

Pakṣadharmatā is not the necessary condition of a valid *hetu*. In an inference of a precedent cause from the effect an object pertaining to the past is inferred, but there is no *pakṣadharmatā* as in the case of an inference of the cloud from the rains. Similarly when we infer a future object from the present object, as rise of *śakaṭa* from rise of *kyttikā* or one present object from another present object as moon in the sky from the image of moon in the water, *pakṣadharmatā* is not a necessary condition.

It would thus be seen that this attitude of the Jainas could allow them to add a new category of *hetu viz., hetu*, which precedes or succeeds.

(iii) In his times *Akalanika* appears to have been impressed by the objection of the Buddhists that the precedent cause may or may not give birth to the effects because he says that only simultaneous cause implies simultaneous effects. But the later *Jaina* logicians improved upon the position by insisting that even the precedent cause implied the effect, as is clear from the illustration given by *Yaśovijaya*³⁸ (18th Cent.) who says that rains are inferred from a particular type of temperature of clouds.

Thus after having brought to light the contributions of the *Jaina* logicians regarding the classification of *hetu*, we would also like to give a few suggestions of our own :

(1) As already pointed out we agree that precedent cause can also lead to the inference of succeeding effect provided that it is *karāṇa* and not merely *Kāraṇa*. The illustration given by *Yaśovijaya* of inference of rain from particular clouds should be replaced by an example of an inference of rise of water from the conjunction of water with heat.

(2) As regards the precedent or succeeding *hetu*, we would like to point out that the non-causal type of these two *hetus* can further be classified into two : (i) where the order of succession is absolutely imaginary just as Monday follows Sunday and (ii) where the order of succession represents some real phenomena in nature as day follows night or as spring follows winter. The inference in the case of first type of

38. वृष्टिर्भवत्यति विशिष्टमेघान्यथानुपपत्तेः ।

—*Jainatarkabhāṣā*, (p. 16)

succession, is analytic; whereas in the case of second type of succession, the inference is based on experience. This difference has not been noted so far to the best of my knowledge.

(3) All the examples of inferences from what is known as *Vyāpakahetu*, are the examples of analytic statements. This analyticity is sometimes based on linguistic analysis like inference of absence of certainty from doubt, and sometimes it is based on inclusion of one class into another class like the inference of tree from *Śimśapā*. In the case of first inference, the conditions of biconditional statement are available while they are not available in the case of the second inference. This distinction has also not been noted so far.

(4) All cases of inferences based on cause-effect relationship according to our analysis, should be biconditional. This would add to the precision of the science of logic in India. As already noted, the smoke implies not only fire but fire in conjunction with wet fuel.

(5) In cases of inferences from non-causal cases of *hetu* which are either precedent or successive, the inference of the precedent from the successive is beyond the possibility of doubt whereas the inference of successive from precedent is dependent on our belief in the uniformity of the law of nature. In case, this law of nature is violated by some accident, the inference could prove to be invalid.

निर्ग्रन्थानां समये नियतिवादनिरूपणम्

नियतिविधिरित्यनर्थान्तरम् ।^१ सोपपत्तिको विधिशब्दः । अनेन विधानं कारण-कार्यात्मकं किञ्चित्त्वक्ष्यते,^२ न पुनः घुणाक्षरन्यायात्मिका यदच्छा^३ कारण-कार्य-विधानञ्च तत्कर्मराद्धान्ताश्रितमेव ।^४ अमुष्मिन् परस्मिन्वा जन्मनि विहितं कर्मैव स्वयंकृतं दुःखसुखहेतु । तदेव दिष्टमित्यभिधीयते । इदं दिष्टमभ्युपगतवत् एवास्तिकत्वं, नास्तिकत्वं चेतरेषाम् ।^५ अतीते कृतकर्म-णाञ्च नियतत्वात्, तत्फलानामपि तथात्वम् । ततो नियतिवादः प्रसज्यते । नियतिवादप्रसङ्गे च भावाः परिवृत्तिं न सहेरन्, तेन पुरुषकारवैयर्थ्यमापद्यते ।^६ नैरर्थक्यञ्च स्यात् पुरुषकारोपदेष्टृणां शास्त्राणाम् । अनभ्युपगते दिष्टे नास्तिकत्वम्, अभ्युपगते नियतिवादप्रसङ्ग इत्युभयतः पाशे पाश्चात्यपौरस्त्योभयविध-विद्वांसो विमुह्यन्ते । अत्र निर्ग्रन्थानां समये का स्थितिरित्यवेक्षितुमयं प्रयासः ।

नियतानियतवादः

यस्तु नियतिवादपुरुषार्थवादयोरेकतरमेव सर्वथा श्लाघते गृह्णति वा स मिथ्यादृगिति विस्फुटमार्हतानां मतं सूत्रकृताङ्गे । नियतानियताः भावा इति स्थितिः^७ कथं वानेकान्तवादिनो नियतिमेकान्ततोऽङ्गी कुर्युनिराकुर्युर्वा । जैन-

१. अमरकोशः, प्रथमकाण्डं कालवर्ग २८ तमः श्लोकः
दैवं दिष्टं भागधेयं भाग्यं स्त्री नियतिविधिः ।
२. तदेव, तृतीयकाण्डं, नानार्थवर्गः, १०६ तमः श्लोकः—विधिर्विधानं दैवेऽपि ।
३. अस्मादेव हेतोः श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि नियति-यदच्छयोः पृथङ्निर्देशः -
कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदच्छा— श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद् १. २.
४. चरकसंहिता—दैवमात्मकृतं विद्यात् कर्म यत् पौर्वदैहिकम् ।
५. अष्टाध्यायी ४. ४. ६०.
अस्ति नास्ति दिष्टं मतिः ।
६. तुलनीयम्—“....There would be no meaning in an ‘ought’ if it were not accompanied by a ‘can’.
—John S. Mackenzie : A Manual of Ethics, p 73
७. सूत्रकृताङ्गम् १. १. २ (४)
एवमेयाणि जम्पन्ता बाला पण्डित्याणि ।
नियमानिययं सन्तं ग्रन्थान्ता अबुद्धियो ॥

जैनेतरदर्शनयोः पुनरयमेव भेदः गोम्मटसारे निदिष्टः—जैनाः कथञ्चिदिति सम्य-
स्वचनपरायणाः, इतरे पुनः सथेर्वति मिथ्यैकान्ताभिनिवेशिनः ।^८ तस्मात्
सिद्धसेनदिवाकरः समुदितान् काल-स्वभाव-नियतिपूर्वकृतपुरुषकारान् कार्य-
साधकानाह, नान्योऽन्यविरहितान् ।^९ एवं स्थिते निर्ग्रन्थग्रन्थेषु यत्र नियतिवाद-
गर्हा तत्र पुरुषकारानपेक्षिणो नियतिवादस्य गर्हा, यत्र च नियतिवादप्रशंसा तत्र
पुरुषकारादिकारणान्तरापेक्षिणः कर्मसिद्धान्तावलम्बिनो नियतिवादस्य प्रशंसेति
यथायथमूहम् । प्रतीयमान एवात्र विरोधो न वास्तविकः ।^{१०} जैनग्रन्थेषु
नियतिवादस्य निन्दाप्रशंस उभेऽपि कथमुपलभ्येत इति विस्तरेण वितन्यते ।
नियतिवादनिन्दा

उपासकदशाङ्गसूत्रस्य षष्ठेऽध्ययने कश्चिद्देवः महावीरस्यानुयायिनं कुण्ड-
कौलिकनामानमागत्य गोशालस्य सम्मतं नियतिवादं प्रशशंस । अयं गोशालः
षड्हायनं यावन्महावीरानुयायी आसीत् ।^{११} कुण्डलकौलिकस्तं देवं पप्रच्छ—
'देवपदमिदं पुरुषकारेण प्राप्तवानसि पुरुषकारेण विना वेति । पुरुषकारेण
चेत्, किमिति पुरुषकारं देवपदप्राप्तिहेतुं विनिन्द्य नियतिं श्लाघसे; पुरुष-
कारेण विना चेत्, किमिति त्वमेव देवपदं प्राप्तवान्नेतरः' इति ।^{१२} देवस्तु
सः किञ्चिदपि प्रत्याख्यातुं न शशाक निववृते च ।

८. गोम्मटसारः ८६५

परसमयाणं वयणं भिच्छं खलु सहोडि सग्वाहावयणा
जेणाणं पुण वयणं सम्मं खु कहंचिक्यणादो ।

९. सन्मतितर्कप्रकरणं, तृतीयखण्डम्

कालो सहावणिग्यई पुव्वकयं पुरिसकारणेगंता ।

मिच्छतं ते चेव उ, समासग्नो होति सम्मतं ॥

१०. तुलनीयम्—“there is no contradiction when we observe
precisely what is the nature of the freedom and what is
the nature of the necessity that is demanded.”

