

KĀRIKĀ 2

REJECTION OF THE REVEALED MEANS

(Invariableness and Finality in revealed Means)

आह—यद्येकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावाद् दृष्टे हेतावपरितोषस्तेन तर्ह्यस्त्य-
यमन्यो हेतुरुभयदोषवर्जितः स कस्मान्न परिगृह्यते? कोऽसाविति चेत् उच्यते,
शास्त्रोक्तः कर्मविधिः । स ह्यैकान्तिकः । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—पशुबन्धेन
सर्वाल्लोकान् जयति । न तूक्तं कदाचिज्जयति, कदाचिन्नेति । फलस्य
प्रत्यक्षानुपलब्धेरनैकान्तिकत्वमिति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् प्रत्यक्षत एवेदं
विहितस्य कर्मणः फलं नोपलभ्यते । तथा हि पुत्रकाम ईष्टं निरूप्य दुहितरं
अपि न प्राप्नोति । अर्थकामश्च कर्म कृत्वा माषकमपि न लभते । तस्मान्ना-
यमैकान्तिक इति । एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? साधनवैकल्यात्तदनुपपत्तेः ।
अनेकसाधनसाध्यो हि कर्मविधिः । यत्र फलं नोपलभ्यते तत्र साधनवैकल्य-
मनुमातव्यम् । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतदिष्टं, सति कारणे कार्यं न भवति । किं
चान्यत्, संसाराऽभावप्रसङ्गात् । यदि खल्वपि कर्मणः फलवत्त्वं नेष्यते
तेन तन्निमित्तस्य संसारस्याभावप्रसङ्गः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । तस्मात्सिद्ध-
मस्यैकान्तिकत्वम् ।

आत्यन्तिकत्वमपि सिद्धमेव । यस्मादाह अपाम सोमममृता अभू-
मेति । अत्र सोमपानादमृतत्वावाप्तिः श्रूयते । तस्मात्तदेवानुष्ठातव्यम् ।
किमन्येन हेतुना परिकल्पितेनेति जिज्ञासाऽपार्थवेति ।

Opponent : If there is dissatisfaction over the perceptible means on
account of lack of invariableness and finality, here is another
means which is free from both of these defects. Why don't you
resort to that ? If you ask what is that, the reply is—ritual
prescribed in the scripture. That is endowed with invaria-
bleness.

How ?

It is stated : 'one wins over all the worlds by tying the animal (to the sacrificial post),¹ (Here) it is not stated that sometimes one wins and sometimes does not'.

If it is argued that it lacks in invariableness because the fruit is not visible ? It may be like this : the fruit of that ritual prescribed is not directly observed; for example, after performing the ritual the one desirous of son does not get even a daughter. And, after performing the act (prescribed in the scripture) the one desirous of wealth does not get even beans. Hence, it is not invariable.

It is not so.

Why ?

That is not justified *because the non-attainment of that (desired fruit) is due to the deficiency in accessories*. Wherever the (desired) fruit is not attained, (there) the deficiency in the accessories should be inferred.

Why ?

It is not desirable that the effect does not arise when its causes are present. *Moreover, it would involve the undesirable contingency of non-existence of the world*. If the act is not accepted as yielding its fruit, there would be contingency of the non-existence of the world, (since it is) caused by that (fruit of acts).² And, it is not desirable. Therefore, its invariableness is established.

Its finality is also established. That is why it is stated : 'I have drunk Soma; I have become immortal,'³ etc." Here, we hear of the attainment of immortality through drinking Soma. Hence, it should be observed. What is the use of some other imaginary means ?⁴

1. Cf. *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 11.7.11 and *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.2.4

2. According to Indian Philosophy transmigration is caused by the acts the fruit of which is not enjoyed.

3. *R̥gveda* 8.48.3.

4. It is because it is not having the support of the Śruti.

Hence, the desire to know is certainly useless.

(Revealed Means are like Perceptible Means)

उच्यते

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः

अनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवः । अनुश्रवे भव आनुश्रविकः । दृष्टेन तुल्यं वर्तते दृष्टवत् । किमसावनभिप्रेत इति वाक्यशेषः ।

Proponent : THE REVEALED (MEANS OF ALLEVIATING MISERY) ARE LIKE THE PERCEPTIBLE.

Revelation is that which is revealed. The *ānuśrāvikaḥ* (revealed) is that which occurs in revelation.⁵ The term *dṛṣṭvat* (like perceptible)⁶ means that which is similar to the perceptible. What of this ? (It is) not desirable—is the remaining part of the sentence.

(Nature of Revelation)

आह कः पुनरयमनुश्रवः ?

Opponent : What is the revelation ?

उच्यते—मन्त्रब्राह्मणं यावद्वा पुरातनमनुश्रूयमाणं प्रामाण्येनाभ्युपगम्यते तत्रभवद्भिः । यथाश्रुतिनिवन्धनाः स्मृतयः । अङ्गानि वेदास्तर्का वा । यथाह वेदवेदाङ्गतर्केषु वेदसंज्ञा निरुच्यते । इति ।

Proponent : Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas or as much as you accept as authentic in the ancient revealed literature; for example, the Smṛtis related to the revealed literature (i.e., the Vedas), the ancillaries of the Vedas and (literature relating to) logic. As it is stated : 'The term Veda is applied (lit. spoken with reference to) the Veda, its ancillary literature and the (literature related with) logic, etc.

5. Pāṇini 5.1.115

6. Pāṇini 4.3.53

(Additional defects in revealed Means)

आह, किं पूर्वस्मादेव हेतोरयमानुश्रविको हेतुरनभिप्रेत इति ?

Opponent : Is this revealed means (of alleviating misery) not desirable on the above mentioned grounds only ?

नेत्युच्यते । किन्तहि

स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

इति । स इत्यानुश्रविकस्य हेतोः प्रतिनिर्देशः । हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे । अविशुद्धिश्च क्षयश्चातिशयश्च तैर्युक्तः । एतदुक्तं भवति । यस्मादयमानुश्रविको हेतुरविशुद्धोऽनित्यस्तारतम्यवांश्चातो दृष्ट इवाऽनभिप्रेतः ।

Proponent : No, on the contrary,

BECAUSE THAT IS ENDOWED WITH IMPURITY, DECAY AND SURPASSABILITY.

The term 'that' refers back to the revealed means (of alleviating misery). The term *hi* is used in the sense of *yasmāt* (because). The defects are impurity, decay and surpassability. It is endowed with these. The statement comes to mean this : because this revealed means (of alleviating misery) is impure, temporary and having gradation, it is not desirable like the perceptible (means of alleviating misery).

(Impurity of Revealed Means)

तत्राविशुद्धियुक्तस्तावत् हिंसाविधानात् । यदाह ब्राह्मणे-ब्राह्मणमालभेतेत्यादि । तथा—

षट्शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।

अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥

इति हिंसा चाविशुद्धिः । प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापादनात् ।

It is endowed with impurity because it prescribes violence. As

it is stated in the Brāhmaṇas—‘one should kill a Brahmin’, etc., and

“According to the (sacrificial) injunctions relating to Aśvamedha, six hundred, minimum three, animals are killed at the middle day”.

This is violence and impurity because it destroys the body which is dear to the living beings.

आह, तदनुपपत्तिः । शास्त्रचोदितत्वात् । यदि शास्त्रेण चोदितेयं हिंसा न स्यात् मुक्तसंशयमविशुद्धित्वमस्याः प्रतिपद्यामहे, शास्त्रचोदिता तु । तस्मान्नेयमविशुद्धिः ।

तत्प्रामाण्याऽनभ्युपगमादविशुद्धिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम्, वेदप्रामाण्यमभ्युपगच्छतामसंशयमेतदेवं स्यात् । हेतुवादकुशलास्तु वयम् । तस्मादधीयतां यदि कश्चिदस्त्युभयपक्षप्रसिद्धो हेतुः यतो निस्संशयः प्रत्ययः स्यादिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभ्युपगमविरोधात् । दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं चेति प्रामाण्यत्रयमभ्युगतं भवद्भिः । इदानीं वेदस्याप्तवचनत्वे सत्यप्रामाण्यं ब्रुवतः स्वमतव्याघातः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

वेदस्याप्तवचनत्वानुपपत्तेरदोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम् । आप्तवचनत्वं प्राक्प्रसाध्यास्य वेदस्य पश्चात् अयमुपालम्भो युक्तमभिधातुं स्यात् । तत्त्वसिद्धम् । तस्मादनुपालम्भोऽयमिति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वे सति रागादियोगाच्छब्दो विचारार्हः स्यात् किमाप्तवचनं न वेति । अपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकस्त्वाम्नायः स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिश्चयेसार्थं प्रवर्तते । तस्मान्नैवंविधमनिष्टं विचारमर्हति । किं चान्यत् अविशुद्धित्वानुपपत्तिप्रसंगात् । यदि चैतस्मिन्नर्थे भवानपि पर्यनुयुज्येत—कथमिदं निश्चीयते यदुत प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापादनादविशुद्धिर्हिंसेति ? अवश्यमभिधानीयं शास्त्रत इति । तदेव च शास्त्रं क्रतौ हिंसामाह । तस्मात् कोऽत्र हेतुः अन्यत्र प्रमाणमिहैवैतदप्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति हिंसातो धर्म इति ?

अनुग्रहोपघातलक्षणत्वादहिंसाहिंसयोः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धिरिति चेत्—
अथापि स्यात् अहिंसातश्चानुग्रहो भवतीष्टशरीराव्यापादनलक्षणः, हिंसा-
तश्चोपघातो भवति अभिप्रेतशरीराव्यापादनलक्षणः । क्रियानुरूपं च फल-
मनुमातुं युक्तमिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमनयोरिष्टानिष्टफलहेतुत्वम् । तस्मात्
कोऽत्र शास्त्रव्यापार इति ? एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनिष्टप्रसंगात्
एवं हि परिकल्प्यमाने गुरुभार्यागमनेऽपि सत्त्वान्तरानुग्रहसामर्थ्यादिष्टफल
सम्बन्धः स्यात् । माणवकं चोपनीय व्रतादेशशौचब्रह्मचर्य्यस्वाध्यायाभ्यास-
भैक्षाग्निपरिचरणगुरुशुश्रूषादिषु प्रवर्तयतोऽनिष्टफलसम्बन्धः स्यात् ।
तस्माल्लोकशास्त्रविरुद्धोऽसत्तर्को नेष्ट इति ।

उभयाभिधानाच्छास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् तदेव-
शास्त्रमहिंसामाह, तदेव हिंसाम् । एवं सति परस्परविरुद्धयोरर्थयोश्चोदि-
तत्वादुभयानुग्रहासम्भवे शास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ?
उत्सर्गपवादयोर्विषयभेदात् । सामान्ये हि शास्त्रमहिंसामुत्सृज्य विशेषे
ऋतुलक्षणेऽपवादं शास्ति । सामान्यविहितं च विशेषविहितेन बाध्यते ।
तद्यथा-दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति । तस्मादुत्सर्गपवाद-
योर्विषयभेदान्नास्ति शास्त्रविरोध इति । किं चान्यत् । कन्यागमनवत्
पुनर्विधाने दोषाभावात् । यथा खल्वपि शास्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धं कन्यागमनमिति
नेदानीमभिरूपः प्रतिगृह्य, तामभिगम्याऽधर्मभागभवति ।

गृहस्थः सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देतानन्यपूर्विकाम् ।

इति शास्त्रान्तरसद्भावात् । एवं शास्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धा हिंसा । नेदानीं
ऋतौ हिंसायां प्रवर्तमानोऽनिष्टफलभाक् स्यात् । पूर्वोक्तादेव शास्त्रान्तर-
सद्भावात् । तत्र यदुक्तं प्राणिनामिष्टशरीराव्यापादनादविशुद्धिर्हिंसेत्ये-
तदयुक्तम् ।

Opponent : That is wrong, because it is prescribed in the scriptures.

Had the violence not be prescribed in the scriptures, we would
have undoubtedly propounded its impurity. But, this is

prescribed in the scriptures.⁷ Hence, it is not impurity.

If its impurity is (propounded) on the basis of rejecting the validity of the scripture ? It may be like this. It would have undoubtedly been the case with those who accept validity of the Vedas. We are, however, proficient in reasoning. Therefore, tell us some reason well known to the (upholders of) both the views, which would give us some definite knowledge.

And, this is wrong.

Why ?

It contradicts your own view. Perception, inference and verbal testimony of an authority—these three means of knowledge are accepted by you.⁸ In spite of (considering the) authority of the Veda, if you speak of its non-validity, it will contradict your own opinion. Hence, it is wrong.

(If you argue that) it is faultless on account of non-justification of considering the Vedas as authoritative ? It may be like this. It would have been proper to adduce this reproach after establishing the authority of the Vedas. This is, however, not established. Therefore, this reasoning is not applicable to us.

It is also wrong.

Why ?

It would have been worth considering as to whether it is authoritative statement or not if it would have been produced by a human intellect (and consequently associated with attachment, etc. However, the Vedas are not produced by a human intellect, and

7. The sense is that the Vedas meant for the welfare of the society should not be considered prescribing something impure.

8. Cf. S.K. 4.

therefore, they independently confer (lit. proceed for) the highest welfare to the human beings. Hence, it does not deserve this sort of unnecessary consideration. *Moreover, it will involve the undesirable contingency of impossibility of impurity as well.* If you also make an inquiry in this respect, how is it ascertained that the violence is impure on account of destroying the body which is dear to the living beings? The most probable answer should be (that it is known) through the scriptures. What reason is there to prove invalidity of the assertion that virtue ensues from violence here only while it is valid elsewhere ?

If it is argued that it is proved through perception because violence and non-violence are of the nature of favour and destruction respectively ? The case may be like this. Favour in the form of non-destruction of the desired body ensues from non-violence, and injury in the form of the destruction of the desired body ensues from violence. And, it is proper to infer the result in accordance with action, and thus, the instrumentality for bringing about the desired and undesired result in case of both of these is proved through perception. Therefore, what is the role of scripture in this case ?

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because there will be the contingency of (its over pervasion even to the) undesirable cases. In the light of this kind of supposition there would be the possibility of the desired (i.e., favourable) result in case of the illicit relation with the wife of the preceptor on account of capability of favour to the other beings in such an act.⁹ There would have been the possibility of the undesired (i.e., unfavourable) result to the one (i.e., the teacher) who after initiating a student induces him to pious observances, (following) the advice, purity, celibacy, practice of studying (the religious texts), begging alms, to wait upon the sacred fire, i.e., to perform sacrifices, and the

9. It refers to a situation when there is the mutual liking for the student and the wife of the preceptor.

service to the preceptor.¹⁰ Hence, your wrong argument which goes against the worldly traditions and the scripture is not possible to us.¹¹

If it is argued that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of mutual contradiction in the scriptural statements on account of the mention of both ? It may be like this. The very scripture speaks of non-violence and also of the violence. In this condition, because both of these are prescribed in the scripture and because both of these are impossible to be followed at a time, there will arise the undesirable contingency of the mutual contradiction in the scripture itself.

That is not so.

Why ?

Because the scope of the general rule and the exception is different. After giving a general rule for prohibition of violence the scripture speaks of an exception with reference to the particular violence committed in sacrificial rituals. And, the general statement is overruled by a particular statement; for example, give curds to the brahmins and buttermilk to Kaunḍinya.¹² Therefore, since the scope of general rule and exception is different, there is no (mutual) contradiction in the scriptures. *Moreover, because there is no fault in prescribing again just as in the case of relation with a virgin.* It is just as the relation with a virgin is indeed prohibited in the scripture, but a good man does not commit sin in going to a virgin after marrying her because there is another scriptural statement that 'a householder should marry a beautiful virgin'. Thus the violence is prohibited in the scripture. No one engaged in the violence in ritual obtains the undesired result because there is the other scriptural injunction mentioned above. Hence, the statement that the violence is impure on account of destroying the desired body of the being, is wrong.

10. The above acts may not be desirable to the student.

11. The first example refers to worldly tradition and the second to the vedic.

12. Kaunḍinya is a sub-caste of the Brahmins.

उच्यते—न, अभिप्रायानवबोधात् । चित्रमपि बह्वेददभिधीयमानो नाभिप्रायं वेद भवान् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मान्न वयं वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे । नो खल्वपि ब्रूमः शास्त्रचोदितायां हिंसायां प्रवर्तमानस्या-निष्टफलसम्बन्धो भवति । किन्तु हिंसायां स्वर्गप्राप्तिनिमित्तत्वे वेदविहितस्य कर्मणः समनुष्ठानं प्राणिजमुपघातमन्तरेण न सम्भवति इति हितकामैरभ्यु-पेक्ष्यते । यस्मात् न ह्येतदुक्तं यदन्येषामुपघातेनात्मानुग्रहः कार्यं इति ।
आह—

न तत्परस्य सन्दध्यात्प्रतिकूलं यदात्मनः ।

एष सङ्क्षेपती धर्मः कामादन्यः प्रवर्तते ॥

Proponent : (It is) not so, because the sense is not understood by you. You, who speak varied and too much, do not understand the sense.

What is the reason (for this statement) ?

Because we do not reject the validity of the Vedas. Nor do we say that one engaged in the violence prescribed by the scripture is associated with undesired result. On the other hand, inspite of being a means for attaining heaven, the performance of the (ritualistic) acts prescribed by the Vedas is not possible without killing the living beings. Hence, it should be neglected by those who wish well for them because it is not stated that one should act for one's own benefit by killing others. It is stated :

“One should not do that to others which is disagreeable to one's own self. This is dharma in brief. Other than this ensues from lust”.

