

17. The knowledge is destructible but is revived again through other causes. Similarly, in the apprehension of the word the process is that the sound is produced at the sounding object and is destroyed after giving rise to another sound and so on and so forth.
18. It appears that something is lacking in this sentence as it supports rather than contradicting the viewpoint of the opponent.
19. If the pot produces another pot, there would be a moment when both the pots serving as cause and that serving as an effect would be observed.
20. The reading marked as doubtful by Pandeya could possibly be *tulantayoh*.
21. This is actually the difference between the Buddhists and the Samkhya view about change. The change, in Buddhist theory, is the result of momentariness while according to the Samkhyas it is due to the manifestation of some other power different in nature to the earlier.

KĀRIKĀ 13

(Nature of the three constituents)

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः

एवशब्दः प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्यते ।

THE SATTVA IS ACCEPTED TO BE BUOYANT AND ILLUMINATING, THE RAJAS IS EXCITING AND MOBILE AND THE TAMAS IS SLUGGISH AND ENVELOPING.

The word 'only' (*eva*) is construed at the end of each (expression describing the constituents).

(Buoyancy and illumination)

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमेवेष्टम् । यत् किञ्चित्कार्यकरणे लघु प्रकाशं च तत्सत्त्वरूपमिति प्रत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्र कार्यस्य तावदुद्गमहेतुर्धर्मो लघुत्वम्, द्रव्यान्तरप्रकाशनम् । करणस्यापि ग्रहणं सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायविषयेषु यथास्वं प्रवर्तमानम् ।

The sattva is accepted to be buoyant and illuminating only. That which is buoyant and illuminating in the course of performance of activity, should be accepted as of the nature of sattve. Buoyancy is the characteristic which is the cause of shooting up of the effect, and of the efficient functioning of all instruments. The illumination refers to the illumination of the other objects through (by) driving away the darkness which is the quality of the earth in the form of the shade (or shadow).¹ That of the instruments is also to be taking place in due order in case of the object of determination, ideation and ascertainment.²

(Exciteness and mobility)

उपस्तम्भकं चलमेव रजः । यः कश्चिदुपस्तम्भश्चलता चोपलभ्यते तद्रजोरूपमित्यवगन्तव्यम् । तत्रोपस्तम्भः प्रयत्नः, चलता क्रिया । सा च द्विविधा, परिणामलक्षणा प्रस्पन्दलक्षणा

च । तत्र परिणामलक्षणया सहकारिभावान्तरानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मात्प्रच्युतिः । प्रस्पन्द-
लक्षणा प्राणादयः कर्मेन्द्रियवृत्तयश्च वचनाद्याः बाह्यानां द्रव्याणामुत्पत्तननिपतनभ्रमणादीनि ।

That which is exciting and mobile only in rajas. Whatever excitingness and mobility is observed, that should be understood as the form of rajas. Excitingness means special effort and mobility means the activity. The activity is of two kinds : of the nature of modification and of the nature of movement. Through the activity in the form of modification results the deprivation from the earlier characteristics in case of some object assisted by the other assisting conditions.³ The activity in the form of movement is in the case of the activity like vital airs; the function of the motor organs like speech, etc., as also the going up, falling down and moving around in case of the substances.

(Sluggishness and enveloping)

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः । यत्किंचिद् गौरवं वरणं चोपलभ्यते तत्तमोरूपमिति प्रत्यवग-
न्तव्यम् । तत्र गुरुत्वं कार्यस्याधोगमनहेतुर्धर्मः करणस्य वृत्तिमन्दता । वरणमपि कार्यगतं च
द्रव्यान्तरितरोधानम् । करणगता चाशुद्धिः प्रकाशप्रतिद्वंद्विभूता । इत्येष सत्त्वादीनामव्यतिक-
रेण स्वभावोपलम्भो यत एषां नानात्वमवसीयते ।

The tamas is sluggish and enveloping only. Whatever sluggishness and enveloping is found, should be understood as of the nature of tamas. The sluggishness is the characteristic conducting the effect to fall down and causing the inertness in the activity of instruments. The enveloping also is found in the effect in the form of concealing the other substance. It is also the impurity found in the instruments, which is opposite to illumination. In this form is the differentiation of the nature of sattva, etc., without intermixture, from which is deduced the manifoldness of these constituents.⁴

(All the Constituents occur in a single object)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं स्त्रीक्षत्रमेघेषु स्वभावव्यतिकरोपलम्भादेको गुणस्त्रिरूपः, सर्वे वा सर्व-
रूपा, रूपान्तरस्य वा सत उत्पत्तिरिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, गुणभूतस्य भक्तित उपकारात्प्रधानरूपोप-
पत्तेः । इह गुणभूतस्य भक्तितः प्रधानोपकारित्वे सति भक्तितस्तद्रूपोपपत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा क्षी-
रादेः । तद्धि मुखादिषु दृष्टप्रतिलब्धप्रवृत्तिः पित्तस्य स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं गच्छंस्तस्योपकारात्ति-
क्तं संपद्यते । न च तथा सदेव । सत्त्वमपि स्त्रैणगुणभूतं सपत्नीरजसः स्वेन रूपेणाङ्गभावं
गच्छंस्तस्योपकाराद् दुःखं संपद्यते । तमसो मोहः । एवं क्षात्रं रजः आर्यदारलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य
दस्युलक्षणस्य च तमसः । एवं मेध्यं तमः कार्षिके सत्त्वस्य प्रोषितदयितायाश्च रजसः । तस्मा-
न्नास्ति गुणानां स्वाभावव्यतिकरः । किं चान्यत् । अगुणभूतानां स्वभावग्रहणात् । यदा
चैतेऽङ्गभावमपगच्छन्तो मध्यस्थास्तुल्यसंस्काराश्च प्रतिपद्यन्ते तदा स्वरूपेणैव । तस्मादसं-
कीर्णं गुणरूपम् ।

As regards your statement⁵ that due to the availability of the intermixture of the nature of these constituents in case of a woman, a warrior and the cloud the single constituent is of three forms or all are of all forms or there is the origination of some other form already existed even before the origination (of these characteristics in the constituent),⁶ we reply it is not so, because the main form is justified as the subordinate assists through its being secondary. For example, in case of milk, etc. The milk which has seen that the bile has got advancement in the mouth, etc., becomes subordinate to the bile itself and becomes pungent on account of its assistance rendered to that. It is not that it is originally of that nature. The sattva also which forms a constituent of the woman becomes subordinate to the rajas of the co-wife and produces misery through its service to that. (Similarly) it produces delusion (when it becomes subordinate to) the tamas. Similarly, the rajas existing in the warrior becomes subordinate to the sattva found in the form of the wife of a noble man and to the tamas in the form of a miscreant.⁷ In the same way, the tamas existing in the cloud (becomes subordinate) to the sattva in the former and to the rajas in the case of the woman whose husband is away.⁸ Therefore, there is no intermixture of the nature in the case of the constituents. *Moreover, because their (essential) nature is perceived when they have not attained the position of subordinate. when they start to get subordinate position, and when they acquire someone neutral and having the past impressions of the same kind (i.e., the nature of the same constituent), they do so⁹ in their own (unmixed) nature. Therefore, the nature of the constituents is unmixed.*

आह-न, सन्देहात् । उभयथा हि रूपान्तरग्रहणं क्षीरादिषु दृष्टम् । ताद्रूप्यात्तैश्च विपरिणतानां गुणभावाच्च । यथोक्तं तत्र कथमिदमेकान्तेन निश्चीयते गुणभावात्सत्त्वादीनां रूपान्तरग्रहणं न पुनस्ताद्रूप्यादेवेति ?

Opponent: No, because of the doubt. The attainment of other form is observed in both the ways in case of milk, etc., in their own form and in the modified form when they become mutually subordinate. How is it absolutely ascertained that the sattva, etc., attain other form due to their subordination and not through their very unmixed form?¹⁰

उच्यते-ग्रहणविकल्पोपलम्भात् । यदि स्त्रैणं सत्त्वं ताद्रूप्यादेव सपत्न्या तेन गृह्यते तेन भर्तुरपि तथा ग्रहणप्रसंगो मध्यस्थानां तुल्यसंस्काराणां च । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्माद् भाक्तोऽयं गुणविकल्पोपलम्भः । किं चान्यत् । उत्तरकालं स्वरूपग्रहणान्निवृत्तानुशयाभिश्चै-

कार्थतामुपगताभिः सपत्नीभिः स्वेनैव रूपेण स्त्रैणस्य सत्त्वस्य ग्रहणमुपलभ्यते । स्वगृहसमवस्थितैश्चार्यदारैः क्षत्रियाणाम् । निष्पन्नशस्यैश्च कृषीवलैर्मैधानाम् । तस्माद् भाक्तोऽयं ग्रहणविकल्पोपलम्भः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् अन्योऽन्यजननवृत्तयो गुणाः, न च संकीर्णस्वभावा इति ।

Proponent: Because of the observation of variety (of form) in their knowledge (i.e., in various forms). If the sattva existing in a woman is supposed to be apprehended in the essential pure form by the co-wife, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of its apprehension by the husband and also the neutral and the person having the similar past impressions in the same form.¹¹ This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the observation of the variety in the same constituent is of secondary form. Moreover, the apprehension of the sattva of the woman is observed in its essential form afterwards on account of its attaining the essential form; by the co-wives which have a single purpose and by those who are free from the past impressions.¹² So also that (rajas) of the warriors by the wives of the noble men staying in their own house with their husbands. Same is the case with that (tamas) of the clouds by the farmers who have cut their crops. Therefore, the observation of variety of their knowledge is secondary. Therefore, it is right that the constituents perform the function of generating each other,¹³ and they are not of the intermixed nature.

(Though opposite in nature the constituents
work for a single purpose)

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् अन्योन्यमिथुनत्वानुपपत्तिः, सत्त्वस्येतरविरोधात्, इत्यत्र ब्रूमः — अस्ति चायं विरोधो गुणानां

प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

किमुपपद्यत इति वाक्यशेषः । तद्यथा वर्तिज्योतिस्तैलानां परस्परविरोधेऽपि प्रदीपकरणैककार्यसाधनभावोपगतानां वृत्तय एकत्र संमूर्छिताः सहभावं प्रकृष्टमपि कालमनुभवन्ति एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमसां सति विरोधे महदाद्येककार्यसाधनभावोपगतानां वृत्तय एकत्र मूर्छिताः सह भवन्तीति ।

As regards your statement that their co-existence does not hold

good because the sattva stands in contradiction to others, we reply, there does exist such a contradiction among the constituents.¹⁴

AND (THEIR) FUNCTION IS FOR A SINGLE PURPOSE JUST LIKE THAT OF THE LAMP.

‘What holds good’ is the remaining sentence. Just as the function of wick, fire and oil which are opposed to each other becomes completely permeated and remain together for a long time when they come together as the parts of a lamp for serving as a means for illuminating, similarly, the function of sattva, rajas and tamas even though opposed to each other is completely permeated and co-exists, when they have become the means of single purpose after attaining the form of intellect, etc.

युक्त्यभावादसिद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् – का पुनरत्र युक्तियेन विरोधिनामेककार्यता भवतीति ?

Opponent: If it is argued that it is not established because there is no argument to prove it? It may be like this. What is that argument through which it is proved that the contradictory objects perform the single act?

उच्यते— गुणप्रधानभावत्वात् । गुणभूतो हि प्रतियोगी प्रधानभूतेन तदुपकारकत्वान्न विरुद्धयत इति संसर्गेण वर्तितुमुत्सहते । तुल्यबलयोस्तु द्वयोः सत्यमेव सहावस्थानस्य नास्ति सम्बन्धः । तथा च भगवान् वार्षगण्यः पठति रूपातिशया वृत्तिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते । सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह वर्तन्ते । तद्यथा जलाग्नी पचनीयस्वेदनीयेषु कार्येषु, छायातपौ च सूक्ष्मरूपप्रकाशने, शीतोष्णे च प्रजावस्थितौ । एवं तत्सिद्धः प्रदीपवत्सत्त्वरजस्तमसां विरोधेऽपि सहभावः ।

Proponent : It is possible because of the relation of principal and subordinate. The subordinate opponent is not opposed to the principal because the former is for the service of the latter. Hence, they can act together. The relation of co-existence, of course, is not found between the two objects having the equal power. So states lord Vārṣaganya “The form in excess and the function in excess contradict the other form and function (which are similarly in excess) and those (form and function) in their ordinary condition co-exist with those which are in excess.”¹⁵ For example, water and fire (co-exist) in the act of cooking and

perspiration, the shade and light in the act of manifesting the subtle form, the cold and heat for the maintenance of the generation. Thus, the co-existence of sattva, rajas and tamas is proved just as that in the case of (the components of) lamp even though they are opposed in nature.

(Mention of six characteristics does not imply the six constituents)

आह, यदुक्तं लघ्वादिभावस्वभावभेदाद् गुणनानात्वमित्यत्रब्रूमः

भिन्ना लक्षणभेदाश्चेन्मिथः सत्त्वादयो गुणाः ।

तर्हि लक्षणयुक्तत्वात्षड्गुणाः प्राप्नुवन्ति ते ॥

यदि लघ्वादिलक्षणभेदात्सत्त्वादीनां नानात्वं मिथोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेन लघुत्वप्रकाशत्व-
योरपि भेदोस्ति गुणद्वयप्रसंगः । एवमुपस्तम्भचलताभ्यां गौरववरणाभ्यां च द्वयं द्वयमिति
षड्गुणाः प्राप्नुवन्ति । अथ मतं लघुत्वप्रकाशयोरभेद इति पृथगनभिधानं प्राप्तम् । तद्भेदे वा
ग्रहणभेदमनिच्छतः प्राप्तो लघुत्वादिभेदेऽपि गुणाभेदस्तथा चैको गुण इति प्राप्तम् । यत्पुनरे-
दुक्तं गुणभूतस्य भक्ति उपकारात्प्रधानरूपापत्तिरिति,

अङ्गभावं व्रजत्सत्त्वं दुःखं सम्पद्यते यदि ।

वैरूप्यस्योपसंहारात्पूर्वदोषनिवर्तनम् ॥

यदि हि रजसोऽङ्गभावमुपगच्छत्सत्त्वमुपकारात्तद्रूपं भवति तेन प्रतिज्ञातस्य रूपान्तर-
स्योपसंहारात्तैरूप्यं गुणानामेकैकस्य प्राप्तम् । रूपान्तरस्य वा सत उत्पत्तिः । तस्मात्पूर्वदोषा-
परिहारात्प्रतिज्ञामात्रमेवायं समाधिः । यदप्युक्तं अगुणभूतानां स्वभावग्रहणादिति ।

अङ्गभावानपेक्षं तु ग्रहणं नास्त्यृषेरपि ।

परमर्षेरपि गुणानां कार्यमेव प्रत्यक्षं न शक्तिमात्रेणावस्थानमसंवेद्यत्वात् । तत्र चाङ्गा-
ङ्गिभावगमनमनिवार्यम् । तस्मादोषमनिच्छता गुणा परित्याज्याः । नास्ति वा सुदूरमपि गत्वा
तत्संकरदोषपरिहारः ।

Opponent : As regards your statement that the constituents are many
due to the differentiation of their nature in respect of being
buoyant, etc., we state :

If it is held that the constituents are many (being different
from each other) having different characteristics, they come to be six
constituents because of their having six characteristics.