—John S. Mackenzie : A Manual of Ethics, p. 75

११. कल्पसूत्रम् ५.१२२ गोशालस्य जीवनक्रमः जैनग्रन्थेषु सविस्तरमुपन्यस्तः ।

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1. B.M. Barua, A History of pre-Buddhist Indian Philo-
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3. Dr. Jogendra Chandra Sikdar, Studies in the Bhaga-
vatīśūtra, Bihar (1964), Chapter 7, sections VI-VII

१२. उपासकदशाङ्गसूत्रम् ६.१६६

उपासकदशाङ्गसूत्रस्यैव सप्तमेऽध्ययने गोशालानुयायिना सद्दालपुत्रेण महावीरस्य चर्चा सप्तजनि । तथाहि कौलालभाण्डं कुर्वन्तं सद्दालपुत्रं महावीरः पप्रच्छ 'सद्दालपुत्र ! एतत् खलु कौलालभाण्डं किमु त्वयानेन यावत् पुरुषकार-पराक्रमेण क्रियते, उताहो अनुत्थानेन यावत् अपुरुषकारपराक्रमेण क्रियते ।' इति । सद्दालपुत्रः 'नास्त्युत्थानमिति वा यावत्पराक्रम इति वा, नियताः सर्व-भावाः' इत्युत्तरयाम्बभूव । महावीरः पुनः प्रत्याचष्टे—'सद्दालपुत्र ! यदि खलु कोऽपि पुरुषो वाताहतं वा पक्वं वा कौलालभाण्डमपहरेद्वा, विकरेद्वा, भिन्नाद्वा, आच्छिन्नाद्वा, परिष्ठापयेद्वा, अग्निमित्रया भार्यया सार्द्धं विपुलान् भोगभोगान् भुञ्जानो विहरेत्, तस्य खलु त्वं पुरुषस्य किं दण्डं वर्तयेः ।' इति, सद्दालपुत्रः प्रत्युवाच "भदन्त ! अहं खलु तं पुरुषमाक्रोशयेयं वा, हन्यां वा, बध्नीयां वा, मथ्नीयां वा, तर्जयेयं वा, ताडयेयं वा, निश्छोटेयेयं वा, निर्भर्त्से-येयं वा, अकाल एव जीविताद्व्यपरोपयेयं वा" इति । तदा महावीरस्तं निगृह्णन्नाह—'अथ खलु तव कोऽपि पुरुषो वाताहतं यावत्परिष्ठापयति वाग्नि-मित्रतां वा यावद्विहरति, त्वं तं पुरुषमाक्रोशसि वा यावद् व्यपरोपयसि तर्हि यद्वदसि 'नास्त्युत्थानमि'ति वा यावन्नियताः सर्वभावास्तत्ते मिथ्या," इति ।^{१३}

कथोपकथनेनानेन गोशालस्य नियतिवादं प्रति महावीरस्य प्रतिक्रिया विशदीभवति । भगवतीसूत्रं चतुरशीतिलक्षसंख्यकेषु महाकल्पेषु परिवर्तमानः स्वतः एव मोक्षं लभते इति गोशालस्य परिवर्तवादं निर्दिशति ।^{१४} अयमेव परिवर्तवादो नियतिवादस्य मूलम् । सौगतानां दीर्घनिकायोऽपि गोशालस्य मतमेवं प्रख्यापयति । तद्यथा—'नास्त्यात्मकारो, नास्ति परकारो, नास्ति पुरुषकारो, नास्ति बलं, नास्ति वीर्यं, नास्ति पुरुषोत्थानम्, नास्ति पुरुषपरा-क्रमः इति ।'^{१५}

पाश्चात्यनीतिज्ञेषु स्पाइनोजा^{१६}-शापनहावर^{१७}-महोदयो नियतिवादसम-

१३. उपासकदशाङ्गसूत्रम् ७. १६५-१६७

१४. भगवतीसूत्रम् १५.१. ५४३

१५. दीर्घनिकायः १. २.

१६. Bertrand Russel, History of Western Philosophy (London, 1948), p. 597

'Only ignorance makes us think that we can alter the future, what will be, will be, and the future is as unalterably fixed as the past. That is why hope and fear are condemned; both depend upon viewing the future as uncertain and therefore spring from lack of wisdom.'

१७. John S. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, p. 74

र्थकत्वेनोत्तरेखमर्हतः । बटलर^१ ८-प्रिगलवैदिसन^१ ६ महोदयी पुननियतिवादं स्वन-
चछुन्नाचारपोषकत्वेन निन्दतः । साद्विसहस्रवर्षपुरातनं गोशालमहावीरयोनि-य-
तिवादमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तो विवाद इदानीं यावत्प्रचलतीत्यहो चिरस्तनता बार्थनिक-
प्रश्नानाम् ।

नियतिवादसमर्थनम्

सत्त्ववपि नियतिवादिनन्दापरायणेषूपर्युक्तेषु बाधेषु निग्रंथग्रन्थेषु नियति-
वादसमर्थनं नोपलभामह इति न । प्रतिपादितं च कार्तिकेयानुप्रेक्षायां (द्वितीय-
विक्रमशताब्द्याम् 'यद्यस्मिन् देशे येन विधानेन यस्मिन्काले जिनेन नियतं ज्ञातं
तत्तस्मिन् देशे तेन विधानेन तस्मिन्कालेऽवश्यमभाव्येति ।^{१०} रविबेलुस्य पद्म-
पुराणे (७३५ विक्रमाब्दे) तादृशं वाक्यान्यवलोचयन्ते ।^{११} बीरसेनकुलायां
षडलाटीकायाऽब्ज (८७३ विक्रमाब्दे) केवलं मनः पर्यायवधिज्ञानैः प्रथमतः ज्ञातं
अविष्यपर्यायं नियतमेव द्रव्याणामिति निश्चितम् ।^{१२} एवमेव गु ७ मद्रस्यातमा-
नुशासने ६१४ विक्रमाब्दे) नियतवादः समर्थितः ।^{१३} विद्यानन्दी श्रष्टसाहस्र्यां
(विक्रमस्य १५ तमायां शताब्द्याम्) बुद्धिव्यवसायसहायादीनि भवितव्यतामनु-

१८. W, E Gladstone, *Studies subsidiary to Butler's works*
(Oxford, 1896), P. 268

१९. Pringle Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals* (Edin.
1907), p. 101

२०. जं जस्स जन्मि देसे जेण विहाणेण जन्मि कालमि-
णादं जिणेण णियदं जम्मं वा अहव मरणं वा ।
तं तस्स तम्मि देसे तेण विहाणेण तम्मि कालमि-
को सक्कइ छालेदं इदो वा अह जिणिदो वा ॥

—कार्तिकेयानुप्रेक्षा, ३२१-३२२

२१. यत्प्राप्तं यदा येन यत्र यावद्यतोऽपि वा
तत्प्राप्यते तदा तेन तत्र तावत्ततो ध्रुवम् ॥

—पद्मपुराणम् २६.८३

२२. षडला ६ २७.१० तथा १३.३४०.१३

२३. आत्मानुशासनम् ३२

नेता यस्य बृहत्पतिः प्रहरणं वज्रं सुराः सैनिकाः
स्वर्गो दुर्गमनुग्रहः खलु हरेरैरावणो वारणः ।

इत्याहचर्यवलाग्वितोऽपि बलमिन्द्रातः परैः सङ्गरे
तद् व्यक्तं ननु देवमेव क्षरणं धिग् धिग् वृथा पोषम् ॥

परिणामन्त इत्याह ।^{२४} राजमल्लोऽपि पञ्चाध्याय्यां (१७१६ विक्रमाब्दे)
तमेवार्थं समर्थयामास ।^{२५}

सम्भवयः

ततो निर्ग्रन्थानां मते कथञ्चिन्नियतत्वं कथञ्चिदनियतत्वं भावानामिति सिद्धम् । कथं पुनः नियतिरनियतत्वेन सङ्गच्छेत कथं वानयोः प्रतीयमानो विरोधः परिहरणीय इति प्रश्नः समुदेति । तत्रोच्यते — त्रिधात्मनः प्रवृत्तिः— कर्मचेतना, ज्ञानचेतना, कर्मफलचेतना चेति ।^{२६} तत्र विगलितकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वा- दिबुद्धेस्त्यक्तसंकल्पविकल्पप्रपञ्चस्य विस्फुरितविशुद्धसहजात्मवृत्तेः स्वसंवित्स्वरूपे ज्ञातृत्वेन दृष्टत्वेन न स्थितिः ज्ञानचेतना । अस्यामवस्थायां निरवशेष- पदार्थानां त्रिकालवर्तिपर्यायसहितं जगत् स्वात्मनि मुकुर इव प्रतिफलति । स्वकृतकर्मभिर्बद्धं जगन्नियतभावेन परिणमतीति नास्ति ममानेन कार्यमिति शुभाशुभोभयविधप्रवृत्तिनिरोधद्वारेण सुखदुःखातीता निर्द्वन्द्वा वीतरागदशा सम्पद्येदिति नियतिवादस्य प्रयोजनम् ।^{२७}

२४. तादृशी जायते बुद्धिर्व्यवसायश्च तादृशः ।

सहायास्तादृशाः सन्ति यादृशी भवितव्यता ॥ अष्टसाहस्री, पृष्ठाङ्कः २५७

२५. पञ्चाध्यायी, उत्तरार्धम् ६५०

२६. प्रवचनसारः २.३१

परिणामवि चेदणारन आदा पुण चेदणा तिघाभिभदा ।

सा पुण णाणे कम्मे फलम्मि वा कम्मणो भणिदा ॥

तुलनीयम्—John, S. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, P.79
There are, in fact, we may say, three selves in every man. There is self that is revealed in occasional impulses which we cannot quite subdue, the "sin" that, after all dwelleth in us. On the other hand, there is the permanent character, the universe in which we habitually live. And finally there is the true or rational self, in which alone we feel that we can rest with satisfaction—the "Christ" (to adopt the Pauline Metaphor) that liveth in us, and in whom we hope more and more to abide. And, as it is said elsewhere, "his service is perfect freedom".