आह यद्येतन्नाभ्युपगम्यते कथं पूर्वमुक्तं प्राणिनामिष्टशरीरव्यापाद-नादविशुद्धिं हिंसेति ?

Opponent : If it is not acceptable, how did you say earlier that the violence is impure because of destroying the desired body of the beings ?

उच्यते कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । योऽसौ हिंसानिमित्तकः कारुण्यान्
मनसि नः परिताप उत्पद्यते सा खल्वविशुद्धिरभिप्रेता । तस्यां कारणमुपचर्यो-
क्तमविशुद्धिर्हिसेति । यथा मुद्गैस्तृप्ताः गोभिः सुखिन इति ।

Proponent : *Because the effect is metaphorically stated to be the cause,*

That effect of violence which generates grief in our mind through compassion is desired to be the impurity. Superimposing it on the cause, it is stated that the violence is impure just as one who is satisfied in (possessing) beans is said to be happy by (having) cows.

आह कथमेतदवगम्यते हिंसाकार्यं परितापमात्रमविशुद्धिराचार्यस्या-
भिप्रेता, न पुनर्हिंसैवेति ?

Opponent : How is it known that merely the sorrow which is the effect of violence and not the violence itself is desired by the preceptor as the impurity ?

उच्यते, प्रकर्षप्रत्ययोपलब्धेः । वक्ष्यत्युपरिष्ठात् तद्विपरीतः श्रेया-
निति (का० २) । समानजातीयं च प्रतियोगिनमपेक्ष्य प्रकर्षप्रत्यय उत्पद्यते
यदि चानुश्रविकस्य प्रशस्यता नाभिप्रेता स्यात् प्रकर्षप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गः ।
तस्मान्नोत्सूत्रमेतत् ।

Proponent : *Because the suffix showing superiority is used.* The author speaks later on 'that which is contrary to that is superior', etc. And, the suffix showing superiority is used with reference to correlative objects of the same kind. If the eminence (or goodness) of the revealed means would not have been meant, there would arise the undesirable contingency of impropriety of use of the suffix showing superiority. Hence, this does not go against the aphorism.

(Actions are not compulsory)

आह, सन्यासाऽनुपपत्तिः । अवियोगश्रवणात् । न हि कर्मणोऽत्याग-
सन्यासयोस्त्वमीशिषे । किन्तर्हि शास्त्रं यदाह तदवश्यं । तच्चाभिरुचि-
कर्मभिरवियोगं शास्ति । कस्मात् ? एवं ह्याह—“जरामर्यमेतत् सत्रं
यदग्निहोत्रदार्शपौर्णमासौ, जरया ह एतस्मात् सत्राद्विमुच्यते, मृत्युना च ।”

पुनरप्याह “कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः ।” तस्मादामरणात् कर्मणामत्यागः । तस्मिन् सति हेत्वन्तरकर्मणामानर्थक्यम् ।

Opponent : *There arises the impropriety of renunciation because the scripture prescribes the association with work. Yoy cannot (at a time) teach both - the non-abandoning of the acts and renunciation. On the contrary, that which is mentioned in the scripture must be done. And, that (scripture) teaches the association with action upto death.*

How ?

Because it is stated : ‘this sacrifice, viz., agnihotra and darśa and pūrṇamāsa, continues up to old age and death. One becomes free from this sacrifice in old age and at death.’ Again it is said : ‘performing the acts (prescribed by the scripture) one should desire to live for hundred years.’ Therefore, there is non-abandoning of the acts upto death. This being so, there is no necessity of giving some other reason in favour of the acts.¹³

उच्यते, न साधनानामस्वभाविकत्वात् । पत्नीसंयोगादिभिरनेकैः साधनैरयं कर्मविधिः प्रसाध्यते । तेषां चास्वाभाविकत्वात् अशक्यमर्जनं प्रयोगतः पूर्वं कर्तुमिति प्रतिपादितम् । तस्मादनित्यानि कर्माणि ।

हेतुशास्त्रविप्रतिपत्तौ शास्त्रबलीयस्त्वमिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । यत्र हेतुशास्त्रयोर्यविप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति तत्र विप्रलम्भभूयिष्ठत्वादनुमानस्य बलीयः शास्त्रमित्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । तच्चानुपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? शक्तितो विनियोगात् शक्तिमपेक्ष्य शास्त्रमग्निहोत्रादीनि कर्माणि विदधत्तेषाम नित्यतां ज्ञापयति । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह, “योऽलं सन्नग्निहोत्रायाग्निहोत्रं न जुहोति तमेषा देवताऽपरुद्धाऽपरुद्धयस्माल्लोकादमुष्माच्चोभाभ्याम् ।” तस्मादनित्यानि कर्माणि । किं चान्यत् । जराग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । त्वदीय एव

13. Here, the author raises one more issue involving the apparent contradiction of the Sāṃkhya line of thought with the vedas. The Sāṃkhya in opposition to ritual prescribes knowledge and renunciation from ritualistic acts.

ज्ञापके जराग्रहणमस्ति । अतोऽनुमीयते शक्त्यपेक्षम् नित्यं च कर्म । किं चान्यत् शास्त्रहानेः । उभयं हि शास्त्रे निर्दिष्टम् । कर्माणि सन्यासश्च । यदि पुनः कर्माणि नित्यकर्तव्यतयेष्यन्ते तेन सन्यासशास्त्रं हीयते । तस्माद्विषयरागाविष्करणमेतद्वः ।

Proponent : *No, because (the collection of) the means is unnatural.*

This course of action is accomplished with many means like association with wife, etc., and because of their being unnatural, it is established (through experience) that it is impossible to acquire them all before the performance of the acts. Hence, the actions are not compulsory.

If it is argued that in case of contradiction between reasoning and scripture, the latter is stronger ? It can be like this. Where there is contradiction between reasoning and scripture, it should be certainly accepted that the scripture is stronger because the inference is in more cases deceiving.

That is wrong.

Why ?

Because of (their) application in accordance with the capacity. (The scripture) while enjoying the performance of Agnihotra, etc., in accordance with the capacity indicates their non-compulsory nature.

How ?

It is stated : 'One even capable for ritual does not perform Agnihotra sacrifice for the sake of Agnihotra, is driven away from both—this and the other world by the god who wants to drive him out' Therefore, the actions are not compulsory.¹⁴ *Moreover, by the force of inclusion of old age.* Old age is included in the statement quoted by you as a proof. Hence, it is inferred that the action is (performed) in accordance with the capacity and is not compulsory. *Moreover, on account of abandonment of the scripture.* Both of these

14. If it would be natural and unconditional, it would be eternal.

action and renunciation, are mentioned in the scripture. If the actions are desired to be performed compulsorily, it will lead to the abandonment of the scripture prescribing renunciation. Therefore, this statement of yours is the manifestation of the attachment towards the objects of enjoyment.

आह, न, श्रुतिबलीयस्त्वात् । तुल्यबलयोर्हि शास्त्रयोरेकविषयसन्निपाते द्वयोर्युगपदनुग्रहासम्भवे विकल्पपर्यायो भवतः । श्रुतिस्मृतिसन्निपाते च श्रुतिर्बलीयसी, स्मृतिविहितश्च सन्यासः । तस्मान्नानयोर्विकल्पः । न खल्वपि पर्यायो न्याय्यः ।

Opponent : No, because of the fact that the scripture is stronger.

When two scriptures of the same strength apply to the same topic (and) because it is impossible to follow both of them simultaneously, there is alternative or some other arrangement. In case of application of śruti and smṛti (on the same topic), the scripture is stronger. And renunciation is prescribed in the smṛti. Hence, there is no alternative in case of them. The other arrangement is also not correct too.

उच्यते—तदितरत्र तुल्यम् । यथैव कर्मणां समनुष्ठानं शास्ति शास्त्रं तथा सन्यासमपि । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमानशुः ।

परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो विशन्ति ॥

न कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेद्धुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमाणाः ।

अथाऽपरे ऋषयो मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशुः ॥

ब्राह्मणं चात्र भवति—“तद्य इदं विदुः, ये चेमेऽरण्याः श्रद्धातप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसम्भवन्ति । अर्चिषो हरह्ण आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यन्पडुदङ्ङेति मासांस्तान्मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं संवत्सरादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमाणवः स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति ।” पुनरप्याह—“एतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति, एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति । एतद्ध स्म वै पूर्वे विद्वांसः, प्रजा न कामन्तु प्रजया किं करिष्यामो येषां नायमात्मा नायं लोक इति ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च

वित्तैषणायाश्च लौकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्तीति ।”
तस्मादेते त्यागसन्न्यासयोरुभयोर्लिङ्गम् ।

Proponent : *It is similar in both the cases.* As the scripture instructs the performance of actions so does it instruct renunciation too.
It is stated :

“They attained immortality neither by actions nor by progeny and wealth, but only through renunciation. The heaven is placed in the cave (and) shines there where the striver (an ascetic) enters.”

And,

“The seers having progeny and desiring for wealth could not get over death through action. However, the other wise seers attained immortality after rising above actions.”

There is a Brāhmaṇa¹⁵ statement in this sense :

“Those who know this and practise the faith and austerity having resorted to the forest, are connected with light, from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month; from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves northward, from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the light. He is a man in the non-human state. He sends these (strivers) to Brahman.”

It is said again :

“Knowing this one becomes an ascetic, desiring this (soul) as the world, the monks wander forth; on account of this the earlier knowers did not wish for offspring; what shall we do with the offsprings, who are neither the soul nor that world ? Having risen above the desire for sons, the

desire for wealth, desire for reputation, they led the life of an ascetic.”¹⁶

Thus, there are the indicatives of both—acts and renunciation.

(Nature of Injunction and Eulogium)

आह—यद्यप्येवं शास्त्रं तथाऽपि समनुष्ठाने विधिरस्ति । विहितं चावश्यं कर्तव्यम् । सन्न्यासे त्वर्थवादमात्रमित्यनयोः विशेषः । तस्मिन् सति समनुष्ठानं ज्यायो न त्यागः ।

Opponent ; *Even though the scriptural statement goes like this, there is the injunction for performing them.* That which is prescribed ought to be done. In case of renunciation there is eulogy only. Here lies the difference between these two. In the light of this, the performance of the acts is superior, not the renunciation.

उच्यते—कोऽयं विधिः, कोऽयमर्थवादः ?

Proponent : What is injunction and what is eulogium.

आह—विधिस्तदर्थत्वेनापूर्वोपदेशः । यो हि विध्यर्थेन लिङा लोटा कृत्यैर्वापूर्वोपदेशः क्रियते स विधिः । यथा—अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः वायव्यं श्वेतमजमालभेत भूतिकाम इति । स्तुतिरर्थवादः । तस्य तु विहितस्य प्ररोचनार्थं या स्तुतिः सोऽर्थवादः । तद्यथा—“वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव तेन भागधेयेनोपधावति, स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति” इति । एवंविधां हि स्तुतिमुपश्रुत्य फलार्थिने हि यजमानाय विधिः प्ररोचते । एतस्मिन् हितकामः प्रवर्तते इति ।

Opponent : Injunction is the instruction which is not conferred for that purpose earlier.¹⁷ The injunction is that which is quite new advice of the acts related through liḍ, loṭ or kṛtya suffixes meaning injunction;¹⁸ for example, ‘the desirous of heaven

16. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4th Brāhmaṇa.

17. Cf. the Mīmāṃsā definition : *ajñātārthajñāpako vedabhāgaḥ vidhiḥ*.

18. This refers to *bhāvanā* in Mīmāṃsā terminology.

should perform Aghihotra'; 'the desirous of property should offer a white he-goat to wind', Eulogium is praise. The praise of that which is prescribed (in the scripture) to incite interest for it, is eulogium; for example, 'Wind is the swiftest deity; verily he who has recourse to him with his own share, verily he makes him attain prosperity'.¹⁹ The injunction incites interest in a patron of sacrifice who longs for the result (of sacrifice) after he has heard the praise of this kind. The one desirous of welfare will start performing it (sacrifice).

उच्यते—न, अत एव सन्न्याससिद्धिः । एवं चेन्मन्यसे यमाम्नायः श्रैयांसमर्थं मन्यते, तं प्ररोचनाय स्तौति तथा सन्न्याससिद्धिः । कस्मात् ? स्तुतत्वात् । बहुलार्थिनां सन्न्यासमाम्नायः स्तौति । स कस्मान्न प्ररोचते ? इतरथा ह्यानर्थक्यम् । यदि खल्वप्यर्थवादः स्तुवन्नपि न प्ररोचयेत् यदुक्तं प्ररोचनार्थोऽर्थवाद इति तद् भवद्भिर्हापितव्यं स्यात् । अनर्थको ह्येवं सत्यर्थवादो न प्ररोचनार्थः । अर्थान्तरवचनं वा । यदि प्ररोचनार्थत्वमस्य नेष्यते तेन तदर्थान्तरं वक्तव्यम् । मा भूदनर्थकत्वं वेदैकदेशस्येति । तस्मान्नानया विभीषिकया वयं शक्याः सन्मार्गादिपनेतुम् । किञ्चान्यत् । उभयथा विकल्पेऽनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । इहायमाम्नायो विधेयत्वेन वा सन्न्यासं स्तूयात् अविधेयत्वेन वा । किञ्चातः ? तद्यदि तावद्विधेयत्वेन स्तौति किमन्यद्विचार्यते ? सिद्धः सन्न्यासः । अथ विधेयत्वेन, स्तुतावस्य प्रयोजनं कर्तव्यम् । यद्वि कर्तव्यतया नेष्टं तदपुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वकः स्वतन्त्रः पुरुषनिश्च्रेय-सार्थं प्रवर्तमान आम्नायः किमिति प्ररोचयेत् ? तस्मादेतामपि कल्पनां कृत्वा कृशमेवैतत् । अथवोभया विकल्प इत्यस्यायमन्योऽर्थः । इहायमाम्नायो भूतार्थेन वा सन्न्यासं प्ररोचयेत् । अभूतार्थेन वा ? किं चातः ? तद्यदि तावद् भूतार्थेन प्ररोचयति तथा सत्यमृतत्वप्रापकस्य सन्न्यासस्यापरिग्रहे विषयारागान्यो हेतुर्वक्तव्यः । अथाभूतार्थेन, पुरुषो निःश्रेयसाद्वीयते । कस्मात् ? न ह्येतद्युक्तं यदश्रेयसि मार्गे प्रमाणभूत आम्नायो मातृमोद-कन्यायेनेहितार्थिनः प्राणिनः प्रतारयेत् । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् अनेकान्तात् । नचायमेकान्तो यद्विहितमेव कर्तव्यम् । तथा च शाबराः

पठन्ति ग्रामगमनं भवतः शोभनमित्यत्रान्तरेण विधिं स्तुतिरेव देवदत्तं ग्रामगमनाय प्ररोचयतीति । किञ्चान्यत्, आशङ्काप्रसंगात् । यदि खल्वपि किञ्चित् सत्यं किञ्चिदनृतं ब्रूयाद्वेदः तथा सति पौरुषेयवाक्यवद्वेदवाक्येऽपि आशंका प्रसज्येत । तथा च सति यदुक्तमेव प्रसंगः । अनिष्टं चैतत् । किं च विध्यनुमानं वा तत्, एवमेकदेशभूतत्वात् । अथवा विध्येकदेशोऽर्थवाद इत्यतिसृष्टं भवता । तत्र सन्न्यासेऽर्थवादमुपलभ्य विधिरप्यस्तीति अनुमातव्यम् । अनुपलम्भाददोष इति चेत् स्याच्चैवं यद्यसौ विधिरुपलभ्यते । तस्मादनुपलम्भादयं दोषान्निवर्तिष्यत इति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकभेदत्वात् । उपलब्धौ यत्नः क्रियताम् । अनेकभेदो हि प्रतिवेदमाप्नायः । तत्र यदुक्तं विधिसद्भावात् क्रियाप्राधान्यमित्येतदप्ययुक्तम् । इतिकर्तव्यतानुपदेशात् सन्न्यासानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्-अथापि स्याद् यदि सन्न्यासमप्याप्नायो विधेयं मन्येत । तेन यथा गार्हस्थ्यस्येतिकर्तव्यतां भार्योद्वहनादिकां मन्त्रवदुपदिशति तथा सन्न्यासमप्युपदिशेत् । न तूपदिष्टवान् । तस्मान्नास्ति सन्न्यास इति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? अभावात् । इतिकर्तव्यतानां हि सर्वासामभावः सन्न्यासः । तत्र किं शास्त्रमुपेक्ष्यति ? यावती खल्वितिकर्तव्यता सन्न्यासाङ्गं तामुपदिशति शास्त्रम् । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह— “तपःश्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्ति अरण्ये शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्षचर्या चरन्तः सूर्यद्वारेण ते विरजसः प्रयान्ति यत्रामृतः स पुरुषोऽव्ययात्मा ।” तत्र तपः श्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्तीत्येन श्रद्धयोपेतं यमनियमलक्षणं धर्ममाह । अरण्य इति गृहेभ्यो विनिस्सृतिम् । शान्ता इतीन्द्रियाणामन्तःकरणस्य च विषयाभिलाषाद्विनिवर्तनम् । विद्वांस इति पूर्वरात्रापररात्रादिषु कालेष्वनिर्विण्णस्य योगिनो ज्ञानाभ्यासम् । भैक्षचर्या चरन्त इति शरीरस्थितिनिमित्तं परिमितमभ्यवहारनियोगम् । उत्तरार्धेन च फलमाचष्टे । तन्निबन्धनश्च विस्तरः सन्न्यासेतिकर्तव्यतायां मन्वादिभिरभिहितः । श्रुतिनिर्वचनाश्च स्मृतयो भवतां प्रमाणमिति पक्षः । तत्र यदुक्तमितिकर्तव्यतानुपदेशान्नास्ति सन्न्यास इत्येतदयुक्तम् । एवं च न नित्यानि कर्माणि । यत्त्वनेनैतदुक्तमानुश्रविको हेतुरनैकान्तिक इति सत्यमेतत् । अवश्यं हि कर्मणः फलमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । इतरथा हि तन्निमित्तस्य संसारस्याभावादनिष्टप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादनिष्टमेवैतदाचार्यस्य ।

Proponent : No, by this reason only is the renunciation proved. If you hold that the scripture praises for inciting interest in a man whom it considers capable for highest good, it serves as a proof for renunciation.

