the body. Or, here intellect may

stand for the principle alongwith the power of deliberation which is not possible without the contact with the soul.

38. The virtue and vice cannot be supposed to exist in the initial creation of the universe. Therefore, the production of them needs some cause. It cannot be the Isvara himself because there is no purpose of Isvara in producing and attaching vice to particular persons only. Thus, it cannot be properly explained why some beings are happy and the others miserble in the initial state of creation.
39. The superior intellect and the contact between conscious and non-conscious are not possible in this case.
40. The maxim is that the composite substance are non-eternal by nature.
41. The actions are the activities and require the pre-existence of the body in the beginning of the creation to officiate over worldly activites.
42. It is still to be proved whether action means the acts ready for fruition. Secondly, it cannot be in any case established that actions are the cause of creation in the initial state of creation.
43. In brief, the maxim 'like produces like' is viciated if something possessed of particular qualities is supposed to be produced from that having no quality.
44. The Sāṃkhyas like the Naiyayikas and unlike the Mimamakas believe that power is not an independent object.
45. The favouring entity would be supposed as created by some other favouring entity and so on and so forth.
46. Separation is also not an independent object. Hence, it also cannot be accepted as separate entity.

KĀRIKĀ-16

(Cosmic Matter acts through the three constituents)

आह एवमप्यस्य व्यक्तहेतुत्वमनुपपन्नम्, एकत्वात् । बहूनां कार्यारम्भो दृष्टस्तन्वादीनाम् । एकं प्रधानं, तस्मान्न तदारम्भशक्तियुक्तमिति

Opponent: In this way also it is not possible that it (the cosmic matter) is the cause of the manifest because of its being one. The production of effects is observed through (collection of) many as that of the threads. The cosmic matter is one. Therefore, it is not endowed with the power of the activity for creation.

उच्यते—यद्यपि गुणानां प्रधानलक्षणमवस्थान्तरमभिन्नबुद्धिनिमित्तत्वादेकामपिकार्यकाले किञ्चिद्वैषम्योपजनितव्यपदेश्यरूपाभिरितरेतरोपकारिणीभिः शक्तिभिः समुदायत्वमापद्यते । तस्मादिदानीं

प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च

प्रवर्तते इत्यनेनोत्पत्तिमाचष्टे । त्रिगुणत इत्यव्यपदेश्यरूपाणां प्रधानभावेन गुणशक्तीनां वैषम्यादव्यपदेश्यरूपान्तरमाह । यत्रैतच्छक्यते वक्तुं त्रयः सत्त्वादय इति तदवस्थानं कार्यारम्भकमिति । समुदयादित्यनेन परस्परापेक्षाणामारम्भशक्तिमवद्योतयति । एतदुक्तं भवति—कार्यकाले गुणाः परित्यक्तपूर्वावस्था भेदं प्रतिलभ्य परस्परोपकारेण संहन्यन्ते । संहताश्च व्यक्तमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्मान्नाऽवस्थान्तरस्याभिन्नबुद्धिनिमित्तत्वात्प्रधानैकत्वदोषः गुणभेदात्रैकस्य कार्यारम्भ इति ।

Proponent: Though the other state of the constituents in the form of the cosmic matter is one because it gives rise to a single knowledge, yet it comes to be (or attains) the state of collectiveness through the powers which are mutually helpful and which get some designation brought about by unequilibrium. Therefore, now,

IT OPERATES THROUGH THE THREE CONSTITUENTS AND IN COMBINATION.

Through the expression 'operates' the author states 'creation'. Through the expression 'through the constituents' the author means another nameable form of the constituents which are essentially of unnameable form through the unequilibrium of the powers of the constituents because of their attaining the state of principal and subordinate. The state in which it is possible to say that there are three, sattva, etc., it is the (initial active) cause of the effects. Through the expression 'through their combination'¹ the author suggests the power of giving rise to the effect invested in the constituents standing in need of each other. This is meant here. At the time of operation the constituents having given up the earlier state and having attained the differentiations, get together through mutual service. And, having got together, they give rise to the manifest. Therefore, there arises no defect of oneness of the cosmic matter because it is the other state which gives rise to a non-different or one knowledge. There is no operation for initial activity by a single entity only because there is the difference of the constituents.

(Cosmic Matter does not move but modifies)

आह, निष्क्रियत्वात्तर्हि प्रकृतेः कार्यारम्भोऽनुपपन्नः । क्रियात्वानभ्युपगमे वा व्यक्तवैधर्म्यविरोध इति ।

Opponent: There is no possibility of initial operation in the cosmic matter because the cosmic matter is inactive. Or, if the activity is accepted, there will be contradiction with the statement of its dissimilarity to the manifest.²

उच्यते—न, क्रियावैधर्म्यभेदात् । द्विविधा हि क्रिया प्रस्पन्दलक्षणा परिणामलक्षणा च । तत्र प्रस्पन्दः प्रधानस्य सौक्ख्यात्प्रतिषिध्यते ।

परिणामतः

तु तत्कार्यमारभते इति ।

Proponent: No, because of the distinction through different types of activities. There are two types of activity—movement and modification. The movement is negated in cosmic matter because it is subtle.

THROUGH MODIFICATION

Its effects start.

आह- ननु च परिणामोऽपि सौक्ष्म्यात्प्रधानस्य नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? न हि सौक्ष्म्यात्सूक्ष्मस्याकाशादेर्विपरिणामो दृष्ट इति ।

Opponent: The modification is also not possible in the cosmic matter because it is subtle in nature.

Why?

Because the modification is not observed in the subtle objects like space because of their being subtle in nature.

उच्यते-

संस्कारस्य सौक्ष्म्येऽपि परिणामोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तस्माद् युक्तः सूक्ष्मपरिणामीति ॥

Proponent: In spite of subtlety of refinement, its modification should be accepted.³ Therefore, it is right to declare it subtle and modifiable.

(Nature of modification)

आह, कः पुनरयं परिणामो नाम ?

Opponent: What is the modification?

उच्यते-

जहद्वर्मान्तरं पूर्वमादत्ते यदा परम् ।

तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मी परिणामः स उच्यते ॥ इति ।

यदा शक्त्यन्तरानुग्रहात्पूर्वधर्मान् तिरोभाव्य स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मी धर्मान्तरेणाविर्भवति तदवस्थानमस्माकं परिणाम इत्युच्यते ।

Proponent: "When the object without deviating from its essence, acquires the new qualities leaving the earlier, that is called modification."⁴

When an object without deviating from its essential nature comes up with the other (new) qualities after subduing the earlier qualities with the help of the power, that state is said by us to be the modification.⁵

आह, नैतदभिधानमात्रं दृष्टान्तमन्तरेण प्रतिपद्यामहे । तस्माद्यथा किमिति वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent: We do not understand this mere mention without an example. Therefore, an example should be given.

उच्यते- यथा पालाशं पलशादप्रच्युतनिमित्तान्तरस्यातपादेरनुग्रहाच्छ्यामतां तिरो-

भाव्य पीततां व्रजति तथेदं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Proponent: just as an object made of palasa wood without deviating from palasahood attains the yellow colour after subduing the blackness on account of the influence of other cause like heat, etc., it should also be understood like this.

आह न, अन्यथोत्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधात् । कथं पुनरेतदवगम्यते पालाशं स्वरूपादप्रच्युतं धर्मान्तरस्य परित्यागमुपादानं च करोति, न पुनरन्यथा चान्यथा चोत्पद्यत इति ?

Opponent: No, because the production of a different object is not negated. How is it known that the object made of palasa wood leaves and acquires the other qualities without deviating from its essential nature, and it is not born a fresh again and again.