२७. मोक्षप्राभृतः ८६ (पण्डितजयचन्द्रः)

सम्भवति चेदं यद्गोशालस्याऽपीदमेवाकृतमासीत्, परं विरोधिभ्यां
जैनबौद्धाभ्यां न सः साधु व्याख्यातः ।

कर्मचेतनायां पुनः छद्मास्थावयां ते ते सङ्कल्पाः मनो विकुर्वन्ति । तत्र गुप्तिसमित्यादिभिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठेताशुभप्रवृत्तिम्, शुभायाञ्च सरण्यां प्रवर्तयेन्मन इति पुरुषार्थवादस्य सारः । स्वच्छन्दाचारं नियतिवादच्छलेन न कदापि समर्थयेत् । नियतो विधिरिति कुतर्कं प्रस्तूय हिंसायां प्रवर्तमानं पृच्छामः—जिघंस्यमानस्य हननं नियतमनियतं वेति । आद्यञ्चेत्, कैमथिकी ते प्रवृत्तिरिति, द्वितीयञ्चेद्, कथं ते हनन-प्रवृत्तौ न दोष इति । तस्माच्छुभाशुभाभ्यां प्रवृत्तीभ्यां विरमेत्, प्रवर्तेत चेच्छुभायामेव नाशुभायामिति सारः ।

तुलनीयम् Zimmer, pp. 267-68]

“According to this ‘hemper shirt’ doctrine of Gosāla man’s moral conduct is not without significance ...our words and deeds, that is to say, announce to our selves...and to the world every minute, just what milestone we have come to...pious acts, then are not the causes, but the effects, they do not bring but they foretell release.”

SUPRA-MORAL PLAN OF JAINA ETHICS

Ethics has been precisely defined 'as the study of what is right or good in conduct.'¹ Thus the term 'ethics' came closely to be associated with the term 'moral'. But what may be considered as a special contribution of Indian philosophy in general and Jaina philosophy in particular, to the ethical thought, is the supra-moral plan of life as the ultimate goal or niścaya dharma in contradiction to the vyavahāra dharma, which implies the moral plan of life.²

Our lives are beset with dilemmas of conflicts between the self and others, pleasures and duty, freedom and necessity, law and liberality, and circumstances and character.³ We have to choose between the good and the bad, between the śubha and the aśubha at every step. In the word of Aristotle, the virtue and the pleasures are two beautiful damsels trying to tempt human imagination each with their own charm. Here one has to exert his will-power in favour of the good as against the pleasure. This is the path of virtue, the śubhopa-yoga.

But this is not all, for which a sādhaṅga aspires.⁴ A

1. Mackenzie, John. S., *A Manual of Ethics*, London, 1929, p. 1.
2. Cf. आत्माश्रितो निश्चयनयः पराश्रितः व्यवहारनयः — Amṛtacandra on Samayasāra, 2
3. Muirhead, John H. *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 1
4. The meritorious action leads to wealth, wealth to pride, pride to infatuation and infatuation to sin; let, therefore, be no good actions for us.

पुण्येण होइ बिहवो बिहवेण मओ मएण मह-मोहो ।

मइ-मोहेण य पावं ता पुण्यं अमह मा होउ ॥

Paramārthaprakāśa, 2.60

sādhaka is an aspirant for liberation, a mumukṣu. Mokṣa is not merely freedom from the bad, it is freedom from the good also. The good and the bad are inter-related, the one implies the other. Moral life is a life of choice, but supra-moral life is a life of choicelessness.⁵ Choice implies imperfection, a life of options, a life governed by motives; good motives engaging us in good activities and bad motives alluring us to the sensuous life. This, however, does not mean that good actions are always motivated by good intentions. In fact, our activities can be classified under the following four heads :

1. good actions motivated by unselfish end (puṇyānu-bandhi puṇya).
2. Good actions motivated by selfish ends (pāpānu-bandhi puṇya).
3. Bad actions motivated by selfish ends (pāpānu-bandhi pāpa).
4. Bad actions motivated by unselfish ends (puṇyānu-bandhipāpa).

But where do all these activities lead us to ? Not, of course, to emancipation from mundane existence.⁶ Even the good activities motivated by unselfish ends are actuated by a subtle form of attachment.⁷

Attachment and aversion are got rid of not by actions, good or bad, but by an inner awakening, by realising that we are perfect, that happiness lies within us and does not come

5. ततः परमार्थतः शुभाशुभोपयोगयोः पृथक्त्वव्यवस्था नावतिष्ठते

Amṛtacandra on Pravacanasāra, 1.72

न खलु परमार्थतः पुण्यपापद्वैतमवतिष्ठते Ibid., 1.77

6. 'Even though one may be inclined towards the knowledge of padārthas, and devotion of tīrthaṅkaras and may have interest in the scriptures and may observe self-control and penance, yet nirvāṇa is far away from him (without self-realisation).

सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगद्बुद्धिस्स मुत्तरोइस्स ।

दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपओत्तस्स ॥ Pañcāstikāya, 170

7. Kārttikeyānuprekṣā defines vice as intense passion and virtue as mild passion, Kart. 90

from without. One may become worse or better by vicious or virtuous activities, but perfection is a far cry without self-realisation.⁸

Self-realisation means the feeling-realisation of the innate blissfulness of the nature of the self. It is with this realisation, the samyagdarśana, that a man is asked to withdraw from all worldly activities. Withdrawal from activities, without replacing them by an intense inner activity, would mean a state of inertia which is much more than the life of activity.⁹

In fact, life does not tolerate a vacuum, we must replace the mundane life by a spiritual life of diving deep into the realm of self, or otherwise licentiousness would automatically replace it. Vice and Virtue are, no doubt, shackles of iron and gold respectively, and as such, both of them bind us to the physical world.¹⁰ But a virtuous life is certainly to be preferred to a vicious life. It is better to attain worldly pleasure by performance of virtue rather than inviting troubles by vicious life, for there is a great difference between one who waits in the shade and the other who waits in the sun.¹¹

Thus we are to transcend, and not to track aside, the good. Transcendental morality should be no excuse for total obliteration of distinction, between vice and virtue. The lofty ideal of supra-moral plan of life should not check an ordinary man from discharging his normal duties of life.¹² But at the

8. कर्म सर्वमपि सर्वविदो यद् बन्धसाधनमुशन्यविशेषात् ।

तेन सर्वमपि तत्प्रतिविद्धं ज्ञानमेव विहितं शिवहेतुः

—Samayasāraśa, 103

9. शुभ and अशुभ उपयोग are to be replaced by शुद्धोपयोग: and not by अनुपयोग ।

10. सौवर्णायं पि रण्यलं बंधदि कालायसं पि जह पुरिसं
बंधदि एवं जीवं सुहृमसुहं वा कदं कम्मं ॥ —Samayasāra, 146

11. वरं व्रतैः पदं दैवं, नाव्रतैर्बत नारकम्
छायातपस्थयोर्भेदः प्रतिपालयतोर्महान्—Iṣṭopadeśa, 3

12. For a man, engaged in worldly affairs, it is not possible to remain absorbed in pure consciousness.

गृहव्यापारयुक्तस्य मुख्यत्वेनेह दुर्घटम् ।

निर्विकल्पचिदानन्दं निजात्मचिन्तनं परम् ॥ Bhāvasaṃgraha, 607

same time, there must be a clear understanding that all extroversion is a deviation from the path of liberation, a fall from the pinnacle of detached conduct.¹³

Thus, both the virtuous life of transcendental morality are complimentary to each other as the means and the end. Pleasures, to which virtuous life leads, dwindle into insignificance before the ecstasies of self-consciousness, and yet are superior to miseries, to which a vicious life leads. Those very pleasures, are however, condemnable as a hindrance rather than an aid to the higher spiritual life.¹⁴ A well-judged balance between these two positions, the desirability of pleasure through virtue and their condemnation in favour of a higher spiritual life will lead to a correct estimate of moral problems.

The Jains elaborated this concept of morality in detail. But Jainism is not an isolated system in this respect. The Kathopaniṣad said "Brahman is beyond good and bad both."¹⁴ In Buddhism, all acts, good or bad, are considered impure from the point of view of meditation.¹⁵ The Yoga system clearly mentions, that of all the four types of activities, the black, the white, the mixed, and the neither-black-nor-white, it is the last type of activity, which is meditation, which leads to liberation.¹⁶ Even the Mīmāṃsā system, which is the strongest votary of action, holds that an absolute cessation of body,

13. How an action, leading to bondage, can be called good

कह तं होदि सुसीलं जं संसारं पवेसेदि —Samayasāra 145

Rare is a wise man who considers even a virtue to be a vice—जो पुण्य वि पाउवि भणइ सो बुह को वि हवेइ

—Yogasāra, 71

14. तेन निदानबद्धपुण्येन भवान्तरे भोगान् लब्ध्वा पश्चान्नरकादिकं गच्छति
—Brah. Pur., 2,5

15. Radhakrishnan. S., Indian Philosophy, Vol I, p. 49

16. Vyāsa on Yogasūtra, 4.7

which is the mokṣa, comes through the exhaustion of not only bad actions but good actions also.¹⁷

Thus, this basic concept of supra-moral plan of life is to be properly understood not only for a correct estimate of Jaina view of life but also for understanding the Indian view of life in its proper perspective.