How ?

Because it is praised. The scripture praises renunciation for those who desire for much. Why does that not incite interest in it ? Otherwise, it would be meaningless. If the eulogium does not incite interest in it even inspite of praises for it, you would also have to withdraw your statement that eulogium is to incite interest in the act. If this is the case, the eulogium would be meaningless and not meant for inciting interest in the act. Or, its other meaning should be mentioned. If it is not desirable that it incites the interest for the act, its other meaning should be mentioned, (so that) a part of the Veda may not be meaningless. Therefore, we cannot be led away from the right path by this terror.

Moreover, because both the suppositions lead to the contingency of admitting the undesirable. The scripture may praise renunciation either as it should be practised or as not be practised.

So what ?

If the scripture praises it as should be practised, what else is considered ? The (prescription for) renunciation is established. If the scripture praises it as not to be practised, the other purpose for its praise should be mentioned. If it is not desired to be practised, why should the scripture, which is meant for highest good for the men independently and is not a composition of a human being, incites the interest in an act which is not intended to be performed ? Hence, even after making this supposition your argument is weak. Or, its other meaning would be that there is an alternative for both (practice and non-practice).

Does the scripture incite interest in renunciation in the form of something real or in the form of an unreal object.

Why do you ask like this ?

If it incites (in the renunciation) in the form of the real object, you should tell some means (of liberation) other than attachment to the objects, without accepting renunciation which is a means of attaining immortality. If (the scripture incites interest in renunciation) in the form of an unreal object, a man would be deprived of the highest end of life (liberation).

How ?

It is not right (to say) that the scripture which is an authority in prescribing a way for the highest end of life, would dissuade a person wishing for the welfare just as a mother does so with a child by offering him a sweet-meat ball.

Moreover, on account of lack of invariableness. It is not invariable that only whatever is prescribed (and not the eulogised) should be done. So say the followers of Śābara 'It is well for you to go to the village'. In this sentence the praise without injunction incites the interest in Devadatta to go to the village. Moreover, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of rise of doubt. If the Veda teaches some true and some wrong things, there would arise the doubt with reference to the veracity of the Veda as is the case with the statement of man. Thus, arises the undesirable contingency stated above. If this is the case, the statement of the other scripture that the devotion of the high-souled (towards Veda) is sudden (i.e., natural), will be contradicted. *Moreover, otherwise (i.e. if the Vedas are not considered as prescribing real), there will be contingency of fun.* If the Veda would mention something real and something unreal, there will arise in this case the contingency of a fun.²⁰ And, this is not desirable.

Moreover, that would be an inference of injunction for in the above stated manner it (the eulogium) is a part of injunction. Or, you have granted in addition that the eulogium is a part of an injunction and finding eulogium in case of renunciation it should be inferred that the injunction is also there.

It if is argued that it is faultless because it is not found ? It may be like this, It may be so if the injunction for it is available; therefore, it will be free from this fault because it is not available.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

20. Additional sentences given by Pandeya from Ahmedabad manuscript, with slight difference.

Because there are many divisions. You should try to search for it. The literature of each of the Vedas is of many divisions. The statement that it abounds in (ritualistic) acts on account of the existence of injunction, is also wrong.

If it is argued that renunciation is not possible (to be searched out in the Vedas) for there is no advice regarding its mode of observance ? It may be like this. If the Vedas consider renunciation as worthy to be followed, they would have advised about the mode of renunciation with sacred mantras as they prescribe the observance of domestic (practices) like marriage (with the sacred mantras). The renunciation is, however, not prescribed thus. Hence, there is no (provision for) renunciation.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the absence. The renunciation is (of the nature of) absence of all the modes of observance. What will the scripture advise about it ? The scripture does advise about the possible mode of observance forming the accessories of renunciation.

How ?

It is stated like this :

“Those undisturbed knowers (of truth) who live on alms in the forest practising austerity and faith (in the truth), freed from passion, go through the Sun to the place free from sins, where there is immortal immutable Self which is (called) Puruṣa.”²¹

Here, by the clause ‘those who practise austerity and faith (in truth)’, the author mentioned the dharma of the nature of social and individual restraints and other observances along with belief (in truth). The expression ‘in the forest’ suggests that they have gone out of their houses. The Term ‘undisturbed’ indicates the cessation of their desires for the objects of senses and the internal organs. The expression ‘knower (of the truth)’ suggests the constant practice of

21. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.11

knowledge by the non-dejected yogin in the first half and the latter half of the night, etc. The expression 'living on alms' suggests that they use to take the limited food and other things only for the maintenance of the body. The author has mentioned the result of it through the second half of the verse. Its explanation is given by Manu and other (authors of the Smṛtis) in context of the mode in renunciation. And, your stand is that the Smṛtis explaining the Śruti are the authority for you. Hence, your statement that on account of the absence of the mention of the mode of renunciation there is no (provision for) renunciation, is wrong. In this way also the actions are not compulsory. That which is stated by this (author) that the Vedic means are not invariable, is true. The fruit of the actions is surely to be accepted. Otherwise, there will arise the undesirable contingency of admitting the absence of the world which is caused by that (fruit of the acts).

आह, कथमेतदनुमातव्यमिति ?

Opponent : How is it to be inferred ?

उच्यते, क्षयग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । यदि पूर्वसूत्रोक्तमिहानुवर्तते क्षय-
ग्रहणमनर्थकं स्यात् । कस्मात् ? अत्यन्ताभावपर्यायो हि क्षय इति कृत्वा ।
एवं सिद्धोऽविशुद्धियोगः ।

Proponent : *On the force of the mention of the word 'decay'.* If that which is stated in the previous aphorism (is considered) to follow here, the mention of the term 'decay' would be meaningless.

Why ?

Decay is understood as a synonym of absolute negation.

Thus, the association with impurity is proved.

(Decay in Revealed Means)

आह, क्षययोग इदानीं कथमनुमातव्य इति ?

Opponent : How is the association with decay inferred ?

उच्यते—क्षययोगोऽङ्गपरिमाणात् । क्षययोगः पुनरस्य हेतोरङ्ग-

परिमाणाद्वेदितव्यः । यानि हि यजेरङ्गानि पशुपुरोडाशादीनि तानि परिमितानि । परिमितानां साधनानां तन्त्वादीनां परिमितं कार्यं पटादि दृष्टम् परिमितं क्षयधर्मि दृष्टम् । तद्वदेव । किञ्चान्यत् । संसारोपलम्भात् । दृश्यते चायं वाग्बुद्धिस्वभावाहारविहारभेदभिन्नकर्मविहारवैचित्र्यनिमित्तः संसारः । यदि पुनः साक्षात् कृतं कर्माक्षयफलं स्यात् स पुनरावृत्त्यभावात् प्राणिनां नोपलभ्येत ।

शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । “शब्दप्रमाणका वयं, यच्छब्द आहतदस्माकं प्रमाणम् ।” स चास्य हेतोर्मृतत्वमाह “तरति मृत्युं, तरति पाप्मानमित्यादि” । तस्मादनिच्छताऽप्येतदवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अनभ्युपगमे वा प्रतिज्ञाहानिर्वेदः प्रमाणमिति । एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? शब्दान्तरेण विरोधात् । अनित्यत्वमस्य हेतोः शब्दोऽनुमन्यते । तस्यैवं सति विरोधः प्राप्नोति । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“अथ ये इमे ग्रामे इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते, अथैतमेवाध्वानं पुनर्निवर्तन्ते । यथैतमाकाशं आकाशाद् वायुम् । ते धूममभिसम्भवन्ति । धूमो भूत्वाऽभ्रं भवति । मेघो भूत्वा प्रवर्षति । त इह ब्रीहियवा ओषधिवनस्पतयस्तिला माषा इति जायन्ते । ततो वै योऽन्नमिति यो रेतः सिञ्चति स भूय एव भवतीति ।” तत्र यदुक्तं शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent : *The association with decay is inferred through the limited magnitude of the means, The association with decay should be known through the probans in the form of the limited magnitude of the means. Whatever are the means of sacrifice like animal and oblation, all of them are limited in magnitude. The effects like cloth (coming out) of the means like threads which are limited in magnitude, are limited in magnitude. That which is characterised by limited magnitude is also observed to be characterised by decay. It is like that (i.e., the example of cloth and threads cited above).²² Moreover, because of the transmigration. It is observed that the transmigration is caused*

22. In Kārikā 15th the author has used limited magnitude as a probans to prove the eternal and non-limited cause, viz., cosmic matter.

by the variety resulting from different distribution (i.e., allotment) of actions due to (different types of) speech, intellect, nature, food, actions, etc. If the results of the acts performed directly would have been undecaying, the transmigration would not have taken place for the lack of rebirth.

If it is argued through the force of verbal testimony that the world is eternal ? It may be like this. We accept the validity of the words uttered by an authority, Whatever is stated in the words uttered by an authority is valid.²³ And that (verbal testimony) speaks of eternity because of the statements like (one) crosses the death; one crosses the unhappiness. Hence, it (the eternity of the world) must be admitted even though unwillingly. The non-acceptance of it would lead to giving up of the proposition that the Veda is Valid.

It is not so.

Why ?

Because it contradicts the other authoritative statements. The authoritative statement supports the non-eternity of this means. Granting this the contradiction is involved.

How ?

It is stated :

“Those who in the village perform sacrifice, work for the public good and give alms, come back through the same course by which they went; from here to the sky, from sky to air; then they are connected with the smoke, after becoming smoke they become mist, then after becoming cloud it rains down; they are born on the earth as rice, barley, medicinal herbs and trees, sesamum plants and beans, thence whoever eats the food and sows the seed, he is born again.”²⁴

(Hence,) the statement that the eternity of world is conveyed through the force of the authoritative statement, is wrong.

(Eternity of world in secondary sense)

23. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1

24. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 5.10.3-6

परिमाणाद्वेदितव्यः । यानि हि यजेरङ्गानि पशुपुरोडाशादीनि तानि परिमितानि । परिमितानां साधनानां तन्त्वादीनां परिमितं कार्यं पटादि दृष्टम् परिमितं क्षयधर्मि दृष्टम् । तद्वदेव । किञ्चान्यत् । संसारोपलम्भात् । दृश्यते चायं वाग्बुद्धिस्वभावाहारविहारभेदभिन्नकर्मविहारवैचित्र्यनिमित्तः संसारः । यदि पुनः साक्षात् कृतं कर्माक्षयफलं स्यात् स पुनरावृत्त्यभावात् प्राणिनां नोपलभ्येत ।

शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमिति चेत् स्यादेतत् । “शब्दप्रमाणका वयं, यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् ।” स चास्य हेतोरमृतत्वमाह “तरति मृत्युं, तरति पाप्मानमित्यादि” । तस्मादनिच्छताऽप्येतदवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अनभ्युपगमे वा प्रतिज्ञाहानिर्वेदः प्रमाणमिति । एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? शब्दान्तरेण विरोधात् । अनित्यत्वमस्य हेतोः शब्दोऽनुमन्यते । तस्यैवं सति विरोधः प्राप्नोति । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“अथ ये इमे ग्रामे इष्टापूर्वं दत्तमित्युपासते, अथैतमेवाध्वानं पुनर्निवर्तन्ते । यथैतमाकाशं आकाशाद्वायुम् । ते धूममभिसम्भवन्ति । धूमो भूत्वाऽभ्रं भवति । मेघो भूत्वा प्रवर्षति । त इह ब्रीहियवा ओषधिवनस्पतयस्तिला माषा इति जायन्ते । ततो वै योऽन्नमत्ति यो रेतः सिञ्चति स भूय एव भवतीति ।” तत्र यदुक्तं शब्दसामर्थ्यान्नित्यत्वमित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent : *The association with decay is inferred through the limited magnitude of the means, The association with decay should be known through the probans in the form of the limited magnitude of the means. Whatever are the means of sacrifice like animal and oblation, all of them are limited in magnitude. The effects like cloth (coming out) of the means like threads which are limited in magnitude, are limited in magnitude. That which is characterised by limited magnitude is also observed to be characterised by decay. It is like that (i.e., the example of cloth and threads cited above).²² Moreover, because of the transmigration. It is observed that the transmigration is caused*

22. In Kārikā 15th the author has used limited magnitude as a probans to prove the eternal and non-limited cause, viz., cosmic matter.

by the variety resulting from different distribution (i.e.. allotment) of actions due to (different types of) speech, intellect, nature, food, actions, etc. If the results of the acts performed directly would have been undecaying, the transmigration would not have taken place for the lack of rebirth.

If it is argued through the force of verbal testimony that the world is eternal ? It may be like this. We accept the validity of the words uttered by an authority, Whatever is stated in the words uttered by an authority is valid.²³ And that (verbal testimony) speaks of eternity because of the statements like (one) crosses the death; one crosses the unhappiness. Hence, it (the eternity of the world) must be admitted even though unwillingly. The non-acceptance of it would lead to giving up of the proposition that the Veda is Valid.

It is not so.

Why ?

Because it contradicts the other authoritative statements. The authoritative statement supports the non-eternity of this means. Granting this the contradiction is involved.

How ?

It is stated :

“Those who in the village perform sacrifice, work for the public good and give alms, come back through the same course by which they went; from here to the sky, from sky to air; then they are connected with the smoke, after becoming smoke they become mist, then after becoming cloud it rains down; they are born on the earth as rice, barley, medicinal herbs and trees, sesamum plants and beans, thence whoever eats the food and sows the seed, he is born again.²⁴

(Hence,) the statement that the eternity of world is conveyed through the force of the authoritative statement, is wrong.

(Eternity of world in secondary sense)

23. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1

24. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 5.10.3-6

उभयथाभिधानाच्छास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । तदेव शास्त्रं नित्यत्वमाह तदेवानित्यत्वम् । एवं सति परस्परविरोधिनोरर्थयोश्चोदितत्वात् उभयानुग्रहासम्भवे सति शास्त्रविरोधप्रसङ्ग इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? असम्भवे सत्यर्थान्तरकल्पते । यत्र हि प्रमाणभूता श्रुतिरसम्भविनमर्थं चोदयति, तत्रार्थान्तरं कल्पयति । तद्यथा—“स आत्मनो वपामुदखिदत्” “स्तेनं मनः” “अनृतवादिनो वाग्” इत्येवमादिषु । एवमिहापि नास्ति सम्भवः यदेकोऽर्थो नित्यश्च स्यादनित्यश्चेति । तस्मान्नित्यत्ववाचकस्य शास्त्रान्तरस्य भक्त्याऽर्थान्तरं परिकल्पयिष्यामः । तद्वदितरत्रापीति चेत् स्यान्मतम्—यथैव भवता नित्यानित्ययोरेकत्रासम्भवान्नित्यत्वस्य भक्त्या कल्पना कृता तथैवानित्यत्वस्यापि करिष्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? सर्वप्रमाणविरोधप्रसङ्गात् । विनाशे हि भक्त्या कल्प्यमाने सर्वप्रमाणविविरोधः प्रसज्येत । कथम् ? प्रत्यक्षविरोधस्तावत् संसारोपलम्भात् । अनुमानविरोधः अङ्गपरिमाणे सत्यङ्गिनो नित्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । शब्दविरोधः ते धूममभिसम्भवन्तीति वचनात् । न तु नित्यत्वे भक्त्या कल्प्यमाने दोषोऽयमुपपद्यते । तस्माद्विषमेतत् ।

If it is argued that it would involve self-contradiction in the statements of the scripture on account of prescribing both ? It may be like this. The same scripture has mentioned eternity and non-eternity. In the light of this, since self-contradictory statements occur in the scripture and since the acceptance of both of them (at a time) is impossible, there would arise the undesirable contingency of self-contradiction in the scripture.

That is not so.

Why ?

Because of postulation of some other meaning in case of impossibility. Wherever the valid scripture incites one for some impossible object, one postulates some other meaning instead. As is the case of the statements like, he drew out a hole in the soul;²⁵ ‘mind is thief,’²⁶

25. Soul is in corporeal and, hence, there is no possibility of making a hole in it.

26. Mind being incorporeal is incapable of seizing and consequently there is no possibility of its stealing something.

'speech tells lie'²⁷; etc. Similarly, in the present case also it is not possible that the same object may be eternal or non-eternal (at a time). Hence, through the secondary meaning we shall postulate some other meaning of the scriptural sentences which convey the eternity of the world.

If it is argued that the same argument may be raised with reference to the opposite case ? It may be like this. As you have postulated through secondary sense some other meaning for the statement denoting eternity on the ground that both—eternity and non-eternity are not possible at a single place, in the same way someone would postulate the same about non-eternity.

This is wrong.

Why ?

Because there would be the undesirable contingency of the contradiction (of the assertion) with all the other means of knowledge. If the non-destruction²⁸ is postulated through secondary sense, there would follow the contradiction with all the means of knowledge.

