

JAINA ETHICS

*(A thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the
University of Delhi)*

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Those who know Brahman in Man
know the Being who is supreme.

—अथर्ववेद, १०.७.१७

SCHEME OF transliteration

Vowels

अ	a,	आ	ā,	इ	i,	ई	ī,	उ	u,	ऊ	ū,
ऋ	r,	ॠ	l,	ए	e,	ऐ	ai,	ओ	o,	औ	au.

Consonants

क	k,	ख	kh,	ग	g,	घ	gh,	ङ	ṅ,
च	c,	छ	ch,	ज	j,	झ	jh,	ञ	ñ,
ट	t,	ठ	ṭh,	ड	d,	ढ	ḍh,	ण	ṇ,
त	t,	थ	th,	द	d,	ध	dh,	न	n,
प	p,	फ	ph,	ब	b,	भ	bh,	म	m,
य	y,	र	r,	ल	l,	व	v,	श	ś,
ष	ṣ,	स	s,	ह	h,	.	m,	:	h.

ABBREVIATIONS

C.I.	Coorg Inscriptions
E.C.	Epigraphia Carnatica
E.I.	Epigraphia Indica
E.R.E.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
S.B.E.	Sacred Books of the East
S.B.H.	Sacred Books of the Hindus
S.B.J.	Sacred Books of the Jainas
V.S. or Vik. Sam.	Vikrama Samvat
S.S.	Śaka Samvat
V.N.S. or Vir. Nir. Sam.	Vīra Nirvāṇa Samvat

FOREWORD

I have very great pleasure in writing these few words by way of introducing the thesis 'JAINA ETHICS' by Dr. Dayanand Bhargava which is now appearing in print. This work was submitted by Dr. Bhargava for his Doctorate Degree of the Delhi University and he has revised it with a view to making it more comprehensive as well as useful both to the general reader and the student seriously interested in Jaina Studies. Jainism has made very significant contribution to Indian thought and has added both to its variety and richness. Dr. Bhargava's present work attempts to study and highlight the contribution to the ethical thought. His study is deep and wide in extent and critical and original in approach. He has also discussed the metaphysical concepts since these are vitally connected with ethics in any system. He has attempted to carry out a comparative as well as historical study of this ethics and discussed the ethical thought of the six systems of Indian Philosophy. I have no doubt that the work will be very widely welcomed and appreciated by scholars and students alike.

Delhi, 29th April, 1968.

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PREFACE

The metaphysical Reality or the Truth of logical coherence must remain merely a theoretical possibility unless it is translated into good of life through right-living. In fact, the Reality or Truth is supra-logical and can be better realised by living it practically than by speculating on it intellectually.

Indian philosophy in general and Jainism in particular, therefore, ascribes the supreme place, of all the branches of philosophy, to ethics. Śīlāṅka, a great commentator on Jaina Āgamas, considers all the branches of philosophy only subsidiary to and meant for ethics. Yet there is no work, written on the lines of modern research, dealing with the Jaina view of life in its entirety. The present work is a humble attempt to cover up that lacuna.

I do not lay claim either to perfection or to originality. I could only pick up a few pebbles out of the vast ocean of Jaina scriptures and explore the scattered theme of my thesis from the original sources to arrange it into a systematic whole. I am presenting the ethical views of the ancient Jaina thinkers, as faithfully as I can, before the world of scholars, who are the best judges of the degree of success achieved in this effort and whose satisfaction will be my best reward.

I have adopted a synthetic view of things, while making comparisons and emphasised the unity existing in the diversity of Indian thinking. I believe that this is in keeping with the traditional Jaina way of looking at problems. Syādvāda, which has become almost a synonym for Jainism, teaches us that the same truth could be differently expressed without involving us in any real contradiction. As I have always kept the problems of modern society in view, and shown the utility of Jaina ethical concepts for humanity in general, I hope that the book would interest the general reader also.

Jaina ācāryas have always stood for the dignity of man, and equality of all, advocated the birth-right of indepen-

dence of all individuals and have preached the elevated ideal of non-violence. I dedicate my work to these noble and lofty causes for which all right-thinking men of all times and nations have striven.

Before I conclude, I have to place on record my sincerest gratitude for Dr. Indra Chandra Śāstri, M.A., Ph.D., Śāstrācārya, Nyāyatīrtha and formerly Head of the Department of Sanskrit in the Institute of post-Graduate (Evening) Studies, University of Delhi, for his invaluable guidance without which the thesis for my Ph.D. would have been a Herculean task for me. My sincerest thanks to Dr. R.V. Joshi, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt. (Paris), my teacher, to Late Babu Jai Bhagwan Jain, and to Rev. Kṣullaka Jinendra Varṇi, whose assistance and guidance have served as beacon-light during the progress of my research-work. Pandit Dalsukh Bhai Malavania, Professor, University of Toronto (Canada), one of the examiners of my thesis deserves special thanks for his valuable suggestions.

Dr. T.G. Mainkar, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit in the University of Delhi, who has the rarest combination of benevolence and scholarship in him, has very kindly contributed a foreword to this book for which he deserves my sincere gratitude.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Lala Sundar Lal Jain, the proprietor of M/s. Moti Lal Banarsidass, for his keen personal interest in the publication of this work. The Manager and the staff of the Jainendra Press also deserve my thanks for their active co-operation. Shri J.L. Shastri, who spared no pains in reading the proofs, also deserves my gratefulness.

Needless to say that suggestions for improvement will be most welcome and incorporated in the next edition.

Delhi,
27th May, 1968.

Dayanand Bhargava

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What is Ethics?

The word Ethics is derived from $\eta\theta os$, meaning character, and $\eta\theta os$ is derived, from $\epsilon\theta os$, meaning custom or habit. The term 'moral', closely associated with ethics, comes from the latin word 'mores', which primarily stands for 'custom' or 'habit' and secondarily means 'character'.¹ In India also, the word 'dharma'² has been explained in two ways. On the one hand, it stands for preservation of traditional values as reflected in social customs; on the other, it means moral qualities of universal nature like non-violence and truth. The former view is emphasised by *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, which defines *dharma* as 'rules laid down by the *Vedas*',³ which are repositories of the traditional social virtues. The latter view is emphasised by Jainism, which says that *dharma* is made up of 'non-violence, self-control and austerity'.⁴ *Manusmṛti* fuses both of these views together when it says that *dharma* is characterised by *Veda*, *Smṛti*, good conduct and that which appeals to the conscience.⁵

1. Muirhead, John H., *The Elements of Ethics*, London, 1910, p. 4.

2. The word 'dharma' has been defined as conduct (*cāritra*) cf.

चारित्तं खलु धम्मो—*Pravacanasāra*, 1.7. Also धर्मञ्चारित्रलक्षणम्—*Abhayadeva on Sthānāṅga sūtra*, 4.3.320.

3. चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः धर्मः ।

—*Mīmāṃsādarśana*, Benaras, 1929, 1.1.2.

The definition of 'dharma' of *Mīmāṃsādarśana* can be compared with the following words of Mahāvīra "आणाए मामगं धम्मं" (Dharma consists in following my commandments).

—*Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.6.2.180.

4. धम्मो मंगलमुक्किट्ठं अहिंसा संजमो तवो ।

—*Daśavaikālika*, 1.1.

5. वेदः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः ।

एतच्चतुर्विधं प्राहुः साक्षाद्धर्मस्य लक्षणम् ॥

—*Manusmṛti*, Bombay, 1894, 2.12.

In the West, ethics has been precisely defined 'as the study of what is right or good in conduct'.¹ What do, however, the terms 'right' and 'good' signify? An answer to this question may help us in understanding the nature and scope of ethics.

(i) *Right* : This term, derived from Latin word 'rectus', means 'according to rule'. Its Greek synonym, *δikaïos*, also signifies the same sense. Right conduct, therefore, would mean a conduct 'according to some rules'.

(ii) *Good* : This term, derived from Greek *αγαθός*, means 'which is valuable for some end'. Good conduct, therefore, will mean a conduct which is 'valuable for some end'.