17. आत्यन्तिकस्तु देहोच्छेदो निश्शेषधर्माधर्मपरिक्षयनिबन्धनो मोक्ष इति
युक्तम् —Prakaraṇa pañcāśikā, p. 341

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय । श्रीकृष्णार्जुनसंवादे अर्जुनस्य वचनम् ॥

भाद्वतीनाम भाद्वतीश्वर ऋषभदेवः ब्रह्मि तस्मिन् एव विष्णोत्पत्तयाम-
बल परमर्षिभ्यः प्रसादितो नामैः प्रियविष्णोष्या तद-भूतरोषायाम् भवेद्व्या

‘मदन्तस्य ते समन्विताः प्रजाः सन्विता विमन्थतः सुदृढः सधवते ५ । विधायाः
सर्वं प्रमादं वृद्धिं प्रीति-साधनां च वृत्तिं स्फुटं प्रपद्यति जगत्पते ॥

लोकः स्वयं अग्रिमं नष्टद्वारं यास्यात् समाहितं निरामकामः ।
 अन्त्यायवैरः सुखलयाहितोऽग्रमन्तर्जः न च वेद मूढः ॥

[illegible]

॥ பெருந்தலை கொண்ட சுருந்தலை பெருந்தலை

२. तत्र च १. ५. ४ (तुम म म म म व व व तुव तु म न म) ।
३. श्रीमद्-भागवतम् ५. ३. २०

ጸ. ሆቲታዊ ስ. ስ. ስ. (ጸ. ሆቲታዊ)

४. प्रकृत ५. ५. २

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥
॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

६. तत्र ४. ४. १७ ।
७. विनसेनऽऽवायुकेन इतिवक्ष्यमाणम् ८. ३

७. विनयेनऽऽवायुं हिरवंपुत्राय ६. ३५.

अथ सर्वत्र सिद्ध्याद आत्मरक्षात् भगवान् ऋषदेवञ्च शत्रुघ्नारण्यम्
 अभ्यर्त्तति इति प्रतीयते । तेन स न केवञ्च निर्वर्त्तमानो महोत्तमश्च अहिंसां
 मुनिभ्य उपदिशति अपिच आनन्दोत्पत्त्युत्पत्त्यर्थं प्रवर्त्तमानश्च अल्प अहिंसां
 आह इति ज्ञायते ।
 भाष्येण महोत्तम उपदेशः
 ऋषभस्य वारुणी करालकालेन कर्त्तव्या । अन्धेषाम् अपि दृष्टिनिर्विण्ण-
 कृत्याणां वारुणी साक्षात् तोषणमाप्तम् । परन्तु विषद्व्यस्तित्वमन्धेष्वृक्षैरस्य महो-
 तीरस्य वारुणी अश्वतः वृत्तानाम्पु सभासादधामः । तद् यथा—भगवाँ विष्णु-
 याऽऽश्वतित्वञ्च व हिंसायां मूलम् । १८ कोष-मान-लोभादिदकषायानां हन्ता एव
 तीरः । १९ न कोऽपि दुःख कामयतेऽतः सर्वोद्दिष्ट्याः । १० सत्यादिब्रह्मचर्याण्य
 अल्प अहिंसायां उपदिशन्ति भवन्ति । ११

यत्नं चरेत्, यत्नं निरुद्धं, यत्नं आसीत्, यत्नं स्वयम् ।
 यत्नं युक्तान्ति भाष्यतः, पापकर्म न वध्यते ॥ १२

सर्वभूतेषु आत्मरक्षितुं अहिंसायां मूलम् । १३
 एवम् आश्वत्थमाद आत्मरक्षितुम् एकवाहिंसापरायणता या रोगादेषु बर्त्त-
 न्ति ।
 कृतकद्वारायां नष्टमन्धरीकायां च
 मधुमन्धरायां रोग-द्वारायां हन्तुं हन्तस्य वेत्त्य उच्यते: भाष्योद्दिष्टित्
 इत्य मयम् एवाऽयं परिपुल्यानि कृतकद्वारायाः—
 भाष्योद्दिष्टं ज्ञेयं मोक्षद्वारायां करुणि ज्ञेयताः ।
 यदि स भवति हि बर्त्तन्ति आत्मरक्षितुम् ॥ १४

८. आचारानुसंगम् १. १. ४

९. चर्त्तव

कोद्विद्वद्भाष्ये हिंसायां य तीर लोभस्य पासे निरयं महन्ति ।
 तस्मात् हि तीरे तीरत्र बद्धाश्च विरुद्धेभ्यः सप्त बद्धैर्युगपत् ॥
 १०. युक्तवर्त्तनम् १. ४. ९ (सर्वे भक्तवर्त्तनः सप्त, अथो सर्वे अहिंसायां ।)
 ११. दशवृत्तकालिकवर्त्तनम्: मधुमन्धरायां (अहिंसा मह्यो एव महोत्तमस्य)
 गहिंसायां भवति ।
 १२. दशवृत्तकालिकवर्त्तनम् ४. ८ (मधुमन्धरायाः सर्वकृतवर्त्तनम् ।)
 १३. दशवृत्तकालिकवर्त्तनम् ४. ९

१४. मधुमन्धरायाः २. ४. ९

सर्वभूतेषु भूतेषु, सप्त भूयादं पक्षिभ्यो ।
 सिद्धिभाष्यवदस्य दत्तस्य, पादं कर्म न बध्यते ॥

यदि परहिंसा (द्रव्यहिंसा) कदाचिन् न स्यात्, रागद्वेषाभ्यामात्म-स्वरूप-हिंसा (भावहिंसा) तु भवत्य् एव । आह च नवमशताब्द्याम् अमृतचन्द्राऽऽचार्यस् तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायाम् तदा कदाचित् परस्य द्रव्यप्राणान् आबाध्य कदाचिद् अना-बाध्य स्वस्य भावप्राणान् उपरक्तत्वेन बाधमानो ज्ञानावरणाऽऽदीनि कर्माणि बध्नाति ।^{१५}

त्रयोदशशताब्द्याम् अमुम् अर्थं विशदयति जयसेनाऽऽचार्यः 'यथा कोऽपि तप्त-लोह-पिण्डेन परं हन्तुकामः सन् पूर्वं तावद् आत्मानम् एव हन्ति पश्चाद् अन्यघाते नियमो नास्ति, तथाऽयम् अज्ञानी जीवोऽपि तप्तलोह-पिण्डस्थानीय-मोहादिपरिणामेन परिणतः सन् पूर्वं निर्विकारस्वसंवेदनज्ञानस्वरूपं स्वकीय-शुद्धप्राणं हन्ति पश्चाद् उत्तरकाले पर-प्राणघाते नियमो नास्ति ।'^{१६}

अत्र स्वयं कुन्दकुन्दाऽऽचार्योऽप्य् आह—

अन्यतां वा जीवतु वा जीवोऽयताऽऽचारस्य निश्चिता हिंसा ।

प्रपतस्य नास्ति बन्धो हिंसामात्रेण समितस्य ॥^{१७}

अत्र तत्त्वप्रदीपिका—'अशुद्धोपयोगोऽन्तरङ्गच्छेदः, पर-प्राण-व्यपरोपो बहि-रङ्गः'^{१८} इति ।

परमार्थतो न हि कोऽपि कस्याऽपीतरस्य सुख-दुःखयोः प्रभवतीति कुन्द-कुन्दाऽऽचार्योऽभ्युपगच्छति—

"दुःखितसुखितान् जीवान् करोमि बन्धयामि तथा विमोचयामि ।

या एषा मूढमतिर् निरर्थिका सा खलु ते मिथ्या ॥"^{१९}

अमुम् एव भावम् अघिकृत्याऽमृतचन्द्राऽऽचार्यस्य एषः कलशो निभाल्य-ताम्—

सर्वं सदैव नियतं भवति स्वकीय-

कर्मोदयान् मरण-जीवित-दुःख-सौख्यम् ।

अज्ञानम् एतद् इह यत् तु परस्य कुर्यात्

एवं पुमान् मरण-जीवित-दुःख-सौख्यम् ॥^{२०}

न चाऽत्र पुरुषकारोच्छेदः कल्पनीयः, निश्चय-व्यवहार-नययोर् दृष्टि-भेदात् । स्वाऽऽश्रितो निश्चयः, पराऽऽश्रितो व्यवहारः । आत्म-चिन्तन-रतः साधकः

१५. प्रवचनसारः, तात्पर्यवृत्तिः, टीका, २, ५७.

१६. तत्रैव, तात्पर्यवृत्तिः, टीका २. ५७.

१७. तत्रैव ३. १७.

१८. तत्रैव, तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, ३. १७.

१९. समयसारः, २६६, २०. समयसारः १६८ मः कलशः ।

राजवात्तिके 'वैदिकी हिंसा हिंसा न भवति' इति मतं विस्तरेणाऽऽलोचितम् । तत्राऽयं सारः — 'अन्तर्वेदिगतः पशुबधः प्रत्यवाय-हेतुः प्राण-वियोग-हेतुत्वात् बहिर-वेदि-पशु-बधवत् ।'^{३५} तस्मान् नास्ति लौकिक-वैदिक-हिंसयोः कश्चन भेदः ।

प्राणेश्वरोऽन्य आत्मा, अतः प्राण-वियोगे नाऽऽत्मनः किञ्चिद् भवति इत्यग्रधर्माभावः स्याद् इति, तत् न, किं कारणम् ? तद् दुःखोत्पादकत्वात् । प्राण-व्यपरोपणे हि सति तत्-सम्बन्धिनो जीवस्य दुःखम् उत्पद्यत इत्यग्रधर्म-सिद्धिः ।^{३६} 'ग्रन्थत्वेऽपि सति पुत्र-कलत्राऽऽदिवियोगे तापो दृश्यते ।'^{३७} सर्वत्र जीवाऽऽकुले विश्वस्मिन् अहिंसा न सम्भवति इत्यग्रपि च वाक्यम्, भिक्षोर्ज्ञान-ध्यान-परायणस्य प्रमत्त-योगाऽभावात् प्रमत्त-योगाऽभावे हिंसाया अभावाच्च ।^{३८} वीरसेन-कृत 'धवला' ग्रन्थेऽप्यग्रहिंसायाः स्वाश्रयत्वम् इत्थं स्फुटतया प्रतिपादितम् —

