

आह—बहूनि प्रमाणान्याचार्यैरभ्युपगम्यन्ते तानि सर्वाणि किं भवाननुमन्यते ?

Opponent : The (other) authorities have accepted many means of knowledge.⁷ Do you approve all of them ?

नेत्युच्यते ।

त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टम्

किंतिहि विधानं विधा, तिस्रो विधा अस्य तत्त्रिविधं त्रिप्रकार-मित्यर्थः । अनेनैतदाचष्टे—एकमेव बुद्धिलक्षणं सत्त्वं निमित्तान्तरानुग्रहोप-जनिताभिः कार्यविशेषपरिच्छिन्नरूपभेदाभिः शक्तिभिरुपकाराद् भिन्नमिव प्रत्यवभासमानं दृष्टादिशब्दवाच्यं भवति । न तु यथा तन्त्रान्तरीयाणां विषयोपनिपातिभिर्निन्द्रयैरुपजनितावध्यो बुद्ध्यस्तथेह विद्यन्ते याः परि-कल्प्यमानाः स्वतन्त्राणि त्रीणि प्रमाणानि स्युः ।

Proponent : No,

THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE APPROVED IS OF THREE KINDS.

Vidhā denotes kinds and the compound *trividham* is dissolved as the one of three kinds which means that which is of three kinds.

7. Cf. *Y.D.* on the present *kārikā*. The Cārvākas recognise perception only, the Vaiśeṣikas recognise perception and inference, the Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the Viśitādvaita, Dvaita, Śuddhādvaita and the Dvaitādvaita schools of Uttaramīmāṃsā recognise perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas recognise Upamāna in addition, the Prābhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā adds arthāpatti to them. The Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Advaita school of Uttaramīmāṃsā recognise the above with the addition of anupalabdhi. The Paurāṇikas admit the above with the addition of *sambhava*, *aitihya* and *pratibhā*. The *Yuktidīpikā* establishes the independence of verbal testimony under *kārikā* 5. It includes the additional *pramāṇas* into those accepted by the Sāṃkhyas here.

This is what is to be meant—the single *sattva* in the form of the intellect is described differently by the words like perception, etc., when it appears to be different through the help rendered by the powers which have come to be differentiated in nature due to their form limited by the particular act and which are caused by the other causes (leading to different means). In this scripture there are not the (different) inviolable knowledges caused by the senses which have come in contact with the objects (of knowledge) as they are so in other philosophical systems. If these (different knowledges) are admitted, there will be three independent means of knowledge⁸

स्यान्मतम्, कथं पुनः प्रमाणलक्षणानां शक्तीनामकवस्तुसन्निवेश-
रूपभेदा भवन्तीति ?

Opponent : It may be asked how there are the differentiations in the means of knowledge due to the differentiation in the form of a particular arrangement in an object called power.⁹

उच्यते—सत्त्वादिवत् । यथा सत्त्वादीनां गुणानामेकशब्दादिवस्तु-
सन्निवेशेऽपि प्रकाशादिकार्यभेदाद्रूपसंकरो न भवति, यथा वा शब्दस्पर्श-
रूपरसगन्धानामेकद्रव्यसन्निवेशेऽपि ग्राहकान्तरगम्यकत्वात्, यथा वा
कर्तृकरणाधिकरणसम्प्रदानापादानकर्मलक्षणानां शक्तीनामेकद्रव्यसन्निवेशे-
ऽपि कार्यविशेषपरिच्छिन्नानि स्वरूपाणि न संकीर्यन्ते, तद्वदिदं द्रष्टव्यम् ।
शक्त्यन्तरोपजनने वस्त्वन्तरोपपत्तिरिति चेन् न, अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि

8. The Sāṃkhyas unlike the Naiyāyikas do not believe that perception, inference, etc., are independent means of knowledge. On the contrary, the means of knowledge in the form of intellect is one and the knowledge is metaphorically said to be of different kinds when the other factors which do not form the means of knowledge directly are different.

9. The meaning is that if the power is itself the *pramāṇa*, how can the non-material object like power be differentiated through the difference in other factors particularly when it is essentially non-different from that located into a single object.

क्षणभङ्गसाहसं युक्तिमन्तरेण दण्डभयादपि प्रतिपद्यामहे, न तु तस्यामवसर इति स्थीयतां तावत् ।

Proponent : *Like the sattva, etc.* Just as there is no inter-mixture of form among the three constituents due to the differentiation of functions like illumination, etc., though they are located in a single substance like word, etc., or just as the qualities like word, touch, form, taste and smell though located in the same object, are not intermixed because of being apprehended through different means (i.e., organs of knowledge)¹⁰, or as—though the powers characterised by nominative, instrumental, locative, dative, ablative and accusative are located in the same object, yet their forms circumscribed by particular action (of denoting different cases) are not inter-mixed. In the same way it (the case of power relating to different means of knowledge) should be understood.

If it is argued that the production of different types of power leads to the production of objects ?

We reply—no, because it is not accepted (by us). We do not accept baseless boldness of the theory of momentariness without solid reason even with the fear of punishment, and there is no scope for that (type of reason) in the present case. Hence, you should stop (arguing here).

(Other Means of Knowledge included into the three)

आह, कथं पुनरेतद् गम्यते यथा त्रिविधमेव प्रमाणं न पुनरनेक-विधमपीति ?

Opponent : Then, how is it known that the means of knowledge is threefold only and not of many varieties ?

उच्यते—

सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

सर्वाणि च तानि प्रमाणानि सर्वप्रमाणानि । सिद्धस्य भावः सिद्धत्वम् । सर्वप्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वम् । सिद्धत्वमन्तर्भावि इत्यर्थः ।

10. To be cognised through different organs is the test of differentiation in objects,

तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मिन्नेव त्रिविधे प्रमाणे इति वाक्यशेषः । सर्वेषां परपरिकल्पितानां प्रमाणानामस्मिन्नेव त्रिविधे प्रमाणेऽन्तर्भावादिति यावदुक्तं स्यात्तावदिदमुच्यते सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वादिति । अथवा सर्वप्रमाणेषु सिद्धं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धं—सप्तमी सिद्धशुष्कपक्वबन्धैरिति समासः, यथा सांकाश्यसिद्धः पाटलिपुत्रसिद्ध इति । तद्भावः प्रमाणसिद्धत्वं तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । कस्य त्रिविधस्य प्रमाणस्येति वाक्यशेषः ।

Proponent : BECAUSE ALL THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE INCLUDED (IN THIS THREEFOLD MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE).

The expression sarvapramāṇāni denotes all the means of knowledge. The state of inclusion is denoted by the term siddhatvam. The expression sarvapramāṇasiddhatva means the state of inclusion of all the means of knowledge. The expression siddhatva means inclusion. Adding fifth case termination in the sense of reason we get sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt. 'In this threefold means of knowledge' is the remaining expression. It is stated as above because of the inclusion of all the means of knowledge, so that it may be (understood) that all the means of knowledge posited (by the other authorities) may be included in this threefold means of knowledge only. Or, the compound sarvapramāṇasiddha may be dissolved as sarvapramāṇeṣu siddham and these words are compounded by the rule that a word ending in seventh case affix is compounded with the words siddha (born or known), śuṣka (dried), pakva (cooked)¹¹ and bandha (bound) as the expression like Sāṃkāśyasiddhaḥ (born or known in Sāṃkāśyā) and Pāṭaliputrasiddhaḥ (born or known in Pataliputra). The state of it is denoted by the expression sarvapramāṇasiddhatvam and adding fifth case affix we get sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt. Of which ? Of three kinds 'of means of knowledge' is the remaining expression.

केन पुनराकारेण त्रिविधं प्रमाणं सिद्धमिति ?

Opponent : In what way the threefold means is established ?

उच्यते—परस्पराविशेषात् । अन्यानि पुनरस्मात् त्रयात् यथाऽभिन्नानि तथा प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : Because of lack of mutual distinction. How the others are not distinct from these three, we will propound later on.

(Means of Knowledge accepted in Sāṃkhya)

आह, किम्पुनस्तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति ?

Opponent : Of What sub-varieties is that threefold means of knowledge ?

उच्यते—

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च

इति । तत्र दृष्टं नाम उपात्तविषयेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपाती योऽध्यवसायः । अनुमानं द्वयोरविनाभाविनोरेकं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाय तत्पूर्वकं सम्बन्ध्यन्तरे यत् पश्चान्मानं भवति । आप्तवचनं तु प्रमाणभूतद्वारकोऽत्यन्तपरोक्षेऽर्थे निश्चयः । इत्युद्देशमात्रमिदम् । मूललक्षणं तु आचार्यो वक्ष्यति स्वयमेव प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमित्यादि ।

proponent ; PERCEPTION, INFERENCE AND VERBAL TESTIMONY.

Out of them, the perception is the definite cognition resulting from (lit. following the) function of the senses which have come in contact with the object. After knowing through perception one of the two invariably associated objects and taking this knowledge as preceding when there is the ascertainment of one of the associated, it is called inference.¹² The verbal testimony is the ascertainment of the extremely invisible object through (someone whose words are) valid.¹³ It is merely the enunciation (of the means of knowledge). The basic definition will be given by the authority himself as perception is the definite cognition of an object through the senses (kā. 5), and the like.

(Means of Knowledge accepted by others)

12. This is the explanation based upon the derivation of the term.

13. Cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā 6.

आह, त्रैविध्याऽनुपपत्तिः, न्यूनाधिकश्रवणात् । तन्त्रान्तरीयाः केचित् चत्वारि प्रयाणानीच्छन्ति । प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति वचनात्, तथा षडित्यन्ये ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शब्दं चोपमया सह ।

अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च हेतवः साध्यसाधकाः ॥

इत्यभिधानात् । एतानि सम्भवैति ह्यचेष्टासहितानि नवेत्यपरे । प्रत्यक्षानुमाने एवेति वैशेषिकबौद्धाः । तत्र कथमिदं निश्चीयते त्रिविधमेव प्रमाणं, न पुनर्न्यूनमधिकं वेति ?

Opponent : There is no propriety of threefold-ness (of the means of knowledge), because we hear less or more number (of the means of knowledge). Out of the followers of the other systems, some accept four means of knowledge. (It is on the authority of the statement) 'perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony are the means of knowledge.'¹⁴ Similarly, some accept six because of the following statement :

"Perception and inference and verbal testimony along with analogy, and presumption and absence are the means of establishing the object to be established."

The others hold that these are nine with the addition of probability, tradition and gesture to the above six. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists hold that there are two means of knowledge, viz., perception and inference.¹⁵ Then, how it is ascertained that the means of knowledge is of three kinds only and not of less or more than them ?