उच्यते—क्षणभङ्गप्रतिषेधात् प्रागेवक्षणभङ्गनिर्दिष्टं विनष्टानां भावानां पुनरुत्पत्तौ नास्ति कारणम् । तदभावे चोत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति ।

Proponent: Because of the negation of momentariness. Earlier only in case of momentariness it is mentioned (that) there is no cause for (accepting) the production or the origination of the object already destroyed.⁶ And, the production is not justified without that.

(change in form or quality does not change the original)

आह, धर्मधर्मिणोरनन्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमाद्धर्मोत्पत्तिविनाशे धर्म्युत्पत्तिविनाशप्रसंगः । न हि वो धर्मेभ्योऽन्यो धर्मी । तत्र यदि धर्मस्य निवृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते धर्मिणोऽपि निवृत्तिरनन्यत्वात्प्राप्ता । धर्मोत्पत्तौ तदुत्पत्तिः । तत्र यदुक्तं धर्मोत्पत्तिविरोधे धर्मोत्पत्तिविनाशप्रसंगमिति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent: There arises the undesirable contingency of the production and destruction of the qualified object through the production and destruction of the qualities because of the acceptance of the identity of the qualities and the object qualified. In your theory, the object is not different from the qualities. If the destruction of quality is accepted, there results the destruction of the qualified also because of their being one. Similarly, is the production of that object with the production of the qualities. Therefore, the statement that the essential nature of the object persists inspite of the origination and

destruction of the qualities, is wrong.⁷

उच्यते न, सेनादिवदव्यवस्थानोपपत्तेः । तद्यथा सेनाङ्गेभ्योऽनन्यत्वं सेनायाः न च सेनाङ्गानां विनाशे सेनाविनाशः । तद्यथा तन्तुभ्यो नाऽन्यः पटः । बौद्धानां संयोगावयविप्रतिषेधात् । न च पटविनाशे तन्तुविनाशः तत्र । यतुक्तं धर्मिविनाशे धर्मविनाश इति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent: No because of the possibility of its staying (i.e., existing) like the army. To explain, there is the non-difference of the army from its parts. And, there is no destruction of army with the destruction of the parts of the army.⁸ Similarly, the cloth is not different from the threads because the conjunction and whole are rejected by the Buddhists. And, there is no destruction of threads with the destruction of cloth. The statement that the qualified object is destroyed with the destruction of the qualities, is wrong.

(Generality and particularity)

आह, एवमप्ययुक्तम् । तत्कस्मात् ? सामान्यविशेषयोर्धर्मिस्वरूपपरिकल्पनानुपपत्तेः इह रूपादिसामान्यं वा धर्मिरूपत्वेन परिकल्प्यमानं परिकल्प्येत रूपादिविशेषो वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावद्रूपादिसामान्यं धर्मिस्वरूपमिति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । कस्मात् ? असम्भवात् । यदि तावत्पृथिवि सामान्यं घटादिविशेषस्तेन पृथिव्यपि तन्मात्रपेक्षया विशेषः । यावत्प्रधानमिति नास्ति सामान्यम् । तदभावाद् धर्मिस्वरूपाभावः । अथ विशेषा घटादयस्तेषां विशेषान्तरेण सहाऽवस्थानाद्धर्मिस्वरूपानवस्थानात् । ततश्च यदुक्तं स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मा धर्मान्तरं विजहाति, धर्मान्तरमुपादत्ते इति तद्वयाहन्यत इति ।

Opponent: This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no justification of postulating the general or the particular as the essential nature of the object qualified. While postulating like this in the nature of the object qualified, one may postulate the general quality or the particular.

What difference does it make ? the generality of form, etc., cannot be postulated as identical with the object qualified.

Why ?

Because it is impossible. If the earth its general and pot, etc., the particular, the earth also is particular in comparison to the subtle elements. There is nothing general upto the state of cosmic matter.⁹ In the absence of that (general) there will be the absence of the form of the object qualified (by generality). If they (the qualified ob-

jects) are the particular, i.e., qualified by particularity like, pot etc., the form of the object qualified could not be decided because those will exist with the other particular object. Then, the statement that the object qualified without deviating from its essential nature leaves the other qualities and acquires the new, is contradicted.

उच्यते-यदुक्तं रूपादिसामान्यविशेषयोर्धर्मिस्वरूपपरिकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति, अस्तु सामान्यम् । यत्तुक्तं सामान्यं सामान्यान्तरापेक्षं विशेषत्वमिति न प्रत्ययनिवृत्तौ सामान्याभाववस्थितेस्ततश्च धर्मिस्वरूपसिद्धेः, यावत्पृथिवीत्ययं प्रत्ययो न निवर्तते सामान्यं घटादिविशेषः, द्रव्यत्वं चासौ, धर्मान्तरपरिवर्तेषु तदाकारप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिः स्वरूपावस्थानसिद्धेर्धर्मा घटादयः । यदा तु पृथिवीप्रत्ययनिवृत्तिस्तदा तन्मात्राणां सामान्यभावो द्रव्यत्वं च विशेषो धर्म इति यावत्प्रधानं तस्य तु सामान्यान्तरानुपपत्तेः कौटस्थ्यमेव । यत्र सर्वविशेषाभावस्तत्प्रधानम् । यदि तु पृथिव्यादीनां नित्यमव्यावृत्तं सति कौटस्थ्यमेषां प्राप्तम् । तस्मात्तु धर्मिस्वरूपाभावः शक्तेर्वा सामान्यभावाऽभ्युपगमात् । अथवा सुखदुःखमोहशक्तय एवेह महदादिना विशेषान्तेन लिगेडन परिणामं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तासां च सततं सामान्यप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात्स्वरूपादप्रच्युते तद् द्रव्यत्वं लिङस्य धर्मत्वम् । अप्रसिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेन्नोक्तत्वात् । प्रागुक्तमेतत्सुखादिपूर्वकमिदं विश्वमिति ।

Reply: As regards the objection of postulating general or particular as the object qualified, we reply : let it be the general. As regards your statement that one general is particular in comparison to (or depending upon) other (wider) general, (we reply) it is not so because the absence of general becomes certain with eradication of all knowledge (of general); because the nature of the object qualified is proved thereby. Until the knowledge that this is earth is not dispelled, the earth is general and the pot, etc., the particular. This is substance also. The pot, etc., are the modifications (qualities) because the subsistence of the form (of the object qualified in case of earth etc.) is proved through the origination of knowledge of its identical form when the qualities are changed. When the knowledge of the earth is dispelled, there is the knowledge of generality with reference to the subtle elements and of the substantiality as the particular quality. This order goes on up to the cosmic matter. It is unchangeable general (object). Cosmic matter is the state where there is the absence of all particularities. If the general nature in the earth, etc., would be al-

ways associated with them, they come to be unchangeable because there would always be their general form only. Therefore, there is no absence of the form of the object qualified. *Or because the general nature (generality) is admitted with reference to the power.* Or, the powers, viz., pleasure, pain and indifference undergo modification into the mergent object like the intellect, etc., up gross elements. Because they do not deviate from their essential nature as they are always the cause of the knowledge of generality, that substance-ness is the (general) quality of the mergent. If it is argued that it is not so because it is not well-known, we reply it is not so because we have already stated. We have already stated that the universe comes out of pleasure, etc.

आह— एवमपि वैश्वरूप्यानुपपत्तिः। कारणाविशेषात्। यदि सुखादिशक्तय एव परिणामिन्यो यदिदं ब्रह्मादि स्थावरान्तं वैश्वरूप्यं तत्रोपपद्यते।

Opponent: In this way also there is no possibility of the universe because there is no specification of the cause. If the power, viz., pleasure, etc. are modifiable, (the origin of) the universe beginning from Brahma to the immovable objects does not become possible.