How ?

There would arise the contradiction with perception because the world is attained (again and again by the beings). There would be the contradiction with inference, for if the part is limited in magnitude, there is no possibility of the eternity of the whole. It would contradict the testimony of the verbal authority because it is stated that 'they are connected with smoke.' This defect does not arise if the eternity is postulated as metaphorical. Hence, it is a different case.

(Need of interpreting Śruti in secondary sense)

आह, कथमिदानीं भक्त्या कल्पयितव्यं शास्त्रमिति ?

Opponent : Why should the scripture be postulated in a secondary sense ?

27. Speech being insentient cannot decide to speak lie or truth.

28. The context demands the reading *avināṣe* instead of *vināṣe*.

उच्यते, प्रकृष्टार्थतया । यथा खल्वप्यमृतं वा मृतमतिजीवो मा ते हासिषुरसवः शरीरमित्यभिधीते । न च प्राणिनामत्यन्तायासवो जहति, किन्तर्हि प्रकृष्टं कालम् । एवमिहाप्युच्यते तरति मृत्युमिति । नात्यन्ताय मृत्युं तरति, किन्तर्हि प्रकृष्टं कालम् । उपचर्यते हि लोके प्रकृष्टे नित्यशब्दः । तद्यथा नित्यप्रहसितो नित्यप्रजल्पित इति । एवं सिद्धः क्षययोगः ।

Proponent : On account of excellence of meaning. As, when it is stated that 'let your vital airs, surpassing in mode of living, not leave the body—which may be mortal or immortal'. In this case, it is not that the vital airs do not leave the being for ever, but it does not leave for a long time. Similarly, it is stated... crosses the death. (Here) it is not that one crosses the death absolutely but crosses it for a long time. The word eternal is metaphorically used in the worldly behaviour in the sense of 'for a long time'; as in the sentences 'always laughing', and 'always talking'. Thus is established the association with decay'

(Surpassability in revealed means)

आह, अतिशययोग इदानीमस्य हेतोः कथमनुमातव्य इति ।

Opponent ; How is the association with surpassability inferred in the case of this means ?

उच्यते—अतिशययोगः क्रियाभ्यासात् । यत्र हि क्रिया सकृत् प्रवर्तते यत्र चासकृदावर्तते तत्रातिशयो दृष्टः । तद्यथा कृष्यादिषु । यज्ञे च द्रव्योपादानशक्त्यपेक्षा । क्वचित् सकृदेव प्रवृत्तिः, क्वचित् पुनःपुनरावृत्तिः । तस्मादतिशयेन भवितव्यम् । किं चान्यत् अङ्गातिशयात् । इहाङ्गानामतिशयादङ्गिनोऽपि घटादेरतिशयो दृष्टः । अस्ति चायं प्रतियज्ञमङ्गानां दक्षिणादीनामतिशयः ।

तस्मादत्राप्यतिशयेन भवितव्यम् ।

Proponent : *The association with surpassability is because of the repetition of activity.* Wherever the activity is practised once and also wherever it is repeated, the surpassability is observed there, as it is observed in case of ploughing, etc.²⁹ The sacrifice

29. If the land is ploughed more, it gives better crop.

also depends upon the power of acquiring the material used. Sometimes the action is practised once and sometimes it is repeated. Hence, there must be surpassability in case of sacrificial ritual. *Moreover, on account of the surpassability in the accessories.* The surpassability in the whole, i. e., a pot is observed to follow the surpassability of each of the parts. And, there is surpassability in the accessories of the sacrifice, like presents given to the brahmins. Therefore, surpassability should be in this case also.

देवताङ्गभावगमनात् क्षयातिशयानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्—अथापि स्यात्, यो हि यज्ञे द्रव्यमात्रस्य साधनभावमनुमन्यते तं प्रति क्षयातिशयदोषावपरिहायौ स्याताम् । वयन्तु द्रव्यसमवायिनीं देवतां कृतावङ्गभावमुपगच्छन्तीं विद्मः । तस्माददोषोऽयमिति । तच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? साध्यत्वात् । देवतानामपरिमितत्वं साध्यम् । तदङ्गभावगमनाच्च दोषाभावः । न चात्मक्रियाङ्गत्वमुदासीनत्वात् इति नः सिद्धान्तः । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । उपेत्य वा । क्रतुसमनुष्ठानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । यदि द्रव्यसमवायिनीं देवतामुपलभ्य तदङ्गभावगमनादक्षयो निरतिशयश्च हेतुरवाप्यते इतीष्टं वः, तेन तर्हि यद्वा तद्वा वेदोक्तं कर्म कृत्वा शक्योऽवाप्तुमर्थः । किं प्राणिविनाशहेतुभिः क्रतुभिः ? कथम् ? न हि किञ्चित्कर्म विद्यते यत्र शरीरस्याङ्गभावो न स्यात् । सर्वदेवतामयं च शरीरं यस्मादाह तस्माद्वै विद्वान्पुरुषमिदं ब्रह्मेति मन्यते । सर्वा ह्यस्मिन् देवताः शरीरेऽधि समाहिताः । तत्र यदुक्तं देवताङ्गभावगमनात् क्षयातिशयानुपपत्तिरित्येतदयुक्तम् । एवमयं हेतुस्त्रिदोषः । तेन यः फलविशेषोऽभिनिर्वर्त्यते सोऽपि तथाजातीयक इति शक्यमनुमातुम् । तस्मान्नास्य जिज्ञासोरत्र समाधिः ।

It may be argued that there can be no surpassability and decay in the accessories (of the sacrifice) because they have become the limbs of the deity (presiding over the sacrifice). This is like this. The defects of decay and surpassability are unavoidable for the one who admits the substance employed in the performance of sacrifice as the only means (of sacrifice). On the other hand, we consider the deity connected with the substance (employed in the sacrifice) as becoming the part of the sacrifice. Hence, it is faultless.

That is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is also to be proved. The unlimited magnitude of the deities is also to be proved. (Similarly, it is also to be proved that) there is no fault because of becoming the part of that. Moreover, our theory is that to become the part is not the activity of the soul because the soul is indifferent.³⁰ Therefore, it is wrong. Even after accepting your position we argue that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of uselessness of performance of a sacrifice. If your desired meaning is that we know the means as lacking in decay and surpassability because of its becoming the part of the deity connected with the substance (of sacrifice), it would be easy to attain the (desired) object by doing any act prescribed in the Veda; then, what is the use of sacrifice which is the cause of destruction of the living being ?

How ?

There is no act which does not have the body as its part. The body is possessed of all the deities because it is stated that 'by this reason only a knower (of reality) considers about the man as this only is the Brahman'. All the deities are placed in the body. The statement that because of becoming the part of the deity there is no possibility of decay and surpassability, is wrong. In this way, this (i.e. the Vedic) means involves three defects. It can be inferred from this that the result arising of it is also of the same nature. Therefore, there is no eagerness of the one desirous of knowing towards this means.

(Path of Knowledge is superior to the revealed means)

आह, यदि नायं श्रेयानिति कृत्वाऽस्य जिज्ञासोर्नात्र समाधिः तेन तर्हि यः श्रेयान् फलविशेषः स उपदेष्टव्य इति ।

30. Or the term *ātmā* may be interpreted as itself and the sentence will come to mean that the part is not the activity of its own.

Opponent : If the desire for alleviating misery is not satisfied because it is not superior (i.e., efficacious for highest good), the special result which is superior should be mentioned.

उच्यते—

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्

तदित्यनेन कर्मविधिनिष्पादितस्य स्वर्गप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य फलस्याभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्विपरीतः शुद्धोऽक्षयो निरतिशय इत्यर्थः । कोऽसावित्युच्यते मोक्षः श्रेयान् । एतदुक्तं भवति । उभावप्येतौ प्रशस्यौ स्वर्गपवर्गौ, आम्नायविहितत्वात् । मोक्षस्तु प्रशस्यतरः । कस्मात् ? यथोक्तदोषाऽनुपपत्तेः । स ह्यवश्यंभावित्वादैकान्तिकः । अतीन्द्रियत्वादसंवेद्यः । स्वात्मन्यवस्थित्वाल्लघुः सर्वत्र सन्निहितश्च । आम्नायस्तुतत्वात्प्रशस्तः । सद्भिरासेवितत्वादनन्दितः । यमनियमवैराग्यज्ञानाभ्युपायशुद्धेर्विशुद्धः । अद्रव्यत्वादक्षयो निरतिशयश्च ।

Proponent : THE ONE (I.E. RESULT) WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THAT IS SUPERIOR.

The pronoun 'that' refers to the result which is of the nature of attainment of heaven and is achieved through ritual. Contrary to that is that which is pure, undecaying and without surpassability. If it is asked what is that, the reply is that it is liberation which is superior.

The statement comes to mean this. Both of these heaven and liberation are good because both of these are prescribed in the scripture. But, liberation is better.³¹

How ?

Because of the impossibility of the above mentioned defects. That is invariable because it takes place invariably. It cannot be

31. Through such an interpretation the author tries in a way to alleviate the contradiction of Sāṃkhya with the Vedas, but he gives a more deadly blow to them by putting the Sāṃkhya means over and above the vedic means of alleviating misery.

noticed because it is beyond the senses.³² It is easy (i.e., accomplished with less means) because it is located in one's own soul and is near everywhere. It is good because it is eulogised in the scriptures. It is irreproachable because it is resorted to by the noble persons. It is pure for its means like social restraints, individual restraints, non-attachment and knowledge are pure. It is not decaying and surpassable for it is non-material.³³

(Knowledge forms the Path of Liberation)

आह, कथं पुनरयमपवर्गः प्राप्यत इति ?

Opponent : How is this liberation attained ?

उच्यते, संयोगाभावात् । दुःखं च प्रधानम् । तथा च तन्त्रान्तरेष्वप्युक्तम्—दुःखहेतुः कार्यकारणशक्तिरिति । तेन यदा पुरुषस्य संयोगस्तदाऽविशुद्धित्वमस्य । स्वशक्तिविशेषयोगात्तेषु तेषु जात्यन्तरपरिवर्तेषु धर्मादिनिमित्तसामर्थ्यादायासमनुभवति । यदा तु प्रधानसंयोगो विनिवर्तते तदा निमित्ताभावे नैमित्तकस्याप्यभाव इति कृत्वा न पुनर्द्वन्द्वान्यनुभवति ।

Proponent : Through lack of contact.³⁴ The cosmic matter itself is the misery. It is stated in the other philosophical treatises too—'the capacity of (becoming) cause and effect or attaining a body is the cause of misery'. When the sentient entity comes into its

32. This is mentioned as a contradiction to the nature of worldly enjoyments which are noticed by others. Similar is the case with the characteristics like easiness and omnipresence, etc. Cf. *Y.D.* 1.

33. It is because the material objects leading to surpassability and decay are not used here.

34. If the means of liberation or removal of pains is the lack of contact between conscious entity and cosmic matter, the cause of misery signified by the term *abhighāta* in the first *kārikā* should be interpreted as the contact.

contact, the former attains impurity. Due to the association of its own particular power it experiences miseries into various births on account of the capability of the causes like virtue, etc., which also transmigrate in various births. But, when the contact with the cosmic matter comes to an end, one does not experience the pairs of opposite because there is the absence of the effect in the absence of its cause.

आह, किमर्थः पुनरयं प्रधानस्य पुरुषेण सह संयोगः ?

Opponent : What is the purpose of this contact of the cosmic matter with the sentient entity ?

उच्यते, नैतदिहाभिधानीयम् । वक्ष्यत्ययमुरिष्ठादाचार्यः “पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः, कैवल्यार्थस्तथा प्रधानस्य । पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोग इति” (का० २१) ।

Proponent : It is not to be stated here. The authority will speak of it later on as —‘the contact of the two like that of the lame and the blind, is for the purpose of perception of cosmic matter by the sentient entity and for the purpose of the cosmic matter to isolate the sentient entity. Through this contact the evolution is brought about’ (k. 21).

आह, वियोगस्तर्हि कस्मान्निमित्ताद् भवतीति ?

Opponent : By what cause does the separation take place ?

उच्यते—

व्यक्ताऽव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥२॥

व्यक्तं चाव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः । तेषां विज्ञानं व्यक्ता-
व्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानं तस्मात् । बहुष्वनियमादल्पाचोऽपि ज्ञशब्दस्य न
पूर्वनिपातः । अथवा ज्ञानस्य साधकतमं व्यक्तम् । तत्पूर्वकत्वादव्यक्त-
समधिगमस्येत्यभिहितम् । यद्वा व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ते व्यक्ताव्यक्ते, ते
विज्ञानाति इति व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञः, तद्विज्ञानात् संयोगो निवर्तते । वक्ष्यति
चैतत्, “दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षत एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या” इति (का० ६६)।

Proponent : FROM THE DISCRIMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANIFEST, THE UNMANIFEST AND THE KNOWER.

The compound *vyaktāvyaktajñāḥ* denotes the manifest, and the unmanifest and the knower. The knowledge of them is denoted by the expression *vyaktāvyaktajñāṇam*. 'From that' is the meaning of the fifth case. The word 'jñā' though having minimum vowels, is not placed in the beginning of the compound since there is no such restriction in (the case of the compound having) many words.³⁵ Or, the manifest is the most efficient (cause) of knowledge; and because on the basis of the earlier knowledge of the manifest the unmanifest is known, it is stated so. Or, (an alternate) interpretation is that the manifest and the unmanifest are denoted by the term *vyaktāvyakte* and the compound *vyaktāvyaktajña* means the one who knows the two—manifest and the unmanifest. The contact (of the cosmic matter and the sentient entity) comes to an end through the knowledge of that (knower).³⁶ The author will speak of it as, 'thinking that (i.e. the cosmic matter) is seen by me, the one (i.e. the sentient entity) becomes indifferent and thinking that I have been seen, the other (i.e. the cosmic matter) desists from its activity' (k. 66).

तत्र रूपप्रवृत्तिफललक्षणं व्यक्तम् । रूपं पुनः महानहंकारः पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च महाभूतानि । सामान्यतः प्रवृत्ति-द्विविधा । हितकामप्रयोजना च, अहितप्रतिषेधप्रयोजना च । विशेषतः पञ्च

35. Grammar prescribes that the word containing minimum vowels should precede in a copulative (*dvandva*) compound. Hence, *jñā* should be placed first. But, the rule does not take place when the compound consists of many words.

36. The alternate interpretation is not happy as it does not correspond to the Sāṃkhya doctrine that liberation ensues from the knowledge of the twenty five categories. This interpretation would turn the knowledge of the rest of the categories secondary bringing Sāṃkhya position nearer to that of Vedānta.

कर्मयोनयो वृत्त्याद्याः प्राणाद्याश्च पञ्च वायवः । फलं द्विविधम् । दृष्टम-
दृष्टं च । तत्र दृष्टं सिद्धितुष्ट्यशक्तिविपर्ययलक्षणम् । अदृष्टं ब्रह्मादौ
स्तम्बपर्यन्ते संसारे शरीरप्रतिलम्भ इत्येतद् व्यक्तम् । एषां गुणानां
सत्त्वरजस्तमसामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनाद्विशेषगृहीतिः । यदा त्वङ्गभावम-
गच्छन्तो निर्लिखितविशेषा व्यवतिष्ठन्ते तदाऽव्यक्तमित्युच्यन्ते । चेतना-
शक्तिरूपत्वाच्चित्रं गुणवृत्तं जानातीति ज्ञः ।

Out of these, the manifest is characterised with (different) kinds, activities and results. The different kinds (of manifest) are intellect, egoism, five subtle elements, eleven senses and the five gross elements. The activity in general is of two kinds—the purpose of which is to desire for the beneficial, and the purpose of which is to ward off the harmful. Particularly speaking the activities are those relating to the five sources of activity, different activities of other things and the five vital airs like the vital airs, etc. The result is of two kinds—perceptible and non-perceptible. Out of these, the perceptible is characterised by attainment (of supernatural powers), contentment, disability and wrong knowledge. The imperceptible result is to obtain the body in the form of (the beings) from Brahmā down to the stuff of grass. This particular form is attained by those objects since the constituents of cosmic matter, sattva, rajas and tamas have attained the relation of principal and subordinate.³⁷ When these constituents of the cosmic matter remain without this particular form and do not stand in relation of principal and subordinate, they are termed unmanifest. The knower is called so since it knows the strange character of the constituents of cosmic matter on account of its being of the nature of the power of consciousness.

एषां त्रयाणां भेदमभेदं च विज्ञाय संयोगनिवृत्तिं लभते । कस्मात् ?
संयोगनिमित्तप्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतत्वाद्वियोगनिमित्तस्य । इह यदाऽदर्शननिमित्तः
प्रधानपुरुषोः संयोगः तस्मादस्य प्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतेन ज्ञानेन वियोगहेतुना
भवितव्यम् । को दृष्टान्तः ? तमः प्रकाशवत् । यथा तमसा
तिरोहितानि द्रव्याणि घटादीनि नोपलभ्यन्ते, तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्विभूतेन तु

37. This refers to the state of creation.

प्रदीपेन प्रकाशितानामेषामुपलब्धिर्भवति । तद्वदिहापि द्रष्टव्यमिति सिद्धं
ज्ञानान्मोक्षः । उक्तं च—

वृक्षाग्राच्छ्रुतयादो यद्वदनिच्छन्नरः पतत्येव ।

तद्वद् गुणपुरुषज्ञोऽनिच्छन्नपि केवली भवति ॥

किं चान्यत् । आम्नायाभिहितत्वात् । आम्नायनिबन्धनो ह्ययमर्थो
ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति, न यादृच्छिकः । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं
ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह
ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ।”

“यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन ॥”

“तमेव विदित्वाऽमृतत्वमेति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते ।” तथा
ब्राह्मणेऽप्युक्तम्—“तरति शोकमात्मवित् ।” “ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवतीति ।”
तस्मादाम्नायप्रामाण्यादपि मन्यामहे ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति ।

One attains (for himself) the cessation of the contact (between
the cosmic matter and the conscious entity) after knowing the
mutual similarity among the three.