(Analogy and tradition included under verbal testimony)

उच्यते—किम्पुनरिदमुपमानं नाम ?

Proponent : (As a reply to it first of all we ask) what is, then, the analogy ?

14. N. S. 1.1.3

15. Cf. Note 8 above.

आह, प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् । प्रसिद्धः प्रज्ञातः, तेन साधर्म्यात् साध्यस्याऽप्रसिद्धस्य साधनमधिगमो यस्तदुपमानम् । अवबोध-विधिस्तु येनाऽनुपलब्धो गवयः स तस्योपलब्ध्यर्थमधिगतगवयं पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते-किरूपो गवय इति । स तस्मा आचष्टे—यथा गौरेवं गवय इति । तत्र प्रति-पत्त्याऽत्यन्ताऽनुपलक्षितगवयस्वरूपो व्याख्यातृप्रतिपादितप्रसिद्धवस्तु-साधर्म्यज्ञानाहितसंस्कारः प्रतिपद्यते—नूनमेवरूपो गवय इति । अपर आह—प्रतिराप्तवचनोपजनितप्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधर्म्यज्ञानाहितसंस्कारस्योत्तर-कालं प्रत्यक्षेण तमुपलभ्य या समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः—अयमसावर्थोऽस्य शब्दस्य समाख्या इति—तदुपमानमुच्यते ।

Opponent : Analogy is the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well known.¹⁶ Prasiddha means well known and by means of resemblance to that sādhanam, i.e., knowledge of that which is not well known, is the analogy. The process of knowing (in analogy) is thus – one who has not yet known the gavaya asks for the sake of knowing it the other who has known it ‘of what form is the gavaya’. He tells him ‘as the cow, so the gavaya’. By means of this knowledge one who has not observed the form of the gavaya and who is endowed with the impression of the knowledge of similarity with the well known object propounded by the expounder, comes to know ‘the gavaya, of course, is of this form’. Some other states (about the process of analogy) as when there is the knowledge of relation of name and its denotation in the form ‘this object is denoted by this name’, in the one who is endowed with the impression of the knowledge of similarity with the well known object through the statement of an authority and (again) one observes through perception afterwards that object, it is the analogy.¹⁷

यद्येवमुपमैतिह्यावचनम्, आप्तोपदेशसिद्धेः । यथा गौरेवं गवय इति चाप्तोपदेशबलात् प्रतिपत्ता अप्रसिद्धं गवयमुपलभते न साधर्म्य-

16. N. S. 1.1.6.

17. In the first explanation the resultant knowledge refers to the form of gavaya and in the second, to the denotative relation.

मात्रात् । तस्मान्न शब्दात् पृथगुपमा । यत्तु खल्विति ह उवाच याज्ञवल्क्य इत्येतदैतिह्यं नाम प्रमाणान्तरमुपकल्प्यते तदपि वक्तृविशेषापेक्षत्वान्न शब्दादर्थान्तरम् ।

Proponent: If it is so, the analogy and tradition should not be mentioned (as distinct means of knowledge) since these are included in the verbal testimony. The person engaged in knowing knows the gavaya, which is not well known, by the force of the statement of an authority and not merely through the similarity.¹⁸ Hence, the analogy is not different from verbal testimony.

Some different means of knowledge, viz., tradition, is posited in (expounding the statements like) 'that which is certainly, etc., said Yājñavalkya'. That also is not something other than the verbal testimony because it depends upon a particular speaker.¹⁹

आह, न । साधर्म्यपेक्षत्वात् । यदि ह्याप्तोपदेश उपमा स्यात्तेन यथा स्वर्गोऽप्सरसः, उत्तराः कुरव इत्येवमादिष्वन्तरेण साधर्म्योपादानं प्रति-
पत्तिर्भवति एवमिहापि स्यात् । गवयन्तु अयमाख्याता प्रतिपादयिष्यन्
प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यगर्भं शब्दमुपादत्ते न केवलम् । प्रतिपत्तापि तस्मादेव प्रति-
पद्यते न शब्दमात्रात्, तस्मात्पृथगेवास्योपदेशः कर्तव्यः । शब्दव्यापारात्त-
दन्तर्भाव इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् शब्दव्यापारसहितोऽयं प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यलक्षणार्थो
गवयप्रतिपत्तौ न केवलः, तस्मादस्य तत्रान्तर्भाव इति तदप्यनुपपन्नम् ।
कस्मात् ? वीतावीतयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । वीतावीतावपि हेतू परप्रतिपाद-
नार्थमुपादीयमानौ शब्दव्यापारमपेक्षेते । तयोरप्याप्तवचनत्वप्रसंगः ।
अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मान्नोपमानमाप्तोपदेशः ।

18. It means that the *karana* in this case is the authoritative statement and not the similarity.

19. The sense is that the validity of a verbal testimony depends upon the authority of the speaker. The same is the case with the upamāna and tradition.

Opponent : No, because it requires the similarity. If the analogy would be verbal testimony, there would arise the knowledge, in case of analogy also without the mention of similarity as is the case of the statements like 'there is the land of the Uttarakurus' 'there are nymphs in heaven' (which serve as the examples of verbal testimony). While propounding (the knowledge of gavaya) the person who communicates takes recourse to the words containing the well-known similarity and not to the words only. The knower also understands through that only and not merely through words. Hence, it (analogy) should be mentioned separately (i.e., as a separate means of knowledge). If it is argued that it is included in verbal testimony because of the operation through words ? It may be like this. In the act of knowing the gavaya, the meaning characterised by the well-known similarity accompanies the verbal operation and it is not merely the similarity to well known. Hence, it is included in verbal testimony.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it will lead to the undesirable contingency of inclusion of direct inference and the inference-by-elimination²⁰ into verbal testimony. The direct and the implied reasons (in inference) while reported to for propounding something to the others, stand in need of the verbal operation. There will be the undesirable contingency of their inclusion in verbal testimony. This is undesirable. Hence, the analogy is not verbal testimony.

उच्यते, साधर्म्याज्यतिरेकः, उपायभूतत्वात् । आख्यातृप्रामाण्यादव प्रतिपत्तुर्गवयविज्ञानमुपपद्यते । स तु कौशलाद्दुरूपपादोऽयमर्थः इति कृत्वा प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यमुपादत्ते । तस्मादाख्यातुर्गवयप्रतिपादनार्थमुपायभूतं साधर्म्यमुपाददानस्य शब्दादर्थान्तरमुद्भवति । अथैवंजातीयकानामपि प्रमाणान्त-

20. Cf. *kārikā* 5.

रत्वमिष्यते तेनात्यल्पमिदमुच्यते चत्वारि प्रमाणानीति । किं तर्हि पाणि-
विहाराक्षिणिकोचप्रभृतीनामप्युपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम् । किंच वक्तृविशेषा-
पेक्षत्वात् । यत्र ह्यर्थवशात्प्रतिपत्तिरूपद्यते न तत्र प्रतिपत्ता वक्तृविशेषम-
पेक्षते दृष्टार्थोऽयमदृष्टार्थोऽयमिति । तद्यथाऽनुमाने । अस्ति चोपमाने वक्तृ-
विशेषापेक्षा । तस्मान्न शब्दादर्थान्तरं तत् । अवश्य चैतदेवं विज्ञेयम् । यो
हि मन्यते प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादेव गवयप्रतिपत्तिरिति यथाश्वस्तथा गवय इत्ये-
तस्मादपि तस्य सम्प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । न चार्हति भवितुं, मिथ्याज्ञानत्वात् ।
यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते यतः समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरिति तदुपमानमिति ।
एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । तद् यथा बहुषु निषण्णेषु
कोऽत्र देवदत्त इत्युक्ते यो मुकुटी कुंडली व्यूढोरस्कस्ताम्रायताक्ष इति
प्रत्याह । ततश्च समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरिति प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसङ्ग इत्येव-
मनवस्था प्रमाणानां स्यात् । अनिष्टं चैतत् । एवं हि न तावत्परत उपमानं
प्रमाणान्तरम् । यदा स्वयमेव गां गवयं चोपलभ्य विकल्पयति यथाऽयं
तथाऽयमिति तदा तस्यार्थस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाधिगतत्वात् प्रमाणमेव तन्न
भवतीति । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तमयमैतिह्यावचनमाप्तोपदेशात् सिद्धेरिति ।

Proponent : *Similarity is not distinct because it serves only as an aid.*

The knowledge of gavaya arises in the knower only through the validity of the person who explains. Thinking that the object is difficult to be established he skillfully uses the well known similarity. Consequently, the similarity which serves as an aid for explaining the gavaya adopted by person who is engaged in explaining, is not something different from verbal testimony.²¹ If the property of being separate means of knowledge is desired in case of this sort of means, it is too less to say that there are four means of knowledge, (In that case) stepping of the foot and closing of the eye, etc., should also be mentioned (as separate means of knowledge). Moreover, (it is not different (from verbal authority) because it depends upon a particular speaker. Wherever the knowledge arises due to (the nature of)

21. Here, we have preferred Chakravarti's reading as : *śabdāda-rthāntram*.

an object, the knower does not require the particular speaker as to whether the person has perceived the object or not, as it is the case of inference. And, there is the requirement of a particular speaker in case of analogy. Hence, it is not different from the verbal testimony. It should certainly be understood in this way only.²² One who holds that the knowledge is attained merely through the well known similarity, to him the knowledge (of gavaya) would arise through the statement 'as the horse, so the gavaya'.²³ And, it cannot take place because it would be erroneous knowledge. The statement that the analogy is that from which arises the knowledge of relation of name with the object denoted, is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it leads to the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. When it is asked out of the many persons sitting here, who is Devadatta, the reply is given that a man who is wearing a diadem, decorated with ear-ring, with broad chest, and with red and large eyes, is Devadatta. The knowledge of the relation of name with the object denoted arises out of that and it would lead to the undesirable contingency of its being a distinct means of knowledge and, thus, there would arise the infinite regress with reference to the number of the means of knowledge. And, this is undesirable. In this way, the analogy meant for the knowledge of others is not a separate means of knowledge, when one at the sight of both the cow and the gavaya reflects upon for himself that as this (cow) so is this (gavaya), here the object being cognised by some other means of knowledge, it is not a case of (distinct) means of knowledge at all.²⁴ Therefore, it is rightly stated that this (analogy) and tradition should not be

22. This is to stress the fact of difference between verbal testimony and the other means of knowledge.

23. It is because in this case the similarity is not conveyed through an authoritative person.

24. Since it is cognised through perception, there is no point in accepting upamāna as an independent means of knowledge.

mentioned (as separate means of knowledge) because of their being verbal testimony itself (and consequently) being included (in that).