Why?

Because there is no origination of a identical (or absolutely similar) effect.

(The constituents give rise to various objects)

उच्यते— शक्तिश्च परिणामिनि, भवति तेन वैश्वरूप्यम्। कथम्?

सलिलवत्प्रति प्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

यथान्तरिक्षाविशिष्टस्याम्भसः प्रच्युतिराश्रयेण गोभुजङ्गमोद्गादीनां, विशेषात्क्षीरमूत्र-विषादिवैश्वरूप्यं चोपपद्यते। तथा गुणशक्तयो विशिष्टाः परस्पराश्रयविशेषाद् ब्रह्मादि स्तम्भान्तं जात्याकृतिवाग्बुद्धिस्वभावाहारविहाररूपं वैश्वरूप्यं प्रतिपद्यते। तस्मात्सिद्धमेतत् प्रकृतिरेव सर्वभावनां प्रसवित्री। न च कश्चिद्दोष इति ॥ १६ ॥

Proponent: The power is also modifiable; the universe originates from that.

How?

LIKE WATER, ON ACCOUNT OF RESORTING TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE CONSTITUENTS.

As the water falls from the sky without differentiation in it, there arises in it the difference into milk, urine and poison according to the differentiation as it comes into the contact with a cow, camel and snake. Similarly, the power in the form of the constituents which are specified get various forms right from Brahma to the gross objects like the species and form (of the object), tongue, intellect, nature, wordly activities. Therefore, it is established that the cosmic matter is the origination of all the entities. And, there is no fault in it.

॥ युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ चतुर्थमाह्निकम् ॥

Here ends the fourth discourse of the Yuktidīpikā.

KARIKA 16

1. The reading given by ch. viz. samudayadityanena in place of samudayatyena of pandey's text, is correct.
2. The other commentators deny movement in the cosmic matter because of its being all -pervasive.
3. The context demands the reading kriyatvabhyupagame in place of kriyatvanabhyupagame of pandeyas's text.
4. Here, samskara may mean creation. It implies that the change leading to creation is so subtle that it is not perceptible, still the modification is not deniend. The objects imperceptible in nature also undergo change.
5. It differentiates the Samkhya view of change from that of Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta. In tha system of Nyaya the object is created a fresh and the same object does not modify into the other. In Advaita vedanta the change is allusory. In Samkhya, however, change is real but the object created is not altogether fresh but is the modified form of the cause in which some qualities are given up while the other are introduced.
6. Of. Karika 9
7. Since the Samkhy do not accept inherence as a relation, they accept tadatmya (identity-cum-difference) between the quality and its substratum. Therefore, the objector raises such an objection.
8. The argument is based upon the relation between part and whole. The example though not based upon quality and its substratum cannot be said to be wrong. The Samkhyas admit the relation of identity-cum-difference. (tadatmya) between part and whole also.
9. The Samkhyas are presented to hold the same view as the Naiyayikas regarding genarality and particularity. There is no fixed rule about them. However it is certain that samanya is of two kinds: the most pervasive and the least pervasive like the qualities of a particular object. The objects in middle may be said to be general or particular compartively. The cosmic matter is the most general while a particular object made of gross elements is the least general. About the objects in middle generality or particularity depends upon their comparative position. In Samkhya the rule is that the cause is more pervasive than the effect. In other words, in the hirarchy of causal classification the

earlier is more general than the latter.

10. The nature or the form of the object is determined by the knowledge of that. If something is known as earth, it is determined as earth though the qualities may change.
11. The sense is if the general nature is not deviated, that object would be eternal in its form and thus the causal relation would come to an end.

KĀRIKĀ-17

(Existence of Conscious Entity)

आह, समधिगतं प्रधानम् । पुरुष इदानीं कार्यकारणव्यतिरिक्तोऽस्तीत्येतत्प्रतिपाद्यम् । कुतः संशय इति चेत् अनुपलभ्यमानस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वादित्युक्तम् । किं चान्यत् । आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः । विज्ञानस्कन्धव्यतिरिक्तो नास्ति कश्चिदर्थ इति शाक्यपुत्रीयाः प्रतिपन्नाः । कस्मात् ? सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धे । इह यदस्ति तत्प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, तद्यथा रूपादि । ततश्च तावदयमात्मा न प्रत्यक्षत उपलभ्यते । कस्मात् ? अशब्दादिलक्षणत्वात् । नान्तःप्रत्यक्षतः । कस्मात् ? त्रिगुणादिविपरीतस्य तदविषयत्वात् । न पूर्ववच्छेषवद्भ्याम् । कार्यकारणाऽनुपपत्तेः । न च सामान्यतोद्घात् । धर्मसामान्याऽभावात् । नाप्तवचनात् । अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि बौद्धानां श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणेतिहासाः प्रमाणम् । यश्चैषामागमः, स एवमाह

“आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो नास्ति विपरीतेन कल्प्यते ।

नैवेह सत्त्वमात्मास्ति धर्मास्त्वेते सहेतुकाः ॥

द्वादशैव तवाङ्गानि स्कन्धायतनधातवः ।

विचिन्त्य सर्वाण्येतानि पुद्गलो नोपलभ्यते ॥

शून्यमाध्यात्मिकं विद्धि शून्यं पश्य बहिर्गतम् ।

न दृश्यते सोऽपि कश्चिद्यो भावयति शून्यताम् ॥

पुनरप्याह “अस्ति कर्मास्ति विपाकः, कारकस्तु नोपलभ्यते य इमान्स्वान्धर्मानाक्षिपति । अन्यांश्च प्रति सन्दधाति, अन्यत्र धर्मसंकेतात् ।” । तस्मात्सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धेर्नास्त्यात्मेति ।

Opponent : The cosmic matter is understood. Now, it should be established that the conscious entity exists as different from body. If it is asked why does the doubt arise, (the reply is) we have already stated that the imperceptible object is observed to be of both the kinds (or in both the ways).¹ Moreover, because there is the difference of opinion among the authorities. The Buddhists hold that nothing except thought-faculty and constituents of the body exists.

Why?

Because it is not known through any of the means of knowledge.

Whatever exists in the universe is known through some means of knowledge like perception as for example the form, etc. The soul (postulated by the Sāṃkhyas) is not known through perception.

Why

Because it is by nature devoid of sound, etc.² Nor is it known through internal perception.

Why ?

because the objects contradictory to one (devoid of the qualities like) composed of three constituents, etc., are not the object of that (internal perception). Nor is it known through apriori³ and aposteriori⁴ type of inference because the idea of cause and effect does not hold good (in case of soul). Nor is it known through the inference based on analogy⁵ because there is absence of all common qualities in it. Nor (is it known) through valid testimony because it is not accepted by us as a means of valid knowledge. The sruti, śmṛti, Purāṇa and itihāsa are not the means of valid knowledge according to the Bauddhas. Their own scripture states as :

“There is no soul of the one (supposed to be wrongly) possessed of it. It is invertedly postulated. There is no entity called soul. There are the elements which are caused. You are composed of twelve only the skandhas, āyatanas and the dhātus. After analysing all these, the man is not observed. Know the internal objects as void and consider the external objects also as void. The one who cherishes the void is also an ignorant as well.”⁶

Again, it is stated that “the acts are there, their fruition is there. No agent, however, is observed to take these elements off and to collect the others, than the stipulation of the qualities.” Therefore, since the soul is not established by any means of knowledge, it does not exist.

(The Existence of soul established through inference
based on analogy).