If manyness among the sattva, etc., is due to the difference of
the characteristics like buoyancy, etc., there is the differentiation of
the buoyancy and illumination. Hence, there arises the undesirable

contingency of granting it as two constituents. Similarly, the rajas also comes to be two on account of excitement and mobility and the tamas also comes to be two on account of its sluggishness and enveloping. If you hold that the buoyancy and illumination are non-different, they should not be spoken to be different. Or, if they are different but the difference in cognition is not desirable, it comes to mean that the constituent is one only. As regards your statement that there is the attainment of the principal form (by the constituent) because of the service rendered through subordination by the subordinate, we reply:

If the sattva after attaining the subordinate form gives (lit. accomplishes) misery, the dissimilarity (of it with rajas) being ended, the earlier objection¹⁶ is not alleviated.

If sattva attains the form of the rajas as it becomes subordinate to the rajas and renders its service to the rajas, the notion of other independent form of each of the constituents comes to an end and, thus, it leads to the conclusion that each constituent is of three forms. Or (we get the idea that) there is origin of some other already existent form. Therefore, the answer to our objection remains only an empty declaration because the defect shown earlier is not alleviated. As regards your statement that on account of observation of their nature when they have not become subordinate, we state 'even a seer cannot cognise them without their state of subordination'. Even to great seer what is cognizable is only the action of the constituents and not their state of existing in potential form because such state is not cognizable. In that case their attainment of state of the principal and subordinate is compulsory. Thus, the concept of constituents is abandoned by the one desiring to avoid the defects.¹⁷ Or, even stretched too far there is no alleviation of the defect of their intermixture of nature.

उच्यते- यत्तावदुक्तं लक्षणभेदाद् गुणनानात्ववादिनो लक्षणद्वययोगादेकैकस्य गुणषट्त्वप्रसंग इति तन्न । कस्मात् ? द्वयोगुणप्रधानभावानुपपत्तेः । इहार्थान्तरस्यार्थान्तरेण गुणप्रधानभावो भवति । यथा स्त्रीक्षत्रमेघेषु व्याख्यातम् । न च लघुत्वप्रकाशयोरुपस्तम्भचलनयोगैरववरणयोश्च मिथौ गुणप्रधानभावोऽस्ति, तदनर्थान्तरं धर्मास्त इति नास्ति षट्त्वप्रसंग इति । किं च अप्रसिद्धत्वात् । न ह्येतत्क्वचित्प्रसिद्धम् यथा यावन्तो धर्मास्तावन्तो धर्मिण इति । न चाप्रसिद्धेन व्यवहारः । किंच पृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रसङ्गात् । लक्षणभेदान्नानात्वप्रतिज्ञस्य सर्वार्थानां स्वसामान्यलक्षयोगात्त्वतोऽर्थान्तरमिति पृथक्त्वैकान्तप्रसंगः । अथैतदनिष्टं न तर्हि वक्तव्यं लक्षणभेदाद् गुणानां षट्त्वमिति । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं अङ्गभूतस्य प्रधानरूपापत्तेः पूर्व-लोपानिवृत्तिरिति तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? भक्त्यभिधानात् । असकृदधीतमस्माभि-

Kārikā 13

भक्तिोऽयं गुणानां ग्रहणविकल्प इति । न च भक्तिः परमार्थ इत्यस्थाने यत्नः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं अगुणभूतानां सत्त्वादीनामृषेरप्यविषयत्वमिति सत्यमेतत् । यत्तुक्तं कार्यस्य विषयभूतत्वाद-
ज्ञाङ्गिभावगमनं गुणानां सकलसत्कार्यमपेक्षते । तथा स्त्रीक्षत्रमेधाः प्रकृतास्तेष्वङ्गभावमगच्छत
इति विज्ञायत इति । सामान्यशब्दानां हि प्रकरणाद्विशेषेऽवस्थानं भवति । तद्यथा भोजनकाले
सैन्धवमानयेत्युक्ते लवणे संप्रतिपत्तिर्नाश्वादिषु । तस्मात्प्रकरणमनपेक्ष्य महति तन्त्रे दोषाभि-
धानं बालवाक्यस्थानीयम् । एवं गुणलक्षणोपदेशात्सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यम् ॥१३॥

Proponent : As regards your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting six constituents in case of the one who speaks of the differentiation of the constituents through the differentiation of their peculiar characteristics, because two characteristics are associated with each of the constituents, (we reply) it is not the case.

Why ?

Because there cannot be the relation of subordinate and principal in case of the two (of the qualities of the constituents). It is observed here that the state of subordinate and principal takes place in case of one object with the other object which is different as it is explained in case of a woman, warrior and the cloud. There is no relation of mutual subordination and principal between buoyancy and illumination; between excitingness and mobility; and between sluggishness and enveloping. These are the qualities and not the other object and, hence, there arises no undesirable contingency of the constituents' being six.¹⁸ Moreover, it is not well established. It is not well established anywhere that there are as many substances as qualities. There is no investigation (or argumentation) of a case through unestablished facts. Moreover, because there arises the undesirable contingency of absolute differentiation. There arises the undesirable contingency of absolute differentiation in case of the one who declares the differentiation through the difference of peculiar characteristics because the characteristics are found associated differently with each object, (and, hence,) each object would be unique. If this is undesirable, it should not be stated that the constituents are six on account of different characteristics.

The objection that the earlier defect is not alleviated because of attainment of the principal form by the subordinate one, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because we have spoken of the secondary sense. We have

repeatedly stated that the variety in the understanding (or knowledge) of the constituents is in the secondary sense.¹⁹ And, the secondary sense is not real. Hence, you are making an effort at a wrong place. Your statement that the *sattva*, etc., which have not attained the state of principal and subordinate cannot be known even by the seers, is right. As regards your statement that the attainment of the subordinate and the principal state refers to the effect (i.e., is found in the case of effect) and as such it depends upon the complete existence of the effect, (our reply is as follows). The woman, warrior and the cloud are the subject of discussion. It is understood that the constituents do not attain the subordinate state in them. The words giving general sense are restricted to a particular sense through context. For example, if it is stated at the time of taking meals 'bring *saindhava* (meaning both horse and salt)', the understanding is with reference to the salt and not to horse, etc. Therefore, the mention of faults in a great system of philosophy with no consideration of the context is like a statement of children.²⁰ Thus, through the mention of the peculiar characteristics of the constituents, the three constituents are established.

KĀRIKĀ 13

1. The sense is that the earth abounds in tamas and thus is having the quality of darkness and enveloping. If the sttva would not illumine the objects, they would have always got darkness.
2. In the theory of the Samkhyas the senses proceed to the respective activity of their own and are not prompted by any external instrumentality. The self-motivation for activity is due to rajas and less quantity of tamas.
3. The change in the objects is caused by rajas.
4. The manifoldness of the constituents is inferred from their un-mixed qualities because the constituents are supra sensuous and hence their manifoldness cannot be directly cognised.
5. As this statement is not available in the present text, it can be assumed that it may have been made in that part of the text which is not available to us. Similar assumption should be made in similar cases in the other parts of the commentary on this Karika.
6. The meaning is that a woman, a warrior and the clouds are observed to have the qualities of all the constituents as they are pleasurable to some, painful to other and causing indifference to the rest. Therefore, if it is admitted that the dominance of a certain constituent the rise of certain feeling each of the constituents would be considered as having all these forms or it should be admitted that a new quality is manifested in these constituents.
7. The sense is that in a warrior rajas abounds but it excites pleasure in the wife of a noble man because in that case the rajas becomes subordinate to sattva. Similarly, it becomes subordinate to the tamas in the miscreant when the latter shows indifference to it.
8. The sense is like manifests like'. Though every object is composed of three constituents but one of them gets dominance when it comes in contact with a similar constituents and the rest of the constituents start assisting it. For example, a beautiful woman gives pleasure to her husband as when the sattva of the husband gets dominated when it finds sattva of his wife dominated. As a matter of fact, this theory of Samkhya cannot explain as to why does the rajas of the wife does not cause dominance of the rajas of her husband. Thus, the dominance of

one constituent in one object and the dominance of the same in the other are inter-dependent for their knowledge.

9. i.e. they act according to their own nature giving rise to pleasure, etc.
10. Milk is changed in taste when it modifies itself into curds, etc. When it is not subordinate to anything else, as also in the mouth of the one having advancement of bile. Similarly, it cannot be absolutely ascertained in case of constituents also whether they change the form of own or after their becoming subordinate to the other.
11. The sense is that if the sattva is apprehended in its own form of giving pleasure, it should be of this nature in everyone. Thus, the sattva of a woman should equally give pleasure to the co-wives as well as an indifferent person. It is, however, not so. Therefore, it is proved that the constituents are not apprehended always in their unmixed form.
12. It refers to the situation when the beautiful woman is seen objectively without favour or prejudice towards her. Such a situation arises when persons come together and work for a single purpose without individual interest. Thus, when all the co-wives act for a single purpose of pleasing the king, the beautiful woman is seen in its own form.
13. The text here gives a clue for the interpretation of the expression anyonyajanavanvrttayah on which the commentary is not available. The expression according to the Y.D. means to give rise to the function of one constituent by becoming subordinate to it.
14. The objector is objecting against mutual co-existing of the constituents with an impression that the objects of mutually opposed nature cannot act together.
15. The Quotation occurs in the Yogabhasya 3.13. As informed by Chakrabarti Vacaspati ascribes it there to Pancasikha. The Yogabhasya quotes it to establish the non-contradiction between the past and present states as also between the present and the future states of an object. The Yuktidīpikā, however, proves that when the form or function is in the states of pre-dominance over each. Other, there is the contradiction but when one remains as subordinate to the other, there is no contradiction between them.
16. It refers to the objection that each of the constituents is of many forms and not of one. It is clear from the next sentence.

17. The fundamental position that the constituents are not perceptible but are inferred through their activities is given up at the cost of defending the theory that each of the constituents has a distinct nature of its own.
18. Single object may contain many qualities. Thus, the qualities do not bring out the differentiation into object. It is the differentiation of objects only which may serve as the basis for differentiating the objects separately.
19. In fact the constituents cannot be known separately. The knowledge of each is spoken in the secondary sense.
20. The sense is that through the context it is clear that the constituents attain the state of principal and subordinate in the example of woman, warrior and the cloud given above. But the argument of the opponents depends upon the fact that they do not attain the state of principal and subordinate.

KĀRIKĀ 14

(Undistinguishableness. etc., in Cosmic matter)

आह—अविवेक्यादिरिदानीं गणः कथं प्रतिपत्तव्य इति ?

Opponent : How should the non-discriminative and the group of other qualities be determined ?

उच्यते—

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धस्त्रैगुण्यात्

यत्त्रिगुणं तदविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मीति (का. ११) । कथमवगम्यत इति चेत्

तद्विपर्ययाऽभावात् ।

यस्माद् गुणविपर्ययः क्षेत्रज्ञः । तत्र विषयत्वमचेतनत्वं प्रसवधर्मित्वं च न भवतीति पुरस्तात्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मात्परिशेषतो व्यक्ते एतेषां धर्माणामविरोधः ।

Proponent : THE QUALITIES OF NON-DISCRIMINATIVE, ETC., ARE ESTABLISHED BY THEIR NATURE OF BEING COMPOSED OF THE THREE CONSTITUENTS.

Whatever is composed of the three constituents is non-discriminative, object of knowledge, common, non-conscious and productive. (Ka. 11).

If it is asked how is it known (the reply is)

BECAUSE OF THEIR ABSENCE IN THE OPPOSITE OF THAT.

Because the opposite of that composed of three constituents is the conscious entity. The objectivity, non-consciousness and productivity are not found in that. We shall establish it later on. Therefore, through elimination there is non-contradiction of these qualities in case of the manifest.²

आह, तथा प्रधानमिति प्रागुक्तं (का. ११) भवता । तदिदानीं कथं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् प्रधा-

नमपि त्रिगुणादियुक्तमिति ?

Opponent : You have stated earlier that the cosmic matter also is similar to that (Ka. 11). How, then, it should be understood that cosmic matter also is composed of the three constituents, etc.?

उच्यते

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

इह कारणगुणात्मकं कार्यं दृष्टं पटादि । व्यक्ते च त्रैगुण्याद्युपलभ्यते । तस्मात्कारणमप्यस्य तथाजातीयकमिति शक्यमनुमातुम् । सिद्धान्तमात्रोपदर्शनमेतदाचार्यः करोति । न्यायं तु यथोक्तेषु प्रदेशेषूपपादयिष्यामः ॥ १४ ॥

Proponent : THE NON-MANIFEST IS ALSO ESTABLISHED (TO BE SO) ON THE GROUND THAT THE EFFECT IS OF THE NATURE OF CAUSE.

It is observed here that the effect like a cloth is of the nature of the cause. And, the properties as composed of the three constituents, etc., are found in the manifest. Therefore, it is possible to infer that its cause is also of the same nature. The authority has merely mentioned the theory here. We shall adduce the logical justification for it at proper occasions.