It will be observed that the same conduct may be termed both 'right' and 'good' from two different angles. Rules are framed with some end in view. Therefore, a conduct, which will be 'according to rules' or right will also be 'valuable for some end', which is kept in view while framing those rules, and therefore it will also be good.

It is this main problem of ethics, viz. the study of what is 'good' or 'right' in conduct, which has many more corollaries. For example, "Is happiness the ultimate end of action? Is virtue preferable to pleasure? How do pleasure and happiness differ? What is meant by saying that I ought to perform some particular action or to respect some general precept, such as the keeping of promises? Am I under any obligation to seek the welfare of other persons, as well as my own? If so, what is the right proportion between the two welfares? What is meant by 'freedom of the will'? Is feeling or reason the right guide to conduct? What do the terms 'good', 'right', 'obligation', 'duty', 'conscience' signify practically and theoretically?"² Thus, there are many dilemmas at every step in our life, when we cannot escape the responsibility of passing a moral judgement on problems arising from such conflict as that of self and others, pleasure and duty, freedom and necessity, law and liberality and circumstances and character.³

1. Mackenzie, John S., *A Manual of Ethics*, London, 1929, p. 1.

2. Rogers, A.P., *A Short History of Ethics*, London, 1913, p. 1.

3. Muirhead, John H., *The Elements of Ethics*, p. 1.

Summum Bonum of our life

All these problems are to be answered by referring to certain rules of conduct, which are to be framed with some end in view. Ethics does not deal with any particular conduct but with conduct in general. Therefore, the rules under a system of ethics are not to be framed for a particular end; but for the attainment of the supreme good, which is termed as summum bonum of life. People with different tastes and set-up of mind have different ends in view. Some crave for wealth; others for knowledge; still others for fame. There are people who would sacrifice one of these for the sake of others. Many of these aims cannot be regarded as ultimate. Wealth, knowledge and fame are not ends in themselves; they are means to some end. True, that many of the philosophers have preached the theory of 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' and have opposed any attempt at attributing any ulterior motive to it; but no philosopher can afford to neglect the impact of knowledge on life. One may differ as to his conception of happiness, as he may differ about the ways through which he seeks happiness; but there is no denying the fact that every man, and every sentient being for that matter, seeks happiness and repels misery. There is no dearth of men who voluntarily impose sufferings on themselves; but in fact they find happiness through sufferings. The question why we seek happiness is as absurd as the question why water is cold or fire is hot. Reasoning stops here. The inherent nature of things cannot be reasoned out.¹ It is the inherent blissful nature of the self that makes us repulsive to misery. We can, therefore, conclude that all conduct should be such as would bring us the maximum of happiness and remove miseries from our lives. This, of course, is a very general sort of statement and requires some further clarification in as much as the terms like 'happiness' and 'misery' are very vague.

Happiness and misery

Wealth, health, beautiful persons, good food, clothing and houses are some of the objects which an average man general-

1. स्वभावोक्तर्गोचरः—*Pañcādhyāyī*, Indore, Vīr. Nir. Saṁ. 2444, 2.53.

ly likes to have. The anti-thesis of it may be called misery which includes poverty, ill-health, ugly faces, starvation or ill-feeding, and absence of proper clothing and residence. A vivid description of objects of pleasure have been given in Indian scriptures.¹ Similarly, the miseries of the world known as *trividhatāpa* also form the subject-matter of many a good number of books on philosophy and religion.

Preyas and Śreyas

The above account of happiness and misery, however, is obviously very gross and incomplete. Our rich possessions do not make us necessarily and fully happy.² Nor are poor people always unhappy. Happiness does not depend merely on possessions or their absence but is mainly dependent on our mental attitude. A state of mental poise and calmness, which springs forth from self-control and integrity of personality, cannot be bought for money or worldly possessions. There is a happiness which comes from within and not from without, which is more commonly known as 'bliss' or 'beatitude'. Sometimes this state is explained in negative term as absence of pain. In fact, this state is inexplicable in words. The two ends of worldly happiness and spiritual bliss are termed as *preyas* and *śreyas*, respectively.

Suddhopayoga and Subhopayoga

We may point it out here that the main concern of Jaina ethics is *śreyas* and not *preyas*. It means that it aims at spiritual upliftment of the individual rather than his worldly well-being. It implies a supra-moral plan of life, where one transcends both, good and bad. Any extrovert activity, whether vicious or virtuous, is a deviation from the path of liberation. Kundakunda says that vice and virtue are shackles of iron and gold respectively, both of which bind us to the physical world.³

1. *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*, 1.1.23-25. (For this and other *Upaniṣads* see 'the Principal *Upaniṣads*', London, 1953).

2. न वित्तेन तर्पणीयो मनुष्यः ।

—*Ibid.*, 1.1.27.

3. सौवर्णियं पि णियलं बंधदि कालायसं पि जह पुरिसं ।

बंधदि एवं जीवं सुहमसुहं वा कदं कम्मं ॥

—*Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, *Gāthā* 146.

A state of self-absorption, with inner awakening, is the highest moral ideal. This lofty ideal of transcendental morality should, however, be no excuse for obliteration of distinction between vice and virtue. The supra-ethical plan of life can be realised only by persons with higher spiritual attainments, who have dived deep into the realm of self.

Everybody should aspire for this lofty ideal but with due consideration to one's limitations. At the initial stage, the force of habit does not allow the aspirant to remain self-absorbed. Here he is required to be vigilant, lest he should go astray. *Pūjyapāda* says that virtuous life is definitely to be preferred to licentiousness, for it is better to wait, if we have to wait at all, in the cool shade rather than in the hot sun.¹ Thus the distinction of good and bad is not to be totally obliterated. The path of virtuous activities, leading to worldly and heavenly pleasures, is known as *śubhopayoga*, as against the path of transcendental morality, known as *śuddhopayoga*. As we shall deal with this problem in a later chapter separately, we may here point out only this that the above mentioned emphasis on the transcendental morality in Jainism has made it highly spiritualistic and individualistic. *Dharma* as a means to worldly prosperity (*artha* and *kāma*), as mentioned by the *Mahābhārata*,² does not occupy an eminent position in Jainism.

The problem of ethics—removal of misery

The problem of ethics has been differently stated by different schools of Indian philosophy. These schools can be broadly classified under the following three heads :

(i) Those who are mainly concerned with the enjoyments of this world and the world beyond, but are silent about the concept of liberation. This is the older tradition of the *Vedas* represented by *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school.

1. वरं व्रतैः पदं देवं, नाव्रतैश्चैत नारकं ।

छायातपस्थयोर्भेदः, प्रतिपालयतोर्महान् ॥

—*Iṣṭopadeśa*, Bombay, 1954, verse 3.

2. धर्मादर्थश्च कामश्च स किमर्थं न सेव्यते ॥

—*Mahābhārata*, Poona, 1933, 18.5.62.

(ii) Those who are mainly concerned with the spiritual well-being of the man. This tradition, represented by the *Upaniṣads* includes *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vedānta* amongst orthodox school, and Buddhism and Jainism amongst the unorthodox systems.

(iii) The third category consists of those who strike a balance between the two opposite views mentioned above, and give equal importance to both of them. *Vaiśeṣika* system may be mentioned amongst this category.

The attitude of Brāhmaṇism

In the *Vedic* period, the *Rṣis* seem to be anxious for long life, progeny, wealth and fame. It was in the *Upaniṣadic* age that the pressure of the problem of misery was acutely felt. In the *Chāndogyoṣanīṣad*, *Nārada*, who had mastered all branches of knowledge, including the *Vedas* could not find out the way to get rid of misery. He approached *Sanatkumāra* in all humbleness, and told him that though he had heard that a man with self-realisation crossed miseries, he himself was not capable of overcoming them. "O Lord ! I am in grief; lead me to the shore that lies beyond grief",¹ he requested. In response to this request, *Sanatakumāra* unfolded the mysteries of life to *Nārada*.