उच्यते-यत्तावदुक्तं प्रत्यक्षतः पूर्ववच्छेषवद्भ्यां चात्मनो नोपलब्धिरिति, सत्यमेतत् ।
यत्तूक्तं सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुपलब्धिरात्मसामान्याऽनुपपत्तेरिति, तदयुक्तम् ।

(composite is meant for others)

कस्मात् ?

संघातपरार्थत्वात्

इह संघाताः परार्था दृष्टाः । तद्यथा शयनासनरथचरणादयः । अस्ति चायं शरीरलक्षणः संघातः । तस्मादनेनाऽपि परार्थेन भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ परः स पुरुषः । तस्मादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Why ?

BECAUSE THE COMPOSITE IS MEANT FOR OTHER

The composites are observed to be meant for others just as the bed, seat, chariot and feet, etc. The body is also a composite. Therefore, it should also be meant for other. The other entity referred to here is the conscious entity. Therefore, the conscious entity exists.

(Conscious entity is non-composite in nature)

आह, संघातार्थत्वोपलब्धेः । शयनादयो हि सत्यपि परार्थत्वे संघातार्थाः । यदि च तैरतिदेशः कार्यकारणसंघातस्य क्रियते प्राप्तमस्य तद्वत्संघातार्थत्वम् । एवं पुरुषविपरीताऽर्थसिद्धिप्रसंगः । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तर्हि चक्षुरादयः परार्थाः ।

Opponent : Because the nature of being meant for (other) composite is also experienced. The bed, etc., though meant for others are meant for some other composite. If their application is extended to the composite of the cause and effect (i.e., body), its nature of being meant for some other composite is established. This would lead to the undesirable contingency of establishing something opposite to the conscious entity (in nature). If it is undesirable, the sense of sight, etc., would not be meant for others.

उच्यते—न शक्यमेतदापादयितुम् । कस्मात् ? असंहतत्वसिद्धौ वादप्रवृत्ते । सिद्धे सत्यसंहतत्वे पुरुषस्यायं वादः प्रवृत्तः । तस्मान्न पारार्थ्यमनेन बाध्यते । कथमवगम्यत इति चेत्, प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेः । सति हि संघातत्वे देवदत्तादिवदयं पुरुषः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्येत । तथा च सति संशयाभावात्प्रवृत्तिरेवास्य वादस्य न स्यात् । तस्मादयुक्तं संहतार्थाः शयनादिवच्चक्षुरादयः ।

Proponent : This cannot be accepted.

Why?

Because the discussion is commenced after the establishment of non-composite nature of the conscious entity. The discussion is taken up when the non-composite nature of the conscious entity is proved. Therefore, it (the reason) does not go against the nature of

being meant for other.⁷ If it is asked how is it known, we reply, because it is not cognised directly. If there would be composite nature (of the conscious entity), the conscious entity would be directly known like Devadatta, etc. If this would have been the case, there would be no doubt and consequently the discussion would not commence. Therefore, it is wrong that the eye, etc., are meant for other composite as is the case with the bed, etc.

आह, परस्पोपकारित्वात्पारार्थसिद्धिः । इह क्षेत्रोदकसूर्यादयः शस्यादीनामुपकारकाः । तथा कार्यकारणत्वासंघातश्च । यथोक्तं तस्मादयुक्तमेतेषां पारतन्त्र्यमिति ।

Opponent : Their nature of being meant for other is proved by their mutual service. The field, water, sun, etc., are doing service to the crop. Therefore, on account of serving the body it is composite. This is stated so and, hence, their nature of being dependent, is wrong.

उच्यते-न शयनादिवत्ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वात् । तद्यथा शयनाद्यङ्गानां सति परस्पोपकारित्वे ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वात्तदभावे चार्थानिर्धक्यम् । एवं चक्षुरादीनां सति परस्पोपकारित्वे ततोऽन्येनार्थवत्त्वं भवितुमर्हति । तदभावे चार्थानिर्धक्यमिति ।

Proponent : No, because it (eye) is, like bed, etc., meant for other than itself. For example though the parts of the bed are mutually meant for other, yet they are purposive for some entity other than themselves and are useless in the absence of that. Similarly, though there is mutual serviceableness in the eye, etc., yet they are purposeful only through (in presence of) someone different from them. And, in the absence of that there is the purposelessness of them.

आह, शयनादीनां देवदत्तार्थत्वात्तस्य च भेदा बहिर्भावात्परस्परार्थत्वप्रसंगः । एवं शयनादयो देवदत्तार्थाः, कार्यकारणसंघातश्च देवदत्तशब्दवाच्यस्तत्र भेदानामेव भेदार्थत्वात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धिः । दृष्टान्ताऽभावो वा । अथ मतं शयनादयो न देवदत्तार्थाः, किं तर्हि क्षेत्रज्ञार्थाः । तथा सति साध्यसमो दृष्टान्त इति ।

Opponent : Since the bed, etc., are meant for Devadatta, and the latter being not outside the realm of composite nature, there arises the undesirable contingency of their being meant for one another (i.e. one composite for the other). Thus, the bed, etc., are meant for Devadatta and the object denoted by the word Devadatta is

the composite of cause and effect (body). Hence, the purpose of the conscious entity is served (by some composite only) since one composite is meant for the other. Or there will be no example (to support your thesis). If you hold that the bed, etc., are not meant for Devadatta, etc., but are meant for the self, in that case the example would be equally unproved like the probandum (i.e. the example would be equal to the probandum).⁸

उच्यते-न, प्रसिद्धनुरोधात् । सत्यं कार्यकारणसंघातस्य पारार्थ्यम् । भोक्तृत्वं नोपपद्यते । लोके तु देवदत्तार्थत्वं शयनादीनां प्रसिद्धम् । अतस्तदनुगच्छन्तो वयमप्येवं ब्रूमः । कस्मात् ? प्रसिद्धेः । प्रसिद्धेन ह्यप्रसिद्धं तद्धर्मतामापद्यते । पश्चात्तु द्वयोरप्येकधर्मानुगमाद्धर्मान्तरेणाऽपि तद्वत्ताऽनुमीयते । तथा च क्षणभङ्गाधिकारे भवद्विरप्युक्तं “यस्य हि प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं नास्ति तस्य बाह्यप्रत्ययो भेदः, पश्चाद्विशेषग्रहणे नास्ति । तद्यथा भूमेरपच्यमानायाः पाकजानाम् ।” न च भूमेः प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं नास्ति, अक्षणिकत्वप्रसंगात् । सौक्ष्म्याद् दुरधिगमो भेद इति दृष्टान्तः प्रत्युक्तः । तस्मात्प्रसिद्धं संघातपारार्थत्वादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Proponent : *No, on the basis of its being well known.* It is true that the composite of effect and cause is meant for other ; the nature of their being experiencer does not hold good, i.e., they cannot be the enjoyer. In the world, the bed, etc., are commonly experienced as meant for Devadatta, etc. Hence, following it we also speak like this.

Why ?

Because it is a well known fact. Through the commonly experienced fact the unexperienced also comes to possess the nature of the former. Afterwards, since both are having the same nature, it is inferred from the other quality that the one possesses this nature also. You have also stated in the discussion (lit. realm) of momentariness : “ In case of them in whose theory there is no change every moment, there is no differentiation externally just as in the case of backed atoms of the earth afterwords when the particularity is once cognised! And it is not that there is no change every moment in ground ; otherwise it will involve the undesirable contingency of its not being momentary. Thus, the example that the differentiation is difficult to be cognised on account of subtlety, is refuted. Therefore, it is proved that conscious entity exists because the composite is meant for others.