Why ?

*Because the cause of separation is opposite in nature to the cause
of contact.* Here, when the contact of the cosmic matter and
the sentient entity is caused by non-perception (of the difference
stated above), the knowledge which is opposite to that is the cause
of the separation (of the cosmic matter and the sentient entity).

What is the example (in this context) ?

Like darkness and light. It is just as the objects like pot,
etc., when concealed in darkness are not perceived, they are
perceived when illumined by the light which is opposite to that
(darkness). In the present case also we should understand like this
only. Hence, it is established that liberation is attained through
knowledge. It is stated also ;

“Just as a man with his foot removed from the top of the tree certainly falls, even though unwillingly, similarly, the knower of the (difference between) the constituents of cosmic matter and the sentient entity becomes isolated, even though unwillingly.”

Moreover, because it is stated in the scriptures. The concept that liberation is attained through knowledge is rooted in the scriptures and is not stated at random.

How ?

It is stated :

“He who knows Brahman is the real, is the knowledge and is the infinite, is placed in the secret place of the heart and in the highest heaven (lit. sky) attains all desires along with Brahman, the intelligent.”³⁸

“Whence words return along with the mind, without attaining It, he who knows that bliss of Brahman, does not fear at any time.”³⁹

“Only by knowing him does one pass over death. There is no other way for going there.”⁴⁰

It is stated in the Brāhmaṇa⁴¹ also :

“One, who knows the soul, crosses over sorrow.” “One, who knows the Brahman, becomes Brahman itself.”⁴²

Therefore, on the authority of the scripture also we hold that liberation is attained through knowledge.

(Knowledge and Action)

आह, ज्ञानवाचिनोऽमृतत्वनिमित्ताऽभ्युपगमान्महत आम्नायान्त-
रस्यानर्थक्यम् । यदि ज्ञानवाचिन आम्नायखण्डकादमृतत्वमवाप्यत इत्येतद-

38. *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* 2.1

39. *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* 2.41

40. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.8

41. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 7.3.1

42. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.9

भ्युपगम्यते, तेन क्रियावाचिनो महत् आम्नायान्तरस्यानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् । किं कारणम् ? न ह्यनायासेनेष्टावाप्तौ सत्याम् आयासभूयिष्ठे कर्मणिः प्रवर्तमानः कृती भवतीति । आह च—

अक्के चेन्मधु बिन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।

इष्टस्यार्थस्य संप्राप्तौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ॥

Opponent : The acceptance of the belief that the portion prescribing knowledge is the cause of immortality with leads to (suppose) the futility of rest of the huge portion of the scripture. If it is held that the immortality is attained through the part of the scripture which prescribes knowledge, we arrive at the futility of a huge portion (of the scripture) which prescribes ritualistic activity.

For what reason ?

Because an agent does not proceed to the activity involving much effort if his desired object is attained through the easy means. It is stated also :

“When the desired object is attained, which wise man will make (further) effort. When a man can get honey on a clotropis gigantea plant, why should he go to the mountain ?”⁴³

उच्यते—यदि पुनः कर्माण्यत्यन्तकर्तव्यतयेष्यन्ते, ज्ञानवाचिन आम्नायस्य कथमर्थवत्ता सिद्धा भवति ?

Proponent : In reply we ask—if the activities are considered to be the final duty (i.e., a must), how can there be proved the meaningfulness of the part of the scripture prescribing knowledge ?

(Combination of Knowledge and Action)

आह, समुच्चये तूभयार्थवत्त्वम् । ज्ञानकर्मणोस्तु समुच्चयेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने द्वयोरप्याम्नायार्थवत्ता सिद्धा भवति । विद्वान् यजेत विद्वान्

याजयेदिति वचनात्, तथा सर्वपुरुषाणां क्रतावधिकारः अश्रोत्रियषष्टशूद्र-
वर्जमिति न्यायात् । तस्माज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयादिष्टप्रसिद्धिः ।

Opponent : *If combined, both of them will turn purposeful. If the combination of knowledge and action is accepted, the purposefulness of both the parts of scripture would be established, because it is prescribed that 'the knower should perform sacrifice', and 'the knower should make others perform sacrifice.'* All the persons have the right to perform sacrifice as it is established through the maxim that 'those who are not versed in the veda, an impotent, and a man of the fourth or the lowest of the four castes are prohibited (to perform sacrifice).' Hence, the fulfilment of the desired object through the combination of knowledge and action is a well known fact.

उच्यते—न, पूर्वदोषापरिहारात् । यदि नियमतो विदुषैव कर्माणि कर्तव्यानीत्यभ्युपगम्यते तेन यः पूर्वोक्तो दोषः संसाराभावप्रसङ्गः, तस्या-
परिहारः । किं च शास्त्रहानेश्च । यच्च शास्त्रमिष्टापूर्त्तं समुपास्यते ते
धूममभिसंभवन्तीति तदेतस्यां कल्पनायां हीयते । किं चान्यत्—भिन्न-
फलत्वात् । इहाभिन्नफलानि द्रव्याणि समुच्चीयन्ते । तद्यथा भुज्यङ्गानि
सूपादीनि । अभिन्नं तेषां तृप्तिलक्षणं फलमिति । न चैतज्ज्ञानकर्मणोर-
भिन्नं फलम् । स्वर्गपिवर्गहंतुत्वात् । ज्ञानसामर्थ्यात्कैवल्यमभिन्नं फल-
मिति चेत् पूर्वोणाविशेषः । यदुक्तं संसाराभावप्रसंग इति तदनपहृतमेव
भवति । किंचान्यत्—श्रूयमाणफलविरोधश्च । यच्च क्रियायाः फलं श्रूयते
अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामो, राष्ट्रमग्निष्टोमेन जयतीति तद्विरुध्यते ।
कर्मणश्च शेषभावः । स्वार्थोपसर्जनत्वे सत्यर्थान्तरनिष्पादकत्वात् ।
यथाऽवहन्तीत्येवमाद्याः क्रियाः स्वं फलमुपसर्जनीकृत्य तद्द्वारेण यजेरुप-
कुर्वन्त्यस्तच्छेषभूता भवन्ति एवं क्रियापि ज्ञानफलभूतत्वात्तच्छेषभूता
स्यात् ।

Proponent : *No, because it does not alleviate the defect mentioned above. If it is held as a rule that the actions should be performed by the knower only, it would not alleviate the*

defect arising of undesirable contingency of the absence of transmigration.⁴⁴ This defect would not be alleviated. *Moreover, because it would lead to abandon the scripture.* When it is said that those, who perform the sacrifices and the work of public good according to the scripture, are related to the smoke, the scripture is given up in your supposition. *Moreover, on account of leading to different results.* Here, the objects leading to the same result are combined together, for example the soup, etc., are the members of food. Their result in the form of satisfying someone is common to all (these members). But, the result of knowledge and of actions is not the same, because the one (the former) leads to liberation while the latter to heaven.

If it is argued that both lead to the same result in the form of liberation because of the capability of knowledge, the argument is not different from the one adduced earlier. The defect that it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the absence of transmigration remains unalleviated. *Moreover, it contradicts the result mentioned in the scripture itself.* It contradicts the result of actions mentioned in the scriptures as 'the desirous of heaven should perform Agnihotra,' and 'one wins over the nation through Agniṣṭoma sacrifice'.⁴⁵ *And the action becomes secondary.* It is because (in itself) it becomes secondary to its purpose and accomplishes some other object. As, for example, the act of threshing and the like become secondary to the act of sacrifice, turning their own result secondary and serving as a means to the

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44. If the actions are done and still the men are considered to be liberated, the actions would be considered as not leading to the fruits enjoyed, which would consequently mean the absence of transmigration.
45. When the results of actions are mentioned in the scripture itself, to say that they lead to knowledge will oppose them.

act of sacrifice. Similarly, the actions also would have been secondary on account of their leading to knowledge.⁴⁶

विधिसद्भावात् क्रियाप्राधान्यमिति चेन्न—उक्तत्वात् । कथमेतत् ? नास्ति विधिकृतो विशेषः । उपेत्य वा । तत्रापि तदुत्पत्तेः । अस्ति हि ज्ञानस्यापि विधायकं शास्त्रम् । कथम् ? एवं ह्याह—“य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजिघत्सो विपिपासो विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकः सन्न्यस्तसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स जिज्ञासितव्यः । सर्वाश्च कामानवाप्नोति य आत्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति” प्रजापतेर्वचनं श्रूयते । पुनरप्याह—“द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये परा चैवापरा च” या । तस्माद्विधिसद्भावात्क्रियाप्राधान्यमिति स्वपक्षानुरागमात्रमेतत् । दृष्टार्थत्वादित्येके ।

If it is argued that the action predominates because there is injunction, we reply, *no, because of the reason already given.*

How is it ?

There is no speciality for injunction only. Even accepting your argument (we argue), *because there also occurs the mention of the (knowledge).* There is the scriptural statement prescribing knowledge too.

How ?

It is stated “That Ātman which is free from evils, hunger, thirst, old age, death, sorrows and desire, that should be searched, that should be an object of the desire to know. He who knows the Ātman after discovering it, attains all the (objects of) desire.”⁴⁷ Thus are the scriptural statements of the Lord of the living beings (Prajāpati). Again it is stated

46. The acts of threshing and the like in the sacrifice yield the results which become secondary to that of the whole of the sacrifice and are, therefore, secondary. Similarly, the actions would also turn secondary leading to knowledge which in turn leads to liberation.

47. *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 8.7.

‘two kinds of knowledge is to be acquired—the higher as well as the lower.’⁴⁸ Therefore, it is only the (undue) attachment to your own thesis that the action dominates because there is the injunction.

दृष्टार्थत्वादित्येके एके पुनराचार्या मन्यन्ते दृष्टमेव ज्ञानस्याज्ञान-
निवृत्तिलक्षणं फलं तस्मान्न शास्त्रेण विधीयते । किं कारणम् ? दृष्टार्थस्य
हि कर्मणो न शास्त्रं प्रयोजकम् । स्वयमेवार्थितत्वात्तत्र प्रवृत्तेर्भुज्यादिवत् ।
तेषां ज्ञानविधायकानि वाक्यानि तान्युपायगुणविधानार्थमनुवादभूतान्या-
श्रीयन्ते । तद्यथा दध्ना जुहोति, पयसा जुहोतीति ।

Some hold (that the scripture does not prescribe knowledge (explicitly) because its purpose is known through perception. Some authorities hold that the result of knowledge in the form of removal of ignorance is known through perception; therefore, it is not prescribed (explicitly) in the scriptures.

What is the reason for it ?

The scripture does not incite someone to the act the result of which is apparent, because the person proceeds to it by himself, just as to the action of taking food since it is desired by oneself. The statements prescribing the knowledge are resorted to as restatement of them in order to prescribe the excellence of these means; for example, ‘he offers an oblation of curds,’ ‘he offers an oblation of milk.’

यत्तु खल्विदमुच्यते विद्वान्यजेत, विद्वान् याजयेत्, श्रोत्रियस्य च कर्मण्यधिकार इति तस्यायमर्थः—अधीत्य वेदं क्रियाऽनुपूर्वी च ज्ञात्वा कर्मणि प्रवर्तितव्यम् । एवं च सति न कश्चिद्दोषः । यदि पुनर्नियमत एवात्मविदां कर्मण्यधिकारस्तेन संसारप्रसंगः । स्वाभाविकत्वात् । विज्ञानस्य शास्त्रस्य सर्वाधिकारविरोधः । तस्मान्नास्ति समुच्चयो ज्ञान-कर्मणोः ।

The statements as 'the knower should perform sacrifice', 'the knower should incite others to perform sacrifice', and 'a learned in the Vedas is authorised to perform the acts', mean that one should proceed to act after studying the Veda and after knowing the orderly arrangement of the ritualistic acts. And, in this way, there is no fault. If it is understood that the knower of the soul is authorised to act as a rule, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of (continuation in the) world, because it is natural.⁴⁹ There is the opposition of the knowledge or the scripture (prescribing knowledge) to all these rights (to act). Therefore, there is no (possibility of the) combination of knowledge and action.

(View that actions are meant for everyone while knowledge for those debarred from action)

अपर आह—सत्यम् । नास्त्यनयोः समुच्चयः किन्तर्हि सर्वार्था क्रिया ज्ञानं प्रतिषिद्धार्थम् । ये हि षण्ढान्धवधिरादयः कर्मणोऽस्त्यन्तं निराकृतास्तेषां ज्ञानादाश्रमान्तरेऽमृतत्वावाप्तिः । इतरेषां तु मूलाश्रमे कर्मण एवेति तस्य नायं वादिनः परिहार इति ।

Other Opponent : (It is) true. There is no combination of these two. On the other hand, the action is meant for everyone while the knowledge is meant for those for whom the action is prohibited. The eunuch, blind, deaf, etc., who are completely debarred from actions, attain immortality through knowledge in the other stage of life. The others, however, get it in the very stage of life through actions only. Hence, it is not the alleviation of (the objection raised by) the opponent.

उच्यते—न, स्वसमयविरोधात् । एवं ब्रुवाणस्यास्य वादिनः स्वसमय एव विरुध्यते । यदुक्तम्—विद्वांसः प्रजां नाकामयन्त, किं प्रजया करिष्यामः ? अथ यदुक्तं पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च व्युत्थाय भैक्षचर्या

49. Here, we prefer the reading *Samsāraprasaṅgaḥ* as found in Poona manuscript against *samśārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* accepted by Pandeya.

चरन्तीति । न च षण्डानां पुत्रैषणाव्युत्थानमथवद् भवति, देवकृतत्वात् । किं चान्यत्—रहस्यभूतत्वात् । रहस्यभूतं हि वेदानां ज्ञानम् । यस्मादाह—तद्ध स्मैतदारुणिरौदालकिज्येष्ठाय पुत्राय प्रोवाच । इदं ज्येष्ठपुत्राय पिता ब्रह्म प्रब्रूयात् । प्रणाय्यायान्तेवासिने नान्यस्मै यस्मै कस्मैचन । य इमामद्भिः परिगृहीतां वसुना वसुमतीं पूर्णां दद्यादेतदेव ततो भूय इति ।

Proponent : No, because it contradicts (their) own theory. The opponent speaking like this contradicts his own theory. The statement “the knower (of truth) not desiring for progeny state ‘what will we do with progeny ?’ (will be contradicted). As regards the statement “after abandoning the desire for son and the desire for wealth (they) live on alms”, the act of abandoning the desire for son is not meaningful for the eunuch because it (the eunuch) is made so by the gods.⁵⁰ Moreover, because of its being secret. The knowledge expounded in the Vedas is secret. That is why it is stated “Uddālaka Āruṇi taught Brahman to the eldest son; the father may teach this Brahman to the eldest son, (a teacher) to a worthy disciple and not to anyone else; even if one offers him the whole of this (earth) encompassed by water and filled with treasure; this truly is greater than that.”⁵¹

(Praise of Path of knowledge)

भवति चात्र—

परं रहस्यं वेदानामवसानेषु पठ्यते ।
 षण्डाद्यर्थं तदिष्टं चेद्दिष्ट्या सफलता श्रुते ॥
 विद्वान् कर्माणि कुर्वीतेत्येतदुक्तं किल श्रुतौ ।
 स च षण्डादिरेवस्याद्योऽत्यन्तं कर्मणश्च्युतः ॥

50. The reading should be *ṣaṇḍānām* as against *paṇḍānām* accepted by Pandeya.

51. *Chāndogyopanṣad* 3.11.4-6

स एव वर्त्यतां प्राज्ञैः किं न्याय्योऽथ मतिभ्रमः ?
 इन्द्रियार्थानुरागो वा द्वेषो वा मोक्षवर्त्मनि ॥
 कैवल्यप्राप्तिहेतुत्वाद्या वेदविहिता स्तुतिः ।
 प्रशस्ता याज्ञवल्क्याद्यैर्विशिष्टैस्तत्त्वनिश्चयात् ॥
 सेयं विषयरಾಗान्धैर्विपरीतार्थवादिभिः ।
 विद्या कन्येव षण्डाय दीयमाना न शोभते ॥
 तस्माद्भागानुगैरुक्तां कुहेतुपृतनामिमाम् ।
 अपोह्य मतिमान्युवत्या ह्याश्रमादश्रमं व्रजेत् ॥

इति श्रीमदाचार्येश्वरकृष्णविरचितायां सांख्यसप्ततौ युक्तिदीपिका-
 नाम्नि विवरणे प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

In this case it is stated :

The highest secret of the Vedas is read at their end (i.e., in the Upaniṣads). If that is intended to be meant for knowledge, fortunately the scripture becomes successful. Of course it is stated in the scripture that a knower should perform the act; one who is completely devoid of actions would be the first amongst the wise; that (way of action) should be followed by the wise; (but) is it right or merely the confusion of intellect? (It is in fact) an attachment to the objects of the senses or hatred towards the way of liberation.

The eulogy of knowledge occurring in the Vedas due to its being the means of attaining isolation is praised (as preferable) by the great men like Yājñavalkya, etc., through deciding the exact nature of the objects.