KĀRIKĀ 14

1. The compound is dissolved as tasya (gunasya) viparyaye abhavat.
2. This is established through sesavat type of inference that these qualities are found in the manifest objects.

KĀRIKĀ-15

आह, कार्यधर्मस्य कारणोपलब्धौ हेतुमदादिप्रसंगः, अविशेषात् । यदि कार्ये दृष्टस्य धर्मस्य कारणे सद्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते प्राप्तो हेतुमदादीनामपि धर्माणां कार्यदृष्टत्वात्प्रधाने प्रसंगः । अथ कायोपलब्धौ तुल्यायां हेतुमदादयो नेष्यन्ते न तर्हीतरेषामपि कारणावस्थितिरस्तीति ।

Opponent : If the properties of the effect are found in the cause, there arises the undesirable contingency of being caused, etc., in the case of the cosmic matter because there is no difference between the two (cause and effect). If the existence of the properties perceived in the effect is admitted in cause also, there arises the undesirable contingency of existence of the properties like having a cause, etc., in the cosmic matter because these are observed in the effect. If inspite that they are commonly found in the effect, the properties like having a cause, etc., are not desired in the cause, in that case the existence of others also should not be admitted in the cause.

उच्यते न, स्वरूपविरोधित्वे तदपवादविज्ञानात् । कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्येत्यनेन लिंगेन हेतुमदादयोऽपि कारणे प्रसज्यन्ते । तेषां तु कार्यकारणरूपविरोधित्वादपवादो विज्ञायते । कथम् ? यदि तावद्धेतुमदादयो व्यक्ते दृष्टत्वात्प्रधाने व्यञ्जन्ते, कृतकत्वात्कार्यमेव तन्न कारणमिति प्राप्तम् । अनित्यत्वाच्च स्वयमुच्छिद्यमानमननुप्राहकमव्यापित्वादिभिश्चानन्तविकारोत्पादनशक्तिहीनम् । अहेतुमदादयः प्रधानेऽभ्युपगमाद्व्यक्तेरपि प्राप्यन्ते तादृशाः कारणासम्भवात्कार्यमेव तन्न भवतीति प्राप्तम् । अविवेक्यादयस्तूभयत्रापि भवन्तो नेतरेतरस्वरूपविरोधिनः । तस्मात्कार्यकारणभावाभ्युपगमाद्धेतुमदाद्यपवादः, इतरेषां च कारणसद्भावः सिद्धः ।

Proponent : No, because their exception is known because of their *opposition in nature*. There arises the undesirable contingency of the occurrence of the properties like having a cause, etc., in the cause through the probans that the effect is of the nature of cause. However, their exception is known through the opposi-

tion of the nature of effect and the cause.

How ?

If the properties like having a cause, etc., are found in the cosmic matter on the ground of their occurrence in the manifest, the cosmic matter would be an effect on account of being a product, and it would not be a cause. And, being destructible and on account of being non-eternal, not favouring others, and non-pervasive, etc., it would be devoid of the power of giving rise to various products. Since the properties like not having a cause, etc., are admitted in the manifest, then without the possibility of the cause of those kinds, they would not be the effect at all. The properties like non-discriminative, etc., do not mutually oppose the nature even while existing in both. Therefore, because of the acceptance of the relation of cause and effect, the properties like having a cause, etc., form the exception. The existence of the others in the cause is established.¹

(Similarity between manifest and cosmic matter presupposes
the existence of cosmic matter)

यदुक्तं कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धमिति तदयुक्तम् । कस्यात् ?
व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः कार्यकारणभावाप्रसिद्धेः । सिद्धे हि व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः कारणत्वे एतदेवं
स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : Your statement that the non-manifest also is proved (to be so), because the effect is of the nature of the cause, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because the relation of effect and cause is not well-established between the manifest and the non-manifest. This would have been the case if the manifest and the non-manifest would be established as the effect and cause mutually. That is, however, not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

विशेषानभिधानादुभयसाम्यमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा भवानाह व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः
कार्यकारणभावोऽप्रसिद्धः, एवं वयं वक्ष्यामः— तयोः कार्यकारणभावाप्रसिद्धिरप्यसिद्धा । न च
क्वचिद्विशेषोस्त्युभयसाम्यं भविष्यतीति । तच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सद्भावासिद्धेः । सत्यम्,
अनभिधीयमाने विशेषे स्यादुभयसाम्यम् । अव्यक्तस्य तु सद्भाव एवासिद्ध इत्ययं विशेषः ।
तस्मादयुक्तमेतदपीति ।

If it is argued that on account of lack of a particular (reason) both are similar ? It may be like this. As you said that the relation of

cause and effect is not well established in case of the manifest and the non-manifest, we also state that the non-establishment of the relation of cause and effect between them is also not established. Since there is no particularity, both the aspects will be similar.²

That is, however, wrong.

Why ?

Because of the non-establishment of the existence. It is right that there would be the similarity of both (the aspects) if the particularity is not put forward. The particularity here is that existence of the non-manifest is not established. Therefore, it is wrong.

कार्यस्य कारणपूर्वकत्वाद्व्यक्तस्य च कार्यत्वादव्यक्तसद्भावे प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । कार्यं कारणपूर्वकं दृष्टम् । घटादिकार्यं चेदव्यक्तं प्रमितत्वात्तस्मादिदमपि कारणपूर्वकं भवितुमर्हति । यच्च तस्य कारणं तदव्यक्तमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्तात् । इहाकस्मिकी च कार्यस्योत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथेन्द्रधनुषः । असतश्च भ्रान्तिमात्रात् । तद्यथा मायास्वप्नेन्द्रजालमृगतृष्णिकालातचक्रगन्धर्वनगराणाम् । सतश्च कारणात् । तद्यथा मृदादिभ्यो घटादीनाम् । कार्यं चेदव्यक्तमतः संशयः किमिन्द्रधनुर्वदकस्मादस्य प्रादुर्भावोऽथ मायादिवदसतोऽथ कारणात्सतो घटवदिति ?

If it is argued that there is the justification for the existence of the non-manifest because the effect presupposes the cause and the manifest is the effect ? It may be like this. The effect is observed as produced from the cause. If the effects like pot are taken to be non-manifest (before and after their worldly existence) because of their nature of being known, it also deserves to have some cause; and whatever is the cause of that is the non-manifest itself.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of certainty. Here, the accidental origination of the effect is also observed just as that of a rainbow; the origination of non-existent from delusion (is also observed) just as the maya, dream, jugglery, mirage, a fire brand and the city of the gandharvas (a class of semi-gods); it is also observed as taking place from some existent cause just as that of the pot, etc., from clay, etc. If the effect is non-manifest, there arises the doubt as to whether its origination is accidental like that of rainbow, or from an existent cause like that of pot, etc.

(Proofs for the existence of cosmic matter)

उच्यते- नाकस्मिकमसत्पूर्वं व्यक्तम् । कस्मात् ?

भेदानां परिमाणात्

यत्परिमितं तस्य सत उत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा । तद्यथा मूलाङ्कुरपर्णनालदण्डवुसतुषशूकयुष्क्षीर-
तण्डुलकणानाम् । परिमिता महदहंकारेन्द्रियतन्मात्रमहाभूतलक्षणभेदाः । तस्मात्सत्कारणपू-
र्वकाः । यदेषां कारणं तदव्यक्तम् ।

॥ इति युक्तिदीपिकायां सांख्यसप्ततिपद्धतौ तृतीयमाह्निकं प्रथमं च प्रकरणं समाप्तम् ॥

Proponent : The manifest is not causeless, or accidental and not from a non-existent cause as well.

Why ?

(Finiteness of objects)

BECAUSE OF FINITE NATURE OF THE SPECIFIC OBJECT.

The finite object is observed to originate from the existent (cause) just like the origination of the roof, sprout, leaf, stalk, husk, chaff, awn, flower, sap and the particles of rice. The specific objects like intellect, egoism, senses, subtle elements and the gross elements are finite in magnitude. Therefore, they arise from an existent cause. Whatever is the cause of these, is the non-manifest.

Here ends the third discourse of the commentary Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā as also the first chapter.

आह— कस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ? असद्भेदानामपि परिमाणदर्शनात् । अनेकान्त इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, अस्ति हि मायास्वप्नेन्द्रजालानुविधायिनामपि भेदानां परिमाणमिति । तस्मादनैकान्तिको हेतुरिति ।

Opponent : For what reason does the non-manifest exist ? Because the limited magnitude is observed in case of the non-existent specific objects as well.

If it is argued that it (the above reason) is not conclusive? It may be like this. The limited magnitude is found in case of the specific objects like māyā, dream, jugglery, etc. Therefore, the reason is not absolute.

तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? न हि तेषां नियमोऽस्ति, एतावद्भिरेवोत्पत्तव्यं नान्यैरिति । महदादयस्तु प्रलयकाले तिरोभूतास्तावन्त एवोत्पद्यन्ते ।

Proponent : This is not the case.

Why ?

There is no restriction in their case that they should originate from this much and not from others.³ The intellect, etc., which disappear at the state of dissolution, originate from the specific cause only. Therefore, the reason is conclusive.

आह, परिमाणानवस्थानं कालद्वयानुपलब्धेः । सत्यं, साम्प्रते काले महदादयो युक्तपरिमाणाः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपलब्धेः । अतीतानागतयोस्तु कालयोर्नास्ति प्रसिद्धिः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : The limited magnitude is not settled because it is not found in the two periods of time (past and future). It is true that the intellect, etc., are possessed of magnitude at the present time only because it is known so through perception and inference. Their limited magnitude is not well known (to exist) in the past and the future time. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते न, विपर्यये प्रमाणानुपलब्धेः । इदानीमेतावन्तो भेदा इत्येतच्छक्यमनुमातुम् अतीतानागतयोस्तु कालयोर्नास्ति प्रसिद्धिः । तस्मात्र भेदानवस्थाप्रसंगः

Proponent : It is not so because no proof is found for the opposite case as well. It is possible to infer that at present time these objects are finite. They are not known so or otherwise in their past and future periods of time. Therefore, there arises no undesirable contingency of uncertainty with regard to their finite magnitude.⁴

आह, भेदाभेदानवस्थानात् । महदादीनां ये भेदा देवमनुष्यतिर्यञ्चो घटादयश्च तेषामशक्यं परिमाणं परिच्छेत्तुम् । सामान्येऽन्तर्भावादयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, अस्ति शरीराणां महाभूतसामान्यं घटादीनां च पृथिवीसामान्यं, तत्परिमाणादेतेऽपि परिमिता इति । तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभावात् । नहि वः सामान्यं द्रव्यादर्थान्तरभूतमस्ति । सारूप्यमात्रे सामान्यपरिकल्पनात् ।

Opponent : Because the identity of all products is not settled. The magnitude of the (finite) products of intellect, etc., like the gods, men and the animal and also that of the pot, etc., cannot be established.⁵

If you argue that the argument is wrong because it is included

in generality? It may be like this. The generality of the gross elements is found in case of the bodies, and the generality of the earth, etc., is found in case of the pot, etc., and since those (causes) are finite in magnitude, these would also be finite in magnitude.⁶

This is also wrong.

Why?

Because of the absence (of generality). The generality according to you, is not something different from the substance, because you have postulated generality as the similarity of form itself.⁶

उच्यते न, तत्त्वान्तरानुपपत्तेः । तत्त्वभेदेन परिमिता भेदा इत्येतद्विवक्षितं यथोक्तमस्माभिरुक्तं च यद्यस्ति तत्त्वान्तरमुच्यताम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं सामान्यस्यार्थान्तरभूतस्य भवत्पक्षेऽनुपपत्तिरिति सत्यमेतत् । तथाविधेनापि तु तेन संव्यवहारो न प्रतिषिध्यते इति वक्ष्यामः । तस्मात्सिद्धं भेदानां परिमाणादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Proponent : No, there is no possibility of different essence (in different types of the same object). What we intend to say is that the specific objects are limited in magnitude due to the differentiation in essence of the elements. We have expressed also the same as we have stated above. If there is variety of essence, you should speak. Your statement that there is no justification for generality as a distinct element in your theory is true. (In this respect), we say that we also do not reject the practical activities through that kind of generality.⁷ Therefore, it is established that the non-manifest exists because the specific objects are finite in magnitude.

(Homogeneity)

किं चान्यत् ।

समन्वयात्

इह येन भेदानां समनुगतिस्तस्य सत्त्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा मृदा घटादीनाम् । अस्ति चेयं सुखदुःखमोहैः शब्दादीनां समनुगतिः । तस्मात्तेऽपि सन्ति चे च सुखादयोऽस्तमितविशेषास्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover

BECAUSE OF HOMOGENEITY

It is observed here that whatever is found in many specific ob-

jects (i.e., the homogeneous element in many specific objects) exists (as the essence of them) just as the clay in the case of pot, etc. The word, etc., are homogeneous in respect of pleasure, pain and indifference. Therefore, these (pleasure, etc.,) exist. When these pleasure, etc., exist without particularity, that state is the non-manifest. Therefore, the non-manifest exists.

आह, नासिद्धत्वात् । सुखादिभिः शब्दादयोऽनुगम्यन्त इत्येतदप्रसिद्धम् केन कारणेन प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ?

Opponent : No, because it is not established. It is not established that the pleasure, etc., are commonly found in the word, etc.

Through which reason should it be understood?

उच्यते—तदुद्धिनिमित्तत्वात् । इह शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगंधानां सन्निधाने स्वसंस्कारविशेषयोगात्सुखदुःखमोहाकाराः प्राणिनां बुद्ध्य उत्पद्यन्ते । यच्च यादृशीं बुद्धिमुत्पादयति तत्तेनावितम् । तद्यथा चन्दनादिभिः शकलादयः । तस्मान्नासिद्धिः समन्वयस्येति ।

Proponent : Because it serves as the cause of that. It is observed here that there arises in the beings the knowledge in the form of pleasure, pain and indifference due to the contact of word, touch, form, taste and smell, in accordance with the particular type of the past impressions of the beings. Whatever produces a particular type of knowledge, that (quality) exists in the object of knowledge just as a fragment (is endowed with the fragrance) of sandalwood, etc. Therefore, the homogeneity is not disproved.⁸

आह, असिद्ध एवायं समन्वयः । कस्मात् ? विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । न ह्ययं नियमः कारणसदृशमेव कार्यमुत्पद्यते । किं तर्हि विलक्षणं अग्निधूमशब्दादि । कथम् ? न ह्यग्निस्तृणादिस्वभावकोऽग्निस्वाभावको वा धूमः । न च भेरीदण्डादिस्वभावः शब्दः । तस्मात्सुखाद्यनुगताः शब्दादय इतीच्छामात्रम् ।

Opponent : The homogeneity is unestablished .