(Opposition to the properties of the manifest)

इतस्त्वं-

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि च बाह्याध्यात्मिकं तथा प्रधानम् । तत्र यद्येतावदेतत्स्यात् किमपेक्ष्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्त्रैगुण्यादीति ?

And due to the following reason also the conscious entity exists.

BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION TO THE THREE CONSTITUENTS AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES

The internal and the external objects are composed of three constituents, non-discriminative, objective, common to many conscious entities and productive (and) so is the cosmic matter. If this is so, in comparison to what there are the properties of being composed of three constituents and the others in manifest and the non-manifest?⁹

(Control over non-sentient)

किं चान्यत् ।

अधिष्ठानात् ।

इहाकस्मिन्व्यां प्रधानप्रवृत्तावर्थवशः सन्निविशेषनियमो न स्यात् । श्रोत्रादि पृथिव्यादीनां देवमानुषतिर्यक्षु हितयोगार्थश्चाहितप्रतिषेधार्थश्च सः । तस्मादस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्तो यदधिष्ठितानां गुणानामयं चित्ररूपो विपरिणामः ।

Moreover,

BECAUSE OF THE CONTROL

In case the activity of cosmic matter is causeless (or sudden), there would not have been the restriction (or rule) about a particular arrangement meant for a particular purpose (object). That rule (or particular arrangement) of earth, etc., in the form of ear, etc., is found in the (body of) gods, man and animal for the attainment of (association with) the desired and the avoidance of the undesired. Therefore, there does exist the conscious entity) different from them controlled by the constituents undergo diverse transformation.

(Control is metaphorical)

कर्तृत्वप्रसंगादधिष्ठानानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं यदि गुणानां पुरुषाधिष्ठितानां प्रवृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते, कर्तृत्वमस्य प्राप्तम् । अर्थाऽकर्ता न तद्व्यतिरिक्त्यधिष्ठातृत्वमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अर्थे तदुपचारात् । यथाऽपुरुषार्थः सिद्ध्यति तथा गुणा कार्यकारणभावेन व्यूहन्त इत्यतस्तत्पारतन्त्र्यादेशामधिष्ठितत्वमुपपद्यते, पुरुषस्य चाधिष्ठितृत्वम् । अतो नास्य

कर्तृत्वप्रसंगः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् अधिष्ठानात्पुरुषः ।

Plausible objection : If it is argued that the control is not justified because it would involve the undesirable contingency of (supposition) of agency (in the conscious entity)? It may be like this. If the activity is admitted (to belong) to the constituents controlled by the conscious entity, there will be the admittance of agency in it. If it is not an agent, there is no controlling power (in the consconscious entity).

Reply : This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because the control is metaphorically spoken with reference to the purpose (of the conscious entity).¹⁰ The constituents attain the state of effect and cause (i. e., objects) in a way that the purpose of the conscious entity is fulfilled. Hence, since they are dependent upon him, their nature of being controlled is justified. (Similarly) the control-ership of the conscious entity (is justified). Therefore, arises no undesirable contingency of the agency of the conscious entity.¹¹ Hence, it is right that the conscious entity exists because of the control.

(conscious entity exists as an enjoyer)

किञ्चान्यत् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्

इह सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादचेतनं व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, तस्मादस्य परस्परेण भोगो नोपपद्यते; इत्यवश्यं भोक्त्रा भवितव्यम् । योऽसौ भोक्ता स पुरुषः ।

Moreover,

BECAUSE OF THE ENJOYERSHIP THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY EXISTS.

Here, both the manifest and the unmanifest, being of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, are unconscious in nature. Therefore, there is no propriety in considering their mutual enjoying. Whosoever is this enjoyer is the conscious entity.

(Enjoyment of conscious entity is metaphorical)

आह, कः पुनरयं भोगो नाम ?

Opponent : What is this enjoyment ?

उच्यते— भोग उपलब्धिसद्भावात् ।

Proponent : The enjoyment is caused by the attainment of the object.

विज्ञानमेव हि विषयोपलब्धिसमर्थमित्यतस्तावन्मात्रमेवास्तु किं पुरुषेण परिकल्पिते-
नेति ?

Opponent : The knowing faculty is capable is capable of attaining the objects. Hence, let there be the knowing faculty only (as the enjoyer). What then is there the need of postulating the conscious entity ?

उच्यते— किं पुनरिदं विज्ञानं नामेति ?

Proponent : What is then this knowing faculty ?

आह, चित्तं मनो विज्ञानमिति । तच्च षड्विधं ज्ञानं - चक्षुर्विज्ञानं, श्रोत्रविज्ञानं, श्रोत्रविज्ञानं, घ्राणविज्ञानं, जिह्वाविज्ञानं, कायविज्ञानं, मनोविज्ञानमिति । तत्र रूपं प्रतीत्य चक्षुश्चोत्पद्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानम् । एवं श्रोत्रशब्दघ्राण-ग्रन्थ-जिह्वा-रस-मनोधर्माश्चित्तमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्य धर्माः -- वेदना, संज्ञा, चेतना, स्पर्शो, मनः, संस्कार एवमादयः तस्माद्विज्ञानस्कन्धस्यैवोपभोगसामर्थ्या-
न्नास्त्यात्मेति

Opponent : Knowledge, consciousness, mind are synonymous. There are six kinds of knowledge : Knowledge arising of eye, Knowledge arising of ear, Knowledge arising of nose, knowledge arising of tongue, knowledge arising of skin and the knowledge arising of mind. That which arises lwith the help of the form and eye is the knowledge arising of eye. In this way, the ear and word, nose and smell, tongue and taste, and the properties of mind give rise to the consciousness. Its attributes are affection, perception, psychic stirring, conduct, mind (deliberation) and impressions, etc. Therefore, since the knowing faculty forming the part of the body is capable of enjoying, there is no soul at all.

(Consciousness can belong to soul only)

उच्यते— न, अचेतनविकारस्य चेतनानुपपत्तेः । यतुखल्विदमिष्यते रूपं प्रतीत्य चक्षु-
श्चोत्पद्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानमित्यादि, तेनाचेतनविकारत्वात्तदचेतनं घटादिवदित्यापन्नम् । तस्मान्म-
नो धर्मश्चेतनेति मनोरथमात्रमेतत् । विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं नायं
नियमः यदुत यज्जातीयं कारणं तज्जातीयकेन कार्येण भवितव्यम् । किं तर्हि विलक्षणकार्यो-

त्यतिरपि भावानामुपलभ्यते । तद्यथा—शृङ्गाच्छ्रो जायते, गोलोमाऽविलोमभ्यो दूर्वा । वत्स-
तरान्मुक...यश्चन्द्रकान्तेन्दुसंयोगात्सलिलम् । सूर्यकान्तगोमयार्कसम्पर्कात् सुधोदकसम्पर्कादू-
रणिनिर्मथनाच्चाग्निः । एवमचेतेनेभ्यो रूपादिभ्यश्चेतनमुत्पद्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम्, चेतना-
चेतनोत्पत्तिनियमवत्तन्नियमात् । यथा सत्येतस्मिन्विलक्षणकार्यप्रादुर्भावे भवतश्चेतनाच्चि-
त्तान्नाचेतनं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नियमः, तथा सत्येतस्मिन्विलक्षणकार्यप्रादुर्भावे नाचेतनेभ्यो
रूपादिभ्यश्चेतनं चित्तमुत्पद्यत इत्ययं नियमो नः । तस्मादेषां दृष्टानां सति बहुत्वे मायाकारनग-
रविन्यासवदयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वादसाधीयस्त्वम् । प्रदीपवत्तद्वयवस्थेति चेत्, स्यादेतत्
यथाऽचेतनेभ्यः सत्तवादिभ्योऽव्यवसायकं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नैदानीं व्यवसायको महान्नोत्प-
द्यते । एवं रूपादिभ्योऽचेतनं घटाद्युत्पद्यत इति नैदानीं चेतनं चित्तं नोत्पद्यत इति । एतदप्यनु-
पपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? शक्तिभेदात् । प्रकाशस्वाभाव्याद् व्यवसायात्मकं सत्त्वम् । तद्युक्तं यदि
तत्त्वान्यादव्यसायात्मको महानुत्पद्यते । तमः प्राधान्यादघटादयः । भवतस्त्वेकारः रूपादयः
तस्मादयमसमः सामाधिः ।

Proponent : No, because of the non-justification of postulating consi-
ciousness as belonging to a product of the non-conscious. With
the acceptance that the knowledge arising of eye arises with
regard to the eye and the form, it (knowledge) would be non-
conscious because of its being the modification of the non-con-
scious, just as a pot. Therefore, it is merely a cherished well
that the consciousness is the property of the mind.