स्वयं ह्यग्रहिंसा स्वयम् एवाऽहिंसनं न तत्पराधीनम् इह द्वयं भवेद्^{३९}

कश्चन प्राणी प्राण्य-अन्तरम् असुमिर् वियोजयति तथाऽपि न बध्यते ।^{४०}

अन्यश्च जीवान् अहिंसन् अपि हिंसकत्वम् उपैति ।^{४१} अन्तरङ्गहिंसा एव परमार्थतो हिंसा न बहिरङ्गहिंसा ।^{४२} एवं 'धवलायां' हिंसाऽहिंसयोर् विशदं व्याख्यानं विहितम् । पुरुषार्थ-सिद्ध्युपाय-नाम्नि ग्रन्थेऽपि जिनाऽऽगमस्य हादौऽभिप्राय एवम् आविष्कृतः —

"अप्रादुर्भावः खलु रागाऽऽदीनां भवत्यग्रहिंसेति ।

तेषाम् एवोत्पत्तिर् हिंसेति जिनाऽऽगमस्य संक्षेपः ॥^{४३} इति

तस्माद् अशुद्धोपयोग एव हिंसा इति पिण्डितार्थः । अनृत-वचनं वा^{४४}, स्तेयं वा^{४५}, मैथुनं वा^{४६}, परिग्रहो वा इति^{४७} सर्वाणि पापानि हिंसायाम् एवाऽन्तर्भवन्ति । देवाऽर्चनायाऽपि कृता हिंसा गह्वरी ।^{४८} हिंस्रान् अपि पशून् न हिंस्यात् ।^{४९} रोग-ग्रस्तं दारिद्र्य-ग्रस्तं वा दुःख-विमोचनार्थं नाऽसुमिर् विमोचयेत् ।^{५०} ग्रन्थाऽन्तरेष्वग्रप्यग्रहिंसा-विषयक-विचारा यथोपलभ्यन्ते तथाऽत्र निरूप्यन्ते ।

३५. राजवात्तिकम् द. १. २०

३७. तत्रैव ७. १३, ६

३६. धवला १४. ५. ६०

४१. तत्रैव १४. ६. ६०

४३. पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्युपायः १६.

४५. तत्रैव १०२, १०३.

४७. तत्रैव ११६.

४९. तत्रैव ८३.

३६. राजवात्तिकम् ७. १३. ८

३८. तत्रैव ७. १३. १२

४०. तत्रैव १४. ६. १००.

४२. तत्रैव १४. ६. ५

४४. पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्युपायः ६६.

४६. तत्रैव १०७, १०८.

४८. तत्रैव ८०.

५०. तत्रैव ८५.

योगेन्द्रदेवः परमात्मप्रकाशे बुद्धाऽऽत्म-चेतन्यरक्षाऽर्थम् अहिंसा-व्रतम् इति प्रकटयति । ५१ तन्-मतं राजमल्लः समर्थयामास । ५२

एको हि दोषो गुणसन्निपाते निमज्जतीन्दोः किरणेष्व् इवाङ्कुः । इति न्यायेन देवाऽऽलयादि-निर्माणे विहिता हिंसा न दोषाय । ५३ एतच् चाऽहिंसाया व्यावहारिकं स्वरूपम् । 'गृहस्थः केवलां सङ्कतिपत-हिंसां जहाति स्व-व्यवसाये, गृह-कर्मणि आत्म-रक्षायां वा विहिता हिंसा गृहस्थथाऽनुमन्यते । आततायिनम् आक्रमितारं रिपुम् आत्म-रक्षायै 'सर्वनाशे समुत्पन्नेऽर्ध्वं त्यजति पण्डितः' इति बुद्ध्या शस्त्रैर्, अपि प्रतिशन्ध्यात् । राजा लोक-रक्षायै दण्डं धारयेत्—

‘दण्डो हि केवलो लोकम् इमम् चाऽमुं च रक्षति ।
राजा शत्रौ च पुत्रे च यथाशेषं ससं धृतः ॥’ ५४

अतो जैनदर्शन-प्रतिपादितायाम् अहिंसायाम् अव्यवहार्यत्वाऽऽरोपात्स्यते । उत्तराध्ययनेऽपि राजधर्म एवम् उपदिष्टः—

“जह् तसि भोगे चहउ असत्तो, अज्जाहं कम्महाइं करेह रायं ।

धम्मं ठिअो सव्वपथायुक्कम्पो, तो होहिंसि देवो इअो विउव्वीक ॥” ५५
अत्र केचन विचिकित्सन्ति— प्राणानां आत्मनाशो नास्ति निश्चयेन तयोर् भिन्नत्वात् । व्यवहारेण तयोर् अभिन्नत्वे व्यवहारेण एव वन्धो न निश्चयेन चेत् सरथम्, व्यवहारेण एव पुनः नरकादिदुःखम् अपि । ५६

उपसंहारः—

एवं सर्वैः प्राचीनाऽर्वाचीनाऽऽचार्यैः भार्वाक-साधनो वन्दन-मोक्षाव् इति समवेत-स्वरेणोद्घोषितम्—

“विष्वग्-जोव-चिते लोके ष्व वरन् कोप्स् अमोक्षयत् ।

भार्वाकसाधनो वन्दन-मोक्षो चेन् नाऽभविष्यताम् ॥” ५७

अहिंसा एव भूतानां माता—

अल्पं यथाऽजुतो नास्ति, महद् आकाशतो यथा ।

अहिंसाव्रततो नास्ति, तथा परम् उरुव्रतम् ॥” ५८

न बाह्य-शत्रु-विजिगीषुर् आन्तराशत्रून् उपेक्षेत । न बाह्य-युद्धभात्र-शूरं शूरम् आचक्षेत् । ५९ अहिंसा एव कामधेनुः, अतो विजिगीषुः सर्वफलप्राप्त्यभ्यर्थं ताम् एव उपासीत ।

५१. परमात्मप्रकाशः २. १८५. २६८. ५२. पञ्चाध्यायी, उत्तरार्धम्, ७५५
५३. बृहत् स्वयम्भूस्तोत्रम्, १२. ३.
५४. सागरधर्माभूतम्, टीका, २२४. ५५. उत्तराध्ययनम्, २३. ३२.
५६. परमात्मप्रकाशः, २, १२७. २७१. ५७. सागर-धर्माभूतम् ४. २३.
५८. भगवती-आराधना ७८४.

५९. उत्तराध्ययनम् ६. ३५. (अप्याणमेव जुञ्जामहि किं जुञ्जेण वज्रमग्नौ)

THE JAINA VIEW REGARDING PREDOMINANCE OF MIND OVER BODY

1. The Upālisutta of Majjhimanikāya,¹ while recording a dialogue between a Jaina monk and Lord Buddha, makes a significant statement. It says that out of the three agencies of actions and sin—the body, speech and mind—the most important according to the Jainas is the first viz. the body, whereas the Buddhists hold the last viz. the mind to be most important. The statement given by an opponent as it is—needs a careful study in the light of the stand taken by the Jainas in their scriptures.

2. We find that the Jainas have given due importance to mind. While enumerating the three agencies, the mind is generally² given the first place. The Uttarādhyayana while speaking of the guptis and discipline gives first place to manogupti or discipline of mind; the vacogupti and kāyagupti occupy only the second and the third place.³ The same order is followed in Tṛhāṇam⁴ and Mūlācāra.⁵ Even in the context of daṇḍas, it is only Upālisutta, mentioned above, which places kāyadaṇḍa first; the Jaina scriptures like Tṛhāṇam⁶ or Cāritrasāra⁷ place manodaṇḍa first.

It is not only the first place from which the predominance of mind is to be inferred; it is said explicitly also in works like Jñānārṇava that “we are purified by purification of mind

1. Majjhimanikāya, Pt. I (Ed Bhagwat, N.K.) Bombay, 1939.

2. For an exception see Sarvārthasiddhi, Kashi, 1955, 1.4.

3. SBE Vol. XLV, New York, p. 169-170.

4. Tṛhāṇam, Ladnun, 1766, p. 161.

5. Mūlācāra (Anatakīrti Granthamālā) V.S. 1906, Gāthā 331.

6. Tṛhāṇam, p. 962

7. Cāritrasāra Mahavīraji, Vir Niy San 2488, 99.5.

alone, without which anything is just a futile mortification of body only."¹

3. What is, then, the reason for the above misunderstanding by the Upālisutta? It could be easily brushed aside as a mere distortion of facts intentionally done by one sect to degrade its opponent sect. It does not, however, appear to be so. Let us take the following description of the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga regarding senseless beings like earth-bodies etc.

"Know this : though these beings have neither mind nor speech, yet as they cause pain, grief, damages harm and injury, they must be regarded as not abstaining from causing pain."²

Jacobi rightly entitles the chapter, from which the above passage is taken as 'an action is sinful though it be done unconsciously.'

The fact that an action of body, even without any association of mind or speech, was considered to be sinful by the Jainas may have led to the statement of the Upālisutta that the Jainas consider the body to be the most important agent of sinful activity and not the mind, as the Buddhists do.

4. The Jainas, however, accept that mental violence, even without any physical expression, is also sinful.¹ Now, this cannot be construed to mean that the Jainas hold mind to be the most important agent of sinful activity. Similarly, the above interpretation of the Upālisutta appears to be wrong.

5. The correct view would be that the Jainas hold mind, and body as the agent of sinful activity even independent of each other whereas the Buddhists hold mind independent of body as source of sinful activity and not the body independent of mind. This gives predominance to mind in the Buddhist scheme of philosophy. The Jainas, on the other hand, give equal importance to mind and body.