(Presumption included in Inference)

किञ्चान्यत् — अर्थापत्तिसंभवाभावचेष्टानामनुमानसिद्धेः । अवचन-
मित्यनुवर्तते । तत्रार्थापत्तिर्नाम यत्रार्थयोः पूर्वमव्यभिचारमुपलभ्य पश्चा-
दन्यतरस्य दर्शनाच्छ्रवणाद्वान्यतरस्मिन्प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । दर्शनाद्यथा गुड-
मुपलभ्य माधुर्यमिन्द्रियान्तरविषयं प्रतिपद्यते । श्रवणाद्यथा गुडशब्दं श्रुत्वा
माधुर्यमशब्दकं प्रतिपद्यत इति । अपरा खल्वार्थापत्तिः । यत्र धर्मयोरव्यभि-
चारमुपलभ्य तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्विनोरपि साहचर्यकल्पना । सा तु द्विविधा, व्यभि-
चारिणी चाव्यभिचारिणी च । तत्र व्यभिचारिणी यथा सावयवमनित्य-
मित्युक्तेऽर्थादापन्नं निरवयवं नित्यमिति । तच्च कर्मादिष्वदृष्टमित्येषाऽ-
नैकान्तिकत्वात्प्रमाणमेव न भवतीति । या त्वविनाभाविनी अव्यभिचारिणी
यथा केसरिवराहयोरुपगह्वरे सन्निपातमुपलभ्योत्तरकालं केवलं केसरिणं
वराहव्रणांकितशरीरं प्रयान्तमुपलभ्य प्रतिपद्यते जितो वराह इति तदनु-
मानम् । कथम् ? यस्मात्केसरिवराहयोर्यौ जयपराजयौ तयोरव्यभिचारी
सम्बन्धः । तत्र यदा केसरिणो जयमुपलभ्याव्यभिचारिणमितरस्य पराजयं
प्रतिपद्यते किमन्यत्स्यादृतेऽनुमानात् ? अधिगतोभयसम्बन्धिसमुदायस्य हि
प्रतिपत्तुः प्रत्यक्षीभूतान्यतरसम्बन्धिनी या सम्बन्ध्यन्तरप्रतिपत्तिस्तद-
नुमानम् । इत्थं चार्थापत्तिरतो न तस्मात्पृथग्भवितुमर्हति ।

Moreover, because presumption, probability, negation and gesture are included in inference. 'Should not be mentioned (as distinct means of knowledge)' follows here also. The presumption is (a means of knowledge) where after observing the invariable concomitance between two objects and on seeing or hearing of one of them later on, one gets the knowledge of the other (of the two). (The example of knowing) through seeing is as after observing the treacle one comprehends its sweetness, which is the object of the sense other than that perceiving it. (The example of presumption) after hearing is as—after hearing the word treacle one comprehends its sweetness which is not denoted by words. There is the other kind of presumption also. (It is found) when after observing the invariable association between two properties, there is the postulation of association between the (objects of) opposite character also. It is twofold ; with

exception and without exception. Out of these, that with exception is exemplified as when it is stated that the conjunct object is non-eternal, it follows by implication that the object which is not conjunct is eternal. It is not observed in the case of action, etc.,²⁵ Hence, on account of being non-decisive it is not a valid means of knowledge at all.²⁶ That which is invariable and without exception is exemplified as—after observing a lion and a boar together near the cave and on observing afterwards the lion walking alone with its body stained with the blood of the boar, one comes to know that the boar is won. It is (however) a case of inference.

How ?

Because there is the invariable association between the victory and the defeat of the lion and the boar respectively. In that case, when after observing the victory of the lion one comprehends the defeat of the other which is invariably associated with the former; what is that other than inference ? The knowledge of the other relata²⁷ in case of one who has observed the group of relata and also observed the one of them through perception,²⁸ is the inference only. The presumption is of the foresaid nature. (Hence) it cannot be distinct from that (inference).

(Probability included in inference)

सम्भवो नाम द्रोणः प्रस्थ इत्युक्तेऽर्धद्रोणादीनां सन्निधानमवसीयते । इत्ययमपि साहचर्यकल्पनयाऽर्थापत्तिरेव । कथम् ? यस्मादुक्तपरिमाणे द्रव्ये द्रोणशब्दो वर्तते, न न्यूने नाधिके । तत्र द्रोण इत्युक्ते यदत्यन्तसहभुवां तदवयवानामन्यशब्दवाच्यानामपि सन्निधानम् तदार्थापत्तिरेव । स चाऽनुमानमित्युक्तम् ।

25. Action is not with components, still it is non-eternal.

26. It is a means leading to erroneous knowledge and, hence, cannot be called a means of valid knowledge.

27. It may suggest the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance).

28. This may be a reference to *līnga*. The *Vyāpti* and *līnga* are the important factors in inference.

Probability is explained as—when the words *droṇa*²⁹ and *prastha*³⁰ are uttered, one comes to know the presence of half *droṇa*, etc. The postulation of presence is presumption only.

How ?

Because the word *droṇa* is used with reference to the object of above mentioned measure, neither less nor more. In that case, when the term *droṇa* is uttered, (the knowledge of) the presence (lit. association) of its components which are found invariably associated with it and which are denoted by other words, is the presumption only, and it is already stated that the presumption is the inference only.

(Negation included in Inference)

अभावो नाम तद्यथा धूमस्य भावादग्नेर्भाविः प्रतीयते एवं धूमाभावा-
दग्न्यभाव इत्ययं प्रतिद्वन्द्विसाहचर्यकल्पनयार्थापत्तिरभिहितः । तत्र यदा
व्यभिचारसाहचर्यकल्पना तदा प्रमाणाभाव एव । तद्यथाऽयोगुडाङ्गारादिषु
धूमाभावो नाग्न्यभावः । यत्र तु क्वचिदेकान्तः स्यात् यथाऽकृतकत्वान्नित्य
इति तत्राऽनुमानम् । कथम् ? साहचर्योपपत्तेः । कृतकत्वान्नित्यत्ववत् ।

The negation is exemplified as—the presence of fire is known through the presence of smoke, so through the absence of smoke (is known) the absence of fire. It is already stated that this postulation of the association of the objects of opposite nature is the presumption. In this case, where is the postulation of association with exception ? That is no valid means of knowledge at all. As in the case of iron ball, treacle or the charcoal, there is the absence of smoke but not that of fire. In some cases where there is invariableness—as in the example that which is not created is eternal, that is the case of inference.

How ?

Because there is the possibility of invariable association as in the case of createdness and non-eternity.

29. An ancient Indian measure for measuring grains or field.

30. An ancient Indian measure for measuring grains or field. 1/16 part of a *droṇa*.

अन्ये तु अभावमन्यथा वर्णयन्ति । तद्यथा गेहे नास्ति चैत्र इत्युक्ते बहिरस्तीति सम्प्रत्ययो भवति, तत्र गेहाभावो बहिर्भावसम्प्रतिपत्तिहेतुरर्थान्तरापत्तिरेव प्रतिद्वन्द्विसाहचर्यकल्पनया । कथम् ? यथैव हि दिवा न भुङ्क्ते देवदत्तः पीन इत्यत्राऽभोजनप्रतियोगिनो मेदुरत्वस्योपलम्भाद्विवाप्रतियोगिनि काले रात्रौ भुजिरवसीयते एवमिहापि गेहाभावाभिधानसामर्थ्यात्तत्प्रतियोगिनि विपर्ययः कल्प्यते । अन्यथा तु यद्यभाव एवाभिप्रेतः स्यान्नास्ति चैत्र एवेति ब्रूयात् । अर्थापत्तिश्चानुमानम् ।

Others explain negation in a different way---when it is told that Caitra is not in the house, it is deduced that he is somewhere outside the house.³¹ In this case, the absence in the house is the reason for the knowledge of his being present somewhere outside and it is the case of presumption only because there is the postulation of association of the objects of opposite nature.

How ?

As in the statement 'Devadatta does not eat by day and yet is fat'. Here, due to the observation of fatness which is opposite to non-eating, his eating at night, which is opposite to that at day, is deduced. Similarly, in the present case also through the mention of his absence in the house, the opposite is postulated in the case of the one whose absence is referred to. If only the absence would have been intended, it would have been stated as Caitra is not present. And, the postulation is the inference.

(Gesture included in Inference)

चेष्टा नाम अभिप्रायसूचकः कश्चिदेवोदरताडनाञ्जलिकरणादिः शरीरव्यापारः । स हि बुभुक्षादीन्यप्रतीयमानानि प्रतिपादयतीति प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । स चानुमानमेव । कस्मात् ? यस्माद् भोजनेच्छादिसहचरो हि व्यापारोऽनुष्ठीयमानो यदि सहचारिणं गमयति तदा नानुमानात्पृथगिति शक्यं प्रतिज्ञातुम् ।

Gesture is explained as the operation of the (limbs of the) body like beating the belly and placing the hands side by side and slightly

31. It is not clear how it would be an example of negation and different from implication according to the *pūrvapakṣa*.

hollowed which is indicative of some intention. That conveys hunger and the like which are not (otherwise) known, and hence, is said to be a means of knowledge. That is inference only.

Why ?

Because if the performance of (bodily) operation, which is associated with the desire for meals, etc., gives rise to the knowledge of its associate, it cannot be declared to be different from inference.

(Imagination is not an independent means of Knowledge)

आह—प्रतिभा तर्हि प्रमाणान्तरं भविष्यति ।

Opponent : Imagination, then, will be a separate means of knowledge.

उच्यते—केयं प्रतिभा नाम ?

Proponent : What is the nature of this imagination ?

आह, योऽमनादौ संसारे देवमनुष्यतिरश्चामभिन्नेऽर्थे बाह्ये स्त्र्यादौ प्रत्यये पूर्वाभ्यासवासनापेक्षः कुणपकामिनीभक्ष्याद्याकारभेदभिन्नप्रत्यय इतिकर्तव्यताङ्गमुत्पद्यते सा हि प्रतिभा । तथा चोक्तम्—

यथाभ्यासं हि वाक्येभ्यो विनाप्यर्थेन जायते ।

स्वप्रत्ययाऽनुकारेण प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥

येन हि योऽर्थोऽभ्यस्तस्मुखादित्वेन तस्य विनाऽपि तेनार्थेन शब्दमात्रात् प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पद्यते । तद्यथा व्याघ्रोऽत्र प्रतिवसतीत्युक्ते विनाऽपि

बाह्येनाऽर्थेनाभ्यासवशादेव स्वेदवेपथुप्रभृतयो भवन्ति । तस्मात् प्रतिभैव देवमनुष्यतिरश्चामितिकर्तव्यताङ्गत्वात्प्रमाणमिति । आह च—

प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुगच्छति ।

व्यवहाराः प्रवर्तन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥

Opponent : In this beginningless world there arises the sense of what to do in the presence of knowledge differentiated by the form of the objects like dead body, desired lady or an eatable object in gods men or insects, etc., due to the past impression

of the common external objects like women. That is called imagination. So, it is stated :

“In accordance with one’s experience, there follow different sorts of understanding (in different persons) in accordance with their own knowledge, through the sentences without (knowing) their meaning.”