If it is argued that it is proved through the observation of the
production of dissimilar effect ? It may be like this. This is not a rule
that the effect should belong to the genus of its cause. On the other
hand, the origination of a dissimilar effect is also observed in case of
the objects. For example, from the peak of the mountain is born the
reed grass (used for arrows), the durva grass originate from the
small hair of the cow (of the body) when not placed in opposite
direction; the small of cowdung from a waned calf and water from
the contact of moon with the moonstone. (Similarly) fire is produced
from the contact of the sun-stone and the cowdung, contact of water
and lime, and the attrition of arni wood. In this way consciousness is
produced from the form, etc. which are unconscious.

Reply : This is also wrong. That restriction is like the
restriction of the origination of conscious and non-conscious. For
example, inspite of the origination of dissimilar effects, there is
a restriction in your theory that from the conscious citta there
is no origination of the unconscious pot, etc., Similarly inspite of

the origination of dissimilar effects the rule in our theory is this that the conscious citta does not originate from the form, etc., which are uncscious. Therefore, though there are many examples, yet you are not better (in theory) because you have (accepted) the objects of wrong knowledge which are like the construction of the city of illusion. If it is argued that the rule will be like a lamp? It may be like this. As the pot, etc., which are not of the form of resolution originate from the sattva which is non-sentient in nature, it is not that the intellect also which is of the nature of resolution does not originate from that. Similarly, the non-conscious pot, etc., originate from the form, etc., which are non-conscious, but it is not that the citta which is conscious does not originate from it.

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the differentiation into capabilities. The sattva is of the nature of resolution because of its being of the nature of light. Then, it is right if (you say that) the intellect which is of the nature of resolution originates when that dominates. The, pot, etc., are of the nature of non-resolution because they abound in tamas.¹² The form, etc., in your theory are, however, of a single nature. Therefore, the solution here is not equal to our case.

(Resolution and consciousness)

आह, किं व्यवसायचैतन्ययोः कश्चिद्रूपभेदोऽस्ति न वेति ?

Opponent : Is there some difference of nature between resolution and consciousness or not ?

उच्यते - किं तर्हि त्रैगुण्यात्सति प्रत्ययरूपत्वे संवेद्या बुद्धिर्यथा तु व्यवसायरूपं तथा चैतन्यरूपमिति । तथा च वार्षगणाः पठन्ति—बुद्धिवृत्त्याविष्टो हि प्रत्ययत्वेनानुवर्तमानामनुयाति पुरुष इति । आह च

अर्थाकार इवाभाति यथा बुद्धिस्तथा पुमान् ।

आभासमानो बुद्ध्याऽतो बोद्धा मणिवदुच्यते ॥

यथा यथा मनोवृत्तिः पुरुषोऽपि तथा तथा ।

बुद्धिरूपमवाप्नोति चेतनत्वात्पराश्रयम् ॥

Proponent : Though the intellect being composed of the three constituents and of the nature of knowledge is knowable, yet when it is of the nature of resolution, it is conscious in nature. Thus state the followers of Varsaganya : 'the conscious entity enveloped with (or possessed of) the function of the intellect follows the intellect and continues (to exist) in the form of knowledge'.¹³ It is stated also :

"The conscious entity appears as having assumed the form of the objects, as the intellect so the conscious entity, shining through (or appearing like) intellects, the conscious entity is said to be a knower as a jewel.¹⁴ As is the modification of the mind, so appears the form of the conscious entity. The conscious entity attains the form of the intellect because it is sentient the form-which is located in the other entity."

आह, रूपाभेदात्पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरन्यतरपरिकल्पानाऽनर्थक्यम् । यदि तर्हि यथा व्यवसायरूपं तथा चैतन्यरूपम्, एवं सति व्यवसायमात्रं परिकल्पनीयं चैतन्यमात्रं वा ? कस्मात् ? न ह्येकान्तकारिणोर्युगपत् कल्पने सामर्थ्यमस्ति । रूपान्तराऽभिधानं वा । अथ व्यवसायचैतन्ययोः पदार्थान्तरमेवेति नित्यतो विशेष्यते, तर्हि वक्तव्यमिदमुभयैवं रूपं नाऽमु-
ष्यति ।

Opponent : The postulation of either of the conscious entity and the internal organ serves no purpose because of the (postulation of) non-difference in the nature (of them). If the position is like this-as the nature of the agent of resolution, so is the nature of consciousness, in this case either you should postulate resolution only or conscious entity only.

Why?

There is no justification of postulation of acting together in case of the one who can act lonely. Or there (should) be the statement of the difference of nature. If the distinction finally remains in case of the resolution and consciousness, it should be stated that this is the nature of this only and not of this.

उच्यते-य एवमाह रूपाभेदादार्थाभेद इति स तावदिदं प्रष्टव्यः-अथ किम् ? भवतः किं विज्ञानविषययोराकारभेदोऽस्ति उत नास्तीति ?

Proponent : One who argues for non-difference of objects due to the non-difference of the form should be asked-so what? In your

theory is there the difference in form between the consciousness and object or not?.

नेत्याह । कस्मात् ? आकारान्तरे सति विषयपरिच्छेदानुपपत्तेः । न हि विषयस्य विज्ञानप्रत्यवभासमन्तरेण शक्यं स्वरूपं परिच्छेत्तुम् । तत्र यदन्याकारो गौरन्याकारं गोविज्ञानं स्यात्तेन यथाऽन्याकारेणाऽश्वविज्ञानेनाऽन्याकारस्य गोरपरिच्छेदः, एवमन्याकारेण गोविज्ञानेनान्याकारस्य गोरपरिच्छेदः स्यात् । तस्मान्नास्ति विषयविज्ञानयोराकारभेद इति ।

Opponent : No,

Why ?

Because there would not arise the discriminative knowledge of an object when the form is different. The form of the object cannot be known without the knowledge of the object. If the cow would be of some other form and the knowledge of the cow of some other form, there would not arise the discriminative knowledge of the cow which is of different form from the cow, just as the knowledge of the cow, which is of different form from that of the horse, does not arise from the discriminative knowledge of the horse which is also of different form from the cow.¹⁵ Therefore, there is no difference between the knowledge and the form.

उच्यते- तयोरीदानीं विषयविषयविज्ञानयोः किमुभयत्वमुताभेद इति ?

Proponent : In this case, is there the distinction between the object and knowledge or both are identical ?

आह, कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why?