That knowledge does not look well with (i.e., when acquired by) the men who are as if blind by the attachment towards the objects and are putting forth the wrong

theories, just as it does not look well if a girl is handed over (married) to an eunuch.⁵²

Therefore, setting aside the battle of putting forth bad (i.e., invalid) reasoning put forth by those rejoicing the attachment towards the objects, the intelligent person having taken recourse to reasoning should go to the other state of life (renunciation) from one state of life (house holder).

Here ends the first discourse of the commentary

Yuktidīpikā by name on the Sāṃkhya-

saptati composed by the

illustrious preceptor

Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

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52. The purpose of knowledge is twofold; leading to detachment forming a way to liberation and to know the objects as they are. If a person does not want these two results, the knowledge becomes useless for him. It is indeed just like marrying a daughter to an eunuch.

KĀRIKĀ 3

(Sections of knowledge of Categories)

आह—सम्यगुपदिष्टं भवता व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्षोऽवाप्यते ।
इदानीमुपदेष्टव्यम् कथमेतत्त्रयं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति ।

Opponent : You have rightly advised that the liberation is attained through the discriminative knowledge of manifest, unmanifest and the knower. Now, you should tell how this triad should be known.

उच्यते—त्रयस्यास्य प्रतिपत्तिं द्वेधा समामनन्ति । समासतो विस्तर-
तश्च । तदेव त्रयं पञ्चभिरधिकरणैर्भिद्यते । कानि पुनरधिकरणानीति ?
उच्यते—प्रकृतिविकारवृत्तं, कार्यकारणवृत्तं, अतिशयानतिशयवृत्तं, निमित्त-
नैमित्तिकवृत्तं, विषयविषयिवृत्तमिति । तत्र प्रकृतिविकारवृत्तपूर्वकत्वा-
दितरेषामधिकरणानां तद्भेदान्वक्ष्यामः । तत्पुनश्चतुर्धा भिद्यते । किं-
चित्कारणमेव न कार्यम् । किञ्चित्कारणं च कार्यं च । किञ्चित्कार्यमेव न
कारणम् । किञ्चिन्नैव कारणं न चापि कार्यमिति ।

Proponent : The knowledge of this triad is traditionally stated to be of two kinds—briefly and in detail. This triad is divided into five sections.

What are those sections ?

(i) The character of original and its modification, (ii) the character of cause and effect, (iii) the character of surpassing and the surpassed, (iv) the character of the indicator and the indicated, and (v) the character of the object and the being who uses it. We shall speak of the character of the original and its modification since all of the rest depend upon it and form the different aspects of that only. That (triad) is again divided into four. Someone is cause

only and not the effect, someone is both—the cause as well as the effect, someone is the effect only and not the cause, and someone is neither the cause nor the effect.

(Original cause)

आह—अतिसामान्योपदिष्टमेतन्नास्माकं बुद्धाववतिष्ठते । तस्माद्विभज्योपदिश्यतां कस्य पदार्थस्य किं वृत्तमिति ?

Opponent : That you have taught to us is too general and, hence, is beyond our comprehension. Therefore, tell us categorically what is the character of which substance.

उच्यते-बाहम् । उपदिश्यते —

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः

मूलमाधारः प्रतिष्ठेत्यनर्थान्तरम् । प्रकरोतीति । प्रकृतिः । मूलं चासौ प्रकृतिर्मूलप्रकृतिः । मूलप्रकृतिः कस्य मूलम् ? महदादीनाम् । संज्ञा खल्वियं प्रधानस्य मूलप्रकृतिरिति । सा चाविकृतिरविकाराऽनुत्पाद्येत्यर्थः ।

Proponent : All right. Here is the mention (categorically) :

THE COSMIC MATTER, THE ROOT OF ALL, IS NOT A PRODUCT.

The words root (mūlam), support (ādhāra) and the resting place (pratiṣṭhā) are synonymous¹. The cosmic matter (prakṛti) is that which produces variously (prakaroti). That which is the root and the cosmic matter is the root cosmic matter.

Whose root is this cosmic matter ?

Of the great principle and the rest. The term root cosmic matter is a name of cosmic matter (pradhāna). That is not a product. The meaning is that it is not modified or product,

(Compound in mūlaprakṛti)

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1. Through the synonyms the author suggests that the cosmic matter is the starting place of all evolutes at the time of creation as also their resting place at the time of dissolution.

आह—समासाऽनुपपत्तिः विशेषणान्तरोपादानात् । मूलमित्ययं शब्दः प्रकृतिविशेषणार्थमुपात्तो महदादिविशेषणान्तरमुपादत्ते । तत्र सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्नेति समासप्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति । समासान्तरविधानाद-
दोष इति चेत्स्यान्मतम्-यद्येतस्मिन् समासे दोषोऽयमुपपद्यते समासान्तर-
मत्र विधास्यते मूलं प्रकृतीनां मूलप्रकृतिरिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् ।
कस्मात् ? दोषान्तरोपपत्तेः । एवमप्युपसर्जनं पूर्वं निपततीति षष्ठ्योक्त-
स्योपसर्जनत्वात्पूर्वनिपातः । तत्रैवं भवितव्यम् मूलं प्रकृतीनां प्रकृतिमूल-
मिति । तस्मादिदमप्यसारमिति ।

Opponent : There is no possibility of a compound (in the term *mūla-prakṛti*) because it contains another adjective. The term root (*mūla*) is employed as an adjective of the cosmic matter but it includes another adjective, viz., the great principle, etc.² A complex formation is not possible in the case of the words having adjective.³ Hence, there is prohibition of compound (in the present case).

If it is argued that the defect can be alleviated by the provision of some other kind of compound ? It may be like this. If the above mentioned defect arises in the case of this compound, it may be compound in some other kind of compound; 'the root cosmic matter' is 'the root of the causes.'⁴

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of the possibility of other defect. Here, by the rule that the secondary member (*upasarjana*) is placed first in a compound,⁵ the term with the sixth case affix should be placed first

2. It would be *mūlam mahadādīnām prakṛtiḥ* or *mahadādīnām prakṛtiḥ*.
3. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.2.1
4. The sense is if *karmadhārya* compound is not possible, it would be *tatpuruṣa* as *prakṛtīnām mūlam*.
5. Pāṇini 2.2.30. Thus the resulting word would be *prakṛtimūlam* and not the *mūlaprakṛti*.

in the compound because of its being the secondary member of the compound. Hence, the form should be *prakṛtimūlam* (the root of the causes). Therefore, this solution is also weak.

उच्यते—पूर्वं एव समासोऽस्तु, सम्बन्धिशब्दः सापेक्षो नित्यं वृत्तौ समस्यते । यत्तूक्तं विशेषणान्तरोपादानात्समासानुपपत्तिरिति—तत्र ब्रूमः सम्बन्धिशब्दानां सम्बन्ध्यन्तरमनपेक्ष्य स्वरूपप्रतिलम्भ एव नास्तीत्याकांक्षावतामेव वृत्त्या भवितव्यम् । तद्यथा देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलमिति सम्बन्धिशब्दत्वाद्देवदत्तशब्दमपेक्षमाणोऽपि गुरुशब्दः कुलशब्देन सह वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यते । एवमिहापि मूलमित्ययं शब्दः सम्बन्धिशब्दत्वान्महदाद्यपेक्षोऽपि प्रकृतिशब्देन सह वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यत इति । किञ्चान्यत् वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य वृत्तावुपलब्धेः । यत्र हि वाक्यप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थो वृत्त्या न लभ्यते यथा ऋद्धस्य राज्ञः पुरुष इति तत्र सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्नेति व्यवस्थितं शास्त्रे । गम्यते चेह वाक्यप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थो वृत्तावपि सत्याम् । तस्माददोषोऽयमिति । किं च ज्ञापकात् । ज्ञापकं खल्वपि “कर्मवत्कर्मणा तुल्यक्रियः” । तथा “अकारस्य विवृतोपदेश” इत्यादि । तस्मान्नात्रासूया कर्तव्येति ।

Proponent : Let the form of the compound mentioned earlier 'be accepted. The related word is always needed and is also compounded in a complex formation. With reference to your statement that there is no possibility of compound because of the intervention by some other adjective, we reply that the inter-related do not attain (i.e. are not used in) their natural form without the other relata. In view of this, only the word which requires some other word for the completion of the sense forms the complex formation (*vr̥tti*). For example, in the expression like *Devadattasya gurukulam* (the clan of the teacher of Devadatta), the word *guru* (teacher) though requiring the word *Devadatta* for the completion of the sense, because of being a related word, is compounded (lit. attains the complex formation) with the word *kulam* (clan). Similarly,

in the present case also the term *mūla* (root) is compounded with the word *prakṛti* (cosmic matter), though it requires the *mahat* (intellect), etc. for the completion of the sense because of its relation with them.⁷ Moreover, because the sense conveyed by a sentence is found in the complex formation. It is established in the scripture that there is no complex formation in the case of words having adjectives attached to them where the sense conveyed by the sentence is not found in the complex formations⁸ as in the expression *īddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. In the present case, however, the sense conveyed by the sentence is known even after the formation of the compound (lit. complex formation). Therefore, it is faultless. Moreover, because there are the usages indicating this formation. For example, take the indicative usage 'the agent connected with the action similar to the object is treated as an object.'⁹ and 'teaching of *a* is the open sound'¹⁰, etc. Therefore, there should be no discontment over this issue.

आह—अवयवस्य प्रत्यवमशानुपपत्तिः संज्ञाशब्दत्वात् । संज्ञाशब्देषु हि नावयवस्य परामर्शो भवति । तद्यथा गजकर्णोऽश्वकर्णः । कस्य गजस्य कस्याश्वस्येति ।

Opponent : There is no propriety in reflecting upon the components (of the term) because of its being a name. No thought is given to the components in case of a word denoting a name. For example, the expression *gajakarṇaḥ* (having ears like an elephant), *aśvakarṇaḥ* (having ears like a horse).¹¹ Of which elephant and of which horse (is not asked in this case).

7. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.1.1

8. *Ibid.*

9. Pāṇini 3.1.87. In the sentence '*karmanā*' is the adjective added to the complex formation *tulyakriyāḥ*.

10. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.2. Here *akārasya* is the adjective of the complex formation *vivartopadeśaḥ*.

11. Even a name may be derivative, still there is no point in considering the meaning of the parts.

उच्यते न, अर्थोपपत्तेः । यत्र ह्यर्थ उपपद्यते भवत्येव तत्र संज्ञा-
शब्देष्वयवपरामर्शः । तद्यथा सप्तपर्णान्यस्य पर्वणि पर्वणि, अष्टौ पदान्यस्य
पङ्क्तौ पङ्क्तौ सप्तपर्णोऽष्टापदमिति । उपपद्यते चेहायमर्थः, तस्माद-
दोषोऽयम् ।

Proponent : *No, because of the possibility of meaning.* There is the
reflecting over the components of a name where there is the
possibility of meaning. For example, the expressions *sapta-*
parṇaḥ (having seven leaves) and *aṣṭapadam* (where there is
the group of eight steps) mean respectively as in every joint of
which there are seven leaves, and in whose case there are
eight steps in a (straight) line.¹² In the present case also this
meaning is possible. Therefore, it is faultless.

(Analysis of the term *mūlaprakṛti*)

आह—मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः, प्रकृतिरिति वक्तव्यम् । यदाह मह-
दाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तेति ।

Opponent : The statement should be *mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtiḥ Prakṛtiḥ*
(i. e. the final cause is that which is the root cosmic matter
and uncaused)¹³ because you have stated that the seven—
intellect, etc., are cause as well as effect.

उच्यते—प्रकृतित्वावचनम् । प्रकृतित्वं च मूलप्रकृतेर्न वक्तव्यम् ।
किं कारणम् ? अर्थादापत्तेः । मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरित्येव सिद्धम् । उच्यमानं
हि तदनर्थकं स्यात् ।

Proponent : The additional term *prakṛti* (suggested by you) should
not be mentioned. The state of being the cause should not be
mentioned with reference to the root cosmic matter.

What is the reason for it ?

-
12. Even though it may be conventional, still there is a possibility
of the sense of the components. In short, it is a case of *yoga-*
rūḍhi in which the derivative meaning may also be considered
with the conventional meaning.
 13. Because the whole expression is the definition of *prakṛti*, the
term defined should also be mentioned.

Because it is implied in its meaning itself. It is established through the statement 'the root cosmic matter is uncaused only'. If it is stated again, it would carry no sense.

(Theory of satkārya does not contradict it)

आह—प्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । सत्कार्यवादाभ्युपगमात् । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः, तद्भावः प्रकृतित्वम् । तच्च सति कार्ये न घटते । कस्मात् ? न हि सतामात्मादीनां कारणमुपपद्यते इति ।

Opponent : The state of being the cause (of everything in the case of cosmic matter) is improper because of the acceptance of the existence of the effect in the cause. The cosmic matter is that which variously produces and the state of being so is the state of the cosmic matter. It does not hold good if the effect already exists.

Why ?

Because there is no possibility of cause of the existent entity like the soul.

उच्यते—तदितरत्रापि तुल्यम् । यथैव हि सतामात्मादीनां कारणं नोपपन्नमेवमसतां शशविषाणादीनामपीति नास्ति कश्चिद्विशेषः । तृतीया तु विषादावत्यैव कोटिः । एवमुभयपक्षव्युदासात्स्वपक्षसिद्धिरिति चेत् अथापि स्यात्—सदसतोः क्रियासम्बन्धं प्रत्यविशेष उपदर्श्यते भवता । तेनोभयोरपि पक्षयोर्व्युदासः कृतो भवति । न चोभयपक्षव्युदासात्स्वपक्षसिद्धिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? उत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधात् । स खल्वेषवादी सत्कार्यवादं प्रत्याचष्टे तस्मात्स्वक एवैनमधिकारे निवर्तयिष्यामः ।

Proponent : Same is the case with the opposite (of it). As there is no possibility of cause of the existent entities like the soul, etc., similarly there is no possibility of cause of non-existent objects like horns of a hare etc., also¹⁴. Thus, there is no speciality in this argument. The third alternative is that of indifference itself.¹⁵

14. The object which did not exist earlier in the cause cannot be brought into existence. Cf. *kārikā* 9.
15. The causal relation can be explained in terms of prior existence or non-existence of effect in the cause. There is no third possibility.

If it is argued that your thesis is proved because both of these are rejected ? It may be like this. You showed that there is no speciality in the case of relation of the existent and the non-existent object with the action. This leads to the rejection of both the theses. Your own thesis, however, is not proved through the rejection of both the theses.

This is also wrong.

How ?

Because the latter (viz., theory of non-existence of the effect in the cause) is rejected. This opponent indeed rejects the theory of pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Therefore, we shall contradict the opponent in his own jurisdiction,¹⁶

(Mention of avikṛti)

आह - अविकृत्यभिधानानर्थक्यम् । मूलप्रकृतित्वात्तत्सिद्धेः । यदि मूलं सर्वासां प्रकृतीनाम् अविकृत्यैव तया भवितव्यम् । इतरथा हि मूल-प्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । यदि खल्वपि प्रधानस्यापि प्रकृत्यन्तरं स्यान्मूल-प्रकृतित्वं नोपपन्नं भवेत् । तस्मान्मूलप्रकृतित्ववचनादेव तत्सिद्धेरविकृति-ग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

Opponent : The mention of the word avikṛti (uncaused) is useless, because it is established through (mention of) 'the root cause'. If it is the root cause of all the other causes, it should invariably be uncaused. Otherwise its nature of being the root cause will not be justified. If there would have been some other cause of the cosmic matter also, its nature of being the root cause would not have been justified. Therefore, that (i.e., its causelessness) being established through the mention of its nature of being the root cause, the use of the term avikṛti (uncaused) is meaningless.

उच्यते—न । अनवस्थाप्रसंगनिवृत्त्यर्थत्वात् । यथा हि मूलादीनां बीजं प्रकृतिस्तस्याप्यन्यत्तस्याप्यन्यदित्यनवस्था एवं महदादीनां प्रधानं

16. The theory of non-existence of effect in the cause will be refuted later on at its proper place.

मूलप्रकृतिः तस्याप्यन्यदित्यनवस्था प्रसज्येत । सा मा भूदित्यतस्तन्नि-
वृत्त्यर्थं तदभिधानम् ।

Proponent : No, because it is meant for avoiding the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. As the seed is the cause of root, etc., it would result into the infinite regress if we postulate some other cause for the seed and then some other cause for that cause and so on. Similarly, the cosmic matter is the root cause of the intellect etc., and there would be undesirable contingency of infinite regress in postulating some other cause for that also. For the purpose that that (infinite regress) should not take place there is the mention of that (avikṛti) to avoid it.¹⁷

आह. न । हेत्वनुपदेशात् । असंशयमेतदेवं स्यात्, न तु हेतुरत्रोप-
दिष्टो भवद्भिः । न चानुपदिष्टहेतुकं विपश्चिद्भिः प्रतिपत्तुं न्याय्यम् ।
तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

Opponent : No, because there is no mention of the reason (to prove the uncaused nature). It would have undoubtedly been so. You have (however) not given the reason. And, it is not right for the scholars to understand (or to accept) something the reason for which is not given. Therefore, it is wrong.