Why ?

Because of the observation of the effect of dissimilar nature.

This is not a rule that the effect arises as similar to the cause. On the contrary, it is of dissimilar nature as in the case of fire smoke and word.

How ?

The fire is not of the nature of grass, etc.; nor is the smoke of the nature of fire; nor is the word of the nature of drum, stick, etc. Therefore, it is merely a wishful thinking that the pleasure, etc., are

found in the word, etc.

विशेषितत्वात् । सुखादिस्वरूपाः शब्दादयः, तत्सन्निधाने सुखाद्याकारप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिरित्येतदादित एवास्माभिर्विशेषितम् । तस्मान्न भिन्नजातीयास्त इति । यत् खल्विदमुच्यतेऽग्नयादीनां विलक्षणानामुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्प्रधानभेदानामतज्जातीयप्रसंग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभिप्रायानवबोधात् । नैव ब्रूमो यो यस्य विकारः स तज्जातीयक इति । किं तर्हि यो यज्जातीयकः स तस्य विकार इति । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किंचान्यत् उदाहरणाप्रसिद्धेः । न चैतदुदाहरणं प्रसिद्धं अग्न्यादयः स्वकारणजातिं नानुविदधतीति । कस्मात् ? बलवीर्यानुविधानात् । तद्यथा अग्नेर्धूमस्य च त्वक्चन्दननलिकादिस्निग्धतानुवृत्तेस्तैक्ष्ण्याद्यनुवृत्तेश्च । भेरीविकारः शब्दो न तु यथा भेरिरूपमवस्थितम् । प्रदीपेनेव तु दंडाभिघातेन व्यज्यत इति साध्यमेतत् । न चैकैको रूपादीनां द्रव्याकारः समुदायधर्मत्वात् । तस्मान्न भेरीविकारः शब्दः । तत्र यदुक्तं विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्तिदर्शनादसिद्धोऽन्वय इत्येतदयुक्तम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् समन्वयादस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Proponent : No, because of the specification .We have specified in the beginning that the word, etc., are of the nature of pleasure ,etc. The notion in the form of pleasure , etc., arises in their association only. Therefore, they do not belong to different genus. Your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting that the evolutes of the cosmic matter are not of the genus of the cosmic matter because of the observation of the origination of the fire, etc., as dissimilar to their causes, is wrong.

Why ?

Because the sense intended is not understood (by you). We do not say that effect is of the genus of that whose modification it is . On the contrary, (we accept that) to whatever genus a particular effect belongs, it is the effect of that. Therefore, this is wrong. Moreover. because of the non-establishment of the example.

The example that the fire, etc., do not correspond to the genus of their cause, is not established.

Why ?

Because of the fact that they (fire, etc.,) follow the powers and potencies (of their causes). To explain, fire and smoke follow the viscosity of skin and pipe of sandal wood, etc., as also the sharpness, etc., (of the fuel). Word is a product of a drum, but it does not subsist in the form of the drum only. It is still to be proved that the word is manifested by the stroke of the stick just as (the object is) manifested

by the lamp. Anyone of the form, etc., also is not of the form of a substance because they are the attributes of the collection. Therefore, the word is not a modification of the drum.⁹ Thus, the statement that homogeneity is not established because of the observation of the origination of the effect of some dissimilar nature, is wrong. Therefore, it is right that the non-manifest exists on account of homogeneity.

(Potency of Functioning)

किं चान्यत् ।

शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

इह यावती काचिल्लोके प्रवृत्तिरुपलभ्यते सा सर्वा शक्तिः । तद्यथा कुम्भकारस्य दण्डादिसाधनविन्यासलक्षणायाश्च शक्तेः सन्निधानाद् घटकरणे प्रवृत्तिरस्ति । व्यक्तस्य चेयं कार्यत्वात्तद्भावे प्रवृत्तिरिति । अतस्तस्यापि शक्त्या भवितव्यम् । याऽसौ शक्तिस्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Moreover,

BECAUSE THE FUNCTIONING IS DUE TO POTENCY.

Whatever functioning is observed here in the world, it is all due to the potency, It is just as the activity of the potter for producing the pot is due to the potency in the form of arrangement of the instruments like stick.¹⁰ Since the manifest is an effect, its activity is due to that (potency). Therefore, there should be (admitted) the potency in case of that also. Whatever is the potency, is the non-manifest itself.¹¹ Therefore, the non-manifest exists.

(Potency is not born at the time of activity)

आह, प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्त्यभावः, प्रवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेः । यदि शक्तिपूर्विका प्रवृत्तिरिति मन्यध्वं तेन यावत्प्रवृत्तिर्नोपलभ्यते तावच्छक्तिर्नास्तित्येतदापन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्यां शक्त्यां कार्याभावे स्वरूपाभावप्रसंगात् । यदि खल्वपि विद्यमाना शक्तिः केनचित्प्रबन्धेन कार्यं नोत्पादयेच्छतकिरशक्तित्येतदापन्नम् । तस्मात्सहकारिभावान्तरसन्निधानात्प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेवार्थानां शक्तय उत्पद्यन्ते । ताश्च तावदेव प्रध्वंसन्ते ।

तत्र यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिदर्शनाद्व्यक्तस्यापि निष्पादिका शक्तिरस्तीत्येतदयुक्तम् । किं चान्यत् भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । इह प्रधानमेव वा शक्तिः स्यात् प्रधानाद्वा भिन्ना ? किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावत्प्रधानमेव शक्तिस्तेन कार्ये भेदाच्छक्तिभेदोऽवसीयत इति शक्तिभेदात्प्र-

धाननानात्वप्रसंगः । प्रधानैकत्वाद्वा तदव्यतिरिक्तानां शक्तीनामेकत्वप्रसंगः । ततश्च कार्यनाना-
त्वाभावः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति प्रधानादर्थान्तरभावः शक्तीनामभ्युपगम्यते तेन भिन्नानां
शक्तीनां प्रवृत्तिः सिद्धौ प्रधानसिद्धिर्नास्तीत्येतदापन्नम् । किं चान्यत् । स्वरूपाभिधानं च ।
प्रधानस्य शक्तिमात्रादप्यर्थान्तरत्वमभ्युपगम्य रूपमीदृक्प्रधानं स्वावस्थायामिति, तच्चाश-
क्यमभिधातुम् । तस्माद् भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तेरकल्पनीया शक्तिरिति ।

Opponent : Before the commencement of the activity there is no
potency because the activity is not observed (at that time). If
the activity is caused by the potency, you should admit that as
long as the activity is not observed, that potency also is not
there; this becomes contingent.

Why ?

If in the presence of the potency there is no effect, there arises
the undesirable contingency of absence of the essential nature (of the
potency). If the potency, even though present, would not give rise to
the effect due to some obstruction, the potency would come to be im-
potency. Therefore, the potencies of the objects originate at the time
of activity only due to the coming together of the other assisting ob-
jects. And, those potencies meet the destruction then and there. The
statement that there is the potency for producing the manifest also
because the potency is observed before the activity also, is wrong.
*Moreover, there is no justification of the postulation of the difference
or non-difference (from cosmic matter). Here, the potency may be
the cosmic matter itself or different from the cosmic matter.*

What ensues from this discussion ?

If the potency is the cosmic matter itself, the difference of
potencies is understood from the difference of effects; thus, it gives
rise to the undesirable contingency of manifoldness of the cosmic
matter due to the difference of potencies.¹² Or, on account of the
oneness of the cosmic matter, there will arise the undesirable contin-
gency of oneness of powers which are not different from the cosmic
matter. From this will result the absence of manifoldness of the ef-
fects.¹³ If with a view that the above defect may not arise, the dif-
ference of the potencies from the cosmic matter is accepted, even
when the different potencies are established through activities, it be-
comes contingent that the existence of the cosmic matter is not estab-
lished (through this reasoning).¹⁴ *Moreover, the statement (of
description) of the nature of cosmic matter becomes contingent. After
admitting the difference of the cosmic matter from the potencies, it*

becomes impossible to describe that this is the essential form of the cosmic matter in its own (unevolved) form. Therefore, on account of the impropriety of the postulation of the difference or non-difference (between the cosmic matter and potencies) the potency should not be postulated.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्त्यभावः प्रवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः नाऽप्रसिद्धत्वात् । कारणं शक्तिः कार्यं प्रवृत्तिः । न च कार्यानुपलब्धौ कार्याभाव इत्येतल्लोके प्रसिद्धम् । यत्पुनरुक्तं कार्यानिष्पत्तौ शक्तेः स्वरूपहानमिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, प्रदीपदृष्टान्तात् । यद्यथा प्रदीपस्य घटादिप्रकाशनशक्तिरस्ति । अथ च कुड्याद्यावरणसामर्थ्यात्र घटादीन्प्रकाशयितुं शक्नोति । न च शक्यते वक्तुं प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशनशक्तिरशक्तेति । एवमन्येषामपि भावानां प्राक्प्रवृत्तेरपि शक्तिः स्यात् । न चाऽप्रवृत्तिदर्शनादस्याः स्वरूपहानं स्यात् । यतुक्तं सहकारिभावान्तरसन्निधानात्प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेवार्थानां शक्तिप्रादुर्भाव इति अत्र ब्रूमः —तदप्रसिद्धिः शक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् । इह सर्वः कर्ता स्वगतां शक्तिमपेक्ष्य तद्योग्यतया सहकारिभावान्तरमुपादत्ते, सा चेत्प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः स्यात्साधनानां विषयस्वभावानवधारणादनुपादानप्रसंगः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मात्प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं तावदेव प्रध्वंसं इति अत्र ब्रूमः न, कार्यनिष्ठादर्शनात् । यदि प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेव प्रध्वंसः स्यात्कार्यनिष्ठैव न स्यात् । तन्निमित्तत्वात्कार्यस्य । अस्ति त्वसौ । तस्मात्र प्रवृत्तिसमकालमेव शक्तिप्रध्वंसः । सदृशसन्धानोत्पत्त्या कार्यनिष्ठेति चेन्न । विनाशसमकालोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । अथापि स्यादेकस्यां शक्तौ क्षणसाध्यमंशमवसाय विनष्टायामन्यत्तत्सदृशं शक्त्यन्तरमुत्पद्यते, तस्मिन्विनष्टेऽन्यदिति । एवं शक्तिसन्तानात्कार्यनिष्ठा भवतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? विनाशकालोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । को ह्यत्र हेतुर्यत्र विनाशसमकालमन्यच्छिक्तरूपं कार्यमवसीययति न पुनः प्राक्तनमेवावस्थितमिति ? किं चान्यत् । कौटस्थ्यदोषपरिहात् । क्षणोत्तरकालावस्थाने च भावानां यो दोष उपातः कौटस्थ्यप्रसंग इति तस्य परिहार उक्तः । तस्मान्नास्ति शक्तीनां प्रवृत्तिकाले विनाशः । प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकालमपि नास्ति । कस्मात् ? पुनः प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । शक्त्यन्तरोत्पत्तौ प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकालमपि इति चेत् न, हेत्वभावात् । को ह्यत्र निर्बन्धः तस्यां विनष्टायामन्या प्रवृत्त्यन्तरहेतुर्भवति नैव पुनः सैवेति ? कृतार्थत्वादिति चेत् न अनभ्युपगमात् । न ह्येकघटार्था शक्तिरभ्युपगम्यते । तत्र येनैव हेतुना एकं घटमवसाय न विनश्यति तेनैव यावन्ति कर्तव्यानीति । तस्मात्त्रिषु कालेषु शक्तयोऽवतिष्ठन्ते ।

Proponent : As regards (your) statement that since no activity is observed before the activity, there is no potency, we reply, *it is not so, because it is not well established*. The cause is the potency and the activity is the effect. It is not established in the world that there is no effect when it is not observed. As regards the statement that in the absence of the production of the effect the essential nature of the potency is abandoned, we reply, it is

not so, because there is the example of lamp. It is just as there is the potency of illuminating the pot, etc., in the lamp, but it cannot illumine the pot, etc., due to the capacity of the obstruction in the form of a wall, etc., it cannot (in this case) be said that the capacity of lamp to illumine is incapable. In the same way, there may be the potency of the other objects also before activity. Nor would there be the abandonment of its essential nature due to the non-observation of the activity (at that time). As regards your statement that there is the origination of the potency in the objects at the time of the activity itself due to the association (or collecting together) of the assisting objects, we reply: *it is not established because it depends upon the potency.* Here, all the agents depend upon their own potency and select the assisting objects in accordance with the capability of that (his own potency). If that would not exist before the activity of that, there would be the undesirable contingency of non-selecting the means because the nature of the means is not ascertained without such potency.¹⁵ This is, however, not desirable. Therefore, the potency does exist before activity. As regards your statement that its destruction takes place then only (immediately after activity), we reply, it is not so, because the completion of the effect is observed. If destruction would take place at the time of the activity itself, there would not have been the completion of the effect because the effect is caused by that. (completion) is, however, there. Therefore, the destruction of the potency does not take place at the time of activity itself.

If it is argued that the completion of the effect takes place due to the origination of uniting together (i.e., series) of the similar potencies, we reply, no because there is no possibility of origination at the very time of destruction. It would be like this. When the one potency is destroyed after accomplishing the part to be accomplished within a moment, there arises another potency similar to that and when that is destroyed, the other originates and so on and so forth. Thus, through the continuity of potency the completion of the effect takes place. This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of origination at the time of destruction. What is the reason (to determine) that the potency which is (born) new at the time of destruction completes the effect, and the old itself does not subsist. Moreover, because the defect of immutability is alleviated. We have already stated the alleviation of the defect of undesirable contingency of immutability of all the objects arising through postulating the existence of the object after a moment. Therefore, there is no destruction of the potencies at the time of activity. Nor does it take place after the activity.