उच्यते- ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावादिति ।

ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्यद्वद्रूपाभेदेऽपि भिन्नता ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन तथैवात्मप्रकाशयोः ॥

यथैव तर्हि भवतः सत्यप्याकारभेदे ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभावपरिकल्पनाद् भेद एवं पुरुषान्तःकरणयोरपीति । ग्राह्यग्राहकभावासिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, यथा गोतद्विज्ञानयोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभावो निश्चितो नैवं पुरुषान्तःकरणयोः । तस्माद्वैषम्यमिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? मार्गान्तरगमनात् । प्रागुक्तं येषामाकारभेदो नास्ति तेषामेकत्वम् । इदानीं तु रूपाऽभेदेऽपि ग्राह्यग्राहकभावादेवं ब्रुवतो मार्गान्तरम् । ज्ञानमात्राभ्युपगमादशाक्यीयमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, ज्ञानमेवान्तराऽसद्विषयभूतानुरज्जितं विषयविषयिरूपेण प्रत्यवभासते । न तु किञ्चिद्वाह्यं किञ्चिद् ग्राह्यरूपापन्नमस्ति । तस्माज्ज्ञानविज्ञेययोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकभेदाद् भेद इत्यशा-

कयीयमेतत् इति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सिद्धान्तभेदात् । येषां बाह्यो विषयोऽस्ति तत्पक्षेऽयं दोषः । इतरेषां तु ज्ञानमात्रस्य विषयविषयिभावं प्रतिषेत्स्याम इति ।

Proponent : Because there is the relation of illuminator and the illumined.

“As there is the difference between the knowledge and the objects of knowledge even though their form is not different, similar is the case with (the difference) between soul and the light through the relation of the object cognised even though there is no difference in form; in the same way, there is the difference between the conscious entity and the internal organ.”

If you argue that is wrong because the relation of the cogniser and the cognised is not determined? It may be like this. Just as the relationship of the cognised and the cogniser is fixed between the cow and its knowledge, it is not so between the conscious entity and the internal organ. Therefore, it involves dissimilarity.

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because you have adopted a different way (here). Earlier you have stated that the objects whose form does not differ are identical. Now, however, speaking like this (i. e. holding the difference) due to the relation of the cognised and the cogniser even in the absense of non-difference in the form (of the two), you have adopted a different way.

If it is argued that it is non-Buddhist (position) because of the admittance of knowledge only (by the Buddhists)? It may be like this. Only the knowledge appears in the form of the objects (of knowledge) and the cogniser when it is coloured by an object which is only internally existent, and (in reality) does not exist. There is nothing external which is endowed with the character of something cognised. Therefore, the position that there is the distinction between the knowledge and the object of knowledge on account of the distinction between the cogniser and the cognised, is non-Buddhist .

That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the difference of the theory. The defect is applicable to those in whose theory the external object exists. We reject the position of the others that the state of both the objects and the cogniser is knowledge itself.

(Conscious entity is not an agent of resolution)

आह, एवमपि विषयाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । विषयिणो विषयत्वप्रतिज्ञानात् । यदि विषयिणोऽप्यध्यवसायस्य विषयभावः प्रतिज्ञायते तेन पुरुषस्यापि विषयिणोऽन्यो विषयीति प्राप्तम्, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यनवस्थाः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति पुरुषो निश्चयरूपत्वात् विषयो न तर्ह्यध्यवसायादपि निश्चेतुरर्थान्तरं कल्पयितव्यमिति ।

Opponent : In this way also there would arise the undesirable contingency of infinite regress in case of the objects, because you have recognised the subject of knowledge also as an object of knowledge. If the objectivity of a cogniser is *recognised*, it would result in the position that there will be other knower of the conscious entity which is himself a knower. There will be someone else of that also. Thus will be the infinite regress. Thus in order to alleviate the defect (it should be postulated that) the conscious entity being of the nature of ascertainment is not the object; nor should then be postulated some cogniser other than resolution.

चेतनात्वात्पुरुषे तदनुपपत्तिः । इन्द्रियाणि तावद् ग्रहणमात्ररूपत्वादप्रत्ययानीति प्रत्ययवदन्तस्तावत्करणं परिकल्प्यते । अन्तःकरणमप्युपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातात्तद्रूपापत्तावपि सत्यामचेतनत्वात्स्वयमुपलब्धुमसमर्थमेव विषयमित्यतो भोक्तारं चेतनं पुरुषमपेक्षते । पुरुषस्य तु चेतनत्वाद् द्रष्टृन्तरमशक्यं कल्पयितुम् । तस्मान्नाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः ।

Proponent : That is not possible in the case of conscious entity because of its being conscious. The senses are of the nature of apprehension only and, hence, are not the knowledge.¹⁷ Hence, some internal organ as endowed with the knowledge is postulated. The internal organ also being unconscious is not capable of cognising the object even it has attained the form of the object following the operation of the senses which have attained the form of the object. Hence, the conscious enjoyer is required. Since the conscious entity is conscious, there is no possibility of postulating some other seer of the conscious entity. Therefore, there is no (scope for) undesirable contingency of infinite regres.

आह, पुरुषस्याध्यवसायकर्तृत्वप्रसंगः, चैतन्यात् । यद्यचेतना बुद्धिस्तेन तस्या अध्यवसायो वृत्तिर्घटादिवन्न प्राप्नोति । अतः पुरुषस्याध्यवसायः प्राप्तः । ततश्च बुद्ध्यभाव इति ।

Opponent: There arises the undesirable contingency of conscious entity's being agent of resolution because of its being con-

scious. If the intellect is unconscious, there will be no operation of resolution in case of it as it is not in case of a pot. Hence, the resolution will belong to the conscious entity. Then there would be the absence of intellect.

उच्यते—न, कैवल्यादप्रतिबन्धप्रसगात् । अनामिश्ररूपं पुरुषतत्त्वमिति एतदुपरिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यामः । स यदि व्यवसायकः स्यात्, अप्रतिबन्धेन दिङ्मिथ्यादिषु सुप्तमत्तमूर्च्छितानां च व्यवसायः स्यात् । दृष्टस्त्वेवमवस्थस्य व्यवसायप्रतिबन्धः । तस्मात् पुरुषस्य व्यवसायः । यस्य पुनरन्तःकरणं व्यवसायकं तस्यैवं दोषो नास्ति । कस्मात् ? त्रैगुण्यात् । सत्त्वादिसंस्थानविशेषो हि बुद्धिः, करणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् । तत्र यदा व्यवसायलक्षणं सत्त्वं गुणाभावात्प्रधानभूतेन तमसा तिरस्कृतशक्ति भवति तदाऽव्यवसायप्रतिबन्धः ।

Proponent : No, because (otherwise) there will arise the undesirable contingency of absence of obstruction because of the isolation of conscious entity. We shall say later on that the conscious entity is of the unmixed form. If it would have been the agent of resolution, there would be resolution of the person asleep, intoxicated or fainted in respect of ascertaining the directions without any obstruction. The obstruction in resolution of a man in these states is, however, observed. Therefore, the resolution does not belong to conscious entity. This defect does not arise in the theory of one according to whom the agent of resolution is the internal organ.

Why ?

Because of its being composed of three constituents. The intellect is a particular arrangement of Sattva, etc., because of the rejection of some other instrument (or operation of some agent). When Sattva having the characteristic of resolution becomes overpowered by Tamas which becomes dominant, then the resolution is obstructed.

आह, कथं पुनरेतद् गम्यते सर्वमिदमचेतनमिति ?

उच्यते—प्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वात् । इह यत्प्रकृतिविकारभूतं तदचेतनम् । तद्यथा तन्तुपटादयः प्रकृतिविकारभूतं तस्मादचेतनम् । आकाशे दर्शनान्नैकान्त इति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात् । न ह्याकाशस्यात्मपक्षे प्रकृतिविकारत्वाभावः सिद्धः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्प्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वादचेतनं सर्वम् । अत एव च चेतनस्याऽप्रकृतिविकारभूतत्वं परस्परवैधर्म्यात् । तस्मान्नान्यस्य परमार्थस्य भोक्तृत्वमाचेतन्यादुपपद्यते, न चेत्भूक्तं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः ।

Opponent : How is it known that everything in the world is unconscious?