उच्यते, कारणान्तरप्रतिषेधात् । पुरुषाकर्तृत्वात्प्रधानाख्यानां
गुणानां चावस्थान्तरानुपपत्तेरविकृतित्वसिद्धिः । इहाराभ्यमाणा प्रकृतिः
कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिराभ्यते, पुरुषेण वा, गुणैर्वा । किञ्चातः ? तन्न
तावत्कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिरारभ्यते । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात् । यथा
कारणान्तराणि न सन्ति तथोत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधः करिष्यते । इदानीं सत्त्वं
रजस्तमः पुरुष इति पदार्थचतुष्टयं प्रतिज्ञायते । तत्रापि पुरुषकर्तृत्वं
प्रत्याख्यायते । तस्मिन्प्रत्याख्याते गुणानामेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षः कार्यकारण-
भावः । सूक्ष्माणां मूर्तिलाभः कार्यम् । निवृत्तविशेषाणामविभागात्मनाव-

17. Sometimes it is observed that the cause of so many things is also caused. Hence, to word off the possibility of being caused in case of prakṛti the further expression 'avikṛti' is necessary.

स्थानं कारणमित्ययं सिद्धान्तः । तत्रास्तङ्गतविशेषाणां निवृत्तपरिणाम-
व्यापाराणामङ्गाङ्गिभावमनुपगच्छतामुपसंहृतशक्तीनां सर्वविकारसाम्यं
सर्वशक्तिप्रलयं निस्सत्तासत्तं निस्सदसदव्यक्तलक्षणमवस्थान्तरमुप-
संप्राप्तानां नास्त्यन्यत्सूक्ष्मतरमवस्थान्तरम्, यस्येदं प्रधानलक्षणमवस्था-
न्तरम् कार्यं स्यात् । तस्मात्सुष्टूच्यते मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरिति ।

Proponent : *Because there is the rejection of other causes.* The state of its being uncaused is established through the fact that the sentient entity is inactive and it is not proper to accept some other state of the constituents of cosmic matter as the cosmic matter itself.¹⁸ The activity of the cosmic matter may be caused by some causes like God (Īśvara) or by the sentient entity or by the constituents of the cosmic matter.

What does it prove ?

That the cosmic matter, however, is not activated by some other cause like God (Īśvara).

Why ?

Because of rejection. So as to demonstrate that there are no other causes, the rejection will be done latter on. Now (in the state of dissolution) we admit the four (objects), viz., Sattva, rajas, tamas and the sentient entity. Out of those also the activity with reference to the sentient entity is rejected. That (activity of the sentient entity) being rejected, causality depends upon the (acquisition of) other states by the constituents of the cosmic matter only. The effect is the attainment of some (gross) form by (these) subtle (principles). The established view is that the (ultimate) cause is the state of the constituents of the cosmic matter in their own form without particularity (in modification) and without their division (i. e. intermixture into unequal proportion). In case of the constituents of cosmic

18. I. e. the constituents do not merge into something else in the state of dissolution so that that state could be caused again.

matter which have attained another state, there is no other more subtle state of the three constituents of the cosmic matter than the one in which the particularity (found in the evolutes) disappears, which have desisted from the activity leading to their modification, which do not attain the state of subordinate and the principle, who have withdrawn their power (of transformation), and who have attained the other state which is the state of equilibrium of all the modifications, the dissolution of all their powers, devoid of the existence and the non-existence, which cannot be called sat (existent) and asat (non-existent) and which is unmanifest—of which the cosmic matter may be considered as an effect in the form of some other state.¹⁹ Therefore, it is rightly stated that the cosmic matter which is the root is uncaused.

(Cause and Modifications)

महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सन्त ।

महानाद्यो यासां ता महदाद्याः । अवयवेन विग्रहः, समुदायः समासार्थः । अन्यथा महानेवात्रापरिगृहीतः स्यात् । प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च प्रकृति विकृतयः । कारणानि कार्याणि चेत्यर्थः । तत्र महानहंकारस्य प्रकृतिः प्रधानस्य विकृतिः । अहंकारोऽपि तन्मात्रेन्द्रियपर्वणोः प्रकृतिविकृतिर्महतः । तन्मात्राणि च भूतपर्वणः प्रकृतिरहंकारस्य विकृतिः ।

THE SEVEN STARTING WITH THE INTELLECT ARE
BOTH—CAUSE AND MODIFICATION.

The intellect, etc., denote the principles of whom the intellect is the first. The mention through the components is to dissolve (the compound) and the mention through collection (of them) is to form a compound. Otherwise, the intellect would not have been accepted. The term cause and modifications (prakṛti-vikṛtayah) is dissolved as both—cause and modifications. The sense is that they are both the causes and the effects. There (in these), the

19. The *Yogabhāṣya* (2.19) also says that it is the final form in which everything is merged, implying that there is no further merging point.

intellect is the cause of the principle of egoism and the modification of cosmic matter. The principle of egoism is the cause of the state of the subtle elements as well as the organs of sense and action, and is the modification of the intellect. The subtle elements also are the cause of the state of the gross elements and the modification of the principle of egoism.

(Purpose of the term seven)

आह—सप्तग्रहणं किमर्थम् ?

Opponent : What is the purpose of using the term seven ?

उच्यते—सप्तग्रहणमवधिपरिच्छेदार्थम् । अक्रियमाणे हि सप्तग्रहणे न ज्ञायते क्रियान्प्रकृतिगणः प्रकृतिविकृतिसंज्ञो भवति । तत्र महाभूतेन्द्रिय-पर्वणोरपि प्रकृतित्वं प्रसज्येत ।

Proponent : *The term seven is used to limit the scope.* Without mentioning the term seven, it is not known as to the group of how many causes is termed both the cause and effect. There would have been the undesirable contingency of considering the state of the gross elements and that of the organs of sense and action also as the cause.²⁰

आह—नैतदस्ति प्रयोजनम् । परिशेषसिद्धेः । इह भवतां पञ्च-शिखानां पञ्चविंशतिस्तत्त्वानि । तत्र मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिरित्युक्तम्, षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुष इति वक्ष्यति । परिशेषतः सप्तैवावशिष्यन्ते । तस्मान्नार्थस्तदर्थेन सप्तग्रहणेन ।

Opponent : It is not the purpose because this is established by way of elimination. There are twenty five categories accepted by you, the followers of Pañcaśikha.²¹ Out of these it is

20. Because all those are in a sense productive of some other element.

21. The importance of the mention of the name of Pañcaśikha in this context is not clear as it may be inferred that the authorities preceding Pañcaśikha also believed in twenty five elements. It may only suggest that among various authorities preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa some may not be accepting all the categories, e.g., it is mentioned later on that Patañjali did not believe in the existence of egoism.

stated that the root cosmic matter is uncaused. The author will state later on that the sixteen are 'the products only and the sentient entity is neither the cause nor the modification. By way of elimination only seven remain. Hence, there is no use of the mention of the term seven for that purpose.

उच्यते—अहंकारपरिग्रहार्थम् । एवं तर्हि नैवाहंकारो विद्यत इति पतञ्जलिः । महतोऽस्मिप्रत्ययरूपत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तत्परिहारार्थमेतद् भविष्यति ।

Proponent : (It is) for the purpose of adopting the principle of egoism (as a separate category). According to Patañjali, there is no principle of egoism (as a separate category), because he holds that the principle of egoism is the sense of 'I' and 'mine' in the intellect itself. It (the mention of seven) is to avoid this sort of opinion.

आह, न । उत्तरत्र परिग्रहात् । एतदपि नास्ति प्रयोजनम् । वक्ष्यति हि महता कण्ठेनोपरिष्ठादाचार्यः “प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कार” (का० २२) इति तेनैवेदं सिद्धम् । नार्थस्तदर्थेनापि सप्तग्रहणेन ।

Opponent : It is not so because it (the principle of egoism) is adopted later on. Hence, this is also not the purpose of (the mention of the term seven). The teacher will speak later on with loud voice—“from the cosmic matter issues the intellect and from that the principle of egoism” (kā. 22). It is established through that only. The term seven is meaningless for that purpose also.

उच्यते—रूपभेदेऽपि तत्त्वाभेदज्ञापनार्थम् । एवं तर्हि धर्मादीन्यष्टौ रूपाणि बुद्धेर्वक्ष्यमाणानि, अहंकारश्च वैकारिकतैजसभूतादिरूपत्वात् त्रिलक्षणो वक्ष्यमाणः । तत्र रूपभेदात्तत्त्वभेदो मा भूदित्येवमर्थं सप्तग्रहणं क्रियते ।

Proponent : This (mention of seven) is to suggest that the principle is not divided even though it possesses different forms. In this way, there are eight forms of intellect which will be mentioned later on. The principle of egoism is also of

three forms, viz., vaikārika (sattva dominating), bhūtādi (tamas dominating) and taijas (rajas dominating) which will be mentioned later on. The term seven is mentioned so that there should be considered no division in the substance due to division into form.

आह, हेतुमन्तरेणाप्रतिपत्तेः । कण्ठोक्तमपि युक्तिमन्तरेण न तर्क-
शीलाः प्रतिपद्यन्ते किम्पुनः लेशोपपादितम् । तस्मादत्र समाधिर्वाच्यः
कथमनेकरूपा बुद्धिरेकैवेति ?

Opponent : It is not ascertained without a reason. Those who are habituated to reasoning do not believe even in an object explicitly declared without reasoning, not to speak of an object touched casually.²² Therefore, you should supply the solution how the intellect possessed of many forms is one only.

उच्यते न, उत्तरत्र विचारणात् । उत्तरत्रैतद्विचारयिष्यामः किमनेक-
रूपाविभवेऽपि तदेव तद्वस्तु भवति आहोस्विद्रूपभेदात्तत्त्वभेदः ? तस्मादिह
तावद् दृश्यतामिति सिद्धं महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सन्तेति ।

Proponent : No, because the problem is considered later on. We shall consider it later on whether inspite of manifesting several forms the object is the same or there is difference in the object due to the division of forms. Therefore, at present you should regard (the reason) as such and it is established that the seven, viz., intellect and the rest are both—cause as well as modification.

(Only Modifications)

षोडशकस्तु विकारः

षोडशपरिमाणमस्य सोऽयं षोडशकः संघः । तस्य परिमाणं संख्यायाः
संज्ञासंघसूत्राध्ययनेष्विति कन्प्रत्ययः ।

22. We have preferred *Chakravarti's* reading *leśopapāditam* to *Pandeya's* reading *kleśopapāditam*, because the earlier fits in the flow of the argument.

THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN IS ONLY THE (UNPRODUCTIVE) MODIFICATION

This group of sixteen consists of the objects sixteen in number. The suffix *kan* is used after a word denoting a numeral in the sense of 'this is its measurement', when the word so formed means a name, a magnitude, a book or a fixed way and mode of study.²³

आह—कः पुनरयं षोडशक इति ?

Opponent : What forms the group of sixteen ?

उच्यते—पञ्च महाभूतानि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि ।

Proponent : (These are) five gross elements and eleven organs.

(Use of the term *tu*)

तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः

The term *tu* is for restriction.

आह—श्वयः पुनरयमर्थोऽन्तरेणापि तुशब्दमवाप्तुम् । कथम् ? महदाद्या प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तेति ह्युपदिष्टं पुरस्तात् । ततोऽहङ्कारतन्मात्रपूर्वकत्वे सिद्धे सति इन्द्रियमहाभूतपर्वणोः पुनः श्रुतेर्नियमो भविष्यति । तद्यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इत्यत्र क्षुत्प्रतीकारसमर्थानां द्रव्याणामर्थादेव सर्वेषां भक्षणे सम्प्राप्ते पुनः श्रुतेर्नियमो भवति, तद्वदिदं द्रष्टव्यम् । इष्टतोऽवधारणार्थं इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । इष्टतोऽवधारणार्थस्तर्हि तुशब्दो भविष्यति । कथं नाम षोडशको विकार एवेति यथा विज्ञायते, षोडशकस्तु विकार इत्येवं मा ज्ञायीति । यद्येवमस्थाने तर्हि तुशब्दः पठितः । षोडशको विकारस्त्विति वक्तव्यम् । अथ मतं वृत्तपरिपूरणार्थमयमस्मिन्प्रदेशे पठितस्तुशब्दो यत्र निर्दोषस्तत्रैवायं द्रष्टव्य इति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? असन्देहात् । महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तेत्यपदिष्टे किमिति सांशयिका भविष्यामः । तस्मात्पेलवमस्य पाठे प्रयोजनं पश्यामः । अथायमभिप्रायः स्यात् यद्यप्येतदर्थतः सिद्धं तथाप्ययमाचार्यः स्फुटप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमवधारणं प्रत्याद्रियते । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात् विचित्राः सूत्रकाराणामभिप्रायगतयः । तद्यथा भगवान् पाणिनिः न क्ये, रात्सस्येत्येवमादिष्वन्तरेण

प्रयत्नमिष्टतोऽवधारणे सिद्धे अन्यत्र अजादौ गुणवचनादेव स्तौतिष्योरेव षण्यभ्यासादित्येवमादिषु यत्नं करोति । तद्वदिहापि द्रष्टव्यमिति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अशक्यत्वात् । सति वा पुनरवधारणार्थत्वे तुशब्दस्य कथमिवात्र शक्यमवधारणं प्रतिपत्तुम् ? यावता महाभूतानामपि शरीरादिलक्षणं कार्यमुपलभ्यत इति । तत्र केचित् समाधिमाहुः । शरीरादीनामनर्थान्तरभावात्पृथिव्यादीनामप्रकृतित्वम् । यस्मात् किल पृथिव्यादीनां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रं कार्यं मुष्टिग्रन्थिकुण्डलादिवन्नार्थान्तरभूतम् । अत एषामप्रकृतित्वमिति । एतच्चानुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? अविशेषात् । सर्वमेव हि सांख्यानां कार्यमनर्थान्तरभूतम् । तत्रैतस्यां कल्पनायां सर्वतत्त्वानामप्रकृतित्वं प्रसज्येत । अथैतदनिष्टं, सत्कार्यव्याघातः । अन्ये पुनराहुः— अपरिणामित्वान्महाभूतानां विकारित्वाऽनवधारणमिति । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः । प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यते महाभूतानां कलिलाङ्कुरक्षीरादिपरिणामः । अनुमानग्राह्यस्तु तत्त्वान्तराणाम् । तदेतदधरोत्तरं भवति । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् ।

न तर्हि इदं प्रतिपत्तव्यं षोडशको विकार एवेति ?

Opponent : This meaning can be conveyed (lit. arrived at) without the word *tu* also.

How ?

It is stated earlier that the intellect, etc., are the seven productive products. There will be the restriction by mentioning again the group of the organs and the gross elements when they are established to be the products of the principle of egoism and the subtle elements respectively. For example, in case of the statement like 'five five-nailed beings are eatable',²⁴ by implication all the objects which can satisfy the hunger were eatable but hearing the statement again, there ensues the restriction. In the present case also it should be understood like this.

If it is considered to put a restriction to (not the objects excluded but the) desired objects ? It may be like this. The

word *tu* will be meant to put a restriction to convey the objects desired. It is known (through the word *tu*) as to why the sixteen are merely the modifications. Do not understand it as merely the group of sixteen is the modifications.

If this is the case, the word *tu* is put at a wrong place. The statement should run as *ṣoḍaśako vikārastu*.

If it is held that the word *tu* is mentioned at this place for the completion of the metre but it should be regarded as occurring where its mention is faultless.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because of lack of doubt. When it is pointed out that the seven are both the cause and the effects, there arises a doubt as to what (are these)

Here, we find that it does not serve a great purpose. The sense may be like this. Though it is proved through the meaning itself but the present author has regards for restriction so that the understanding may be clear.

What is the reason for it ?

There are strange modes of conveying the meaning adopted by the authors of the aphorisms. For example, when the restriction is proved for desirables in 'the word-form ending in *na* only and followed by *kya* (i.e., affix *kyac*, *kam*, and *kyas*) is called a *pada*.²⁵ 'Of a word ending in conjunct consonant, *s* (only) is elided when it follows *r*'.²⁶ At other places lord Pāṇini makes efforts for the purpose in the two affixes beginning with a vowel (i. e., *iyas* and *iṣṭha*) are added (only) after words denoting attributes',²⁷ and in '*ṣ* is

25. Pāṇini 1.4.5

26. Pāṇini 8.2.24

27. Pāṇini 5.3.58.

substituted for *m* after *i* or *u* in the reduplication of a desideratum if the *sa* of *san* is changed to *ṣ* and not otherwise and when only in *stu* and in the causative of roots, which begin with *ṣ* in the dhātupāṭha.²⁸ This should also be understood in the same way.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it is impossible. If it is considered to denote restriction, how is it possible to understand the word *tu* in the sense of restriction as long as we get the effect of the gross elements in the form of the body and the like ?²⁹ In order to justify the above statement, some have offered the solution that the earth, etc., are not cause (productive) because the body, etc., are not different (from them in essence), because the (so called) effects of the earth, etc., are merely the particular arrangement (of them only) and, hence, not different from them like the first, a knot and a ear-ring, etc. Hence, these are not the cause (productive).

This is also wrong.³⁰

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28. Pāṇini 8.3.61. In the first two rules *eva* is not used even though the sense of restriction is present, whereas the term *eva* is used in the last two rules to indicate restriction, suggesting that the author is independent to use or not to use a word indicating restriction.
29. The sense is that the gross elements also serve as the cause of the body, etc., and hence there should be no restriction in their being an effect only.
30. The author means to say that the productive in Sāṃkhya means that which gives rise to something dissimilar in nature. The earth, etc., do not give rise to something essentially different from them. Hence, the modifications of the gross elements are not termed products. Nor are the gross elements the productive.

Why ?