Why ?

Because the activity is observed again also.

If it is argued that the other activity takes place when the new potency is produced, (we reply), no, because there is no reason. What is the reason to determine that the other (fresh) potency arising after the destruction of the earlier serves as the cause of the other activity, and not the same.

If it is argued that it is because the earlier has served its purpose, we reply, it is not so because it is not admitted by us. The potency is not admitted for the purpose of a single pot. In that case, it does not perish after completing a single pot; the pots are supposed to be accomplished through the same reason. Therefore, the potencies subsist in all the three periods of time.

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति, अत्र ब्रूमः - अस्तु प्रधानादभिन्ना शक्तिः । न तस्य नानात्वं शक्त्येकत्वं वा प्रसज्यते । कस्मात् ? संख्याव्यवहारस्य बुद्ध्यपेक्षत्वाद् बुद्धिनिमित्तस्य चासत्कारेण प्रधानशक्तिस्वभावात्, इहायं संख्याव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यपेक्षः । कथम् ? यदभिन्नां बुद्धिमुत्पादयति तदेकं, प्रधानावस्थायां च शक्तयोऽस्तमितविशेत्वादभिन्नां बुद्धिमुत्पादयन्ति । तस्मादेकं तत्प्रवृत्तिकाले विशेषावग्रहणे भेदं प्रतिपद्यते, देवशक्तिर्मनुष्यशक्तिरित्यादि । तस्मान्नासामेकत्वमतो न भेदाभेदकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति । व्यक्ते दर्शनाच्छक्तीनामव्यक्ते प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । व्यक्ते शक्तिप्रवृत्ती दृष्टे न चाव्यक्ते । क्वचिदन्यतो व्यक्तमेवैतस्माद्धेतोः सिद्ध्यति नाव्यक्तमित्येतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सामान्यतोदृष्टान्तात्सिद्धेः । यथैव हि देवदत्ताधारया क्रियया तस्य देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यात्यन्तादृष्टं ज्योतिषां देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गमनमनुमीयते एवं प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिनियमितत्वाद् व्यक्तस्य च प्रवृत्तिभूतत्वादवश्यमत्यन्तादृष्टा शक्तिरभ्युपगन्तव्येति सिद्धं शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेरस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

As regards your further statement that there is no propriety in postulating either of the difference or non-difference (or the potencies from the cosmic matter), we reply, if the potencies be non-different from the cosmic matter, there arises no undesirable

contingency of admitting manifoldness (of cosmic matter) or the oneness of the potencies.

Why ?

Because the usage of number depends upon knowledge and through the rejection of the cause of knowledge it is of the nature of the potency of the cosmic matter. Here also, the usage of number depends upon knowledge.

Why ?

Whatever gives rise to the knowledge of non-difference, is one, and at the state of cosmic matter the potencies give rise to the knowledge of one because all the differentiations are merged there. Therefore, the potency is one only and on account of the knowledge of differentiation at the time of activity, it attains differentiation in the form of potency of the gods, potency of men, etc. Therefore, these (potencies) do not come to be one and, hence, it is not that there is no propriety in the postulation of its difference or non-differentiation (from cosmic matter).¹⁶

If it is argued that the potencies cannot be understood to exist in the non-manifest through their being observed in the manifest? It may be like this. The potency and the activity are observed in case of manifest only and not the non-manifest. In some respect the manifest is proved as different from this potentiality and not the cosmic matter.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is proved through the inference based on general observation. Just as after observing the attainment of some other place through activity in case of Devadatta, the act of moving in case of planets, which is absolutely non-perceptible, is inferred through their attainment of the other place. Similarly, on account of control of activity by the potency and on account of abundance of activity in the manifest the absolutely invisible potency should be admitted. Thus is established that due to the fact that the activity is caused by potency, the unmanifest exists.

(Difference between cause and effect)

किञ्चान्यत् ।

कारणकार्यविभागात्

कारणं च कार्यं च कारणकार्ये तयोर्विभागः कारणकार्यविभागः । इदं कारणमिदं कार्यमिति बुद्ध्या द्विधावस्थापनं विभागो यः स कारणकार्यविभागः । तदवस्थितभावपूर्वकं

दृष्टम् । तद्यथा शयनासनरथचरणादिः । अस्ति चायं व्यक्तस्य कारणकार्यविभागस्तस्मादि-
दमप्यवस्थितभापूर्वकं, योऽसाववस्थितो भावस्तदव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover,

BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT.

The compound 'cause and effect' denotes the cause as well as the effect. The difference between those two is denoted by the expression 'difference between the cause and effect'. The difference between the cause and the effect refers to the difference through the knowledge putting them separately as 'this is the cause and 'this is effect'. That difference is observed to be caused by the objects existing separately just is the case with bed, seat, charriot and foot, etc. There is certainly the differentiation into cause and effect in case of the manifest. Therefore, it is also caused by the separately existent objects. Whatever is that separately existent object, is the unmanifest.

आह, तदनुपलब्धेरयुक्तम् । न हि शयनादीनां कारणकार्यविभागः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते ।
तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : It is wrong because it (the difference through causal relation) is not observed. No differentiation into cause and effect is experienced in case of bed, etc. Therefore, this is wrong .

उच्यते न कार्यकारणयोरुपकारकोपकार्यपर्यायत्वात्कारणकार्यमिति निर्वृत्यनिर्वर्तक-
भावोऽभिप्रेतः । किं तद्व्युपकारकोपकार्यभावः । स चास्ति शयनादीनां व्यक्तस्य च । अतो न
प्रमादाभिधानमेतत् ।

Proponent : No, since the effect and cause are synonymous with the favouring and the favoured, there is intended the relation of accomplished and the accomplisher in the form of the effect and the cause. What is then the relation of the favoured and the favouring? That does exist in case of the bed, etc., and the manifest. Therefore, this statement is not wrong (or carelessly made).

(constituents are mutually cause and effect)

आह, कः पुनर्व्यक्तस्य परस्परस्य कार्यकारणभाव इति ?

Opponent : What is the relation of being mutually effect and cause in

case of the manifest ?

उच्यते गुणानां तावत्सत्त्वरजस्तमसां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण यथा प्रवृत्तिर्भवति, तथा प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मका इत्येतस्मिन्सूत्रे (का. १२) व्याख्यातम् । तथा शब्दादीनां पृथिव्यादिषु परस्परार्थमेकाधारत्वम् । श्रोत्रादीनामितरेतरार्जनरक्षणसंस्काराः । करणस्य कार्यात्स्थानसाधनप्रख्यापनादिकार्यस्य करणाद् वृत्तिक्षतभंगसंरोहणसंशोषणपरिपालनानि । पृथिव्यादीनां वृत्तिसंग्रहणपन्थिव्यूहावकाशदानैर्गवादिभावो देवमानुषतिरश्चां यथर्तुविधानेज्यापोषणाभ्यवहारसंव्यवहारैरितरेतराध्ययनं वर्णानां स्वधर्मप्रवृत्तिविषयभावः । अन्यश्च लोकाद्यथासंभवं द्रष्टव्यः ।

Proponent : The way there is the activity of the constituents , viz., sat-tva, rajas and tamas by favouring each other through their attributes of illuminating, activity and restraint, we have explained so under the aphorism that they are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference (ka. 12). The identity of substratum of word, etc., in the earth, etc., is for the sake of each other . There is the refinement of each other by the word. etc. That location, instrumentality and the act of generating knowledge, of the organs are mutual. The activity, destruction of the defective part, growth, decay and maintenance through the organs are mutual. (Similarly) there is mutual service of understanding amongst gods, men and animal through the acts of arranging the things according to the season, sacrifices, fostering and taking food. Similarly, the performing their own duties in case of the (four) castes is (mutually dependent). The other similar situations should be observed in the worldly behaviour as possibility is found.

आह, तदनुपपत्तिः । क्रमयौगपद्यासम्भवात् ।

योऽयं गुणानां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमैतरेतरोपकारोऽभ्युपगम्यते स खलु क्रमेण वा स्यात् युगपद्वा ? किं चातः ? तन्न तावत्क्रमेण संभवति । कस्मात् ? एकस्य निरपेक्षस्य प्रवृत्तावितरयोरपि तत्प्रसंगात् । यदि तावत्सत्त्वं पूर्वं गुणान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वशक्तिर एव प्रकाशते तयोरुपकारकमित्याश्रीयते । तेन यथा सत्त्वमेवमितरावप्युपकारनिरपेक्षौ स्वकार्यं करिष्यत इत्युपकारानर्थक्यम् । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इत्यतो यौगपद्यमाश्रीयते । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सहभूतानामनुपकारकत्वाद्, गोविषाणवत् । किं चान्यत् । सदसद्विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । इह सत्त्वं प्रकाशमानं रजस्तमसोर्विद्यमानं वा प्रकाशमाविष्कुर्यात् अविद्यमानं वा ? किं चातेः ? तद्यदि

तावद्विद्यमानमभिव्यनक्ति तेन सर्वेषामेकस्वाभाव्याद् गुणत्वाप्रसंगः । किंच सत्त्ववच्चेतरयोः स्वातंत्र्यप्रसंगः । यथा सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशक्तिरस्तीत्यतस्तद् गुणान्तरनिरपेक्षं प्रकाशते तद्वदितरावपीत्यदोषः । अथ वाऽविद्यमाना प्रकाशशक्तिः सत्त्वसम्बन्धाद्रजस्तमसोरुपजायते । तेन यदुक्तं प्राक्प्रवृत्तेरेव तिष्ठन्ते शक्तय इति तद् हीनम् । ततश्च सत्कार्यवादव्याघातः । किं चायमनेकान्तात् । न ह्ययमेकान्तः परस्परोपकारिणामवस्थितभावपूर्वत्वमिति । तथा हि सत्त्वादयः परस्परोपकारिणो न चावस्थितभावपूर्वकाः । तेन यदुक्तं कारणकार्यविभागाद् भेदानामव्यक्तमस्ति एतदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : That is wrong; because there is no possibility of succession and simultaneity. The mutual favouring through illumination, activity and restraint among the constituents accepted by you may be in succession or simultaneously.

What is the result of this discussion ?

That is not possible in succession.

Why ?

Because when one proceeds to activity without requiring the other, the other two would also do so in the same way. (Even) if the sattva illumines first through the own power without requiring other constituents, that is supposed to be subservient to the other two. Hence, just like the sattva the others also will perform their function without requiring the favour of others. In this way the subservience does not serve any purpose. Now, to alleviate the defect the simultaneity is resorted to. That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because those who are born at a time cannot be mutually subservient just as the horns of the cow. Moreover, there is no propriety in both the alternatives of existence or non-existence. Does the sattva illumining itself exhibit the already existent illumination in the rajas and tamas or does it exhibit the light which was not in existence in them.

What ensues from this discussion ?

If the sattva illumines the light already existing in the other two, there will be a single constituent since all are of one nature. Moreover, there arises the undesirable contingency of the independent nature of the other constituent as in the case with the sattva. **Just as there is the power of illumining in the sattva and, hence, it illumines without requiring the other constituents; similarly, the other two also would do so and, hence, the defect does not arise (in our**

argument). Or, the power of illumining which did not exist earlier arises through the contact of the sattva and rajas and tamas. Thus, the statement that the potencies exist even before activity, carries no force.

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Then, this is to cut at the very root of the theory of pre-existence of the effect. Moreover, because it is not certain. It is not certain that the objects mutually subservient are caused by some existing object. The sattva, etc., are subservient to each other but are caused by some existing object. Hence, the statement that due to the differentiation into the cause and effect in case of the objects the unmanifest exists, is wrong.

उच्यते—यदुक्तमुपकाराभावः, क्रमयौगपद्यासम्भवादिति, अस्तु युगपदुपकारः। यतूक्तम् सहभूतानामनुपकारकत्वं गोविषाणादिवदिति, अत्र ब्रूमः न, अन्यथानुपपत्तेः। न हि गोविषाणयोः सहभूतत्वादुपाकारानुपपत्तिः। किं तर्हि एककार्याभावात्। येषां तु कार्यमेकं सहभावे तु तेषामुपकारो न प्रतिषिध्यते। तद्यथा पृथिव्यादीनां धृतिसंग्रहशक्तिव्यूहावकाशदानैः। शरीरस्थितयोरक्रमभाविनोरपि खुरविषाणयोर्नास्ति परस्परुपकारः। तस्मान्न सहभावासहभावानुपकारानुपकारहेतू। किं च दृष्टत्वात्। दृष्टः खलु वेगेनोर्ध्वगमने वायोररघट्टादीनां युगपदुपकारः न च कश्चिदोषः तथा गुणानामपि स्यात्। संयोगनिमित्त इति चेत् साध्यं किमर्थान्तरभूतमुत प्राप्तिमात्रं संयोग इति। यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं सदसद्विकल्पानुपपत्तेरिति अत्र ब्रूमः अयुक्तमेतत्। कस्मात्? पङ्गवन्धवत्तदुपकारे दोषानुपपत्तेः। तद्यथा पङ्गवन्धयोरितरेतरसम्बन्धात् विद्यमानयोर्दृग्गतिशक्त्योरन्योन्यात्मनि व्यक्तिः न चाविद्यमानयोरथ चैककार्यसिद्धिर्यथा च पृथिव्यादीनां परस्परुपकारित्वं शक्तयोरभिव्यज्यते न परशक्त्या एवं गुणानामपीति। यत्पुनरेतदुक्तमनेकान्तादिति तदयुक्तम्। कस्मात्? शास्त्रानवबोधात्। इहास्माकं कार्यकारणयोरर्थानभ्युपगमाद् गुणानामवस्थान्तरमेवावस्थान्तरानपेक्षं कार्यकारणशब्दवाच्यतां लभते। तत्र ये तावत्प्रधानावस्थानुभाविनो गुणास्तेषां शक्तिमात्ररूपत्वादनिर्यप्रकाशादिस्वभावानां नास्ति तन्निबन्धनं उपकारः। यदा वैषम्यमापद्यन्ते तदाऽनिवारितप्रकाशादिरूपास्तन्निमित्तमुपकारं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। तस्माद्व्यक्तानामुपकाराभ्युपगमादवस्थितभावपूर्वकत्वं न विरुध्यत इति