6. The above view of the Jainas led them to preach not only harnessing of mind, through internal austerity but

8. Jñānārṇava, Bombay, 1907, 22.14.

9. SBE Vol. XLV, p. 404.

10. Ibid., p. 400-401.

the harnessing of the body also through external austerity. The Buddhists had a difference of opinion with the Jainas regarding external penance, which concerns mainly with the body.

7. The Jainas can be given the credit of understanding the fact that it is not only the mind which controls the body, the physical conditions control the mind also. Hence is the equal necessity of controlling both of them even though a physical control without mental control would be pseudo-discipline or dravya samnyama. Hence the priority given to the mind-control (above 2).

8. It is not without relevance to mention in this respect that out of all the systems of philosophy of India, it is perhaps the Jain philosophy alone which accepts that the bondage is not only mental (bhāva) but physical (dravya). It would not, therefore, accept the general dictum that 'only mind is the cause of bondage and liberation'. (मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्ध-मोक्षयोः) though it will have no objection if 'only (एव) is replaced by 'also (अपि)' in the above dictum. This is, incidentally, also in keeping with the general scheme of syādvāda.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON BUDDHISTIC AND JAINA ETHICS

The points of similarity between the Buddhist and the Jaina views of life are so glaringly evident that one is likely to miss the distinction between the two which is perhaps equally important, if not more, to understand them in their proper perspective. The attitude of Lord Buddha for the Jaina sadhus is reflected in the Upālisutta, where he asks Upāli, a convert from Jainism to show the same respect for Jaina sadhus as before conversion. Lord Buddha himself, is said to have once led a life in which he remained naked, took his food in the cavity of his hand and plucked out his hair with his hands.¹ Obviously, this resembles the Jaina mode of living of a monk. In fact, Devasena, a Jaina author, has said in his book Darśanasāra that Lord Buddha was once a disciple of Jaina monk, Pihitasarva

In any case, what brought Jainism and Buddhism together was not only the similarity between the two but also their common attitude towards Brahmanism. They differed from the orthodox Vedic religion inasmuch as they divorced spiritualism from a social philosophy, with which the former has intermingled it. This central difference led to many other differences. The enthusiasm of the Jains and the Buddhists for spiritual emancipation of the individual made them indifferent to the secular problems of society. They rejected the life of worldly activity in favour of a life of peaceful contemplation, stressed on asceticism and held the overall supremacy of a monk over a householder.² Being indifferent to social problems, they remained indifferent to the caste system

1. Majjhimnikāya, 1.2.2

2. Lalitavistara, 12.1-4

as a social institution and opposed it as a ban on entering the spiritual life. In the Aśokāvadāna, it is said that the caste is to be taken into consideration in the context of marriage and not in the context of spiritualism.

Āvāhakāle'tha vivāhakāle jāteḥ parikṣā na tu dharma-kāle/dharmakriyāyām hi guṇā nimittā guṇāsca jātim na vicā-rayanti//Somadeva has summarised the whole position by saying that those general customs of the society which are not contrary to the spiritual code of morality should be followed by the Jains :

Sarva eva hi Jainānām pramāṇaṁ laukiko vidhiḥ/
yatra samyaktvahanirna yatra na vratadūṣaṇam//¹

It was on this basis that violence in the sacrifices was condemned.² It would be interesting to note that the Jains today perform sacrifices on special occasions like that of installation of the image. Even the authority of the Vedas was challenged by both of them because they teach violence.³

This emphasis on individualism led to the emphasis on the dignity of an individual. An individual need not bow before any God, who, in fact, does not exist at all. The gods, however, even though existing, bow before the power of a spiritual personality.⁴ We need not seek any help from outside. "Thou art thy own friend and you yourself make an effort," said Lord Mahāvīra.¹ "Lead a life, being a lamp to yourselves", said Lord Buddha.² We are the architects of our fate, no supra-human power interferes. It is through intence human exertion that one has to seek emancipation from the sufferings and miseries of life. It is this belief in the efficacy of human exertion, from which, both, the Jains and the Buddhists derive their common name, śramaṇa, which comes from the root śrama, to exert.

3. Yaśastilakacampu, 8.34

4. Dighanikāya, 1.5

5. Majjhimanikāya, 2.5.5

6. Dasavaikālika, 1.1

7. Acārāṅgasūtra, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII, p. 276.

8. Dighanikāya, 3.2.

Lord Buddha gave the central theme of his ethics in the first sermon at Saranatha, in which he dwelt upon the untold miseries and sufferings of the world. He declared: "Birth is misery; old age, decay, sickness, death, sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair are miseries; not to get what one desires is also misery."⁹ The Uttarādhyayana speaks in rather a poetic tone. "All singing is but prattle, all dancing is but mocking, all ornaments are but a burden, all pleasures produce but pain." In fact the pressure of the problem of misery was already felt acutely in the Upaniṣads. In the Chāndogyaopaniṣad, Nārada is said to have approached Sanatkumāra with the request, "O Lord; I am in grief; lead me to the shore that lies beyond grief."⁵

This attitude gave an ascetic tinge to the Śramaṇism as well as the post-Buddhist Brahmanism. Here Buddha took care to ask his followers to avoid extremes and follow the middle path, which balances self indulgence and self-mortification. There are indications that Buddha was criticised for allowing many enjoyments, which the public opinion at that time did not consider proper for monks.¹⁰ The ancient commentators explain that the Sūtrakṛtāṅga also criticises Buddhist mode of life as being too comfortable.¹¹ The Jains, however, distinguish themselves in the severest austerities. In the beginning of his career Lord Buddha also performed such austerities; but gave them up later on realising that they were not useful for enlightenment. Even then, some of his followers continued to practise such austerities under the name of dhūtāṅgas.¹² In fact, we find traces of distinction between those Bhikkhus who were hermits and loved solitary lives in the woods and those who moved about in bands, frequenting rest houses.¹³ This distinction, later on, led to the schism in the form of Hīnayāna, which laid more emphasis on the love of solitude, and Mahāyāna, which laid more emphasis on the universal compassion towards the suffering creatures.

9. Aṅguttara Nikāya 3.62.10

10. Mahāvagga, 1.39 and 1.49

11. Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XIV, p. 269

12. Saṃyuttanikāya, Vol. II, pp. 132-133

13. Eliott, Sir Charles, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. I, p. 242

In the history of Jainism, however, the penance has held throughout an essential position in the scheme of ethics. The Uttarādhyayana says "As a large tank, when its supply of water has been stopped gradually, dries up by the consumption of water and by evaporation, so the karmans of a monk, which he has acquired in crores of births, is annihilated by austerities."¹⁴

Non-violence is the most important characteristic of asceticism. If suffering is an evil, it is also an evil to inflict suffering on others. So far, both the traditions of Śramaṇism agree. But keeping with the general trend, the Jainas went to the extreme in this case also. Buddha allowed pure meat which is not seen, nor heard, nor supposed to be prepared,¹⁵ even though Devadatta, who was an advocate of dhūtāṅgas requested him to restrict admission to his order only to vegetarians. Though a controversy, whether Mahāvīra allowed meat or not is carried on by some scholars like Paṇḍita Sukhalāla Saṁghavi, yet by and large the creed of non-violence in Jainism seems to be irreconcilable with flesh-eating.¹⁶

But this seems to be rather a minor difference because Lord Buddha also prohibited moving about of the monks¹⁷ in the rainy season and cutting of even trees and grass¹⁸ out of regard for life, which shows that he was no less particular about non-violence. We should avoid inflicting of misery on others but are we under any obligation to alleviate the miseries of others also? Śāntideva says that the world is just like a body the constituents of which are like its limbs and the happiness of the one part belongs to the whole :

hastādibhedena bahuprakāraḥ kāyo yathaikaḥ paripā-
lanīyaḥ tathā jagad bhinnambhinnaduḥkhasukhātma-
kaṁ sarvamidaṁ tathaiva

14. Uttarādhyayana, 30.5

15. Cullavagga, 1.5

16. Sukhalāla, Darśana aur Cintana,, Jain Dharma aur darśana, pp. 70-71

19. Mahāvāṅga, 3.2.2

18. Dīghanikāya, 1.5

Of what use is the dry liberation, which dwindles into insignificance before the oceans of the ecstasies of the creatures being freed ?

mucyamāneṣu sattveṣu ye te prāmodyasāgarāḥ/
taireva nanu paryāptam mokṣeṇārasikena kim//

Obviously this trend became more prominent in the Mahāyāna school. The Bodhisattva's only wish is to do good to others.¹⁹ The Jainas however, emphasized more the negative precept of non-injury. On a minute observation, they realised that the idea of helping the helpless is neither compatible with the high standards of detachment and asceticism nor with the concept of absolute non-violence itself. Any worldly help to a man would imply attachment on the side of one who gives it and the propagation of mundane activities on the side of one who receives it.²⁰ It seems somewhat strange why the Buddhists should not have criticized the Jainas for holding such a restricted and negative view of non-violence and why the Jainas should have spared the Buddhists for allowing flesh eating, even though holding themselves to be the votaries of non-violence.