Because of the lack of speciality. All the effects in the theory of the Sāṃkhya are not different (in essence) from their cause. Hence, this supposition would lead to the undesirable contingency of supposing all the categories as non-cause (unproductive). If it is not desirable, it contradicts the theory of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Others have stated that on account of the non-modifiable nature of the gross elements, their modification is not determined.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

Because it (i.e. their nature of being modifiable) is known through perception itself. The modification of the gross elements into heap, sprout and the milk, etc., are directly observed. (The modifications) of the gross elements are known through inference. Therefore, it is a perverted reply. Hence, it is wrong.

In that case, it should not be understood that the group of sixteen is merely the modifications.

उच्यते—प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । किं कारणम् ? तत्त्वान्तराऽनुपपत्तेः । इह पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना साम्यात्प्रच्युतानां गुणानां योज्यं महदादिविशेषान्तो विपरिणामः स तत्त्वान्तरोत्पत्तिनियमेन व्यवतिष्ठते । न तु पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरोत्पत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादेतेषां विकारत्वमेवेति । किं चान्यत् । ग्राहकान्तराभावात् । यथा तन्मात्रैरारब्धेषु पृथिव्यादिषु अहंकारात्तद्योग्यं ग्राहकान्तरमिन्द्रियलक्षणमुत्पद्यते, नैवं पृथिव्यादिविकाराणां घटादीनां ग्राहकान्तरमस्ति । तस्मान्न तत्त्वान्तरम् । अतश्च पृथिव्यादयो विकारा एवेति । किं चान्यत् । प्रधाने प्रकृतिभावप्रत्यस्तमयवत्तेषु विकारभावप्रत्यस्तमयात् । यथा प्रधानात्सूक्ष्मतरमवस्थान्तरं नास्तीति तत्र प्रकृतिभावस्य प्रत्यस्तमयस्तथा तेषु विकारभावप्रत्यस्तमयः । तस्माद्युक्तमुच्यते षोडशकोऽयं विकार एवेति ।

Proponent : It should be understood so.

What is the reason for it ?

Because it does not give rise to some other object (essentially different from itself). The evolutes beginning with the intellect and ending with the specified categories (i.e., the gross element), which are the modifications of the constituents of the cosmic matter which have lost their state of equilibrium for the purpose of the sentient entity, abide by the rule of production of an essentially different object. From the earth, etc., however, there is no production of some essentially different object. Hence, these are merely the modifications. *Moreover, there is no different means (organ) of perceiving them.* To explain, there is no organ other than that which perceives the earth, etc., to perceive the modifications of earth like pot, etc., as there arise from the principle of egoism the different senses capable of perceiving the earth, etc., arising from the subtle elements. There is, however, no organ separate from the one cognising the earth, etc., to cognise their modifications like pot, etc. Hence, they are not the essentially different objects. And, from this reason also the earth, etc., are merely the modifications. *Moreover, as the nature of being the cause only culminates in the case of cosmic matter, similarly, the nature of being the modification only culminates in case of the (unproductive) modifications.* Since there is no more subtle state than the cosmic matter, there is the culmination of the original cause in it. Similarly, there is the culmination of the modifications only in them. Hence, it is rightly stated that the group of sixteen is merely the modifications.

(Conscious entity)

आह—पुरुषे तर्हि का प्रतिपत्तिरिति ?

Opponent ; What is (your) ascertainment regarding (the nature of) the conscious entity ?

उच्यते

न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥

पुरुषो न ह्ययमवस्थान्तरं प्रतिपद्यते । नो खल्वप्यवस्थान्तरस्यावस्थान्तरं भवतीति ।

Proponent : THE CONSCIOUS ENTITY IS NEITHER A CAUSE NOR A MODIFICATION.

The conscious entity does not attain (i. e., transform itself into) some other state. There is, indeed another different state of another different state with reference to us (i.e., the body).

आह—नैतद्युक्तिमन्तरेण श्रद्धीयते, तस्मादुपपाद्यतां कथमस्या-प्रकृतित्वमविकृतित्वं चेति ।

Opponent : It cannot be believed in without some reason. Hence, its nature of being neither a cause nor a modification should be established (through reasoning) by you.

उच्यते—प्रकृतित्वानुपपत्तिः । उत्तरत्र प्रतिविधानात् । तस्माच्च विपर्यासादित्यत्र (का० १६) युक्तिमुपदेक्ष्यामः । तस्मात्तावदस्याप्रकृतित्वम् । अविकृतित्वं प्रधानवत् । यथा प्रधानमेवमयमपि पुरुषः क्रियमाणः कारणान्तरैरीश्वरादिभिर्नारभ्यते । कस्मात् ? प्रतिषेधात् । यथा कारणान्तराणि न सन्ति तथोत्तरत्र प्रतिषेधः करिष्यते । पुरुषान्तरैः समत्वात् । समाः सर्वे पुरुषाः । न च समानां कार्यकारणभावो दृष्टः । किं च निष्क्रियत्वात् शुद्धत्वाच्चैषां विपरिणामलक्षणा परिस्पन्दलक्षणा वा क्रिया विभुत्वादानुपपन्ना । कस्मात् ? एषामितरेतरानारम्भकत्वात् । न गुणैर्भिन्नजातीयकत्वात् । इहाचेतना गुणा इत्येतत्प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । यच्च येनारभ्यते तच्च तन्मयं भवति । यदि गुणैः पुरुषाणामारम्भः तदा तेषामप्यचेतनत्वं स्यात्, चेतनास्तु ते । तस्मान्न गुणैरारभ्यन्त इति सिद्धमेतत् ।

Proponent : There is no possibility of its being a cause because it (i.e. causality) is rejected later on in this text. We shall mention the reason (for it) in 'and because of that contrast' (kā. 19). Hence, (you accept) its nature of not being a cause now.

Its nature of non-effect is like (that of) the cosmic matter. As is the case with the cosmic matter, the conscious entity, even supposed to be created, is also not created by some other cause like Īśvara, etc.

Why ?

Because of its being negated. It will be demonstrated later on that there is no cause of the conscious entity. Moreover, *because of equality among the conscious entities*. All the conscious entities are equal. The relation of cause and effect is not observed in case of equal objects. *Moreover, there is no possibility of the activity of modification in case of the conscious entity because of its being inactive and pure and there is no possibility of the activity of movement because of its being all pervasive.*

Why ?

Because they do not create one another. Nor are they created by the constituents of cosmic matter because they are different in genus. We shall propound that the constituents of cosmic matter are insentient. An object attains the nature of the object which produces it. If the conscious entities would be produced by the constituents of cosmic matter, they (the conscious entities) would have been insentient in nature. On the other hand, they are sentient in nature. Hence, it is proved that the conscious entities are not produced by the constituents of cosmic matter.

(Four Kinds of Character of Cause and Effect)

किञ्चित्कारणमेव न कार्यम् । किञ्चित्कारणं कार्यं च । किञ्चित्कार्यमेव । किञ्चिन्नैव कारणं नैव कार्यमिति चतुर्विधं कारणवृत्तं प्रतिपादितम् । एतत्प्रतिज्ञापिण्डसूत्रम् । अत्र यदपदिष्टं भवद्भिरस्मिन् शास्त्रे प्रमेयमित्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥३॥

Someone is only the cause and not the modification. Someone is both—the cause and the modification. Someone is merely the modification. Someone is neither cause nor modification. This four kinds of character of cause and effect is propounded. This is brief aphorism conveying the object to be dealt with. That what is mentioned here should be considered by you as the object of knowledge in the present scripture.

KĀRIKĀ 4

(Purpose and Meaning of Pramāṇa)

आह—अथास्य प्रमेयस्य कुतः सिद्धिरिति ?

Opponent : Through what is this object of knowledge known ?

उच्यते—

प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥४॥

प्रमीयते तदिति प्रमेयम् । प्रमेयस्य सिद्धिः प्रमेयसिद्धिः । सिद्धिरधि-
गमोऽवबोध इत्यर्थः । प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति प्रमाणम् । करणसाधनो ल्युट् । तदेक-
मेव, बुद्धेरेकत्वाभ्युपगमात्; उपाधिवशात् भिन्नमाश्रीयते प्रत्यक्षमनुमान-
मित्यादि । तस्य योऽसावुपाधिकृतो भेदस्तमनाश्रित्य प्रमेययरिच्छेदकत्व-
सामान्यमङ्गीकृत्यैकवचननिर्देशः क्रियते प्रमाणादिति । एतस्मात्प्रमेयसिद्धि-
रित्यवगन्तव्यम् । कथम् ? ब्रीह्यादिवत् । यथा ब्रीह्यादि प्रमेयं प्रस्थादिना
प्रमाणेन परिच्छिद्यते एवमिहाऽपि व्यक्तादिप्रमेयं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन परि-
च्छिद्यते इति ।

Proponent : THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE COGNISED
THROUGH THE MEANS OF COGNITION.

That which is cognised is the object of cognition. The expres-
sion *prameyasiddhi* stands for the cognition of the objects of cogni-
tion. The term *siddhi* means cognition or knowledge. That by
means of which something is cognised is a means of knowledge.
The suffix *lyuṭ* is used to form (i.e., denote) instrumentality. That
(means of cognition) is one only since the intellect is held to be
one.¹ Due to its limiting adjuncts it becomes manifold as
perception, inference, etc. Here, it (means of knowledge) is
referred to in singular number as 'through a means of cognition'

1. As that serving as a means of cognition is one, the means of cognition is one only.

accepting its general character of ascertaining the object of cognition and not taking into consideration the difference caused by the limiting adjuncts. It should be understood that the object of cognition is cognised through this.

How ?

Like barley, etc. As the objects to be measured like barley, etc., are measured through the means of measuring like *prastha*, similarly, here also the objects of cognition like manifest objects, etc., are cognised (measured) through the means of cognition like perception.²

(Purpose of the term *hi*)

इह हिशब्द इदानीं किमर्थः स्यात् ?

Opponent : What would be the purpose of the term *hi* ?

अवधारणार्थ इति ।

Proponent : It is for restriction.

आह—यद्येवं हिशब्दावचनम् । अवधारणानुपपत्तेः । न ह्येतस्मिन्सूत्रे कथंचिदवधारणमुपपद्यते । तस्मादवचनमेव हिशब्दस्य न्याय्यम् । प्रमेयस्यैवेति चेत्—न । अन्यस्यासम्भवात् । सति हि व्यभिचारसम्भवे वस्त्वधार्यते - तद्यथा गौरेवायं नाश्वः, देवदत्त एवायं न यज्ञदत्त इति । न च प्रमेयाप्रमेययोः प्रमाणपरिच्छेद्यत्वेऽस्ति प्रसंगः यन्नित्यवृत्त्यर्थं प्रमेयस्यैवेत्यवधार्यते । प्रमाणेभ्य एवेति चेन्न—आर्षज्ञानविरोधप्रसंगात् । परमर्षेहि भगवतः ज्ञानं सांसिद्धिकमप्रमाणपूर्वकमिति वः पक्षः । सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च धर्माद्या (का० ४३) इति वचनात् । तदेवं सति विरुध्यते । उभयावधारणमिति चेन्न उभयदोषप्रसंगात् । उभयावधारणे सति उभयोरपि पक्षयोर्ये दोषास्ते प्रसज्यन्ते । तस्मादयुक्तमेतत् । सिद्धिरेवेति चेन्न अनेकान्तात् । कदाचिद्ध्ययं प्रमाता सन्निहितेऽप्यादित्यादौ लिङ्गे दिङ्निश्चयादिष्वर्थेषु प्रतिहन्यते । तस्मादनेकान्तात् सिद्धिरेवेत्येतदयुक्तमवधारणम् ।

2. Literally *pramāṇa* is derived from *pra mā* (to measure). As the barley, etc., are known to have a specific measure through some means, the means ascertaining the nature of objects are also called *pramāṇa*. It seems, however, better to understand *mā* in the sense of to know.

Opponent : If it is so, the word *hi* need not be mentioned. *There is no propriety of restriction (in the present case).* No restriction is proper is this aphorism. Hence, it is proper not to mention the word *hi*.

If it is considered for a restriction to the objects of cognition ?³

No, *because there is no possibility of some other (object).* Something is restricted when there is possibility of over-pervasion; for example, 'this is cow only and not a horse'; 'this is Devadatta only and not Yajñadatta'. There is no possibility of undesirable contingency of over-pervasion over both the objects of cognition as also the objects to be cognised for avoiding which it (the means of knowledge) may have been restricted only to the objects of cognition only.

If it is considered for a restriction as 'only through the means of knowledge' ?⁴

No, *because it would go against the (supposition of) supra-sensuous cognition of the seers.* You hold that the cognition in the illustrious supreme seer was innate and, thus, not caused by some means of cognition, because it is stated that 'the dispositions like virtue, etc., are innate, natural and acquired' (kā. 43). In this situation your own statement would contradict it.

If it (the word *hi*) is considered for a restriction to both (the object of cognition and the means of cognition) ?

No, *because it would lead to the undesirable contingency of involving the faults of both the cases put together.* In case it (the word *hi*) is taken to restrict both, there would be the undesirable contingency of involving the faults of both the positions (stated above). Hence, it is wrong.

3. I.e. the word *hi* in the sense of restriction is related to *prameya*.

4. I.e. if the word *hi* is related to *pramāṇa*.

If (the word *hi* is considered to mean that) it is the cognition only (which arises through the means of cognition only) ?

No, *because it is not invariable*. Sometimes the cogniser fails to decide the objects like directions even in presence of the probans like the sun, etc., Hence, on account of lack of invariableness it is wrong to say that it (the word *hi*) puts restriction to the cognition only.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं हि शब्दावचनमवधारणानुपपत्तेरिति अस्तु प्रमाणेभ्य एवेत्यवधारणम् । यत्तूक्तमार्षज्ञानविरोधप्रसंग इति अयमदोषः । कस्मात् ? सिद्धरूपत्वात् । साध्यमानरूपाणि हि वस्तूनि नान्तरीयकत्वात् स्वरूप-निष्पत्तये साधनसम्बन्धं प्रत्याकाङ्क्षावन्ति भवन्ति, सिद्धरूपं तु भगवतः परमर्षेर्ज्ञानम् । तस्मादस्य साधनसम्बन्धं प्रत्याकाङ्क्षा नोपपद्यत इति । अथवा पुनरस्तु सिद्धिरेवेत्यवधारणम् । यत्तूक्तमनेकान्तादिति तदनुप-पन्नम् । कस्मात् ? सत्त्वादीनामङ्गाङ्गिभावानियमात् । तमः प्रकर्षसाम-ग्र्यात्प्रमाणवैकल्योपपत्तेः । इह सत्त्वादीनामनियतोऽङ्गाङ्गिभावः । देश-कालनिमित्तसामर्थ्याद्धि कदाचित्सत्त्वं प्रकृष्यते, कदाचिद्रजः, कदाचित्तमः । सत्त्वप्रकर्षश्च प्रकाशरूपत्वात्प्रमाणम् । तत्र यदा तमः प्रकृष्यते तदा तेनाभि-भूतत्वात् सत्त्वस्य तत्कार्यमनुमानं त्रिकालाङ्गमुतिष्ठते । इत्यतः सत्या-मप्यादित्यादिलिङ्गप्रवृत्तौ दिङ्निश्चयादिष्वर्थेषु प्रतिहन्यते । इतरथा तु न स्वरूपहानम् । यस्य तु निष्पत्तिवैकल्यात्प्रमाणप्रतिबन्धो नेष्टः तस्य स्वरूप-हानं प्रमाणानां प्राप्तम् । कथम् ? एतावद्धि तेषां स्वरूपं यदुत प्रमेय-परिच्छेदः । तस्माद्युक्तमेतदवधारणार्थो हि शब्दः ।

Proponent : As regards your argument that the word *hi* should not be mentioned on account of impropriety of restriction, (our reply is) let there be restriction as to by the means of cognition only. As regards your objection that it would involve the undesirable contingency of its contradiction with the (supra sensuous) cognition of the seers, (we reply that) it is not a fault.

Why ?

Because of its being accomplished. The objects which are yet to be accomplished require some means to bring about their form or

existence because there is no other way out.⁵ The knowledge of the illustrious supreme seer is accomplished. Hence, there is no propriety in its requiring some other means. Or again, the restriction may be (understood) as to 'the cognition only'. Your objection that it is not invariable is not correct.

Why ?

Because there is no fixed rule in connection with the mutual relation of the constituents like sattva as to how they acquire the principle and subordinate position. Because there is possibility of defect in the means of cognition due to the dominance of tamas in the totality of the means. The relation of principal and subordinate is not fixed with reference to these three constituents. In accordance with the capacity of place, time and cause sometimes the sattva dominates, sometimes the rajas and sometimes the tamas. The dominance of the sattva is (i.e., leads to) the valid cognition on account of sattva's nature of brightness. wherever the tamas dominates, the inference arising of it will apply only to some part of the three periods (viz., past, present and future and not to all times) since the sattva is dominated by that.⁶ Hence, inspite of the application of the probans like the sun, the inference is obstructed to decide the directions. Otherwise they (i.e., the means) do not deviate from their nature of leading to the valid cognition. The means of knowledge deviate from their essential nature in case of him who does not accept the obstruction to the means of knowledge caused by the defects in rise of knowledge.

How ?

It is their nature to ascertain the objects of knowledge, Therefore, it is correct that the term *hi* is used for the purpose of restriction.

(Number of Means of Knowledge)

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5. The unaccomplished objects cannot be produced without means.
 6. The meaning is that some lacuna is must in the means of knowledge if rajas or Tamas dominates the Sattva, and the inference in that case would be partially true.