शास्त्रमनवगम्यैवमुच्यते नैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः । प्रधानावस्थायामुपकारानभ्युपगमादुत्तरकाल-
मपि तत्प्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यदि गुणानामाद्ये प्रकोपे स्वसामर्थ्यादेव पूर्वस्मात्प्रच्युति-
स्तेनोत्तरकालमपि तद्वदेव भविष्यति । अथ प्रधानावस्थायामपि चोपकारो न तर्हि नानैका-
न्तिको हेतुरिति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? अग्निवत्स्वशक्तिनिमित्तत्वात् । तद्यथा
सूक्ष्मोऽग्निः सूक्ष्मं प्रकाशं स्वयमेव करोति, घटादिप्रकाशने तु तैलवत्प्रद्विपेक्षते । तद्वद् गुणा-
नामाद्यः प्रकोपः स्वशक्तिः । महदाद्यपेक्षस्तूपताकरतः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत् कारणकार्यविभागा-
दस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Proponent : As regards your objection that there is mutual favour be-
cause there is no possibility of succession and simultaneity, (we
reply), let the favour be simultaneous. As regards the state-
ment that there is no favour in case of the two objects originat-
ing simultaneously just as the horns of the cow, we reply, it is
not so, because there is no possibility (or justification) other-
wise. The impossibility of mutual favour in the case of the horns
of the cow is not on account of their origination at a time. On
the contrary, it is on account of absence of a single act. In case
of the objects which perform single act becoming subservient is
not obstructed through their taking place at a time just as
through the act of being capable to support and collecting
together and providing shape and space in case of earth etc.¹⁷
The mutual favour is not found in case of the hoof and the
horn which are located in body even though they do not
originate simultaneously. Therefore, simultaneous and succes-
sive origination are not the cause for favouring others or other-
wise. *Moreover, it is observed so.* It is observed that in going
upward very fast the air and merry-go-round, etc., mutually
favour and there is no fault. Similar may be the case with the
constituents as well. If it is argued that it is caused by contact, it
should be established first whether the contact is a distinct en-
tity or merely the attainment or association. As regards the
statement that because of the impossibility in postulating the
alternatives (about the illumination, etc.) as already existent or
non-existent, we reply, it is wrong.

Why ?

The fault does not arise when their favour is like lame and the blind. Just as in the case of the lame and the blind through the contact of both, neither there is the manifestation of the existent power of seeing and going in each other, nor is it the manifestation of non-existent, still there is the accomplishment of a single act; or just as the potencies of mutual favour are manifest in the earth, etc., (and) it is not through the potency of the other; similarly, there may be that (favour) of the constituents too. The statement that because of its not being certain, is wrong.

Why ?

Because the scripture is not understood properly. In our theory the other states of the constituents and that without requiring some other state is denoted by the term cause and effect,¹⁸ because we do not accept the meaning of cause and effect (current in your theory). The subservience caused by them is not found in the case of the constituents situated in the state of cosmic matter, and because of their possessing (qualities in) the nature of potency only, their nature of illuminating, etc., is not distinctly visible (in that state). When they attain the state of non-equilibrium, the constituents without losing the form of illumination, etc., attain subservience caused by that (potency). Therefore, without understanding the scripture that after admitting the favour in evolved form of the constituents, its being caused by some existent object is not contradicted, it is stated by you that the reason is not conclusive. If it is argued that there arises the undesirable contingency of non-admitting the favour afterwards (in evolved form) because favour is not admitted in the state of cosmic matter ? It may be like this. If at the time of the initial movement in the constituents there is the abandonment of that state by the constituents through their own power, in the later state also it would be like this only.¹⁹ Hence, the favour is in the state of cosmic matter also and, consequently, it is not that the reason is not non-conclusive. It is not so.

Why ?

Because it may be due to own potency, as in the case of fire. Just as the subtle fire itself produces a subtle (very less) light, but requires the oil, wick, etc., in illuminating the pot, etc., the initial movement in the constituents is caused by their own potency and that for the sake of intellect, etc., is through favour. Therefore, it is right to say that on account of the difference of the cause and effect the unmanifest exists.

(Merging of effect in the cause)

किं चान्यत् ।

अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥१५॥

इह यद्विश्वरूपं तस्याविभागो दृष्टः । तद्यथा सलिलादीनाम् । जलभूमी विश्वरूपाश्च महदादयः । तस्मादेषामप्यविभागेन भवितव्यम् । योऽसावविभागस्तदव्यक्तम् । तस्मादस्त्यव्यक्तम् ।

Moreover,

BECAUSE OF THE RE-UNION OF THE WORLD OF EFFECT.

Here, the re-union of all the worldly effects is observed just as of water, etc. Water, earth and intellect, etc., are of the form of worldly objects. Therefore, they would also be re-united. Whatever is that (ultimate re-union), that is the unmanifest. Therefore, the unmanifest exists.

आह, किं पुनस्तद्वैश्वरूप्यं, को वा विश्वरूप इति ?

Opponent : What are the worldly effects or what is the world ?

उच्यते—वैश्वरूप्यमिति विशिष्टमवस्थानमाचक्ष्महे, अस्तमितविशेषत्वमविभाग इति । विशेषस्य सामान्यपूर्वकत्वादिति योऽर्थस्तदुक्तं भवति अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्येति । एवमेतैः पञ्चभिर्वीतैर्व्यक्तस्य कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति सिद्धम् ।

Proponent : Through the term worldly effects we speak of the particular form or arrangement.²⁰ Since the particular is caused by the general, whatever is that (ultimate) object, that is conveyed through the statement that because there is the re-union of the worldly effects. Through these five probans of direct inference is proved that the unmanifest is the cause of the manifest.

आह—विप्रतिषेधप्रसंगः । कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधावचनात् । यथा भवानाह — प्रधानं जगदुत्पत्तिसम कारणमस्ति । एवं तन्त्रान्तरीयाः परमाणुपुरुषेश्वरकर्मद्वैवस्वभावकालयदृच्छाऽभावान्कारणत्वेनाभिदधति, तेषां च प्रतिषेधो नोच्यत इति । अतो विप्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति । किं प्रधानमेव कारणं आहोस्विदेतान्येव वोभयमिति ? अन्वयदर्शनात्तदनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् प्रधानान्वय एव पृथिव्यादिषु सुखादिलक्षण उपलभ्यते । यच्च येनान्वितं तस्यासौ विकार इति युक्तमेतत्प्रागपदिष्टम् । तस्मात्प्रधानविकार एव व्यक्तमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकान्वयसंभवात् । परमाण्वन्वयोऽपि हि व्यक्त उपलभ्यते रूपादिसत्त्वात् ।

पूरुषान्वयः करणस्य संवेदकत्वात् । ईश्वरान्वयः शक्तिविशेषयुक्तानामुपलब्धेः । कर्मदैवान्वयः जगद्वैचित्र्योपलम्भात् । स्वभावान्वयो द्रव्यान्तरसंसर्गेऽपि भावानां तस्मादप्रच्युतेः । कालान्वयः युगाद्यनुविधानात् । यदृच्छान्वयो नियमाभावात् । अभावान्वयो गवादीनां परस्परान्तरस्वदर्शनादितरेतराणि प्रत्युक्तानि । कारणान्तरपूर्वकत्वेऽपि खलु व्यक्तस्य शक्त्याः परिमाणदयः पूर्वमेव कल्पयितुम् । तस्मादयुक्तमन्यथादिभ्यः कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति ।

Objection : This involves the undesirable contingency of its opposition (by equally important theories) because the other causes are not refuted. You said that the cosmic matter is the cause capable of producing the universe. Similarly, the other systems speak of atoms, Purua, Isvara, acts, luck, nature (of the objects), time, chance and non-existence as the cause of the universe and they are not refuted (by you). Hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of opposition by equally important theories as to whether the cosmic matter only is the cause or these (others) only or both.

If it is argued that it is not applicable because the homogeneity is observed ? It may be like this. In the earth, etc., the homogeneity to the cosmic matter in the form of pleasure, etc., is commonly observed. It is rightly said earlier that the object is the modification of that which is homogeneous to that. Therefore, the manifest is the modification of the cosmic matter only.²¹

This is also wrong .

Why ?

Because there is the possibility of homogeneity to many. The homogeneity to atoms also is found in the manifest because of the presence of form, etc. (in both). The homogeneity of organs is to the conscious entity also because those experience the feelings. The homogeneity to isvara is also observed in case of those which are endowed with a particular capacity. There is the homogeneity to acts and luck because the nature of being variegated or strange is observed in the world. There is the homogeneity to the nature of objects because the worldly objects do not deviate from their nature inspite of their contact with other objects. There is homogeneity to time, etc., because there is the conformity with yuga, etc. There is the homogeneity in respect of negation. The cow, etc., are mutually negated because one is not found in the other . The limited magnitude, etc., of the manifest objects are possible to be postulated even if they are supposed to come out of some other cause. Therefore, it is wrong to say that on account of homogeneity, etc., the non-manifest exists as a cause.

(Atoms cannot be the cause of the universe)

उच्यते- यत्तावदुक्तं परमाणूनामप्रतिषेधप्रसंग इति, अत्र ब्रूम- तदनुपपत्तिरस्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् । अस्तित्वे हि परमाणूनामभ्युपगम्यमाने सति सत्यमेवं स्यादियमाशंका, किं परमाणुपूर्वकमिदं विश्वमथ प्रधानपूर्वकमिति ? न तु तेषां सद्भावो निश्चितः । तस्मादरयुक्तमेतत् । यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते पृथिव्यादिषु रूपाद्युपलम्भादन्वयदर्शनादणूनां सद्भावः प्रधानवदेव कल्पयितव्य इत्येतदपि चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अन्यथापि तदुपपत्तेः । तन्मात्रपूर्वकत्वेऽपि हि पृथिव्यादीनां कल्प्यमान रूपादिसत्त्वादतो न युक्तमेतत् । सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्प्रधानेऽपि तत्प्रसंग इति चेत्, अथापि स्याद्यथा तन्मात्राणां रूपादिमत्त्वं कल्प्यते तत्पूर्वकत्वं च पृथिव्यादीनां दृश्यमपि तेषु रूपादिसत्त्वलिङ्गेन परमाणुभ्यो निष्कृष्यते, एवमस्माभिः सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वाभ्युपगमात्तद्वृद्धिनिमित्तत्वे पृथिव्यादीनां प्रधानपूर्वत्वाक्षेपः करिष्यत इति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? आत्मगुणत्वतिषेधात् । तस्माच्च विपर्यासादित्यत्र (क. १९) सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वप्रतिषेधं करिष्यामः तस्मादसम्यगेतत् ।

Proponent : As to the statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of opposition (by equally important theories) because the atoms are not refuted, we reply that that is wrong because their existence is not admitted (by us). If the existence of the atoms is admitted, this doubt would have truly arisen as whether the world arises from the atoms or from the cosmic matter. Their existence, however, is not certain. Therefore, this is wrong. The statement that because of the availability of nature, etc., in the earth, etc., (and consequently) because of the perception of homogeneity,²² the existence of atoms should be accepted like that of cosmic matter, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because that can be justified in other way also. This is not correct because the form, etc., are found when the earth etc., are supposed to come out of, subtle elements.

If it is argued that (above mentioned contingency) is applicable to the cosmic matter also because pleasure, etc., are the qualities of the soul ? It may be like this. The subtle elements are postulated to be possessed of form, etc., and the earth, etc., are observed to come out of subtle elements; through the existence of form, etc., in them they are distinguished from the atoms, similarly we object to the theory of considering cosmic matter as the cause because we consider pleasure, etc., as the qualities of the soul and the earth, etc., as the cause of their knowledge.²³

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because they (pleasure, etc.,) are negated to be the qualities of the soul. We shall negate the pleasure etc., to be the qualities of the soul in the statement 'therefore, from that contrast, etc., (ka. 19).

Therefore, it is wrong.

आह, यदि पुनस्तन्मात्राणामेव परमाणुत्वमभ्युपगम्यते क एवं सति दोषः स्यात् ?

Opponent : If the subtle elements are accepted as the atoms, what will be the fault ?