Proponent : Because of being the modification of cosmic matter.

Here, whatever is the modification of cosmic matter is unconscious, just as the threads, cloth etc., being the modification of cosmic matter are unconscious. If it is argued that it is not conclusive because of its (i.e. of the unconsciousness) observation in the space, we reply. no, because it is not established. The absence of considering the space as the modification of cosmic matter is not established in our theory.¹⁸ Therefore it is right that everything being the modification of cosmic matter is unconscious. Hence, is the nature of non-modification of cosmic matter in the case of the conscious entity because they are contradictory (dissimilar in nature), Therefore, the enjoyer-ness of some other ultimate object (than conscious entity) is not justifiable or possible because of its being unconscious in nature. If it is not so, (i.e. if there is no other enjoyer), it is rightly stated that conscious entity does exist because of its being an enjoyer.

(Tendency for Isolation)

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

इह प्रवृत्तिमतां निमित्तमन्तरेण निवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यते । प्रधानमपि च प्रवृत्तिमद् व्यक्तदर्शनात् । तस्माद्यस्य कैवल्यं प्रधानप्रवृत्तिहेतुः स पुरुषः । प्रधानानुभ्युपगमादुभयाऽप्रसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत्, प्रधानं चेतनवदस्माकमप्रसिद्धम् । यावत्तस्य कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तिर्भवता पुरुषास्तित्वे लिङ्गमपदिश्यते तदिदमसिद्धं प्रतिपाद्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पूर्वं तत्प्रतिपादनात् । प्राक्प्रधानमप्रतिपाद्यैवमाचक्षाणः सत्यमेवं पर्यनुयोगार्हः स्यात्, साधितं तु प्रधानं परिमाणादिभिरित्यतो न किंचिदेतत् ।

AND BECAUSE THERE IS THE TENDENCY FOR ISOLATION.

Here, the cessation of activity of the active agents is not justified without some other reason. Cosmic matter also is active, because it (activity) is observed in the case of manifest.

Therefore, he, whose isolation is the cause of the activity of cosmic matter, is the conscious entity.

If it is argued that since cosmic matter is not accepted, both of them are not established, it may be like this. The cosmic matter also

is not well established for us like the conscious entity. The activity for isolation which is stated to be a reason by you for the existence of conscious entity is not yet proved (and hence,) the proved or existent thing is not being established by it.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is established earlier. The one saying this before establishing (the existence) of cosmic matter would surely deserve reproach. The cosmic matter, however, is already established (by us) through 'limited magnitude', etc., and hence, it (your argument) is not effective.

(Controversy does not prove non-existence of conscious entity.)

सर्वाचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेः पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यदि पुरुषस्य सत्त्वमेव स्यात्तेन तं प्रत्याचार्याणां न धर्मविवादः स्यात् । अस्ति चासौ । तथा हि केषांचिन्निर्गुणः, केषांचित्परवान् । अतः सर्वेषां विभुः, परिमितोऽन्येषां, तथैको नैक इति । तस्माद् भ्रान्तिमात्रं पुरुषकल्पनेति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सर्वपदार्थाभावप्रसंगात् । रूपादिष्वपि विप्रतितेः । केषांचित्क्षणिकाः, केषांचित्कालान्तरावस्थायिनः, तथाश्रिताः, स्वतन्त्रा इत्यादि । तथा श्रोतादीनि भौतिकानि, आहंकारिकाणि, पौरुषाणीति विप्रतिपत्तिः । एवं सर्वपदार्थाभावः स्यात् । तस्मत्तस्ति पुरुषः । तत्र युक्तं सर्वप्रमाणाऽनुपलब्धेर्नास्ति पुरुष इति एतदयुक्तम् । यदप्युक्तम् “शूक्तयमाध्यात्मिकं पश्येति” तस्य पश्चात्प्रतिषेधं वक्ष्यामः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं “अस्ति कर्मास्ति विपाकः कारकस्तु नोपलभ्यत” इति सत्यमेतत् । न हि पुरुषस्कन्धानां निक्षेपे प्रतिसंधानेऽन्यत्र वा कारक इति नः पक्षः । तस्माच्छेयोऽर्थिभिः सर्वांगमतर्कविरुद्धां नैरात्म्यवादपरिकल्पनाभ्रान्तिमसमञ्जसामपोह्य पुरुषसत्त्वपरिज्ञानादेव जननमरणातिसर्वोपद्रवप्रतिपक्षभूतं परममृतं ध्रुवं स्थानमवाप्तव्यमिति ॥ १७ ॥

If it is argued that the existence of conscious entity is not proved because of the controversy among all the authorities.? It may be like this. If there would have been the existence of conscious entity, there would not have been the religious (doctrinal) controversy among the authorities. However, the controversy is there. For example, according to some it is devoid of qualities while according to others it is subservient, all-pervasive according to all but limited in magnitude according to others. Similarly, it is one or many (according to different authorities). Therefore, the postulation of conscious entity is just merely an illusion.

This is wrong.

Why?

Because it involves the undesirable contingency of the absence

of all objects, because the controversy is found in case of form, etc., also. According to some those are momentary and according to others existing for some more time ; similarly, dependdnt according to others. The senses also are products of elements, or products of egoism or products of man thus is the controversy about them. In this way, there would be the absence of all objects. Therefore, conscious entity does exist. It is right that it is wrong to say that conscious entity does not exist because it is not cognised through any means of knowledge. We shall refute the statement ' the internal objects should be seen as void ' afterwards. The statement that 'the action is its fruition also is, the agent, however, is not observed, is right. If the component forming the human body are set aside, there is no other agent to form the (human body); this is our theory. There be the desirous of liberation after setting aside the wrong and illusory postulation of the theory of absence of soul, which is contradicted by al the scriptures and arguments, should attain the everlasting immortal place which is opposite to (i.e. devoid of) all the calamities like birth, death, etc., through the knowledge of the existence of the conscious entity only.

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1. The imperceptible object is observed to be existent or otherwise. Therefore, since the conscious entity is imperceptible, its existence or non-existence is not certain.
2. Since the sensuous perception depend upon the sense-organs which cognise sound, touch, taste, smell and form, the object devoid of these qualities cannot come under the purview of the sense-organs.
3. For details see karika 5.
4. For details see karika 5.
5. For details see karika 5.
6. Cf. Madhyamikakarika
7. The author means to say that parārtha denotes that meant for some other which is not itself composite in nature.
8. The existence of the conscious entity depends upon the fact that the composite objects are meant for others while the fact of their being meant for other presupposes the existence of some other entity. Thus, the probans and the probandum are mutually dependent and the lack of ascertainment in case of one disproves the other also.
9. There characteristics become the distinguishing features only when there is some entity devoid of them.
10. The reading should be probably yatha puruṣārthah in place of yatha apuruṣārthah. In fact the practice of avagraha is very modern and the reading suggested by us can very well be adopted here.
11. The control is merely through presence. The Puruṣa does not do something but the constituents act for a certain purpose which belongs to the conscious entity, and thus is the control over the constituents. Since the constituents depend upon the conscious entity, they are controlled though the conscious entity is not an active controller.
12. The differentiation of nature among all the objects is caused by the differentiation of the constituents as their components.
13. This is the description of the empirical state of the conscious entity. In its transcendental state it is of the nature of pure consciousness, free from its contact with the intellect.