In the one who has repeatedly experienced the particular objects as giving rise to pleasure, etc., the knowledge of that object arises merely through the utterance of the word (denoting that object) even without the presence of that object. For example, when it is stated that a tiger lives here, the actions as sweating and trembling of the body take place even without the external object merely through the earlier practice. Therefore, being a part of (means giving rise to the) sense of what to do with reference to gods, men and insects, imagination is a means of knowledge. It is stated also :

“The entire world understands it in the form of the means of knowledge and the worldly activities of even the insects become possible through that.”³³

उच्यते प्रतिभाया दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण रूपान्तरानुपपत्तेः । अवचन-
मित्यनुवर्तते । यदि पूर्वाभ्यासवासनापेक्षः प्रत्ययः प्रतिभेत्यभ्युपगम्यते तेन
तर्हि असौ प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमाप्तवचनं चेत्येतदापन्नम् । कस्मात् ? यतो न
हि दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षरूपं कदाचिदप्युपलभामहे । तस्मान्न तेभ्यो-
ऽर्थान्तरं प्रतिभा । आर्षप्रत्ययसम्भवादयुक्तमिति चेत्—स्यादेतत्, अस्त्यार्षो
हि दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण सर्वपदार्थेषु सांसिद्धिकः प्रत्ययः । स प्रातिभो
भविष्यतीति । एतच्चाप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तत्वात् । उक्तमेतत् सिद्ध-
रूपं भगवतः परमर्षेज्ज्ञानम् । अतो न प्रमाणापेक्षमिति । योगिनामिति
चेन्न, अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि योगिनामप्रमाणपूर्वकं ज्ञानमिति यथा तथा
वक्ष्यामः । स लौकिक इति चेत् न । अनिश्चितत्वात् । स्यादेतत्—अस्ति
लौकिकः प्रत्ययो दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण । तद्यथा सन्तमसे ब्रजतो द्रागिति
विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते—अस्ति मे प्रतीघाति द्रव्यं पुरस्ताद्धूर्ध्वमवस्थितमिति ।
तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? अनिश्चितत्वात् । न हि तत्र निश्चय उत्पद्यते

इदं तद् द्रव्यमस्ति पुरतो वा व्यवतमस्तीति । न चानिश्चितं प्रमाण-
ज्ञानमिष्यते । किंचान्यत्—अनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । यदि चैवंजातीयकोऽपि
प्रत्ययः प्रमाणमभ्युपगम्यते तेनानवस्था प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् ?
अनवस्थानाद्विकरणस्य । कामक्रोधलोभभयविषादद्वारको विकल्पः
सम्यङ् मिथ्या वा यस्मादनेक उत्पद्यते तस्मान्न लौकिकः प्रत्ययः
प्रतिभा । यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते—अभ्यासवासनापेक्षाऽसत्स्वपि व्याघ्रादिषु
प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पद्यते । इति । सत्यमेतत् । सा तु मिथ्याज्ञानत्वात्प्रमाणत्वेन न
परिगृह्यते इत्यमदोषः । तस्मात् सिद्धं दृष्टादिव्यतिरेकेण रूपान्तराऽनु-
पपत्तेः प्रतिभायाः पृथगनभिधानम् । ततश्च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् त्रिविधं
प्रमाणमिष्टमिति स्थितमेतत् ॥४॥

Proponent : *Because there is no possibility of some form other than perception, etc., in case of imagination.* The phrase 'should not be mentioned' follows from above. If the knowledge caused by the impression of past experience is admitted to be imagination, it comes to be (either of) perception, inference and verbal testimony,³⁴

Why ?

Because we do not get some sort of knowledge through the means other than perception and the rest. Hence, imagination is not something different from those.

If it is argued that the above argument is wrong because there is the possibility of the archaic knowledge ? It may be like this : there is the archaic (knowledge) of every object which is innate and, hence, without perception and the like. That (archaic knowledge) will be caused by imagination.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the statement made above. It is stated (earlier) that the knowledge of the illustrious supreme seer is of accomplished

34. I.e. is included in them only.

nature. Therefore, it does not stand in need of some means of knowledge.³⁵

If it is argued that it may be the knowledge of the yogins ?

No, because it is not held (accepted). We shall establish later on how the knowledge of the yogins is not without some means of knowledge.

If it is argued that is the worldly knowledge ?

No, because it is not ascertained. It may be like this : there is some worldly knowledge without perception, etc., for example, while going in dense darkness there arises the knowledge immediately that there is some obstructing substance standing erect before me. It is, however, not like this.

How ?

Because it is not ascertained. There arises no ascertainment as to whether the substance standing before me is manifest or not. The knowledge which is not ascertained is not accepted to be a valid knowledge. *Moreover, it would lead to undesirable contingency of infinite regress.* If this sort of knowledge also is accepted as valid (knowledge), there arises the undesirable contingency.

What is the reason ?

Because there are infinite defects (in the mind), because uncertainty as whether right or wrong caused by desire, anger, avarice, fear and infatuation gives rise to various alternatives (in the same knowledge.)³⁶ Hence, the imagination is not the worldly knowledge.

35. The sense is that the knowledge was already in him at the time of birth and, hence he did not acquire it through means of knowledge.

36. The knowledge in that is not purely objective but is caused by these defects and, hence, imaginary. If this kind of knowledge is accepted as caused by some means of knowledge, the means of knowledge would be infinite.

Your statement that due to the past impression of earlier experience there arises the knowledge of tiger, etc., even in their absence, is true. That is not accepted as a valid knowledge because that is the wrong knowledge.³⁷ Hence, it is not a fault. Hence, it is proved that because of the lack of possibility of some form of knowledge by means other than perception, etc., the imagination should not be mentioned (as a separate means of knowledge). Hence, because of inclusion of all the other means of knowledge (into these three), it is established that the means of knowledge approved is threefold.

37. Because it arises with reference to an object which is not present that at time.

KĀRIKĀ 5

(Definition of Perception)

आह—अस्त्वेवमेतत् । लक्षणानभिधानात्तदप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्मात्तद-
भिधानम् । अनवस्थितं हि दृष्टादीनां लक्षणम्, दृष्टिवैचित्र्यात् । इन्द्रि-
यार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षमिति
केचित् । तथाऽऽत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षाद्यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यदित्येके ।
सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमित्यपरे । श्रोत्रादिवृत्ति-
रिति वार्षगणाः । कल्पनापोढमित्यन्ये । इत्थमनवस्थितं लक्षणम् । इति
दृष्टादीनामप्रतिपत्तिः । तस्माल्लक्षणमभिधानीयम् ।

Opponent : Let it be so.¹ It cannot be understood without mention-
ing the definition. Therefore, that (definition) should be
mentioned. The definition of perception, etc., is not settled
because there is the difference of opinion. Some define it as—
'perception is the knowledge arising from sense-object contact
(and which is) not caused by words, non-erroneous and is of a
definite character.'² The others define it as—'the other (percep-
tion) is that which arises from the contact of the soul, sense,
mind and the object'³. The others define it as 'the knowledge
which arises due to the contact of man's senses with something
which is present.'⁴ The followers of Vārṣaganya define it as 'the
function of the ear and the rest.'⁵ The others (define it as) 'the
non-conceptual knowledge'.⁶ In this way, the definition of

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1. I.e. even after admitting the foregoing that there are only three means of knowledge.
 2. N.S. 1.1.4
 3. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.1.18.
 4. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4
 5. See note on kārīkā 1
 6. Cf. *Pratyakṣama kalpanāpoḍham*,
Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dinnāga.

perception is unsettled. Therefore, follows the non-understanding (i.e. difficulty in understanding) of the perception, etc. Hence, the definition should be mentioned.

उच्यते—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्

विषिण्वन्तीति विषयाः शब्दादयः । अथवा विषीयन्ते उपलभ्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । ते च द्विविधाः । विशिष्टा अविशिष्टाश्च । विशिष्टाः पृथिव्यादिलक्षणा अस्मदादिगम्याः । अविशिष्टाश्च तन्मात्रलक्षणा योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च गम्याः । वक्ष्यति चैतदुपरिष्ठात् “बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” (का० ३४), अध्यवसायो बृद्धिरिति (का० २३) च वक्ष्यति । विषयं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रतिविषयम् । किन्तु ? इन्द्रियम् । तस्मिन् योऽध्यवसायः स प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्युपनिपाति सत्त्वोद्रेकादरजस्तमस्कं यत्प्रकाशरूपं तद् दृष्टमिति यावत् । तद् दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । एतत्प्रमाणम् । अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्तेरनुग्रहस्तत्फलम् । प्रमेयाः शब्दादयः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि प्रमाणफलभावो द्रष्टव्यः ।

Proponent : PERCEPTION IS THE DETERMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECTS THROUGH THE CONTACT OF THE SENSES.⁷

The objects are those with bear upon or impress their from upon the cognition, for example, word, etc. Or their derivative

7. This is the interpretation according to the commentators. However, when the *kārikā* is interpreted independently of the commentaries, it seems plausible that the *kārikā* has no reference to the sense-object contact to distinguish perception from other means. However, if the term *prativīṣaya* is interpreted as of each or individual object it may be distinguished from other *pramāṇas* which give rise to the knowledge of objects in generality. Further, the perception is defined here in the sense of resultant knowledge and not as a means thereof. The position is similar in early definitions of perception in other systems also. The definition quoted against the name of *Vārṣaganya* is an exception to it.

meaning is as those which are attained (by the senses). Those (objects) are of two kinds—specific and non-specific. The specific are the earth, etc., which are cognisable by (ordinary) persons like us. The non-specific are the subtle elements which are cognisable by the yogins and the divine beings.⁸ The author will (himself) speak later on 'of these organs, the senses have as their objects the things specific as well as non-specific' (Kā. 34). and the author will also speak 'intellect is the determinative knowledge' (Kā. 23).⁹ The term *pratiṣṭhā* means that which bears upon (or comes into contact with) each particular object.

What is that ?