उच्यते—न शक्मेवं भवितुम् । किं कारणम् ? वृद्धिमत्यस्तमात्रलक्षणाः प्रकृतयोऽस्माभिरभ्युपगम्यन्ते । कस्मात् ? स्वकार्याद्धि प्रथीयसी प्रकृतिर्भवतीति च नः समयः । महान्ति च पृथिव्यादीनि महाभूतानि । तस्मात्तेषां तदतिरिक्ततया पृथिव्या भवितव्यम् । परिच्छिन्नदेशाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात् तन्मात्राभ्युपगमात्तेषामभ्युपगमः । उपेत्य वा तदसम्भवः कृतकत्वात् । अस्तु वा परमाणूनां सद्भावस्तथापि तेभ्यो जगदुत्पत्तेरसम्भवं ब्रूमः । किं कारणम् ? कृतकत्वात् । अकृतकेन हि जगत्कारणेन युक्तं भवितुं, कृतकाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्सत्यपि सद्भावे न तेषां जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यते । हेत्वनुपदेशादयुक्तमिति चेत् अथापि स्यात् किं पुनरत्र कारणं येनाऽकृतकं जगत्कारणमिष्यते इति ? उच्यते—तस्यैव कारणत्वप्रसंगात् । यद्धि तत्परमाणूनां कारणं तदेव जगत्कारणत्वेन युक्तं कल्पयितुं स्यात् न तत्रिष्यादिताः परमाणवः । कृतकत्वासिद्धेरयुक्तमिति चेत् स्यान्मतं यदि परमाणूनां कृतकत्वं प्रसिद्धमत एतद्युज्यते वक्तुममुष्माद्धेतोरकारणं परमाणु इति । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मान्न किंचिदेतत् । उच्यते—परिच्छिन्नदेशत्वात् । इह यत्परिच्छिन्नदेशं तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, परिच्छिन्नदेशश्च । तस्मात्परमाणवः कृतकाः । किं चान्यत् रूपादिमत्त्वात् । इह यद्रूपादिमत्तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, रूपादिमन्तश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किं चान्यत् औष्ण्ययोगात् । यद्दौष्ण्ययुक्तं तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा प्रदीपः, तद्वन्तश्चाग्नेयाः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंच वेगवत्त्वात् । इह यद्वेगवत्तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा इषुर्वेगवान्, तद्वन्तो वायवीयाः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंच स्नेहद्रवत्वयोगात् । इह यत्स्नेहद्रवत्वयुक्तं तत्कृतकम् । यथा केदारादिष्वापः । इत्थं चाप्याः परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंचाधेयत्वात् । इह यदन्यस्मिन्नाधीयते तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा ठघवम् । आधीयन्ते च परमाणवः पृथिव्याम्, तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंच अर्थान्तराधारत्वात् । इह यदर्थान्तरस्याधारत्वं प्रतिपद्यते तत्कृतकम् । तद्यथा घटः । अर्थान्तरस्य च द्वयणुकादेराधारत्वमणवः प्रतिपद्यन्ते तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंच प्राप्तिव्यवधानात् । इह ययोर्मध्ये अन्तरा द्रव्यमवस्थितम् प्राप्तेर्व्यवधायकं भवति, तौ कृतकौ । तद्यथा द्वयङ्गुली । तथा चाणू द्वावन्तराण्वन्तरमवस्थितं, यो यः प्राप्तेर्व्यवधायकः, तौ कृतकौ तस्मात्तावपि कृतकौ । किंच द्रव्यान्तरारम्भकत्वात् । इह यद् द्रव्यान्तरारम्भकं तत्कृतकं वः । तद्यथा तन्तुः, द्रव्यारम्भकाश्च परमाणवः । तस्मात्कृतकाः । किंच प्रत्याक्षत्वात् । इह यत्प्रत्यक्षं तत्कृतकं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा घटः, प्रत्यक्षाश्च योगिनां परमाणवः । अतएव कृतकत्वमिति चेत् स्मान्तं यत एव योगिनां प्रत्यक्षाः परमाणवस्तत एव कृतकाः । किं कारणम् ? अस्मादादिप्रत्यक्षं घटादि हि कृतकं दृष्टमिति कृत्वा । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? शरीरकृतकत्वप्रगङ्गात् । शरीरमपि हि योगिनां प्रत्यक्षं, कामं

तदप्यकृतकमस्तु । अथ नैतदेव तर्हि नाकृतकाः परमाणवः । प्रधानादिषु प्रसंग इति चेन्न अन-
भ्युपगमात् । श्रीकपिलब्राह्मणैरपि प्रधानपुरुषावप्रत्यक्षाविति नः शास्त्रम् । तस्माद्यत्किंचिदे-
तत् । सत्तादिवदित चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यथा सत्तागुणत्वरूपत्वादीनां सति प्रत्यक्षतवेऽकृतकत्वम्
एवं परमाणूनां भविष्यतीति । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । परमाण्वकृतकत्ववत्स-
त्तादीनां सद्भावोऽसिद्धः । तस्माच्छशविषाणात्पुरुषविषाणसिद्धिवदग्राह्यमेतत् । सौक्ष्म्याद-
णूनां कृतकत्वाप्रसंग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, न हि परमाणुभ्यः सूक्ष्मतरमन्यद् भावान्तरमस्ति
यदेषामारम्भकं स्यात् । परा खल्वेषाकाष्ठा सौक्ष्म्यस्य यत्परमाणवः । तस्मादेषां कृतकत्वम-
नुपपन्नमिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पाकजेष्वतिप्रसंगात् । सौक्ष्म्यादकृतकत्वप्रसंगः ।
तेऽपि परमाणवः सूक्ष्माः । यत् खल्वतिसौक्ष्म्यात्प्रधानपुरुषयोरकृतकत्वं दृष्टं तत्सति विभु-
त्वे । न च यथा प्रधानपुरुषावेवमणवोऽपि विश्वं व्यश्नुवते । तस्मात्सति सौक्ष्म्ये पाकजवदेषां
कृतकत्वमनिवार्यम् । येषां तु कार्यद्रव्यं पच्यत इति पक्षस्तेषामयमनुपालम्भ इत्यतः परमाणु-
समवेतं कर्मोदाहार्यम् । तद्धि सूक्ष्ममतीन्द्रियं कृतकं चेति सिद्धं कृतकाः परमाणवः कृतकत्वा-
च्चैषामनित्यराप्यन पातिनीति कृत्वाऽन्तरालप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु प्रध्वंसात्परमाणूनां कारणाभा-
वात्कार्याभाव इति स्वशास्त्रसिद्धादनुमानाज्जगदुच्छित्तिदोषप्रसंगः । तथा भोगिनामुपचितस्य
स्वकर्मणोऽनुपभोगात्कृतस्य विप्रणाशः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्न जगत्कारणं परमाणवः ।

Proponent : It is not possible.

What is the reason here?

The subtle elements (having the characteristic of that element only) having larger magnitude (than the gross objects) are admitted by us as the causes.

Why ?

And, our theory is that the cause is certainly of larger magnitude than its effect. And, the earth, etc., which are gross elements are great. Therefore, the earth of them (as a subtle element) should be different from them. The atoms, however, are limited in magnitude. Therefore, they are not accepted through the acceptance of the subtle elements.²⁴ Even if their existence is accepted, it would be impossible (to consider them as the cause of the world) because they are products. Let us admit the existence of the atoms, still we say that the origin of the world is impossible from them.

What is the reason here?

Because they are products. The uncaused should rightly be the cause of the world. The atoms are, however, caused. Therefore, even their existence is admitted, their being the cause of the world is not justified.

If is argued that it is wrong because the reason is not stated? It

may be like this. What is the reason that the uncaused (object) is intended to be the cause of the world ?

To this we reply that there would arise the undesirable contingency of admitting that (cause of that cause) as the cause. Whatever is the cause of the atoms, that would be rightly postulated as the cause of the world, but not the atoms which are the products of that cause.²⁵

If it is argued that it is wrong because the caused nature of the atoms is not proved? It may be like this. If the caused nature of the atoms would be established, it is right to say that the atoms are not the cause because of the above reason. That is, however, not established. Therefore, this is nothing (i.e., this is not a forceful argument).

To this we reply that *because of their being limited in space*. Whatever is limited in space here is observed to be caused as the pot which is limited in space also. Therefore, they are caused. Moreover, because of possessing the form, etc. Here whatever possesses the form, etc., is observed to be caused, as the pot. And the atoms possess the form, etc., therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of their possessing heat*. Whatever possesses heat is caused as the lamp. The atoms of fire are possessed of that (heat). Therefore, they are caused.²⁶ Moreover, because of having the speed. Here, whatever is possessed of speed is caused as the arrow which is possessed of that (speed). The atoms of air are possessed of that. Therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of having lubricity and fluidity*. Here, whatever is possessed of lubricity and fluidity, is caused as the water in the basin around the tree. The water atoms are like this. Hence, they are caused. *Moreover, because of their being located*. Here, *whatever* is located in something else is cause just like *thadhara*.²⁷ The atoms are located in the earth. Therefore, they are caused. *Moreover, because of being the location of some other object*. Here, whatever comes to be the location of some other object is caused just as the pot. The atoms also become the location of some other object like binary. Therefore, they are caused. Moreover, because of the intervention in union. Here, the objects in the middle of which the other object stands as intervention in the union are caused, just like the two fingers. Similarly, some atom stands in the middle of other two atom. Whatever are intervened by some other object, are caused. Therefore, those (two intervened) atoms are also caused. *Moreover, because of giving rise to some other object*. We hold that here whatever gives rise to some other object is caused, as the threads. The atoms give rise to the other object. Therefore, they are caused.²⁸ Moreover,

because of their perceptibility. Here, whatever is perceptible is observed to be caused just as the pot. The atoms are perceptible to the yogins. They are caused.

If it is argued that the above reason is for their being uncaused?²⁹ the yogins they are uncaused.³⁰

Why ?

Because the pot, etc., which are perceptible to us only are observed to be caused.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it would give rise to the undesirable contingency of the supposition of uncaused nature of the body.³¹ The body is also perceptible to the yogins; let it also be uncaused. This is, however, not so. Therefore, the atoms are also not uncaused.

If it is argued that it will give rise to the undesirable contingency (of being caused) in case of the cosmic matter, etc., we reply, no, because it is not admitted by us. According to our scripture the cosmic matter and the conscious entity are not perceptible even to a Brahmin like Kapila. Therefore, the argument has no force.

If it is argued that it is (eternal) like existence, etc., It may be like this. Just as the existence, qualityness, form-ness, etc., are eternal even though they are perceptible, similar will be the case with the atoms.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is also to be proved. Just like the uncaused nature of the atoms, the existence of existence etc., is not proved. Therefore, it is non-acceptable just like establishing the horns of the man through the horns of the hare.

If it is argued that there does not arise the undesirable contingency of caused nature of the atoms because of their subtlety? It may be like this. There is no object more subtle than the atoms so that it may be the cause of these atoms the highest limit of subtlety. Therefore, the originated nature of them cannot be justified.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it will involve the undesirable contingency of over pervasion to the baked (atoms). In the case of those who intend un-

caused nature, there will be the undesirable contingency of admitting uncaused nature in the atoms of earth which are backed and are placed after putting aside the blackness. Those atoms are also subtle.³² The uncaused nature of cosmic matter and the conscious entity, on the other hand, is through their extreme subtlety in presence of their being all-pervasive in addition. The atoms do not pervade the whole universe as the cosmic matter and the conscious entity do. Therefore, inspite of their being subtle, their caused nature is certain just as is the case with the baked atoms. This objection does not arise in case of those in whose theory only the caused substance is baked. In that case the activity inherent in the atoms should be taken for example. That is subtle, imperceptible and caused. In this way, it is proved that the atoms are caused. Due to the caused nature their non-eternity is also unavoidable and, hence, it involves the fault of extirpation of the whole world through the inference setablished in the own system (of the Vaiśeṣikas) because of the destruction of the atoms in the intermediate and the great dissolution and (consequently) because of the absence of the effect in the absence of the cause.³³ Since the acts accumulated by those who are engaged in enjoyment remain unenjoyed, the acts done perish (unenjoyed). This is, however, undesirable. Therefore, the atoms are not the cause of the universe.

(The conscious entity as also Īśvara cannot be the cause)

याऽपि खल्वियमाशंका पुरुषाज्जगदुत्पत्तिर्भविष्यतीत साऽप्ययुक्ता । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात् । तस्माच्च विपर्यासादित्यत्र (का. १९) पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वमुपपादयिष्यामः । चैतन्याविशेषादीश्वरस्यापि स एव विधिः काणत्वप्रतिषेधे बोद्धव्यः ।

The objection that there will be the origination of the universe from the conscious entity is also wrong.

Why ?

Because we have negated. We shall establish the non-doership of the conscious entity in the *kārikā* 'from that contrast, etc. (Ka 19).³⁴ The same method should be known (as applied) in rejecting the nature of being a cause in case of Īśvara because the consciousness is not different (in both the cases).³⁵

(Negation of Existence of Īśvara)

आह अस्त्येवमीश्वर इति पाशुपतवैशेषिकाः । कस्मात् ? कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् । इह कार्यविशेषः प्रासादविमानादिरतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वको दृष्टः । अस्ति चऽयं महाभूतेन्द्रियभुवनविन्यासादिलक्षणः कार्यविशेषः । तस्मादनेनाप्यतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकेण भवित-

व्यम् । यत्पूर्वकोऽयं स ईश्वरः । तस्मादस्तीश्वर इति । किं चान्यत् चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वात् । इह चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धश्चेतनकृतो दृष्टः, तद्यथा गोशकटयोः । अस्ति चऽयं चेतनाचेतनयोः शरीरशरीरिणोभिसम्बन्धः । तस्मादनेनापि चेतनकृतेन भवितव्यम् । यत्कृतोऽयं स ईश्वरः । तस्मादस्तीश्वरः कारणम् ।

Opponent : The Pāsupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the Īśvara exists.

Why ?

Because the particular effects are caused by the intellect surpassing (others). Here, the effects like palace, an aeroplane, etc., are observed to be caused by superior intellect. Whatever is the cause of those is the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara exists. Moreover, because the union of conscious and non-conscious is caused by some sentient entity. It is observed here that the union of the conscious and the non-conscious is caused by some sentient entity, just like the union of the bull and the cart. The union of the body and the soul is that of conscious and non-conscious. Therefore, it should also be caused by some sentient entity. That by whome this union is caused is the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara exists as the cause.