The Jaina view of non-violence led to an idea of supra-moral plan of ethics. The moral plan of life, which is vyavahāra dharma, admits of a distinction between the good and the bad. But this is not the ultimate aim of ethics. The nīścaya dharma consists of transcending the duality of good and bad. The good and the bad, says Kundakundācārya, are both like the shackles of gold and iron respectively, and as such, both of them bind us to the physical world.²¹ No doubt that the intermediary path of morality is to be preferred to the path of immoral practices, because as Pūjyapāda says, is it not better to wait in the cool shade rather than in the hot sun ?²²

Lord Buddha must have also thought only śīla or conduct is insufficient as he has recommended samādhi also. In

19. Jātakamāla, 5.3

20. Cf Muni Nāgarāja Ahimsā-paryavekṣaṇa, pp. 29-32

21. Samayasāra, 146

22. Iṣṭopadeśa, 3

Buddhism also, all acts, whether good or bad are considered impure from the point of view of meditation.²³ Buddhism, however, could never have gone to the extreme of considering even the virtuous activities as a hindrance to liberation. The Jainas argued that the virtuous action leads to wealth, wealth to pride, pride to infatuation and infatuation to sin and, therefore, let there be no actions for us.²⁴ It is to be noted that this condemnation of virtue is connected with the condemnation of vice. The Jainas have included the vow of non-possession in their moral vows, which the Buddhists have not, even though they also prescribed a very limited number of possessions for a monk—'three robes, a girdle, an alms-bowl, razor, a needle and a water strainer.

In Buddhism, the concept of supra-moral plan of life seems to have degenerated in the form of Tantrik Buddhism. It is true that 'we do not always understand the symbolical language in which they were written'²⁵, yet any doctrine which says that nirvāṇa can be found in the blissful embrace of a young girl;²⁶ there can be no liberation, without a female partner²⁷ and lust is crushed by lust²⁸ is bound to be abused by the common man. Thus the abstract idea of nirvāṇa was replaced, by the idea of mahāsukha,²⁹ which led to a code of morality which is sometimes diametrically opposed to what Lord Buddha himself taught.

We find a period of moral decadence in the history of Jaina ethics also. In the commentary on Niśītha (the name, meaning 'night' symbolically indicates its secret nature), we find some striking examples of moral degeneration. A monk, for example, is allowed to use 'oil of swan' as a medicine, which is prepared by the cruel method of piercing the body

23. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol., I, p. 162

24. Puṇṇeṇa hoi viḥavo viḥavena maṃ maṇa mah moho mah mohana ya āvaṃ ta punnan amhā mā hou.

25. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, XXVI, 1930, p. 128

26. Hevajra Tantra, pt. I, pp. 90, 96

27. Ibid., p. 94

28. Guhyasamāja Tantra, pp. 26-27

of the swan, filling its body with medicines and then boiling it on oil.³⁰ A monk is declared as pure even after he has killed there lions to safeguard the saṅgha in a forest.³¹ A monk is asked by the ācārya to kill the Brāhmaṇas by magic, because the king compelled the Jain monks to touch the feet of those Brāhmaṇas.³² We have, on the other hand, the attitude of equanimity of Pārśva to Dharaṇīndra and Kamaṣṭha when the former tried to save him from the latter who tried to kill him. In the Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya, we also find that a senior monk tells lie to a junior monk about the water, which though impure, is declared by him to be pure, because he wants to take it.³³

But the distinction between the attitude of the Jainas and the Buddhists should not be overlooked. The Jainas allowed these practices only as an allowance for human weakness but did not consider them as helpful for liberation whereas the later Buddhists recommended such practices on the ground of the theory that lust is crushed by lust and considered them to be a means to liberation.

Another point to be noted is the attitude of the Jainas towards the relation of the metaphysics and ethics. Buddha kept silence over so many metaphysical problems, which have a close bearing on ethics. The nature of the ātman and the nirvāṇa are the two main problems of this type. Such metaphysical queries are rejected by Lord Buddha as they do not promote the moral well-being of the aspirant. A wounded man should not waste his time and energy in making worthless enquiries about the caste and family etc. of the man who wounded him and about the shape etc. of the arrow.³⁴ The question about the nature of the liberated soul is a wilderness, a desert, a puppet show and it does not encourage distaste for the world, absence of passion, distance for the world, absence

29. Cf. Cīttaviśuddhi prakaraṇa, 6, 19, 33

30. Cūrṇikā on the Nīśītha, gāthā 348

31. Ibid., gāthā 289

32. Ibid., gāthā 287

33. Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya, Vol III, 882

34. Majjhimanikāya, 2.2.3

of passion, cessation of evil, knowledge, perfect enlightenment or nirvāṇa.³⁵ When Lord Buddha was compelled to explain his silence over the question whether ātman existed or not, he replied that he wanted neither to side with those who held ātman to be eternal (śāśvatavāda) nor with those who believed in nihilism (ucchedavāda).³⁶ Similarly, though nirvāṇa is mostly described in negative terms³⁷, yet it is described sometimes as a state of happiness also.³⁸

Jainism adopted the attitude of non-absolutism in such matters by which the apparent contradiction of statements would be logically explained. In fact, Samantabhadra's criticism of the doctrine holding the world and the self as absolutely transitory is based on ethical grounds. He says that all moral distinction between the antithesis of bondage and liberation, puṇya and pāpa, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain will be blurred if we were not to accept that things are partly temporary and partly permanent.³⁹ This silence of Lord Buddha led to a greater schism in Buddhism, whereas a definiteness of the Jaina attitude did not allow an evolution of the metaphysical ideas to any appreciable degree. It is important to note that Aśoka, who showed great interest in the propagation of Buddhistic ethics, did not speak of nirvāṇa at all, though he refers to the other world.

In any case, it is the unanimity on the ethical implications of the doctrine of karman which binds all the three great Aryan religions of India viz., Brāhmaṇism, Jainism and Buddhism, in a common link. If it is true that as you sow so shall you reap, the reverse of it is equally true. It was on account of this similarity, that the older Brahmanism showed a great receptivity to the new religion of the Jains and the Buddhists. A life of introversion and contemplation becomes

35. Majjhim., 2.3.2

36. Saṃyutanikāya, Ānandasutta, 45.10

37. Majjhimanikāya, 1.4.6

38. Ibid., 3.4.9

39. Āptamīmāṃsā, 40-41, Also Syādvādamañjarī, 35 and Yuktyanuśāsaṇa, 15 and 16

as important for Hinduism as it was for Śramanism. In the Yogavāsiṣṭha, Rāma says, "I am not Rāma, my mind is not attached to anything, I want to remain self-absorbed and calm as Jina :

nāhaṁ rāmo na me vāñchā vibhave na ca me manaḥ/
śānta āsitumicchāmi svātmanīva jīno yathā//"

Thus the birth of Jainism and Buddhism led to a synthetic culture.

The basic difference, however, as already indicated, between Brāhmanism and Jainism is that the latter divorced spiritualism from social philosophy. As regards the Jainas and the Buddhists, the former represent the extremists whereas the latter were moderate in ethical principles.

In this discussion, it would not be out of place to mention a strange phenomena. All the Tirthaṅkaras who preached non-violence, came from the Kṣatriya class, who were warriors. But today, their followers come only from the business community, who are not only peace-loving but also of compromising nature.

The utility of theory of passions, which the ascetic religions teach, will have also to be reconsidered in the light of the modern psychology which teaches their sublimation rather than their suppression. Similarly, when science and socialism are engaged in making the whole of the society rich and prosperous, the glorification of self-mortification and poverty in the form of non-possessiveness will have also to be reinterpreted. It seems that Buddhistic ethics may prove to be more helpful rather than Jaina ethics in this effort. But non-absolutism may suit more for the modern times when we like to be rational and not dogmatic in our thinking.

JAINISM AND MODERN PROBLEMS

With the development of science and technology, the world has changed rapidly during the last two centuries. It is during these very two centuries that Prakrita and Sanskrit ceased to be a natural medium of expression with the Jaina, as with the non-Jaina authors. It is, therefore, but natural that there is no direct mention of modern problems in the Prakrita Sanskrit literature of the Jainas. It would however, be seen that the literature of the Jainas is not without relevance to modern times. It is true that the severe austerities, with which Jainism is generally associated, seem to be out-of-date, yet there are concepts, which are of more basic and universal significance and which need to be reviewed in the light of modern society.

An attempt has been made to analyse the causes of modern problems. It has been felt that the problems of modern society arise out of either of the following causes :

1. Scarcity
2. Injustice
3. Ignorance
4. Selfishness

Scarcity :

Science tries to solve this problem in its own way by inventing tools for increasing production, by improving means of comforts and luxuries and by developing new means of fighting against the furies of nature.

As far as science tries to solve this problem, we have to welcome it. At the same time, we should concede that there is an artificial scarcity created by indulgence into such tendencies as hoarding and profiteering not only by individuals but by the nations also. Some of the nations do have an inclination for expansionism. Some of the nations make attempts for bringing smaller nations under their influence. The

tendency to glorify a king who desires to conquer others' territory is very old.

Thus the scarcity of natural resources became more acute on account of the struggle for wealth and power. It is on this aspect of the problem, that the literature of the Jainas has a great role to play. It teaches the motto of 'the lesser the possessions the greater the happiness'. One should not be a slave of worldly objects. Possession is not so much of asset as a liability. A life of race for possessions is to be replaced by a life of contemplation and contentment. However rich a society may be, an individual has to put some limitations on his possessions. This idea of self-imposed austerity is not to be confused either with a morbid sense of self-mortification or with a life of inertia and inactivity.

Injustice :

The rule of the jungle prevails where justice fails. The bigger fish swallows the smaller one. This is called *matsyanyāya*. This injustice prevails in individual as well as social and political life. As a result we have frustration in individual life and revolution and war of social and political level.

At the individual level, Jainism brings us the hope of justice in the form of doctrine of *karman*. The law of cause and effect works automatically and is unfailing in the sphere of ethics. We have, therefore, no reason to be frustrated. Nor can we escape the result of wrongs done by us to others.