The sense. The determinative knowledge in (through) the senses is denoted by the term *pratiṣṭhāyādhyavasāya*. The perception is the light (pure form of *sattva*)¹⁰ without (mixed with) *rajas* and *tamas* which results from the exuberance of *sattva* which follows (or is caused by) the function of the senses in contact with other objects. That is *dr̥ṣṭa* which means perception. This is the means of knowledge. The assistance rendered by it to the sentient power is the resultant.¹¹ The objects of knowledge are the word¹², etc. Similarly,

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8. The cause as to why the subtle elements are called non-specific as also the gross elements the specific, is given in 38th *kārikā*.
 9. The purpose of such a statement is that the *pramāṇa* as a means according to Sāṃkhya is the function of intellect. It is stated to be intellect itself when the act and the agent are taken to be identical. The condition of sense-object contact distinguishes perception from other means of knowledge.
 10. This indicates the state of intellect when *Sattva* dominates in it.
 11. The favour should be interpreted as the false attribution of knowledge, etc., to the sentient entity. In fact, there is no change in the essential nature of conscious entity after the rise of knowledge. The knowledge actually arises in the intellect but is falsely attributed to the sentient entity.
 12. I.e. the objects of the cognitive organs. The cognitive organs—ear, skin, eyes, tongue and nose cognise word, touch, form, taste and smell. Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 28.

the nature of means of knowledge and the resultant thereof should be understood in case of other means of knowledge also.

(Means of knowledge and resultant)

आह—किं पुनरिदं प्रमाणात्फलमर्थान्तरमाहोस्विदनर्थान्तरम् ?

Opponent : Is this resultant different from the means of knowledge or is identical with it ?

कथं तावत् भवितुमर्हति अनर्थान्तरमिति ?

Proponent : How can it be identical ?

आह—कस्मात् ? अधिगमरूपत्वात् । अधिगमरूपं हि ज्ञानं, तस्यो-
त्पत्त्यैवाऽधिगतोऽर्थ इति कुतः फलभेद इति ?

Opponent : Do you ask why so ? Because it is of the form of know-
ledge. The knowledge is the result in (the process of) knowing.
The object is known through the rise of that (knowledge) only.
Hence, how can the resultant be different (from the process).

उच्यते—करणभाव इदानीं कथं स्यात् ?

Proponent : How can, in that case, the means be the instrument in
knowing ?¹³

आह—करणभावस्तु प्रसिद्धिवशात् । विषयनिर्भासा हि ज्ञानस्यो-
त्पत्तिः अधिगमरूपापि लोके सव्यापारेव प्रतीतेति कल्पनया करणभावो-
ऽभ्युपगम्यते न परमार्थतः ।

Opponent : The idea of instrumentality is due to the well known
character. The illumination of the object characterises the rise
of knowledge. The knowledge is experienced as accompanied
with action. Through this postulation only the idea of
instrumentality is accepted. It (the idea of instrumentality) is
not real.¹⁴

13. Means is that which gives rise to something. If the result
itself is taken to be the means, how can there be the instrumen-
tality in the means ?

14. What the opponent means is that the intellect which is an
instrument of knowledge is the locus of knowledge as well.
Hence, the difference between intellect as an instrument of
knowledge and the intellect as a locus of knowledge is
metaphorical.

उच्यते—फलस्यार्थान्तरभावः । अधिकरणभेदात् । बुद्ध्याश्रयं हि प्रमाणमध्यवसायाख्यम्, पुरुषाश्रयं फलमनुग्रहलक्षणम् । न च भिन्नाधिकरणयोरेकत्वमर्हति भवितुम् । यत्तूक्तमधिगमरूपत्वात् ज्ञानमेव फलमिति तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असिद्धत्वात् । यथैव हि घटादयोऽर्था ज्ञानमन्तरेण न तद्रूपा नातद्रूपा इति न शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्, एवं ज्ञानमपि पुरुषप्रत्ययमन्तरेण न विषयरूपं नाविषयरूपम् । तथा च शास्त्रम्—“तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गमिति” (का० २०) वचनात् । अतः पुरुषप्रत्ययमन्तरेण ज्ञानमधिगमरूपमिति सांख्यं प्रत्यसिद्धमेतत् । उभयपक्षप्रसिद्धेन च व्यवहारः । पुरुषाभावादयुक्तमिति चेन्न उत्तरत्र प्रतिपादनात् । संघातपरार्थत्वादित्यत्र पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मात् सिद्धमध्यवसायप्रमाणवादिनः प्रमाणात्फलमर्थान्तरमिति ।

Proponent : *The resultant is different because of the difference in substratum.* The means of knowledge known as determinative knowledge is located in the intellect. The resultant as the favour to the conscious entity is located in the conscious entity. There is no possibility of identity in case of objects having different substrata. The statement that the knowledge being identical with understanding is itself the resultant, is wrong.

Why ?

Because it is not established. As it is not possible to propound without the knowledge that the objects like pot, etc., are of their own form or otherwise, similarly, the knowledge also without the understanding by the conscious entity¹⁵ is neither of the nature of an object of knowledge nor that of the non-object of knowledge. This is (in accordance with) the scripture because it is stated ‘thus, due to that association (of the two) the internal organ though insentient seems as if possessed of consciousness’ (kā 20). Hence, it

15. The understanding of conscious entity means here the knowledge metaphorically imposed upon the conscious entity.

is not established for (or acceptable to) the Sāṃkhya that the knowledge is of the form of understanding without the understanding by the conscious entity. The investigation into a case (or argumentation) is based upon the maxim accepted by both the parties.

If it is argued that it is not established on account of the non-existence of the conscious entity ?

No, because (the existence of the conscious entity) is propounded later on. We shall propound the existence of the conscious entity by the statement like 'the composite objects exist for other', etc. Thus, it is established that the means of knowledge and their resultant are different for the upholders of the theory that the determinative knowledge is the means of knowledge.

आह—यदि ह्यध्यवसायः प्रमाणं कथं लौकिकः प्रयोगोऽर्थवान् भवति प्रत्यक्षं वस्तु इति ?

Opponent : If the determinative knowledge is the means of knowledge, how is the worldly statement that the object is *pratyakṣa*, meaningful ?

उच्यते—विषये प्रत्यक्षशब्दः तत्प्रमितत्वात् तत्कारणत्वाच्च । यथा प्रस्थप्रमितो ब्रीहिराशिः प्रस्थशब्दवाच्यो भवति एवं प्रत्यक्षप्रमितोऽर्थः प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यः स्यात् ।

Proponent - The term *pratyakṣa* is used with reference to an object because the object is (already) measured (known) through it. Or, it is the cause of knowledge (of that object).¹⁶ Just as the heap of barley which is one *prastha* in measure is denoted by the term *prastha*, in the same way the object known through perception may be denoted by the term *pratyakṣa*.

आह, न । अन्यत्रापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । यदि प्रत्यक्षप्रमितत्वाद्विषये प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्तेन तर्हि अनुमानप्रमितोऽर्थोऽनुमानमिति स्यात् । शब्दप्रमितोऽर्थः

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16. (i) The object of knowledge, (ii) the sense-organ and the (iii) internal organs, being the cause of *pratyakṣa*—all of these may be termed *pratyakṣa*.

उच्यते—तदभावादितरत्राप्रवृत्तिः । प्रमाणान्तरे तु नास्ति सामान्यं निमित्तम् । कथम् ? अनुमीयतेऽनेनेत्यनुमानम् । न चाग्न्यादिभिः कश्चिदनुमीयत इत्यतस्तुल्यशब्दवाच्यता न भवति ।

Proponent : *In absence of that it is not applicable to other cases.*

There is no common cause in case of the other means of knowledge.

How ?

The anumāna means that through which something is inferred. Nothing is inferred through fire, etc. Hence, they are not subjected to the same denotation.

(Use of the term determinative knowledge)

आह—अध्यवसायग्रहणं किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : Why is the term determinative knowledge mentioned ?

उच्यते—अतिप्रसंगनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । प्रतिविषयं दृष्टमितीयत्युच्यमाने यावत्किञ्चित् प्रतिविषयं वर्ततेऽनुग्राहकत्वेनोपघातकत्वेन वा तत् सर्वं दृष्टमित्येतदापद्यते । अध्यवसायग्रहणे पुनः क्रियमाणे न दोषो भवति ।

Proponent : *(It is mentioned) to prevent over pervasion.* If it is stated that perception is the object related to the senses, whatever is related to the senses, in the form of a favouring or obstructing object would (undesirably) come to be denoted by the term perception. If the determinative knowledge (adhyavasāya) is mentioned, this defect will not arise.

आह—न, प्रमाणाधिकारात् । नाध्यवसायशब्दस्य प्रयोजनम् । कुतः ? प्रमाणाधिकारोऽयम् । न चाध्यवसायादृते यत्किञ्चिद्विषयं प्रतिपद्यते तेन किञ्चित् प्रमीयते । तेन वयं सामर्थ्यादध्यवसायमेवाभिसंभन्त्यस्यामः । तद्यथा—अध्ययनाधिकारे ब्राह्मणा आनीयन्तामित्युक्ते य एवाधीयन्ते त एवानीयन्ते ।

Opponent : *It is not so because of the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge.* There is no purpose served by the mention of the term determinative knowledge.

Why ?

This is the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge. Except the determinative knowledge no object is known through which the object is cognised. Hence, by the force (of the context of means of knowledge) we can do without the term determinative knowledge. As for example, in the jurisdiction of adhyayana (study of the sacred texts), when it is asked that the brahmins should be brought, only those brahmins who are learned are brought.¹⁷

उच्यते—करणान्तराणां तु सन्देहनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । एवं तर्हि श्रोत्रादीना-
मन्यतममन्तःकरणं चेत्येतद् द्वारद्वारिभावेन चतुष्टयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते ।
तस्मादध्यवसायग्रहणं क्रियते सन्देहो माभूदिति ।

Proponent ; (*The term determinative knowledge is mentioned to dispel the doubt regarding the other organs. The four, viz., one of the ear, etc., and the (others) inner organs are related to the object in the form of the gates and the gatekeepers.*¹⁸ Hence, the term determinative knowledge is mentioned so that there should be no doubt.¹⁹

आह—अस्त्वत्र सन्देहः, नैकेन केनचित् कश्चिद्विषय उपादीयते ।
तेन वयं सर्वेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रतिपत्स्यामहे ।

Opponent : Let there be doubt. No object is cognised through a single organ only. Therefore, we shall recognise all of them as perception.

17. It appears that Pandey's reading *adhīyate* in place of *Chakravarti's* reading *adhiyante* is a misprint.

18. Cf. *Sāmkhyakārikā* 35.

19. The sense is that any of the four viz., one of the external and the three internal organs could be called *pratyakṣa* if the definition would be as 'that related to the object'. With the use of the term *adhyavasāya* the *pratyakṣa* is restricted to the intellect only which is both the determinative knowledge and the instrument of that when the difference between the function and the agent is overlooked.