The attitude of Buddhism

The credit of dealing with this problem of misery in a systematic way goes to Lord *Buddha*, who expounded an elaborate ethical system for the removal of misery. He realised the universality of suffering and explained its existence in these words : "Birth is misery ; old age, decay, sickness, death, sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair are misery; not to get what one desires is misery. In short, the five groups based on grasping are misery."² Lord *Buddha* preached not only the existence of misery but also brought the hope of redemption therefrom for the suffering humanity. He asserted

1. सो हं भगवः शोचामि तं मां भगवच्छोकस्य पारं तारयत्विति ।

—*Chāndogyoṣanīṣad*, 7.1.3.

2. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, London, 1951, 3.62.10. PTS translation (slightly modified.)

that sufferings can be avoided, and should be avoided, by properly following the ethical discipline of self-control. He asserted not only that there is (i) misery (*dukkha*), but also that (ii) it has causal chain (*dukkhasamudaya*), (iii) that it can be stopped (*dukkhanirodha*) and that (iv) there is a way to check it (*dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadā*). These are known as four noble truths.¹ Lord Buddha did not accept that misery was an inevitable part of life, nor could he agree with those absolute fatalists who would believe that misery would be automatically removed at a fixed time and we need not make any effort for it.²

Six systems of Philosophy

Amongst the six orthodox systems of philosophy, the earliest trend of search for happiness is represented by the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school, which, as already pointed out, did not conceive of liberation but conceived of heaven only. The means of attainment of heaven include performance of actions prescribed by the *Veda* and avoidance of actions prohibited by it.³ Some of the *karmans*, called *nityanaimittika* are to be performed by everybody without any exception. Negligence in their performance entails sin. Other *karmans*, called *Kāmya*, are to be performed only with a certain object in view. The actions prohibited by the *Vedas* are called *Niṣiddha* and should be avoided absolutely. Thus in *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, the *Veda* is the highest authority, the actions prescribed therein are the highest duty and heaven is the highest goal. For *Mīmāṃsā* there is no contradiction in a prosperous, rich life and religious life.

The *Sāṅkhya* school, on the other hand, is perhaps the oldest orthodox system which conceived of renunciation as a necessary condition for spiritualism. It begins with the idea that our mundane life is beset with three types of sufferings viz. (i) *ādhyātmika* i.e. arising from psychophysical nature of man, e.g. pain caused by physical or mental disorders. (ii) *ādhibhautika* i.e. arising from some agencies other than the perso-

1. Ibid. 3.61.1-13.

2. Zimmer, Heinrich, *Philosophies of India*, London, 1951, p. 246.

3. *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, 1.2.1.

nality of the sufferer e.g. pain caused by beasts or enemies. (iii) *ādhidaivika* i.e. arising from supernatural powers, including six calamities (*saḍṭiis*), planets and elemental agencies.¹

It may be argued that there are tangible means of getting rid of these miseries, e.g. disease can be cured by medicine; and therefore one need not worry about ethics. But there are two objections to it. In the first place, it is not sure that a particular misery can be cured by a particular tangible means without fail, e.g. a medicine may or may not cure the disease. Secondly, the relief is only temporary. Therefore, we cannot depend on tangible means. The root cause of these miseries will have to be found and a check imposed so as to uproot miseries premanently and unfailingly. Hence the necessity of a moral discipline.² In *Sāṅkhya* the element of *rajas*, which represents misery, is said to be present in all our experience and, therefore, all our intellectual operations are said to be beset with misery.³

Coming to *Yoga*, which represents the ethical aspect of the same system of which *Sāṅkhya* is the metaphysical representation, we find that even so-called pleasures of life have also been considered as miseries; and a check on those miseries, which are yet to come, has been advised.⁴ *Yoga Sūtra* gives many reasons for condemning even so-called pleasures as misery. In the first place, they are not stable. Secondly, even these temporary enjoyments are achieved with a lot of trouble and struggle. Thirdly, dependence on these objects bereaves us of independence. Fourthly, desires never die. Fulfilment of one desire leads to multiplicity of desires, and thus the chain never ends. Fifthly, hankering after worldly objects brings us in clash with those who are running after the self-same object.

1. Miśra, Vācaspati on *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Poona, 1934, *kārikā* 1.

2. दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।

दृष्टे साञ्ज्यार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥

—*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Poona, 1934, *kārikā* 1.

3. तदेतत्प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्यातुम् ।

—Miśra, Vācaspati on *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 1.

4. हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ।

—*Yogasūtra*, Gorakhpura, Vik. Saṁ. 2013, 2.16.

Sixthly, in illness or in old age, after impairment of senses, on which alone such enjoyment depends, we cannot remain happy.¹ Therefore, the *Yoga* system strongly opposes the tendency of hankering after temporary gratification of lust which is generally mistaken for happiness.

According to *Nyāya* system, suffering is said to be the very nature of the world. There is a causal chain behind pain, at the root of which is false notion (*mithyājñāna*). On the removal of the following in turn, there is automatic removal of the preceding one :

- (i) Pain
- (ii) Birth
- (iii) Activity
- (iv) Fault
- (v) False notion.²

The *Vaiśeṣika* system reconciles the two attitudes—one represented by *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and the other represented by *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Nyāya*. It gives worldly prosperity as well as spiritual happiness as the aim of *dharma*.³

According to *Vedānta*, bliss is the nature of self. As soon as the veil of ignorance is removed, the fetters that shut ourselves out from the reality, which we are, are broken asunder and then the self experiences no misery but bliss.

Thus we see that the various systems of Indian philosophy agree on this point that a state of complete mental poise, free from discords and uncertainties of life, is the ultimate aim of life.

1. परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ।

—*Ibid.*, 2.15.

2. दुःखजन्यप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरापाये तदन्तरापायादवर्गः ।

—*Nyāyasūtra*, Poona, 1939, 1.1.2.

Also सुखसाधनमाप्तुमिच्छति दुःखसाधनं हातुमिच्छति । प्राप्तीच्छा-
प्रयुक्तस्यास्य सुखसाधनावाप्त्यै समीहाविशेष आरम्भः । जिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य
दुःखसाधनपरिवर्जनं निवृत्तिः ।

—*Vātsyāyana on Nyāyasūtra*, Poona, 1939, 3.2.34.

3. यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ।

—*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Allahabad, 1923, 1.1.2.

Jaina view

The existence of misery and suffering is as much recognised by Jainism as by its sister religions, Brāhmanism and Buddhism. "The world is afflicted, miserable, difficult to instruct and without discrimination",¹ says the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*. *Śīlāṅka*, a commentator of *Ācārāṅgasūtra* begins his commentary with the following words : All creatures, overcome by attachment, aversion and delusion, tormented by various, excessively bitter physical and mental miseries should try to know what is good and what is bād for the removal of that misery, and this is not possible without a peculiar type of discrimination.² The *Uttarādhyayana* says that all worldly pleasure is suffering in the ultimate analysis. All "singing is but prattle, all dancing is but mocking, all ornaments are but a burden, all pleasures produce but pain."³ The same eternal question haunts the mind of the thinker again and again : "By what acts can I escape a sorrowful lot in this unstable, ineternal *saṃsāra*, which is full of misery ?"⁴ "Birth is misery, old age is misery, and so are disease and death."⁵ The main attraction 'is a safe place in view of all, but difficult of approach, where there is no old age nor death, no pain nor disease.'⁶ "The transitory condition is like a wheel at a well where before one bucketful of distress is got over a large number of afflictions overtake the soul".⁷

Out of the seven fundamental elements of Jaina philosophy, only two, the 'self' and the 'non-self' are dealt with

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, SBE, Vol. XXII, 1.1.2.1. (p. 3).

2. इह हि रागद्वेषमोहाद्यभिभूतेन सर्वेणापि संसारिजन्तुना शारीरमानमा (सा ?) नेकदुःखोपनिपातपीडितेन (त) दपनयनाय हेयोपादेयपरिज्ञाने यत्नो विधेयः । स च न विशिष्टविवेकमृते ।

—*Śīlāṅka*, on *Ibid.*, p. 3.

3. *Uttarādhyayana*, Gurgaon, 1954, 13.16.

4. *Ibid.*, 8.1.