उच्यते— यत्तावदुक्तं कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वादीश्वरसद्भावसिद्धिरिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, साध्यत्वात् । अस्मदादिबुद्धिपूर्वकाः प्रासादादयः, अतिशयबुद्धिपूर्वका वा इति साध्यमेतत् । तस्मादनुत्तरम् । किंच प्राक्प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्बुद्ध्यसम्भवात्कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् प्रधानादयं बुद्धिपूर्वकं कार्यविशेषं कुर्वति । प्राक्च प्रधानविपरिणामाद् बुद्धिरेवनास्तीत्युपपन्नमेतत् । शक्तिमत्त्वात्स्वत इति चेत् स्यात्पुनरेतत् सर्वशक्तिप्रचित ईश्वरः । तस्य प्रागपि प्रधानविपरिणामात्स्वत एवेच्छयोगाद् बुद्धिसद्भावो न प्रतिषिध्यत इति । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? दृष्टान्ताभावात् । बुद्धिः स्वत एवेत्यत्र पर्यनुयुक्त (स्य) कस्ते दृष्टान्तः ? तस्मादसदेतत् । शक्तिविशेषाददोष इति चेत्, अथापि स्यात् नान्येषां बुद्धिमतामीश्वरतुल्या शक्तिः । अत एषां प्रधानाच्छरीरव्यूहसमकालमात्मादिसन्निकर्षाद्वा बुद्ध्य उत्पद्यन्त इति, ईश्वरस्य तु स्वत इति । एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगात् । दृष्टान्तविरुद्धमर्थमादाय प्रतिबध्यमानेन शक्तिविशेषः स्मर्तव्य इत्येतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्ववादसिद्धिप्रसंगः स्यात् । तस्माद् ग्रहमात्रमेतत् । एवं स्वत ईश्वरस्य बुद्धिसम्भवो न चेद् भवेत् युक्तमुच्यते प्राक्प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्बुद्ध्यसम्भवात् बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकोऽयं कार्यविशेषः । किंच फलानुपपत्तेः । दृष्टमदृष्टं वा फलमुद्दिश्य बुद्धिमन्तः कार्यविशेषान्प्रासादविमानादीनारभमाणा दृष्यन्ते । अनुपहृतश्चायमैश्वर्यात् । किं च प्रयोजकाऽनुपपत्तेः । किं च अनेकान्तात् । न च सर्वः कार्यविशेषो बुद्धिपूर्वकः । वृक्षादीनां तद्व्यतिरेकेणोत्पत्तेः । सर्वस्येश्वरबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाभ्युपगमे दृष्टान्ताभावः । न चास्त्यनुदाहृतो वादः । तस्मादनेकान्तात् बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं व्यक्तम् । किं च दुःखोत्तरत्वात् । बुद्धिपूर्वकश्चेदस्य कार्यविशेषः स्यात्कर्तुर्दुःखोत्तरविधाने प्रयोजनं नास्ति । शक्तिमांशायमिति सुखोत्तर-

मेव विदध्यात् । दुःखोत्तरश्चायं, तस्मान्न बुद्धिपूर्वकः । किंच दुःखोपायत्वात् । बुद्धिपूर्वकश्चेदयं कार्यविशेषः स्याद्धर्मार्थकाममोक्षप्राप्तयः सुखोपायाः स्युः, दुःखोपायाश्च, तस्मादबुद्धिपूर्वकः । धर्माधर्मनिमित्तत्वाददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, यद्यपीश्वरपूर्वकोऽयं कार्यविशेषः तथाप्यादिसर्गे सुखोत्तराणामस्मदुत्पन्नानां प्राणिनां धर्माधर्मपरिग्रहाद् हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टवयोजातिस्वभावादियोगो भवति । ततश्च नाऽपराधोयमीश्वरस्येति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अधर्मोत्पत्तिहेत्वभावात् । ईश्वरश्चेद्धर्माधर्मयोरुत्पात्तावीष्टे धर्ममेव प्राणिनां सुखहेतुत्वादुत्पादयेत् नाधर्मं, प्रयोजनाभावात् । अथ मतम् स्वाभाविकी धर्माधर्मयोः स्वकारणादुत्पत्तिः, यदुक्तं सर्वमीश्वरबुद्धिपूर्वकं व्यक्तमिति तु तस्य व्याघातः । तस्मादीश्वरो न कारणम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वादीश्वरस्य सद्भाव इति, अत्र ब्रूमः—अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । योऽयं चेतनाचेतनयोगोऽकटयोरभिसम्बन्धः स केन चेतनेन कृतः ? यदि चैत्रेण, तस्य कार्यकारणसंघातत्वादाचेतन्यम् । अथ चैत्रशब्दावच्यस्य पिण्डस्योपद्रष्टा क्षेत्रज्ञः तत्कृत इष्यते तदयुक्तम्, साध्यत्वात् । न हि पुरुषकर्तृत्वमस्मत्पक्षे प्रसिद्धम् । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धेन व्यवहारः । किं चान्यत् अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वं ब्रुवतः प्राप्तमीश्वरकार्यकारणयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वम् । तथा चाऽनवस्थाप्रसंगः । अथ मा भूदयं दोष इति स्वाभाविक ईश्वरस्य कार्यकारणयोरभिसम्बन्ध इष्यते, न तर्ह्येकान्तिको हेतुः । तयोराचेतन्याददोष इचि चेत्, स्यात्पुनरेतत् ईश्वरस्य यत्कार्यकारणं तदपि चेतनमीश्वरोऽपि, तस्मात्सम्बन्धेन प्रत्युदाहरणमुपपद्यत इति । एतदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? असम्बन्धप्रसंगात् । चैतन्याविशेषादात्मन आत्मान्तरेणाभिसम्बन्धो नास्ति । एवमीश्वरकार्यकारणयोरपि न स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । किं च अविपर्ययप्रसंगात् । उभयचैतन्यप्रतिज्ञस्य यथेश्वरस्य करणं बुद्ध्यादयः, एवमीश्वरोऽपि बुद्ध्यादीनां करणं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? अविशेषात् । अथैतदनिष्टं, न तर्ह्युभयोश्चैतन्यम् । कार्यकारणवत्ताऽनभ्युपगमाददोष इति चेत् व्यापी निरवयवोऽनन्तशक्तिः सूक्ष्मेभ्यः सूक्ष्मतमो महद्भ्यो महत्तमोऽधिकरणधर्माऽनादिरित्येवमनन्तलक्षणमीश्वरपदार्थं तद्विदो व्याचक्षते । तस्य कुतः कार्यकारणमवलम्ब्येदमध्यारोपितमिति ? एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनुमानविरोधात् । इत्थं चेदीश्वरो यदिदमनुमानं कार्यविशेषस्यातिशयबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वाच्च चेतनाचेतनयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य चेतनकृतत्वादिति तद्व्याहन्यते । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतावदीदृशार्थेन सहैतद् दृष्टमिति । उपेत्य वा, मूर्तिपरिग्रहव्याघातात् । यद्येकान्तेनैवरूप ईश्वरः, क्षित्यादिमूर्तिपरिग्रहो व्याहन्येत । किं चान्यत्—श्रुतेः । श्रुतिरपि चास्य मूर्तिमाचष्टे कृत्तिवासाः पिनाकहस्तो विततधन्वा नीलशिखण्डीत्यादि । तदभ्युपगमात्स्वपक्षहानिरिति चेत्, स्यान्मतं यदि तर्हि श्रुतिवचनान्मूर्तिमानीश्वरः परिगृह्यते । तेन सिद्धमस्याऽस्तित्वम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्यसतो मूर्तिमत्त्वमुपपद्यत इति कृत्वा । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । अभिप्रायाऽनवबोधात् । न ह्येकान्तेन वयं भगवतः शक्तिविशेषं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, माहात्म्यशरीरादिपरिग्रहात् । यथा तु भदतोच्यते प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः तयोः प्रयोक्ता नास्तीत्ययमस्मदभिप्रायः, तस्मादेतस्य बाधकम् । अतो न प्रधानपुरुषयोरभिसम्बन्धोऽन्यकृतः । किं चान्यत् अशक्यत्वात् । कुर्वाणः खल्वप्ययमभिसम्बन्धं शरीरमात्रेण वा शरीरिणः कुर्यात्, शरीरकारणेन वा ? किं चातः ? तत्र तावच्छरीरमात्रेण करोति । कस्मात् ? अनपेक्षस्य शरीरोत्पत्तौ निमित्ताभावात् ।

न शरीरकारणेन, विभुत्वात् । परिच्छिन्नयोगोशकटयोरभिसम्बन्धोऽन्यकृतः, विभू च प्रधानपुरुषौ । किं च पारार्थ्यात् । गोशकटयोरभिसम्बन्धः परार्थो दृष्टः । न तु प्रधानपुरुषयोरभिसम्बन्धः परार्थ इति । ईश्वरार्थ इति चेन्न, उक्तत्वात् । दृष्टादृष्टार्थ ईश्वरस्यानुपपन्न इत्यादावेवोक्तमेतत् । एवं तावत्पाशुपतानामीश्वरपरिग्रहे दोषः ।

Proponent : As regards the statement that the existence of Īśvara is proved because the particular effect is caused by the superior intellect, we reply, no, because it is still to be proved. It is yet to be proved whether the palaces, etc., are caused by the intellect like ours or by some surerior one. Therefore, it needs no reply. Moreover, he would have produced the particular effects from the cosmic matter without the intellect³⁶ because the intellect does not exist before the activity of the cosmic matter and there is no other instrumental cause. Before the modification of the cosmic matter, intellect does not exist and, hence, it is not right.

If it is argued that he would create the universe himself because he is endowed with power ? It may be like this. The Īśvara is full of all the powers. The existence of intellect is not rejected because even before the modification of the cosmic matter he is himself endowed with desire (and could create the intellect). The existence of intellect is, thus, not negated.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no example. What is the example in favour of one proving that intellect is by itself (created with desire, etc.)? Therefore, it is wrong.

If it is argued that it is not a fault because of his possessing particular power ? It may be like this. The other beings endowed with intellect do not have the power equal to Īśvara. Thus, the intellects of these beings originate from the cosmic matter at the time of formation of the body or due to the contact with the soul, etc.³⁷ The intellect of the Īśvara, however, originates by itself (through his will).

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there will arise the undesirable contingency of establishment of all the theories. If accepting the object which is opposite

to the example, and if through the contradicted reason some particular power should be accepted, this postulation would involve the establishment of all the theories. Therefore, this is merely a tenacity. Thus, if the intellect of the Īśvara would not originate itself, it is rightly stated that the particular effects (of the universe) are not caused by some intelligent being because there is no possibility of intellect earlier to the activity of the cosmic matter. *Moreover, because of the absence of possibility of (desired) result.* The intelligent persons are observed to start creating the particular effects like palace, aeroplane, etc., with the visible or invisible objective. This (Īśvara) is however, unobstructed (to achieve something) because of his lordly power. *Moreover, the Instigator is not possible (in case of Īśvara).* The intelligent beings are observed to start the particular activities when instigated by other. This is, however, not possible in case of Īśvara because there is no propriety (in holding someone as) endowed with instigation (to Īśvara). *Moreover, because of its being non-conclusive.* All the particular effects are not caused by intellect because the tree, etc., originate without that also. There is no example to support the view that everything is caused by the intellect of Īśvara. And, there is no theory when it is not exemplified. Therefore, on account of non-conclusiveness the manifest objects are not caused by some intelligent beings. *Moreover, because of resulting in misery.* If the particular effects are created deliberately (by some intelligent being), there is no purpose of the creator in creating the object which resulted in misery. And, the Īśvara is powerful also and, hence, he would have created the objects which result in pleasure. Everything in this universe results in misery. Therefore, the particular effects are not caused by intellect. *Moreover, on account of being accomplished with the difficult means.* If the particular objects would have been caused by intelligence, the attainment of virtue, wealth, pleasure and liberation would have been through the easy means. They are, however, attainable through difficult means. Therefore, they are not caused through intelligence.

If it is argued that the above defect does not arise because the virtue and vice serve as the cause of them, it may be like this. The particular effects are caused by Īśvara, but still the beings which originate as abounding in pleasure in the initial state of creation are associated with mean, moderate and eminent age, caste (or birth) and nature due to the accumulation of virtue and vice. This is then not the offence of Īśvara.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the absence of the cause of production of vice. If the Īśvara is desired for the production of virtue and vice, he would have produced only the virtue of the beings for it (virtue) is the cause of pleasure. He would not have produced the vice because of the absence of purpose of (producing vice).³⁸ If it is argued that the production of virtue and vice from their cause is natural, it would contradict the statement that everything is caused by the intelligence of the Īśvara. Therefore, Īśvara is not the cause. As regards your statement that the existence of Īśvara is proved because the contact of conscious and unconscious is caused by some conscious being, we reply that it is wrong.

Why ?

Because it is yet to be proved. By which conscious being is caused the contact of the conscious bull with the unconscious cart ? If you say it is caused by Caitra, he is also unconscious because of being the composite of cause and effect. If it is desired to be made by the entity who is soul the seer of the body denoted by the word Caitra, it is also wrong, because it is also to be proved. The agency (doership) of the conscious entity is not proved in our philosophy. The argumentation is on the ground well known to both the parties. Moreover, because of involving the undesirable contingency of infinite regress, in case of those who speak the contact is done by some sentient being, it would imply that the contact of Īśvara with the cause and effect (body of Īśvara) is done by some other conscious being. And, thus there arises the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. To alleviate this fault the contact of the Īśvara with the cause and effect (body) is accepted as natural. It is also not right, as in that case the reason is not conclusive. If it is argued that the defect does not arise because all of them are conscious, it may be like this. All the cause and effect (body) of Īśvara and also the Īśvara are conscious. Therefore, it can serve as an counter example of the contact.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it would involve the undesirable contingency of its being non-contact. There is no contact of one soul with the other soul because of non-difference of consciousness. In this way, there would not have been the contact between Īśvara and the body also. This is, however, not desirable. Moreover, because of the undesirable contingency of the absence of contradiction. In the case of one who con-

siders both as conscious the Īśvara also would be an instrument of the intellect etc., as the intellect etc., are that of Īśvara.

Why ?

Because there is no differentiation between the two. Since it is not desirable, the consciousness does not belong to both. If it is argued that the defect does not arise because the endowment with cause and effect (body) is not accepted? The knower of that describes the entity Īśvara as pervasive, without components, endowed with endless power, subtlest among the subtle, greatest among the greatest, having supremacy as the characteristic, beginningless and having endless characteristics. How is all this imposed upon him taking recourse to cause and effect (body)? This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it goes against the inference (of Īśvara). If the Īśvara is of this nature, the inference that the Īśvara exists because the particular effect is caused by the superior intellect and because the contact between the conscious and unconscious entities is brought about by some conscious entity, is contradicted.

Why ?

Because this is not observed with such an object.³⁹ Or if it is granted (for the sake of argument), (it will again be wrong) because it will again contradict the idea of assuming a shape (by Īśvara). If the Īśvara is of this nature exclusively, it would contradict the (idea of) assuming the shape of earth, etc., (by Īśvara). *Moreover, because of the scriptures.* The scripture also speaks of its assuming a form—wearing the hide (of an atelope), having a bow (trident) in the hand, with his bow stretched, with blue peacock tail. If you argue that accepting it you will have to deviate from your position? It may be like this. If the Īśvara as endowed with shape is admitted through the statement of the scripture, his existence is proved.

Why ?

Because taking the form is not possible (or justified) in case of non-existent entity. This is also wrong. Because the (real) purport is not understood. We do not reject the particular power of lord absolutely, because he assumes the magnificent body, etc. What we mean to say is there is none different from cosmic matter and the conscious entity as the instigator of the two as held by you. Therefore, (our) position refutes this. Therefore, the contact of, the cosmic matter and the conscious entity is not caused by some other entity.