उच्यते—सर्वाभ्युपगमे हि शास्त्रहानिः । यदि पुनः सर्वेषामेव प्रमाणत्वमभ्युपगम्यते तेन यच्छास्त्रमेकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनमिति तद्धीयते । वक्ष्यति चाचार्यः “एते प्रदीपकल्पाः” (का० ३६), “सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिरिति” (का० ३७) तद्विरुध्यते । तस्मादध्यवसायग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । सन्देहो मा भूदिति ।

Proponent : *If all of them are recognised as perception, that will imply that we do not follow the scripture. If all of them are recognised as means of knowledge, the scripture stating that ‘the knowledge is one and that is intellect only’,²⁰ will have to be abandoned. The authority himself states ‘these (organs) resembling a lamp’, etc. (Kā. 30); ‘in as much as it is the intellect that accomplishes all the experiences of the conscious entity’, etc. (Kā 37).²¹ (This position) is contradicted. Hence,*

20. The line is quoted as a *sūtra* (aphorism) by Vyāsa in his *bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* (1.4). Vācaspati explains it as the function (modification) of the intellect in the form of the objects like sound and that in the form of the discrimination between cosmic matter and the conscious entity is the same. Though the above two forms of knowledge seem to be apparently contradictory and different, yet actually they are one, i.e., form the function or the modification of the intellect. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, interprets the aphorism as to show that there prevails the false knowledge in the world that both the intellect and the conscious entity are identical. The *Yuktidīpikā* seems to take it in the sense accepted by Vācaspati and stresses the fact that even though the forms of knowledge may differ, the knowledge as a *pramāṇa* is one i.e., the modification of the intellect or the intellect itself. There is no difference between the above two for the Sāṃkhya because the function and the agent are the same.

21. The two quotations show that in knowledge or experience, intellect serves as an instrument and is allotted chief position in both the cases.

the term determinative knowledge should be mentioned so that there may not be any doubt.

आह—न, सन्देहभात्रमेतद् भवति । सर्वसन्देहेषु चैतदुपतिष्ठते—
व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि सन्देहादलक्षणम् । तत्राध्यवसायो दृष्ट-
मिति व्याख्यास्यामः ।

Opponent : It is not so. It is merely a doubt. In case of all the doubts the instruction remains as the particular meaning of a term (in case of alternate meanings) is ascertained from interpretation because a rule must teach something definite even though it contains ambiguous terms. Hence, we will interpret the expression as 'perception is the determinate knowledge'.²³

उच्यते—मुक्तसंशयं चेन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रतिपत्तेः । स्यादेतत्, यद्यत्र सन्देहः
स्यात् । नैवात्र सन्देहः प्राप्तः, किन्तर्हि श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेरेव ग्रहणम् ।

Proponent : Because it is beyond doubt that the operation of the senses comes to be known (as perception). It would be so if there would be a doubt (in this case also) but no doubt is attained here.²³ On the other hand, only the operation of the senses is known (or mentioned) to be the perception.

आह—किं पुनः कारणं येन निमित्ताऽविशेषेऽपि श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेरेवात्र
ग्रहणं प्राप्नोति, नान्तःकरणस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ?

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22. The sense is that the *Śāstra* itself need not clear the doubts. The doubts are to be dispelled by the commentators. It is taken for granted that the *śāstra* does teach something definite. If the *śāstra* intends to convey such a meaning, we, the commentators, will interpret it as such. Hence, there is no need of employing the term *adhyavasāya* by the *sūtrakāra* to remove our doubts.
23. It is not that its interpretation was doubtful and there was a need of clarification, but Īśvarakṛṣṇa uses the term *adhyavasāya* to ward off the wrong conception positively prevailing in the people that perception is the function of the ear, etc. Thus could be the meaning of the statement of Īśvarakṛṣṇa also.

Opponent : What is the reason for the fact that inspite of non-speciality in the causes the operation of the senses like ear and not the operation of the internal organs comes to be cognised as perception.

उच्यते—तत्र च मुख्या श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः । कस्मात् ? साक्षाद्विषय-ग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । नान्तःकरणम्, तद्द्वारेण प्रतिपत्तेः । गौणमुख्ययोश्च मुख्ये सम्प्रतिपत्तिः । तद्यथा—गौरनुबन्ध्यः अजोऽग्नीषोमीय इति वाहीको नाऽनुबन्ध्यते ।

Proponent : *The operation of the ear, etc., is principal in this case.*

Why ?

Because of their capability of cognising the objects directly and (this is) not (the case with) the internal organs for the knowledge is acquired through the internal organ (and not mainly from it). Among the principal and the secondary the former is admitted (and not the latter). As, in the injunction like 'the cow (and) the goat related to the deity agni and soma, should be immolated', the vāhika (which is the secondary meaning of cow) is not immolated.

आह—यदीयं श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरेव प्रत्यक्षमित्यभ्युपेयते क एवं सति दोषः स्यात् ?

Opponent : If this operation of the ear, etc., is considered to be the perception, what would be the fault ?

उच्यते—रागादिविषयं यद्विज्ञानं लिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकम्, योगिनां च ध्यानभूमिकासु विहरतामनुमानागमातीतं प्रातिभं यद्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदुप-संख्येयं स्यात् । कुतः ? न हि सुखादयः श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिग्राह्याः, योगिनां चातीन्द्रियं ज्ञानमिति । यथान्यासं तु क्रियमाणे तेऽपि विषयाः, तेषां योऽध्य-वसायस्तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं केन वार्यते ?

Proponent : (In that case) the knowledge regarding attachment, etc., inferred from the sign and the signate and the intuitive knowledge arising in the yogins who have attained various degrees in meditation and which is beyond inference and verbal testimony would have been mentioned (separately).

Why ?

Because the pleasure, etc., are not cognised through the operation of the ear, etc., and the knowledge of the yogins is supra-sensuous. And, when it is expressed as it is done (in the text), the above mentioned (viz., the pleasure, etc., and the objects known to the yogins) also become the object of knowledge. What obstructs the character of perception in the case of the determinate knowledge of these ?

(Use of the term *pratiṣaya*)

आह—प्रतिविषयग्रहणं तर्हि किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : What is, then, the purpose of mentioning the term *pratiṣaya* ?

उच्यते—प्रतिविषयग्रहणमसद्व्युदासार्थम् । अध्यवसायो दृष्टमितीयत्युच्यमाने मृगतृष्णिकाऽलातचक्रगन्धर्वनगरादिषु अपि योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमिति । प्रतिविषयग्रहणात् तेषां व्युदासः कृतो भवति ।

Proponent : The term *pratiṣaya* is mentioned to exclude the (absolutely) non-existent objects (from the domain of perception). If it stated that the determinate knowledge is the perception, the determinate knowledge regarding the mirage, the circle of the fire brand and the city of Gandharvas, would be the cases of perception. They are excluded by the mention of the term *pratiṣaya*.

(Use of the term *prati*)

आह—यद्येवं विषयाध्यवसाय इत्येव चोच्यताम् । किमप्रतिग्रहणेन ?

Opponent : If it is so, you should state as determinate knowledge of an object only. What is the use of the mention of the term *prati* ?

उच्यते—प्रतिग्रहणं सन्निकर्षार्थम् । विषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमितीयत्युच्यमाने विषयमात्रे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । प्रतिग्रहणे पुनः क्रियमाणे प्रतिराभिमुख्ये वर्तते । तेन सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातो योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमित्युपलभ्यते ।

Proponent : The term *prati* is mentioned to denote contact. If it is said that the perception is the determinate knowledge of the object, there would have been the ascertainment only with reference to the object. When the term *prati* is mentioned, it denotes going near the object (i.e., contact). The meaning arrived at is that the perception is the determinative knowledge following the operation of the senses in contact with the object.

आह—कस्य पुनरतीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति ?

Opponent : If the perception is regarded as (resulting from) the contact with the object which does not come in the range of the senses, which other (means of knowledge) comes to be the perception ?

उच्यते—अनुमानस्य । कस्मात् ? तद्धि लिङ्गदर्शनादसन्निकृष्टे विषये भवति ।

Proponent : The inference.

Why ?

Because the inference takes place through observing the sign with reference to the object which is not near.

आह—अनुमानस्याप्रसङ्गः । सामान्यविहितस्य विशेषविहितेन बाधनात् । सामान्ये हि विषयमात्रेऽध्यवसायस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं विधाय विशेषे लिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकेऽनुमानं शास्ति । सामान्यविहितं च विशेषविहितेन बाध्यते, यथा तद्धि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति ।

Opponent ; *There is no undesirable contingency (of the inclusion) of the inference (into perception) because there is the obstruction of a general statement by a particular one.* After assigning the character of perception to the ascertainment of an object in general the author teaches the inference through probans and the probandum in particular cases. And, the general statement is obstructed (overruled) by a particular statement, as in the statement—give curds to all the brahmins, (but) butter milk to Kaundinya.

उच्यते—स्मृतेस्तर्हि प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति । तत्रायमपवादो नाभि-
निविशत इति ।

Proponent : The memory comes to be perception. The above excep-
tion does not apply there.

आह न, स्मृतेः, प्रमाणाधिकारात् । प्रमाणाधिकारोऽयम् । न च
स्मृत्या किञ्चित् प्रमीयते । स्मृतेः प्रमितेऽर्थे प्रादुर्भावात् ।

Opponent : No, to the memory also there is no scope (of the applica-
tion of the character of perception), because of the justification
of the means of valid knowledge. And, nothing is cognised by
memory because the memory arises with reference to the object
which is already cognised.²⁴

उच्यते—संशयस्य तर्हि प्राप्नोति ।

Proponent : The doubt comes to be perception.

न संशयस्य, अध्यवसायग्रहणात् । अध्यवसायो हि दृष्टमित्युच्यते ।
न च संशयोऽध्यवसायोऽनिश्चितत्वात् ।

Opponent : No, the doubt does not come to be perception, because
of the mention of the term 'determinative knowledge'. It is stated
that only the determinative knowledge is the perception.
Doubt is not a determinative knowledge because it lacks in
certainly.

उच्यते—इन्द्रियान्तराकूतविषये तु प्रसङ्गः । एवं तर्हीन्द्रियार्थ-
सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपातीति दोषो न भवति ।

Proponent : There will be the undesirable contingency of the over-
pervasion of the (understanding of the) mutual intention by the
senses. If the perception is (accepted) as arising through the
operation of the senses which are in contact with the
(respective) object, the aforesaid discrepancy does not arise.