5. *Ibid.*, 19.15.

6. *Ibid.*, 23.81.

7. विपद्भवपदावर्ते पादिकेवातिवाह्यते ।

यावत्तावद्भवन्त्यन्याः प्रचुरा विपदः पुरः ॥

—*Iṣṭopadeśa*, 12.

from a metaphysical point of view; the other five are mere corollaries of the problem of getting rid of miseries. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* very beautifully summarises the position when it says : “*Āśrava* (inflow of *kārmic* matter causing misery) is the cause of mundane existence and *Samvara* (stoppage of that inflow) is the cause of liberation : this is the *Jaina* view (in short), every thing else is only its amplification.”¹

Metaphysics and Ethics

Buddhistic View

Where is the necessity of dealing with self and non-self at all ? To quote the famous example of Lord *Buddha*, a man hit by an arrow, need not, and should not, ask such superficial questions as to the caste of the doctor who comes to his rescue, or the details of the arrow which hit him. He need know only this that the arrow has hit him and the doctor can cure him. To those who asked Lord *Buddha* about the nature of self, he did not answer, rejecting their question summarily as unexplained (*avyākṛta*).² This attitude of Lord *Buddha* was probably a reaction to those thinkers of his time who would go on philosophising everything without improving the daily conduct of life

Jaina View

The Jainas, however, true to their tradition of reconciliatory attitude, followed the middle path. They did realise that a strict moral discipline is necessary for purity of life. But they did not overlook such metaphysical questions as the nature of self. Our behaviour cannot be isolated from our metaphysical beliefs. Truth and valuation are inseparable. Without knowing what truth in reality is how can that reality be realised, which is the ultimate aim of all philosophy. Therefore, metaphysics and ethics are the two sides of the same coin. There could not have been a better proof of the realisa-

1. आश्रवो भवहेतुः स्यात्संवरो मोक्षकारणम् ।

इतीयमाहंती दृष्टिरन्यदस्याः प्रपञ्चनम् ॥

—*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Poona, 1951, p. 80.

2. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Saranatha, 1933, 2.2.3.

tion of this relation between metaphysics and ethics than the employment of the word 'dharma' for the 'essential nature of things' (*vastusvabhāvaḥ*) on the one hand, and for 'moral duties' on the other. *Samantabhadra* goes to the extent of saying that without knowing the real nature of things, which is permanency in transitoriness, all moral distinction between the antithesis of bondage and liberation, *punya* and *pāpa*, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain will be blurred.¹ Belief, for example, in the metaphysical view that the nature of things is absolutely transitory would make it impossible to carry on any financial transaction, or to explain the fact of memory, or to have any relation like that of husband and wife.²

1. पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात्प्रेत्यभावः फले कुतः ।
 बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषां न येषां त्वं नासि नायकः ॥
 क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसम्भवः ।
 प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भः कुतः फलम् ॥

—*Āptamīmāṃsā*, Śolāpura, Śak. Saṁ. 1826, 40-41.

Also

न बन्धमोक्षौ क्षणिकैकसंस्थौ
 न संवृत्तिः सापि मृषा स्वभावा ।
 मुख्याहते गौणविधिर्न दृष्टो
 विभ्रान्तदृष्टिस्तव दृष्टितोऽन्या ॥

—*Yuktyanuśāsana*, Saharanapura, 1951, verse 15.

Also

नैकान्तवादे सुखदुःखभोगौ
 न पुण्यपापे न च बन्धमोक्षौ ।
 दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनसिनैवं
 परैर्विलुप्तं जगदप्यशेषम् ॥

—*Syādvādamāñjarī*, Bombay, 1935, verse 35.

2. प्रतिक्षणं भङ्गिषु तत्पृथक्त्वा-
 न्न मातृघाती स्वपतिः स्व-जाया ।
 दत्तग्रहो नाधिगतस्मृतिर्न
 तत्त्वार्थसत्यं न कुलं न जातिः ॥

—*Yuktyanuśāsana*, 16.

Seven fundamentals of Jainism¹

It is due to this close relation between metaphysics and ethics that *Jainācāryas*, though as much interested in the ethical problem of removal of misery as the Buddhists, begin their philosophy with a metaphysical discussion of self and non-self, which are the first and second fundamental truths of Jainism. Thus Jainism is a dualistic system, bifurcating the universe into two exhaustive categories : *jīva*, soul; and *ajīva*, matter. This division of the universe comes nearer to the division of '*puruṣa*' and '*prakṛti*' of *Sāṅkhya* system.

The mystery of how the *jīva* or self joins hands with *ajīva* or non-self in mundane existence still remains unexplained. In Jainism, *Kārmic* matter or subtle material particles are held to be the medium of holding the gross body with the conscious soul. The soul has an inherent quality of attracting these particles towards itself. This is psychophysical process. Whenever the soul entertains any such idea as that of attachment or aversion (called *bhāvāśrava*), it attracts some very subtle particles, which differ in each case in accordance with the nature of the idea entertained by the soul (*dravyāśrava*). This, in short, is the third fundamental truth of Jainism.

The mere inflow of this *kārmic* matter is no obstacle. But four fundamental passions (*Kaṣāya*) viz. anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed, together with wrong belief (*mithyādarśana*), non-discipline (*avirati*), negligence (*pramāda*), and psychophysical activities (*yoga*), hold the *kārmic* matter in bondage (*bandha*) with soul. This is the fourth fundamental truth of Jainism.

The fifth fundamental truth is that this inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter is to be checked (*Saṁvara*). This requires a constant vigilance against such trends of mind, deeds and words as may lead to such inflow.

The sixth fundamental truth is regarding shedding* (*nirjarā*) of such *kārmic* matter as may already be accumulated by the soul. This is rendered possible by penance and meditation.

The seventh fundamental truth is that of liberation, where the soul, engulfed in the mud of *kārmic* matter from times immemorial, after getting rid of it, shines forth in its intrinsic purity of infinite knowledge, intuition, bliss and potency.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, Banaras, 1952, 1.4.

These seven fundamentals of Jainism, it will be seen, are the corollaries of the famous doctrine of *Karman*, on the foundation of which not only the edifice of Jaina ethics but of all ethical systems of India stands. 'As you sow, so shall you reap' is the most fundamental doctrine of all ethical systems. Man is the architect of his own fate. It is this belief which holds him responsible for his own miseries and happiness. It is this belief again, which inspires him to ethical considerations in his conduct. The brief sketch of seven fundamentals of Jainism, which is given here, is a bit difficult to grasp at the beginning and shall be dealt with in detail in the following chapter. But before that, the basis of these principles viz. the doctrine of *Karman*, should be examined now and here, because of its supreme importance for any ethical discussion.

Doctrine of Karman

What is known as the law of cause and effect in the sphere of physical science is known by the name of *karmasiddhānta* in the sphere of ethics. It is not possible to behave in a particular way and escape its concomitant result. Similarly, no result ensues without a corresponding action. No effort, however small, goes for nought. We do not meet any result, which is not justified by our own past doings. This, in short, is the doctrine of *karman*, which is accepted by Brāhmanical, Buddhistic and Jaina schools of thought. But even this doctrine of *karman* has not gone unchallenged in the history of philosophy. We shall refer to some objections to the doctrine of *karman* at the end of this chapter. Herebelow we give a description of some schools of thought, which hold different factors to be responsible for our miseries and pleasures. We shall also try to explain the Jaina attitude towards these schools.

Different schools

The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* gives a beautiful summary of the various schools of thought regarding the causes of misery and happiness prevalent in ancient India. It enumerates seven schools of thought which give prominence to either one or the other of the following factors :

1. Time (*Kāla*)
2. Nature (*Svabhāva*)
3. Fate (*Niyati*)
4. Chance (*Yadṛcchā*)
5. Matter (*Bhūta*)
6. *Puruṣa*
7. A combination of all these (*Samyoga eṣām*).¹

There is reference to many of these sects in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Gommaṣasāra* also. Before we proceed to discuss these schools individually, let us note in the very beginning that the Jaina thinkers have not rejected any of these schools outright. What they have rejected, is the rejection of any one of these factors. The mistake that others have committed, according to Jainism, is that they have over-emphasised the role of one of these factors and have not taken others into consideration at all.² Therefore, the seventh school of thought, taking into consideration all these factors together, seems to represent the Jaina school of thought. This attitude of Jainism is in consonance with its general attitude of non-absolutism (*Syādvāda*). Now, we discuss below each of the schools individually.