At the social level Jainism teaches equality of all life. Opposition to casteism and racialism has been one of the main creeds of Jainism. In 897 A.D. Jinasena declared in clear terms that mankind is one community "*manuṣyajātirekaiva*" (*Ādipurāṇa*, 38-45)

At the political level, the creed of non-violence has the potentiality of wiping out the institution of war from the surface of earth. It may be noted that with the advancement of our capability to use deadly weapons, the world has to choose between the total destruction and non-violence. No other literature of the world has taught the virtue of non-violence so elaborately as the Jaina literature.

Ignorance

Though the modern man is generally well-informed, his

problems seem to multiply rather than decrease. Is it not an indication of something basically wrong with our understanding of the problems ?

Jainism teaches that all knowledge is relative and correlated and should be treated as such. Let us not assume the attitude of finality about our knowledge. Let us not think of a particular problem in isolation. Let us not adopt one-sided approach. The attitude of Jainas is clearly laid down in an old verse which says that one who knows one thing in every respect, knows every thing in every respect, and one who knows everything in every respect knows one thing in every respect :

eko bhāvaḥ sarvathā yena jñātaḥ
sarve bhāvāḥ sarvathā tena jñātāḥ/
sarve bhāvāḥ sarvathā yena jñātā
eko bhāvaḥ sarvathā tena jñātaḥ//

This thoery of relativity of knowledge is perhaps the most valuable contribution of the Jainas for the modern times. In these days of specialization, we are more likely to forget the totality of life and treat different aspects of our knowledge in isolation. All knowledge should be inclusive of other branches of knowledge and not exclusive.

Selfishness

Selfishness cannot be overcome by mere moralisation but by self-realisation. Though all life is not one, as taught by the Vedānta, yet all life is identical in nature. Any ill-feeling, in fact, vitiates our moral structure first ; it harms anybody else afterwards. To use an old simile of the Jaina literature, if a man beats another with a hot rod of iron, he will burn his own hands first before he can beat the other.

Self-realisation in Jainism means a clear concept of the self as distinct from the matter. Our baser instincts of anger, pride, hypocrisy and greed are deeply rooted in a confusion between the self and the matter, which is termed as non-self in Jainism.

Conclusion :

There is a human side to all problems. It is here that the Jaina thinkers are relevant. Science and technology cannot help much in this. Here arises the need for philosophy. From

this point of view it can be said that there is hardly any problem, for which the Jaina literature does not offer a solution. It may however, be noted here that Jainas have always distinguished between the essentials of philosophy and the social structure based on it while being rigid for the former, they have adopted a liberal attitude towards the latter. The change in the social structure, therefore, does not effect their basic creed. Somadeva in 959 A.D. made the position clear when he declared that all such social customs, as are not in contradiction with the righteousness of the attitude or which do not vitiate the cardinal moral virtues are to be observed by the Jainas :

sarva eva hi Jainānām
 pramāṇo laukiko vidhiḥ/
 yatra samyaktvahānirna
 yatra na vratadūṣaṇam//

(*Ṛāṣṭasilaka Campū*, 8.34)

SOME CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAIN CONCEPT OF NON-VIOLENCE

Ahiṃsā—negation of hiṃsā :

Ahiṃsā or non-violence is a negative word; it indicates the negation of that which is unnatural (*vibhāva*) as against that which is natural (*vibhāva*). It means that non-violence is the negation of the unnatural and at the same time the affirmation of that which is natural.

A question may be asked as to why a negative term has been preferred to a positive term like love or compassion, if both the negation of the unnatural and the affirmation of the natural were intended to be connoted by a term? In fact, it would have been more natural and appropriate to use a positive term. We know that in other religions like Christianity and Buddhism, positive terms like love and compassion have been actually preferred.

The approach of Jainism in this respect is peculiar. It asserts that we cannot speak of the positive aspect of love in our present state of mental make-up. We live a life, without a taste of that of what is natural. Unfamiliar as we are with the positive term, we are likely to be misguided. If we speak of love, we can think of one form or the other of attachment only. It was, therefore, thought fit by the Jaina thinkers to speak in negative terms like non-violence or non-attachement rather than using the positive terms like love and compassion, though, they also occasionally use positive terms like affection (*vātsalya*) or compassion (*karuṇā*). This emphasis on negative terms, however, should never be taken to mean that the Jainas conceived of non-violence as a void state of mind, where there is no love.

Non-violence...a natural instinct :

What do the Jainas mean when they speak of violence as unnatural and non-violence as natural? Let us take a gross

example. If one throws a man into the river, his action is not natural. We always presume that it should have some immediate or distinct cause. If one, on the other hand, saves another man from drowning into a river, we do require an explanation for it. We presume that, if a man knows swimming and sees another man drowning, he saves him even without any previous familiarity with the drowning man. We, however, do not presume that any man will push another man into river without any previous enmity with him. It means that love or non-violence is inherent in the nature of things. It would be seen that this is a concept which is opposed to the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest. That the bigger fish swallows the smaller fish, is true of the physical world only, which includes our bodies also. But inherent in our hearts is a natural desire to help others and not to injure them.

Morality and non-violence :

The example which is given above by way of explanation of naturalness or non-violence is indeed very gross. If we analyse and go deep, we find that even such actions as those of saving a drowning man are not without some ulterior motive. These good acts are also a part of our habits which we have acquired from the society in which we live. It means that even such good acts are not, really speaking, natural to man; they are results of impression (Saṁskāras) which we gather from our surroundings. While performing such acts, we are motivated by such ideas as such and such actions are good and that they will lead to good results in this life and life hereafter. Those actions are not the examples of real non-violence. They may be spoken of as practical non-violence. In reality, however, non-violence is not an act but an attitude. This has sometimes led to a wrong identification of non-violence with inaction.

Moral acts are also reactions :

The fact is that all our actions are reactions to some situation. They are, therefore, not natural to us. If we place a man in favourable circumstances, he acts rightly. But, if we place the same person in adverse circumstances, the same person acts wrongly. This person is a slave of circumstances.

Even his good actions are not natural to him. They are reactions to some outward circumstance. Non-violence is as natural as good smell of a flower. Flower emits good smell unmindful of the fact, whether the smell is desirable to others or not and whether those who receive it are grateful to him or not. It emits smell equally to one who plucks and crushes it. Its good smell is not conditional. It is unconditional and unmindful of its surroundings.

The eternal law of give-and-take : non-possessiveness :

This non-violent man may appear to be mad or even violent to a person, who is habituated of love in the world of give-and-take. This man may not react to some of our good gestures and may hurt our feelings by making us think that he is indifferent to us. But non-violence remains outside the circle of give-and-take, which is sometimes spoken of as eternal rule
ददाति प्रतिगृह्णात्येष धर्मः सनातनः

The world of give-and-take pre-supposes three things :

1. The giver who gives things
2. The things which are given
3. The recipient who receives.

Now this is based on the idea of possessiveness or ownership. I must possess things, before I can give them to anybody. But this very idea of ownership is based on violence inasmuch as one who possesses the thing becomes more important than his possession. He predominates over his possession. But the idea of pre-dominance is essentially connected with violence. The idea of non-violence is based on freedom, where none pre-dominates over others. Thus the very basis of give-and-take, is possession which is against the concept of freedom, essential for non-violence.

Inter-relations in the society and non-violence :

The idea of give-and-take is based not only on ownership, but also on inter-relationship of one person with the other. Non-violence, however, is the intrinsic nature of man. It is, therefore, not dependent even on the presence of the other, not to speak of the action of others. To stretch example quoted above a little further, the flower emits good smell equally not only for its friend and foe but also when it is all alone and there is none to receive its smell.

It is clear from what has been said above that any distinction between good and bad from the point of view of non-violence, is not possible. It may imply that this philosophy obliterates distinction between good and bad and thereby creates chaos in the society. The fact is that this philosophy is independent of society. When we dive deep, we find that if we accept difference between good and bad, we cannot remain neutral and are bound to become victims of attachment or aversion. This provides sound philosophical basis for neutrality.

Anekāntavāda : Neutrality in the field of thought :

Another theory which provides a sound basis for neutrality in the field of thought is anekāntavāda—the non-absolutism.

Anekānta says that no ism can claim absolute truth for itself, and no ism can be condemned as absolutely wrong. Every statement has an intermixture of right and wrong. We have to adopt an attitude of neutrality towards two apparently contradictory statements. It is not a case of indecisiveness but a case of clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong in a statement. We would find that there is no occasion for dispute, if we look at things from this angle.

Conclusion :

To conclude we find that the idea of non-violence in Jainism is based on the following presumption :—

- (I) Every man is basically non-violent.
- (II) Non-violence falls outside the inter-relationship of one member of the society with the other member of the society.
- (III) The idea of inner relationship or ownership is incoherent with the idea of non-violence.
- (IV) Any statement and every statement can be interpreted both ways rightly and wrongly. Wrong interpretation leads to violence, whereas right interpretation removes all dispute.

Unfortunately these conceptions have been very much misunderstood. The concept of supra-morality, for example,

has been confused with immorality. The independence of non-violence has been interpreted as anti-social attitude, The idea of non-possession has been condemned as impractical without going into the fact that non-possession is an attitude towards life and is not to be confused with the idea that we should do away with the worldly objects.

The philosophy of non-absolutism has been, again, presented as scepticism and indecisiveness.

आचार्यासुतः एक मानवस्य दृष्टिकोण

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आचार्यासुतः एक मानवस्य दृष्टिकोण

आचार्यासुतः एक मानवस्य दृष्टिकोण