24. It suggests that novelty is also a criterion for valid means of
knowledge.

आह—रागाद्युपसंख्यानम् । यदि सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपाती योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमित्यभ्युपेयते, तेन रागादिविषयं विज्ञानमतीन्द्रियत्वात्प्रत्यक्षं न प्राप्नोति । तस्योपसंख्यानम् कर्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : (*In that case*) attachment, etc., should be mentioned. If the perception is admitted to be the determinative knowledge arising through the operation of the sense which is in contact with the object, the knowledge of the objects like attachment,²⁵ etc., do not come to be regarded as perception because of their being beyond the senses. It should be mentioned separately.

उच्यते—न तर्हीदं प्रतिग्रहणमिन्द्रियविशेषणं विषयं विषयं प्रति यो वर्तते तस्मिन् योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमिति । किन्तर्हि—अध्यवसायविशेषणं विषयं विषयं प्रति योऽध्यवसाय इति ।

Proponent : The term prati is not an adjective of the sense. In that case it amounts to the perception being the determinative knowledge through that (i.e., the sense) which is in contact with every object. On the contrary, it is an adjective of determinative knowledge, which comes to mean that the perception is the determinative knowledge in respect of every object.

आह—अध्यवसायविशेषणमिति चेत्, शब्दाद्युपसंख्यानम् । शब्दादीनामेव तेन प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति । तेषामुपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यं प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् ? अन्तःकरणस्य तैः सन्निकर्षाऽनुपपत्तेः । प्रतिग्रहणं सन्निकर्षार्थमिति पूर्वमतिसृष्टं भवता । तच्चेदानीमन्तःकरणविशेषणम् । न चान्तःकरणस्य शब्दादिभिः सन्निकर्ष उपपद्यते, श्रोत्रादिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । द्वारिद्वारभावस्यापघातप्रसंगाच्च । तस्मात्सुदूरमपि गत्वा प्रतिग्रहणं प्रत्याख्यानान्नमुच्यते । रागाद्युपसंख्यानान्द्वेति ।

Opponent : If it is considered to be the adjective of determinative knowledge, the word, etc., should be mentioned. In that case

25. This refers to the internal objects. Attachment, according to the Sāṃkhya, is a form or quality of intellect and, hence, beyond the reach of the external senses.

of the sense in contact with the object through the compound in the sense of ekaśeṣa compound. Out of these, by one of them there is the acceptance of the perception arising of the external organs. By the second is included the perception arising of intuition and the knowledge of the attachment, etc., and the knowledge of the yogins. Thus, the perception is explained.

(Three kinds of Inference)

आह—अनुमानमिदानीं वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : Now the inference should be explained.

उच्यते—

त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।

अनुमानं त्रिप्रकारमाचार्यैराख्यातम् । पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतो-
दृष्टं च । तत्र पूर्वमिति कारणमुच्यते । यस्य हि यत् कारणं स लोके
तत्पूर्वक इत्युच्यते । यथा तन्तुपूर्वकः पटो, देवदत्तपूर्वको यज्ञदत्त इति ।
पूर्वमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववत् । शेष इति विकारनाम, शिष्यत इति कृत्वा । तथा
चोक्तम्—न शेषोग्नेरन्यस्य जातमित्यस्ति । नापत्यमन्येन जातं सम्भव-
तीत्यर्थः । शेषोऽस्यास्तीति शेषवत् ।

Proponent : INFERENCE IS DECLARED TO BE THREEFOLD.

The inference is declared by the authorities as threefold—
apriori, aposteriori and based on general observation. That which
precedes is said to be the cause. In the worldly behaviour also an
object having another particular object as cause is called to be
having it as the preceding one. As the cloth is (said as) having
threads as precedent; Yajñadatta is (said to have) Devadatta as his
precedent. The term apriori (pūrvavat) means that which has cause
(mentioned as a sign). The effect is called posteriori, because it is
derived as that what remains. It is stated also—the remainder of
the fire is not produced from anything else which means that the
son cannot be born of someone else (than the father). Aposteriori is
that which has the remainder.

(Apriori)

तत्र पूर्ववत् यदा कारणमभ्युदितं दृष्ट्वा भविष्यत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिपद्यते । तद् यथा मेघोदये भविष्यत्त्वं वृष्टेः ।

Out of these apriori is explained as—when after observing that the cause is ready (has come to sight), one comes to know the futurity of the effect. As for example, (one comes to know the) futurity of rains (after observing) the rising of the clouds.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणमनेकान्तात् । न हि मेघोदयोऽवश्यं वृष्टेः कारणं भवति, वाय्वादिनिमित्तप्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. The rising of the clouds does not necessarily becomes the cause of rains because there is the possibility of obstruction by the causes of it (i.e. obstruction), like the wind.

उच्यते—यदि तर्हि कारणशक्तिं सहकारिशक्त्यन्तराऽनुगृहीतामप्रतियोगिनीं दृष्ट्वा कार्यस्य व्यक्तिं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा यदा लौहदंडादि-साधनसम्पन्ने व्यापारवता कुम्भकारेणाधिष्ठितां मृदमुपलभ्य घटस्य, तदा पूर्ववत् ।

Proponent : Apriori is that when after observing the causal power seized amongst the assisting powers and free from obstructing element, one comes to know the (future) manifestation of the effect, just as after seeing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instruments like the iron rod, (one comes to know the future manifestation) of the pot.

(Aposteriori)

शेषवत्—यदा कार्यनिवृत्तिं दृष्ट्वा कारणसद्भावं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा कुमारकं दृष्ट्वा द्वयसमापत्तिम् ।

Aposteriori is that when after observing the accomplishment of the effect, one comes to know the existence of the cause; for example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after seeing a boy.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि द्वयसमापत्तिपूर्वक एव प्राणभृतां प्रादुर्भावो, द्रोणादीनामन्यथोत्पत्तिविशेषश्रवणात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. It is not that the birth of a living being is caused by the meeting of the couple only because we hear of the special birth of Droṇa, etc., without it.

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि प्रभानुरंजितमन्तरिक्षं दृष्ट्वा चन्द्रार्कयोरुदयं प्रतिपद्यते तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after seeing the sky as red with the radiance, one comes to know the rising of the moon or the sun.

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि प्रभाऽनुरागोऽन्तरिक्षे चन्द्रार्कनिमित्त एव भवति । किन्तर्हि दिग्दाहादि-निमित्तोऽपि ।

Opponent : This is also not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. The radiance of the light in the sky is not caused only through the moon and the sun. On the contrary, it is caused by the conflagration of the quarters, etc., also.

उच्यते—यदा तु नदीपूरं दृष्ट्वा वृष्टिं प्रतिपद्यते तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after seeing the flood in the river, one comes to know the past rains.

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । नदीपूरस्य हि निमित्तमनेकविधं भवतीति हिमविलयनसेतुभंगगजक्रीडादि । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : This is also not a (proper) example because it is non-conclusive. There are various causes of the flood in river as the melting of the snow, break of the dam and the play of the elephants. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि पूर्णं दृष्ट्वा शालूकं प्रतिपद्यतेः अंकुरं वा दृष्ट्वा बीजमिति तदा शेषवत् ।

Proponent : The aposteriori is that when after observing the leaf, one comes to know the root of the water lily or when after observing the sprout one comes to know the seed.

(Direct Inference and Inference-by-elimination)

अथवा पुनरस्तु पूर्वकमेवोदाहरणम् । यत्तूक्तं—अनेकान्तादिति अत्र ब्रूमः—वीतावीतसामर्थ्यात् । वीतावीताभ्यां हेतुभूताभ्यामभिप्रेतार्थसिद्धिरिति वक्ष्यामः । प्रसंगिधर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिमुखेन चावीतप्रयोगः । तत्र यदा प्रसंगिनां हिमविलयनादीनां देशकाललिङ्गैः प्रतिषेधः क्रियते तदा मुक्तसंशयं प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । देशतस्तावत्तद् यथा—दक्षिणापथे नास्ति हिमविलयनसम्भवः । कालतो यथा प्रावृट्काले । लिङ्गतोऽपि यस्मान्मुद्गगवेधुकश्यामाककाष्ठतुणसूत्रशकृत्प्रभृतीनामनुपलम्भस्तथोष्मकलुषत्वादीनामुपलम्भः । तस्मात् परिशेषतो मेध्या एवाप इति । तस्मान्नास्नेकान्तः । एवं कृत्वा पूर्वाण्यप्युदाहरणानि उपपन्नानि भवन्ति । देशादिविचारसामर्थ्यात् ।

Or let the above mentioned be (accepted as) examples. As regards your statement that it is non-conclusive, we reply that (it is possible) due to the capacity of the direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. We shall state later on that the desired object is established through direct inference and the inference-by-elimination. The inference-by-elimination is used through eliminating the other qualities of the objects (undesirably) involved. When the undesirably involved objects like melting of the snow, etc., are negated through place, time and the distinguishing marks, there arises the valid knowledge without doubt. Through place as—there is no possibility of melting of the snow in Deccan. Through time as in the rainy season. Through distinguishing marks as—because the mudga (a kind of sea bird) gavedhuka (a kind of grass eaten by cattle), śyāmāka (a kind of grain), piece of wood, reed, fibre and the urine and dung are not observed and the warmth and turbidness, etc., are observed. Therefore, through elimination it is ascertained that the water is due to rains only. Therefore, it is not non-conclusive. In this way, the foregoing examples become correct

because (of the possibility) of the capacity of the consideration of the place, etc.

(Inference based on general observation)

सामान्यतोदृष्टं नाम यत्रैकदाऽर्थयोरव्यभिचारमुपलभ्य देशान्तरे कालान्तरे च तज्जातीययोरव्यभिचारं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा क्वचिद्धमाग्नि-सम्बन्धं दृष्ट्वा क्वचिद्धूमान्तरेणान्यन्तरस्यास्तित्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

The inference based on general observation is explained as—where after once observing the invariable association of two objects, one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of some groups at some other place and at some other time.²⁸ For example, after observing sometimes the relation of smoke and fire, one comes to know at some other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अविशेषप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वत्रैव ह्यनुमाने क्वचिदर्थयोरव्यभिचारमुपलभ्यान्यत्र तज्जातीययोरर्थयोरव्यभिचारं प्रतिपद्यते । तद्यथा क्वचित् साधनवतो मृत्पिण्डाद् घटनिष्पत्तिमुपलभ्यान्यत्र साधनवतः पिण्डान्तराद् घटान्तरनिष्पत्तिं प्रतिपद्यते, तथैकत्र नदी-पूराद् वृष्टिमुपलभ्यान्यत्र नदीपूरान्तराद् वृष्ट्यन्तरमवसीयते । तथा च सति त्रयाणामविशेषप्रसंगः ।

Opponent : *It is not a (proper) example because it involves the undesirable contingency of lack of differentiation.* Everywhere in the case of inference it happens that after observing somewhere the invariable association of the two objects, one comes to know the invariable association of the object of that genus at some other place. For example, after observing the production of pot from the lump of clay accompanied with the instruments at some place, one comes to know production of some other pot from some other lump of clay accompanied with the instruments. Similarly, after observing at one place the rains through

28. Briefly, it is the inference through analogy.

flood in river, one deduces the other rains at some other place through some other flood in river. In this case there will arise the undesirable contingency of lack of differentia among the three (above mentioned kinds of inference).