(i) Time

The *Kālasūkta* of *Atharvaveda* gives a vivid description of time. "It is he (time) who drew forth the worlds and encompasseth them.... There is no power superior to him".³ *Gommaṣasāra* summarises this theory in these words : "Time

1. कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा

भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्याः

संयोग एषां नत्वात्मभावादा-

त्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ।

—*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1.12.

2. परसमयाणं वयणं मिच्छं खलु होइ सव्वहा वयणा

जेणाणं पुण वयणं सम्मं खु कहुंचिवयणादो ।

—*Gommaṣasāra*, Lucknow, 1937, *Karmakāṇḍa*, 895.

3. स एव सं भुवनान्याभरत् स एव सं भुवनानि पर्यैत् ।

...तस्माद् वै नान्यत् परमस्ति तेजः ॥

—*Atharvaveda*, Aundha, 19.53-4.

creates all, time destroys all; time is waking among sleeping people. Time can be deceived by none.”¹ This is an absolutistic (*ekānta*) view according to which everything is determined by time.

Obviously, time cannot be the sole factor in controlling our misery or happiness. Otherwise, how is it that some people are happy and others unhappy at the same time? Time is something unconscious and cannot be held responsible for miseries and happiness which obviously result from our conscious efforts.

While rejecting this theory for such obvious reasons, the force of time-factor should be fully recognised. It is one of the factors affecting our condition. It is not easy to nullify the effects of old age, for which time is primarily responsible. In every walk of life, we do watch that time plays an important part. The mistake lies in believing that everything else is impotent before time.

(ii) Nature

Nature stands for inherent properties of things. Some philosophers, called *Svabhāvavādins*, hold that events are determined by their own inherent nature. They argue out that if nature is not the cause then ‘who makes the sharpness of thorns, and who creates variety in deer and birds’? Therefore, they establish that everything behaves according to its own nature.²

This school of thought denies any freedom of action. A thief must remain a thief for he is so by nature. This leaves no scope for human effort. We become puppets in the hands of our nature. In fact, the Jainas believe that nature, which does influence our conduct to a remarkable degree, is of our own making and we can unmake or modify it by our efforts. If the *Svabhāvavādins* want to refute the existence of any ultramundane controller of this universe, the Jainas join hand

1. *Gommaṣasāra*, *Karmakāṇḍa*, 879.

2. को करइ कंटयाणं तिकखत्तं मियविहंगमादीणं ।

विविहत्तं तु सहाओ इदि संव्वपि य सहाओत्ति ॥

—*Gommaṣasāra*, *karmakāṇḍa*, 883.

with them. But to say that there is no freedom of will, amounts to denial of moral responsibility for action. Obviously, such a theory cannot become the basis of any sound ethical system.

(iii) Fatalism

Fate means that whatever happens, happens necessarily. Everything is predetermined. We cannot choose between good or bad, for our future course of action is already fixed. Amongst modern philosophers, name of Spinoza may be mentioned, who was a staunch believer in determinism. "Only ignorance makes us think that we can alter the future; what will be will be, and the future is as unalterably fixed as the past. This is why hope and fear are condemned : both depend upon viewing the future as uncertain, and therefore spring from lack of wisdom."¹

The *Mahābhārata* has a long discussion on the controversy of fate vs. human efforts.² Amongst contemporaries of *Mahāvīra* and *Buddha*, *Makkhali Gosāla* (or *Maskarin Gosāla*) seems to be an absolute fatalist. According to him, the soul after completing the number of inevitable births is automatically freed of miseries.³ There is no punishment or reward for any conscious practice of vice or virtue. Not that vice and virtue are not connected with bondage or release, but to quote Zimmer : "According to this "hempen shirt" doctrine of Gosāla, man's moral conduct is not without significance.....Our words and deeds, that is to say, announce to ourselves—and to the world—every minute, just what mile stones we have come to.....pious acts, then, are not the causes, but the effects; they do not bring but they foretell release."⁴

Another fatalist with a difference but again a contemporary of *Mahāvīra*, was *Purāṇakāśyapa* (or *Pūrṇakāśyapa*). He says : 'that to one who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into house, who commits dacoity, or

1. Bertrand Russel, *History of Western Philosophy*, London, 1948, p. 597.

2. *Mahābhārata*, 13.6.7-12.

3. *Digha Nikāya*, Pt. I, Bombay, 1942, 1.2.20.

4. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, pp. 267-268.

robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies; to him thus acting there is no guilt'. Again, 'in generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking the truth there is neither merit nor increase of merit'.¹

The distinction between these two can be easily noticed. *Makhali Gosāla* does make a distinction between good and bad, but he denies a man any right of improving his lot which is predetermined. In other words, a man would automatically become good when the time for his release approaches. But for *Purāṇa Kāśyapa* there is nothing like moral. It seems that these two thinkers were misrepresented by their opponents by exaggerating their emphasis on fatalism. But it is also true that any such philosophy which over-emphasises fatalism may prove detrimental for moral progress of a man who may become inert. It was this aspect of fatalism which made Buddha retort such philosophers in these words: "There exists a 'heroic effort (*vīryam*) in man, there exists the possibility of a successful exertion (*utsāha*) aimed at the disengaging of man from the vortex of rebirths...provided he strives whole-heartedly for this end."²

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* summed up this doctrine of fatalism in these words: "But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time etc.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny."³ This attitude is criticised in the following words: "Those who proclaim these opinions, are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge and do not understand that things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion."⁴ Thus the Jainas have a synthetic view in this respect also. There are passages in Jaina literature which favour relative determinism; but it is never done at the cost of human effort,

1. *Dīgha Nikāya*, 1.2.

2. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, p. 226.

3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, Bangalore, Vik. Saṁ. 1993, 1.1.2.2-3. SBE. Translation.

4. *Ibid.*, 1.1.2.4.

Also cf. *Gommaṣasāra*, *Karmakāṇḍa*, 882.

which the Jainas hold to be of supreme value for all moral progress. This synthetic position is not self-contradictory. We shall deal with this problem of determinism vs. freedom of will at the end of this discussion separately. For the present we can say that if our miseries and happiness were to be guided by some blind fate, all ethics, religions and instructions will lose their importance.

4. *Chance (Yadṛcchā)*

This school of thought is called by the name of 'accidentalism' by modern thinkers. These accidentalists believe that there is no so-called 'cause and effect' relation between any objects. Their argument is that we cannot show the ultimate cause of any event. Therefore, they conclude that every event is merely a matter of chance.

The only good that this theory can do to us, according to the Jainas, is that it reminds us of the subordinate position of instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) as against the substantial cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) which holds the primary position. In the history of Western philosophy, Plato and Aristotle are inclined towards accidentalism. Stoics, on the other hand, realised that a law is working in this universe and every effect can be traced to some cause.¹ Grier Hibben has remarked that accidentalism is a view of the world which characterises a pre-scientific period of thought."²

5. *Bhūta (Matter)*

Materialists hold unconscious matter to be responsible for everything. They only believe in *pratyakṣa* (authority of perception) and therefore, do not agree with other systems of Indian philosophy with regard to the existence of soul. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* gives the ethical implications of this theory. 'There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be'.³

1. James, Hastings, (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, New York, 1955, Vol. I, p. 65.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

3. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, SBE Vol. XLV, Oxford, 1895, 1.1.1.12 (p. 237).

Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha summarises the attitude of materialism towards pain and pleasure in these words : "They (i. e. opponents) conceive that you ought to throw away the pleasures of life because they are mixed with pain; but what prudent man will throw away unpeeled rice which encloses excellent grain because it is covered with husk."¹

It is clear from this that materialism glorifies gratification of the lust of senses as the highest good of life. There are, however, reasons to believe that materialism has been misrepresented by the opponents of this school. Materialists did caution us against being too much other-wordly. They tried to organise society not on any theocratic but on a secular basis. They launched an agitation against many baseless superstitions of society, e. g. they argued that if the animal killed in a sacrifice went to heaven why did the sacrificer not kill his own father and send him to heaven.²

The 'matter' is as real to Jainism as to materialism. But to say that matter is the only reality would be against all principles of Jainism. It is not conceivable how consciousness can be the result of natural forces. We shall open another chapter with this discussion. For the present, suffice it to say that the very idea that we can escape the responsibility of our actions is repulsive to ethics. Unrestrained sensualism is self-destructive. Unchecked desires of the members of society may lead to anarchism. If we accept that there are only two aims of life, money and sex (*arthakāmau*), and righteousness and liberation (*dharma mokṣau*) are mere fabrications of human mind then where is the

1. त्याज्यं सुखं विषयसङ्गमजन्म पुंसां
दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणेषा ।
व्रीहीञ्जिहासति सितोत्तमतण्डुलाद्यान्
को नाम भोस्तुषकणोपहितान् हितार्थी ।

—*Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*. p. 4.

2. पशुश्चेन्निहतः स्वर्गं ज्योतिष्टोमे गमिष्यति ।
स्वपिता यजमानेन तत्र कस्मान्न हिंस्यते ॥

Ibid., p. 13.

distinction between a man and an animal and where is the necessity of any ethics ?

6. *Puruṣa*

The word *puruṣa* has many connotations in Indian philosophy. The more important of them are (i) Human beings (ii) *Brahman* and (iii) God or *Īśvara*. All of these are held responsible for misery by one or the other school of thought.

(i) *Human beings*: This school believes that there is no exterior cause of human miseries except the efforts of human beings themselves. There is complete freedom of will. A man may do whatever he likes. There are no limitations on our efforts. This is called theory of indeterminism as against the theory of determinism which is a modern name for fatalism.

This theory is quite congenial to ethics because it does not hold environments responsible for our actions of commission and omission. We cannot be charged for an immoral action which we did not commit of our own choice. Therefore, this theory believes in the capability of a man to choose a path of his own choice. Jainism supports this theory so far. But the force of circumstances should also be recognised, or else what is the use of our previous actions if they do not and cannot mould our present ? The past actions do not go for nought. They leave their impressions on us. We are, therefore, free only to the extent we have not curtailed our freedom by our own past actions.

(ii) *Brahman* : We have discussed above the case of materialism, holding matter to be the only reality. The *Vedāntists* hold just the opposite view. They hold consciousness to be the only reality. This one conscious entity, called *Brahman*, is the substantial as well as the instrumental cause of this universe. It pervades the whole universe.

Samantabhadra in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* has given the following implications of this theory :

“If we accept monism, no distinction between the doer and the action can be made. The existence of good and bad actions, pain and pleasure, this world and the next world, knowledge and nescience, and bondage and liberation, implies duality. And logical conclusion can be drawn only on the basis of two premises, which again imply

duality. If monism is based on scriptures and not on logic, dualism may also be said to be based on scriptures. Nothing is contradicted unless it exists ; and therefore non-duality, which contradicts duality, from this very fact accepts the existence of duality."¹

(iii) *God* : Many popular religions, together with some systems of philosophy, assert that there is an eternal Lord of the universe who creates, sustains and destroys it. It is He who sends us misery and happiness. Of course, according to some religions, He does so in accordance with the actions that we perform. Thus the idea of God is not always disconnected with the doctrine of *karman* in India. But Jainism does not hold it logical to believe that there is an eternal God ruling over the universe and sitting on us in judgment. Before we give reasons for it as forwarded by Jainism, let us examine what the popular religions like Christianity, Islam and Hinduism say about this interesting problem.

Popular theories about God

(A) *Hinduism* : The popular devotional approach of Hinduism towards God is best represented by the *Gītā*. God is all-in-all. We are just puppets in his hands. We should surrender ourselves unconditionally to the will of Almighty.² Nothing can be done without His will. He is situated in every heart, moving every body according to His will.³ The fruit of every good or bad action must be surrendered to Him.

It is, however, repeatedly told by Hindu Scriptures that the consequences of an action performed by a man must be borne by him. So there is no denying the responsibility.

(B) *Christianity* : Coming to Christianity, the old Testament presupposes the existence of God. It does not consider it necessary to give any arguments to prove it. It teaches us to worship one and one God alone and not to pay any attention to lesser deities.

1. *Āptamīmāṃsā*, 24-27.

2. *Gītā*, Madras, 1930. 18.66.

3. *Ibid.*, 18.61.

God is one.¹ He is Spirit,² holy and righteous,³ merciful and forgiving. He cares for the lowliest⁴. Jesus, who is the son of God, knows his father as no other can.⁵ Added to these two, God and His Christ, Spirit makes the Holy Trinity of Christianity complete. "The Father is the primal source, the son the mediating power, the spirit the executive energy ; and every Divine act is to be understood as a working of the Father, through the son, in and by the Holy Spirit."⁶

Evidently, there is not much difference between the idea of God as represented in these popular religions. In Christianity, the mediating power of Christ is an extra entity. He may be compared to the incarnation of Hinduism. The second thing is the denial of any deity other than God. In Hinduism also, Sikhism and Ārya Samāja show the same tendency.

(C) *Islam* : Islam lays even greater emphasis on Oneness of God. It condemns the trinity of Christianity in the following words : "Believe, therefore, in God and his apostles, and say not, "Threë" ; forbear, it will be better for you. God is only one God. Far be it from His Glory that He should have a son."⁷ "...And when God shall say : 'O Jesus, son of Mary, hast thou said unto mankind : Take me and my mother as two Gods beside God ?' He shall say : "Glory be unto thee ; it is not for me to say that which I know to be not true."⁸

Muslim theologians have given the following seven attributes of God : (i) Life (*hayāh*) (ii) Knowledge (*ilm*) (iii) Power (*qudra*) (iv) Will (*irāda*) (v) Hearing (*Sam*), (vi) Seeing (*baṣar*) and (vii) Speech (*Kalām*).⁹

All these attributes hardly make any difference for the ethical discussion with which we are concerned presently. The basic

1. Mark, 12.29 (*The Holy Bible*, London, year is not mentioned).

2. John, 4.24. (*The Holy Bible*).

3. John, 17.11, 25. (*The Holy Bible*).

4. Matthew, 6.30. (*The Holy Bible*).

5. Matthew, 11.27. (*The Holy Bible*).

6. Hastings, James, *E.R.E.* Vol. VI, p. 261.

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI. p. 300.

8. Hastings, James, *E.R.E.* Vol. VI., p. 300.

9. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 300.

truth about these theistic religions is that they all believe in one eternal God, who is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient and who is the author of not only this universe but also of our fate, miseries and happiness. Now, let us examine this contention.

The theory of God is based on the idea that every action must have an agent. So there should be some power which created this universe. Now, the question is whether the supposed creator created this universe out of nothing or out of some material which already existed. He could not create it out of nothing because nothing can be created out of nothing. "There is no existence out of non-existence nor is there destruction of what exists."¹ This is an axiomatic truth. The other alternative that God created this universe out of a pre-existent matter, leaves unanswered the question how a non-creative God suddenly became creative at a particular time.

Ethically also, theistic theory of creation is not free from doubts. "The Dilemma of Epicurus is still with us; if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then He is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if He has both the power and the will, whence then is evil."² W. D. Niven has tried to analyse the problem. There are, according to him, three alternatives : (1) God is not good or (2) He is not impotent or (3) Evil is not what it seems to be. He has discussed the pros and cons of every alternative and this is how he concludes : ".....Every proposed solution either leaves the old question unanswered or raises new ones. The problem is for the human mind insoluble."³

The so-called orthodox systems of Indian philosophy were also familiar with the difficulties about the theistic hypothesis. *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, a commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, says : ".....It becomes impossible to assume that the creation

1. नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।

—*Gītā*, 2.16.

Cf. *Pañcāstikāya*, Bombay, Vik. Saṃ. 1972, 15

2. W.R. Sorley and other, *The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human life*, p. 48. quoted from *ERE*, Vol. XXII, p. 1.

3. Hastings, James, *ERE*, Vol. VI. p. 324.

of the world was due to conscious action. For a God, whose wishes are all fulfilled, can have had no personal interest whatever in the creation for kindness, since before the creation souls suffered no pain.....from what could the kindness of God wish to have souls released? Further, a God who is actuated by kindness would create only joyful creatures."¹

Besides, *Kumārīlabhaṭṭa* in his *Śloka-vārtika*, has held that there could be no creator of this universe.² Even *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*, according to new researches, were originally atheistic.³ *Jaina view about God :*

Keeping in view all these difficulties in accepting a universal Lord of the world, the Jainas believe that the hypothesis that an eternal self-subsistent God made this world, which stood in need of maker, does not hold good. If God could be eternal and self-subsistent, there is no difficulty in holding that the universe, with all its constituent spiritual and material forces, is also eternal and self-subsistent. Substances, which are endowed with certain qualities, can produce new sets of qualities by the process of permutation and combination. These substances are independent of any external agency in their functioning and do not obey any superior power. Of what use is the inherent quality of a substance if it works only under God's supervision? If fire burns and water cools, it is not due to the will of God; it is due to their inherent qualities. To say that these inherent qualities were bestowed on these substances by God is also an impossibility. Can we imagine these substances bereft of their qualities at any time? Therefore, this physical world is ruled by physical law and not by any divine law.

This, however, does not mean that there is no God. "God is only the highest, noblest and fullest manifestation of the powers which lie latent in souls of men."⁴ There is no eternal God sitting upon judgement on human beings. Human souls themselves attain Godhood or *Siddhhood* by shedding away all impurities. Such human souls become completely free and

1. Miśra, Vācaspati, on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 57. cf. Also *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 228.
2. *Śloka-vārtika*, Calcutta, 1909, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 47-59; 74-88.
3. Hastings, James, *ERE*, Vol. II, p. 186.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, London, 1941, Vol. I, p. 331.

are possessed of infinite knowledge, potency, perception and bliss. These *Siddhas* are far more above gods or deities. They neither create nor destroy any thing. They have conquered, once for all, their nescience and passions and cannot be molested by them again.

These *Siddhas* do not and cannot return our prayers. They do not take the law in their hands so as to show to their devotees any grace or forgiveness for which there is no place in the strict law of *karman*. How can they, who have completely conquered attachment and aversion and are equanimous to all, be pleased or angry with anybody?

This does not mean that prayer has no place in Jaina-scheme of life. By meditating upon the attributes of *Siddhas* and by showing respect to them we neither flatter them nor please them but simply try to awaken in us the latent potentialities of Godhood. The *Siddhas* do not come to our rescue but a constant mental association with our ideal, through their medium, helps us in its realisation. Therefore, it is insisted that 'even though one may be inclined towards the knowledge of *padārthas*, and devotion of *tīrthanīkaras* and may have interest in the scriptures and may observe self-control and penance, yet *Nirvāṇa* is far away from him (without self-realisation)'.¹

Some objections to the doctrine of Karman

We have seen above that accidentalism has no scope in modern times. Nothing can fall outside the circle of cause and effect. The interacting causes may cooperate or oppose or neutralise one another in such an intricate manner that the resultant combinations are not predictable easily. If we do not know this intricate chain of causes, we may call an incident accidental; but all the same, it is not without cause. On the same ground, the theories of Time, Nature or Blind Fate or Matter can be dismissed as overlooking the universal rule that there is no effect without a cause

1. सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।

दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपओत्तस्स ॥

—*Pañcāstikāya*, 170.

and there is no cause without an effect. Logically, we have noticed, that even a creator God cannot be the author of our fate. In fact, we are left with no other alternative but to accept that man is the architect of his own fate. Our deeds are like the seeds, the fruits of which are the miseries and happiness of life. 'Vidhi', the *Saṃskṛta* word for destiny, literally means a 'law' and not accident. Every belief, liking, disliking and tendency of life goes to form our temperament, inclinations and capabilities. Every thought, word and deed bears its full fruit. Thus the doctrine of *Karman* involves a great faith in human effort. In spite of this inevitability of the doctrine of *karman* for all moral considerations, Western scholars do not agree with it. As examples, we quote below some of the important objections raised against the doctrine of *Karman* by Mr. John Mckenzie in his book "*Hindu Ethics*" :

(i) "The kind of actions that are supposed to produce good and bad fruits respectively, are by no means always actions that most of us would regard as ethically good and bad."¹

(ii) "Reward and punishment are given twice over, once in heaven or hell, and again in a new birth on earth."²

(iii) "The idea of the grace of God is in contradiction to the *Karma* doctrine."³

(iv) "The doctrine of *Karman* makes our admiration of pain and suffering endured by men for the sake of others absurd."⁴

(v) Mckenzie thinks that one should not demand justification for suffering which humanity endures.

(vi) Mckenzie thinks that in the theory of *Karman* no provision is made for the intentions underlying the action of the doer and that the doctrine works mechanically and does not take the psychological aspect of morality into consideration.

(vii) Doctrine of *Karman* implies fatalism and leaves no room for human efforts.

1. Mckenzie, John, *Hindu Ethics*, London, 1922, p. 218.

2. Ibid., p. 220.

3. Ibid., p. 223.

4. Ibid., p. 224.

These objections have been raised by a scholar like Mckenzie and need careful examination. Here below we would endeavour to examine them one by one :

The first objection can be raised against three types of actions : (a) to quote Mckenzie himself, 'many kinds of rituals and magical acts'; (b) such negative and individual virtues as non-violence and meditation; (c) acts of kindness to small insects and animals, which are hardly considered to be ethical by Western thinkers. As far as the rituals are concerned they do form a part of popular religion in India as elsewhere. Whether we believe in doctrine of *karman* or not, popular forms of religion always develop certain rituals, which are important for religious discipline in life. Of course, these rituals become meaningless in the absence of a genuine moral consciousness. The institution of sacrifice (*yajña*), when it lost its moral background, was condemned not only by the Jainas and the Buddhists but by the *Upaniṣads* also.

As regards the negative virtues, like non-violence, it may be pointed out that negation of evil is also an important part of ethics. Similarly, virtues like meditation may not come under morality according to Western scholars; in fact, they think that only those virtues which have a social bearing can be termed as ethical. But society is made up of individuals; and, therefore, to exclude virtues which lift up the individual from the realm of morality will not be proper.

As regards such actions as showing kindness to small insects, we should remember that Jainism particularly believes in equality of all life. Man is superior to other animals; but that does not give him the licence to tyrannise them. They demand as much of our attention as other fellow beings in the society. The Christian conception that beasts are made for men is not acceptable to *Karmavādins*, who believe in the theory of reincarnation; and, therefore, believe that an animal in this birth may have been a human being in his previous birth.

(ii) Mckenzie seems to confuse the Vedic conception of the other world, which does not conceive of rebirth, with the later conception of hell and heaven, which is much more

rational. It is not necessary, according to *karmavādins* to take birth on earth for receiving punishment or reward for past deeds. Even going to hell or heaven is a sort of rebirth. It is wrong to say that the same deeds are punished or rewarded twice, once in hell or heaven and again in a new birth on earth. One deed yields its fruit only once; it may be either in hell or heaven or on earth. A deed which has yielded its fruit once exhausts, and cannot yield the same fruit again.

(iii) It is perfectly true, as already explained, that the idea of 'grace of God' is in contradiction to the doctrine of *Karman*. But where is the necessity of bringing in a merciful God in human affairs? 'Man thou art thy own friend, why wishest thou a friend beyond thyself?', asks the Jaina scripture, *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*.¹ The doctrine of *Karman* teaches us self-dependence and not dependence on some imaginary grace of an imaginary God.