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि सहभुवामेकस्य विशिष्टगुणमुपलभ्य शेषाणामपि तद्वत्त्वमनुमीयते तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । तद्यथा वृक्षादेकस्य फलस्य पाक-मुपलभ्य शेषाणां वृक्षान्तराणां च पाकोऽनुमीयते ।

Proponent : The inference through general observation is found when after observing the distinguishing characteristics of one of the objects taking place simultaneously, the same characteristic is inferred as possessed by the rest. For example, after observing the ripeness of one fruit from a tree, the ripeness (of fruits) of other trees is inferred.²⁹

आह—एतदपि नास्त्युदाहरणम् । अनेकान्तात् । न हि सवषां फलानां तुल्यकालं पाको भवति । पूर्वापरकालनिष्पन्नत्वात्, निमित्त-भेदाच्च ।

Opponent : This is also not (proper example) because of non-conclusiveness. The ripeness of all the fruits does not take place simultaneously in all the trees because they are sprung up at different times and because of the differentiation of the (other) causes (of fruition).

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि समुद्रादेकमुदबिन्दुं प्राश्य शेषस्य लवणता-ऽनुमीयते । स्थाल्यां वैकं पुलाकमुपलभ्य शेषाणां पाकोऽनुमीयते तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् ।

Proponent : The inference through general observation is when after tasting one drop from the ocean the saltiness of rest of the

29. Here we have followed *Pandeya's* reading based on Manuscripts. *Chakravarti* reads *phalāntarāṇām* in place of *vrkṣāntarāṇām*. The benefit of *Chakravarti's* reading could also be included in *Pandeya's* reading if we interpret it as *śeṣāṇām* (*phalānāmiti śeṣa*) *vrkṣāntarāṇām ca*. The word within parenthesis is justified by the force of the word *ca* which implies that there are two objects connected together.

water is inferred. Or, when after observing one boiled grain in the cooking pot, the boiling of rest of the grains is inferred.

आह—नैतदस्त्युदाहरणम् । अकृत्स्नसङ्ग्रहात् वक्ष्यत्यमुपरिष्ठादाचार्यः 'सामान्यस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानादिति' (का० ६) । तत्रैवं प्रमाणे परिकल्प्यमाने कार्यकारणयोस्तत्संघातानां च सुखदुःखमोह-स्वभावोपलम्भात्तन्मात्राहङ्कारप्रधानानां समधिगमः स्यात् । न पुरुषस्य, तज्जातीयार्थाऽनुपलम्भात् ।

Opponent : This is not a (proper) example because it does not comprehend all the objects. The authority himself states afterwards, "the knowledge of the supra sensuous objects is obtained through the inference based on general observation (kā. 6). If it is supposed to be the nature of this means of knowledge, there may arise the knowledge of the subtle elements, the principle of egoism and the cosmic matter through the observation that the cause, its effects and the composite objects are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference, but the knowledge of the conscious entity will not arise because no object similar to it is available.³⁰

उच्यते—यदा तर्हि क्वचिद्धर्मेण धर्मान्तरस्याव्यभिचारमुपलभ्यैक-धर्मोपलम्भाद् भिन्नजातीयेऽत्यन्तानुपलब्धस्य धर्मान्तरस्य प्रतिपत्तिस्तदा सामान्यतोदृष्टम् । तद्यथा—देवदत्ते गमनाद्देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यात्यन्ता-दृष्टज्योतिषां देशान्तरप्राप्तेर्गमनमनुमीयते । तथा प्रासादादीनां वृद्धिपूर्वकं दीर्घत्वमुपलभ्यौषधिवनस्पतीनां दीर्घत्वदर्शनाद् वृद्धिरनुमीयते ।

30. The sense is that in case of the above interpretation, this kind of inference would give rise to the knowledge of the objects of its own genus (or similar to itself). The conscious entity is stated to be an object of inference by the Sāṃkhyas.

However, this means would not lead to the knowledge of conscious entity. There is no object similar to conscious entity the knowledge of which would lead one to the knowledge of conscious entity.

Proponent : The inference based on general observation is that when after observing the invariable association of the characteristic with some characteristic, later on observing the one characteristic, there arises the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar case. For example, after observing Devadatta's attaining to some different place through movement, the movement is inferred in case of the invisible planets through their attaining to some different place. Similarly, after observing that the length in case of the castle, etc., is caused by growth, the growth is inferred in case of the medicines and trees by observing their length.

आह—नैतदप्यस्त्युदाहरणम् । पूर्वेणाविशेषात् । कार्यात् कारणस्याधिगमः शेषवदिति पूर्वमतिसृष्टं भवता । अत्रापि च देशान्तरप्राप्तिलक्षणात् कार्याद् गतिलक्षणस्य कारणस्याधिगमः । तस्मात् शेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टयोरभेदप्रसंगः ।

Opponent ; This is also not a (proper) example because there is no differentia from the former. You have admitted earlier that the knowledge of cause from the effect is *aposteriori* inference. In the present case also the cause in the form of movement is known from the effect in the form of attaining to some other place. Hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of the non-difference of *aposteriori* inference and the inference based on general observation.

उच्यते—न, अनियमात् । यत्र हि नियमतः कार्येण कारणमधिगम्यते तच्छेषवदिति अयमस्मदभिसन्धिः । न तु तदस्ति सामान्यतोदृष्टे । कस्मात्? संघातत्वसामान्यात् । पारार्थ्यसामान्यसाधनमपि दृश्यते । यथाह—अव्यभिचारद्विशेषास्तु प्रतीताः प्रतिपादकाः इति । साध्यसाधनसामान्ययोरपि दृश्यते, यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति । तत्रैवं सति नियमवादिनः प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकसाधनाभासाः प्रत्युक्ताः । ते हि संशयविपर्ययाज्ञानहेतुकत्वादगमका इति व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ।

Proponent : *No because there is no fixed rule.* The sense intended by us is that the *a posteriori* inference is there where the cause as a rule is inferred from an effect. This does not hold good in case of the inference based on general observation.

Why ?

The establishment of the objective nature (lit. common quality of being meant for other) is observed to be proved from the common quality of being composite. As it is stated also – the particular renowned objects are effective in proving on account of constancy (lit. their virtue of being free from exception). (The constancy) is observed in case of the object to be proved and the general means of establishing it. For example, the word is non-eternal because it is produced. This being the case; the original position of the upholder of the fixed rule is abandoned. By this only are rejected the apparent probans which are non-established, contradictory and non-conclusive. Since they are the cause of doubt, perverted knowledge and absence of knowledge respectively, they cannot lead to the valid knowledge. Thus is explained the inference.³¹

(Verbal Testimony)

आह—आप्तवचनस्य किं लक्षणमिति ?

Opponent : What is the definition of verbal testimony ?

उच्यते—

आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनन्तु ॥५॥

आप्ता नाम रागादिवियुक्तस्यागृह्यमाणकारणपरार्थाः व्याहृतिः । श्रवणं श्रुतिः । आप्ता चाऽसौ श्रुतिराप्तश्रुतिः । अथवा आप्ताऽस्यास्तीत्याप्तः । अकारो मत्वर्थीयः । तद्यथा तुन्दो घट इति । आप्तेभ्यः श्रुतिराप्तश्रुतिः । आप्तश्रुतिश्चाप्तश्रुतिः । सरूपाणिमित्येकशेषः । तत्र पूर्वणाप्त-

31. The portion of the *kārikā-tallingalingipūrvakam* is not commented upon by the *Yuktidīpikā* perhaps under the impression that it is easy to understand.

श्रुतिग्रहणेनैवं प्रतिपादयति अपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वक आम्नायः, स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिः—
 श्रेयसार्थं प्रवर्तमानो निःसंशयं प्रमाणमिति । द्वितीयेन मन्वादिनिबन्धनानां
 च स्मृतीनां वेदाङ्गतर्कतिहासपुराणानां शिष्टानां नानाशिल्पाभियुक्तानां
 चादुष्टमनसां यद्वचस्तत्प्रमाणमित्येतत्सिद्धं भवति । तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः ।
 आप्तश्रुतिरेवाप्तवचनं न शब्दमात्रम् ।

**Proponent : VERBAL TESTIMONY IS THE RELIABLE STATE-
 MENT.**

The verbal testimony is the statement of the one who is free from attachment, etc., made in respect of the objects the cause of which is not known. Śruti means revelation. The compound āptaśruti is dissolved as the śruti which is āpta. Or, the āpta is he who has got reliability. The *a* is in the sense of possession, just as a bulky pot.³² The statement by the reliable man is the reliable statement. It is the residual of the words used three times, through the rule that one remains when there are many words of the same form. Through the mention of the first āptaśruti the author propounds as the veda is not composed by human intellect, and inciting for the highest aim of life, it is undoubtedly the means of valid knowledge independently. Through the second (āptaśruti) it is proved that the statement of the smṛtis composed by Manu, etc., the Vedāṅgas, treatises on logic, history and Purāṇas as also of the cultured persons engaged in various arts and unwieked in mind are also the valid means of knowledge. The word *tu* is for restriction. The verbal testimony is the reliable words only and not the words in general.

(Verbal Testimony cannot be included in Inference)

एवं सति यदुक्तं तन्त्रान्तरीये शिंशपादिशब्दानां निर्विकल्पमनु-
 मानेऽन्तर्भावस्त्रिलक्षणत्वादिति तदयत्नन्तः प्रतिक्षिप्तं भवतीति व्याख्या-
 तानि प्रमाणानि । एतैः पूर्वोक्तं प्रमेयं यथास्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ॥५॥

32. *Tuṇḍa* means bulk and *tuṇḍaḥ* is that which is possessed of bulk.

It, being so, automatically refutes the view stated by those belonging to the other school (i.e., Buddhists) that the word *śinsīpā* (*balbergia sisso*), etc., are included in determinate inference because they are possessed of three characteristics.³³ Thus are explained the means of knowledge. By these the objects of knowledge should be known in a befitting way.

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33. The idea is that the Buddhists refute the independence of verbal testimony as an independent means of knowledge trying to include it in inference. While doing so they try to show that the meaning of the words can be understood by means of inference. In this process they obliterate the subtle distinction between the words in general which do not constitute verbal testimony and the words of the authorities which constitute the proper verbal testimony.