(iv) Here Mckenzie seems to miss the distinction between the real point of view (*nīścayanaya*) and practical point of view (*vyavahāranaya*). The former takes substantial cause to be main factor whereas the latter takes instrumental cause to be predominating.² Both of them are to be taken in their proper perspective. From the real point of view nobody can inherit the acts of others and every body suffers the results of his actions all alone. Therefore, we cannot share the miseries of others. On this view-point is based the conduct of a monk, whose life is devoted to the higher cause of self realisation and emancipation. He is above social obligations. His contribution to the society is limited to the spiritual enlightenment that he gives and of which he is a living embodiment.

The case of a householder is different. His conduct is based on practical point of view. He is always ready to help his fellow beings. To undergo sufferings for others is a highly meritorious action and strongly recommended for a householder. If a householder shirks helping his fellow beings under the pretext of being unable to share the miseries of

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.3.3.4. Max Müller. (ed.), SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 33.

2. आत्माश्रितो निश्चयनयः पराश्रितो व्यवहारनयः ।

—Amṛtacandra on *Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, *gāthā* 272. (p. 352).

anybody else, he is a great hypocrite, who tries to rationalise or justify his selfish motives by quoting the scriptures.

Our obligations, therefore, vary as we ascend the ladders of spirituality. Spiritual realisation and not social service is the ultimate aim of life. But social service can and often does prove a stepping stone to spiritual realisation.

(v) The answer to this question is simple. There should be a cause for every effect. The sufferings, which humanity endures, should have also some cause. It will be a pity to accept that anybody can be miserable without any moral lapse on his part. It amounts to suggest that even a moral man can be miserable and even an immoral man can be happy. Then we will have to confess that there is no justice in the universe. If we believe in God, it must be admitted as a sheer cruelty on His part to inflict miseries on innocent creatures. If we do not believe in God we will have to say that the fates of human beings depend either on the vagaries of nature or on mere accident. We have already indicated that this is not tenable. Why should, after all, an action be considered good or right if it does not bring any good to the agent ?

(vi) The doctrine of *Karman*, as expounded by Jainism, takes notice of the 'motives' behind actions fully. There are two aspects of an action : (i) psychological or subjective; and (ii) physical or objective. The law of *Karman* is inexorable, but it does not mean that it is mechanical. The same action may yield different results in accordance with the motive of the agent. There are examples where a lesser sin was met with heavier punishment on account of the intensity of the feeling of the agent. The story of *Tandulamatsya*, a small fish, sitting in the ear of a bigger fish, can be quoted in this connection.¹ The bigger fish was eating smaller fishes while the *Tandulamatsya* looked on. The bigger fish ate some of the fishes and left others. The *Tandulamatsya* always thought that had he been in the place of the bigger fish he would not have left a single fish alive. Merely by entertaining this violent idea with great intensity the *Tandulamatsya* had to go to lower hells than the bigger fish who actually committed

1. *Upāsakādhyāyana*, pp. 141-142.

the sin of violence. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the doctrine of *Karman* does not take into account the psychological aspect of our actions.

(vii) The last, but not the least, objection against the doctrine of *Karman* is its fatalistic tendency. This question needs to be examined in greater detail, for it is a complicated problem of Jaina ethics. Even in modern times there are as many views regarding this question as there are sub-sects in Jainism. Great controversy seems to continue even among the thinkers of the same sect and, therefore, the question requires a careful study.

The question is : is it possible and consistent to hold the view that freedom of will exists, while accepting the doctrine of *Karman* ? In other words, while admitting the inevitable forces of habit, inherited character and circumstances, can one rise above these and move in a different direction ? If one can, then alone the ethical commandments, whether negative or positive, have any meaning and then only can we hold somebody morally responsible for his actions.

Modern thinkers have shown how a deterministic view of life makes one irresponsible towards moral obligations. Pringle Pattison says that on the basis of determinism one may "really seek to excuse himself in sequel, by trying to show that it was impossible for a man with his particular antecedents to act otherwise than he did .."¹ Butler dismissed necessity with a 'disrespect amounting to contempt'² from the same point of view. According to this view, the course of things cannot be changed ; and praise and blame, punishment, obligation and the hope of progress are illusions.

Kant has viewed this problem from two different angles.³ Man, as an intellectual, demands coherence in experience. Character is empirical from this point of view, i.e. it falls under the law of causation. But as intelligent moral beings, we feel that we fix our ends for ourselves. Viewed from this angle, man seems to possess freedom of will. How to reconcile these

1. Pattison, Pringle, *The Philosophical Radicals*, Edn. 1907, p. 101.

2. Gladstone W.E., *Studies subsidiary to Butler's Works*, Oxford, 1896, p. 268.

3. Hastings, James, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VI, p. 124.

two views is the problem before a thinker on moral problems. He cannot reject either of them and yet it seems difficult to accept both because of their apparently contradictory nature.

Dr. Green has pointed out that 'if I could be something today irrespective of what I was yesterday, or something tomorrow irrespective of what I am today, the motive to the self-reforming effort, furnished by regrets, for a part of which I reap the fruit, that growing success of the effort that comes with habituation, and the assurance of a better future which animates it, would alike be impossible.'¹ Mr. W. James, on the other hand, says that free will gives some ground of hope to those who feel the burden of the past and thus is 'a doctrine of relief.'²

Jaina View on Freedom of Will

It has been already pointed out above that Jainism neither rejects fate nor efforts. *Samantabhadra* has attributed our success or failure to the following three factors : (1) *Bhavitavyatā* or fate (2) *Upādānakāraṇa* or substantial cause, which means human efforts (*puṇyārtha*) in the case of human beings³ (3) *Nimittakāraṇa* or instrumental cause which includes past actions and the forced circumstances. Thus there are many, and not one, factors which act and counteract in the process of liberation. No action takes place in isolation. Our efforts are affected by our circumstances. But it does not mean that we are puppets in the hands of circumstances.

Nevertheless, future is predictable to some extent. In *Dvādaśānupreṣā* it has been said that process of birth or death of a person is already known to the omniscient *Jinas* and nobody can change it.⁴ *Padmapurāṇa* says that a person gets a

1. Green, T.H., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1899. p. 129.

2. James, W., *Pragmatism*, New York, 1948, p. 121.

3. अलंघ्यशक्तिर्भवितव्यतेयं
हेतुर्द्वयाऽऽविष्कृत-कार्ये लिङ्गा ।
—*Śvayambhūstotra*, 33.

4. जं जस्स जम्मि देसे जेण विहाणेण जम्मि कालम्मि ।
णादं जिणेण णियदं जम्मं वा अहव मरणं वा ॥
तं तस्स तस्मि देसे तेण विहाणेण तम्मि कालम्मि ।
को सक्कदि वारेदुं इंदो वा अह जिणिंदो वा ॥

Kārtikeyānupreṣā, Agas, 1960. 321-322.

thing at a time and place predetermined by fate.¹ In *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, a verse is quoted which says that our intellect, effort, and helpers turn the same way as our destiny.²

Now, if we accept so in absolute sense, then all moral teachings become futile. It is no use telling a person what he should or should not do, if he has no freedom of choice. The dangers of determinism are evident. It may paralyze all our efforts. It may make us immoral. Therefore, generally the *Ācāryas* speak about determinism with great caution. They generally praise human efforts and avoid referring to determinism. But all the same truth has to be faced. The theory of omniscience and the theory of *karman* do favour determinism in a certain sense. But they need neither paralyze our effort nor make us immoral. Let us explain it.

Kundakunda says that all of us have two-fold consciousness (i) knowledge-consciousness (*jñānacetanā*) (ii) Action-consciousness (*karmacetanā*).³ Knowledge consciousness means the state of absolute freedom from the sense of being an agent of an action (*karṭṛtvabhāvanā*) : In this state of knowledge-consciousness, the soul remains absorbed in its pure intrinsic, blissful, conscious state. It has no desire or initiative for action. This is a state of supra-moral plane of life which is beyond good and bad both. This is not a state of inertia but a state of sense of fulfilment of the purpose of life. This is the ultimate end of life. Determinism paralyzes not only the good activities but bad activities also and what remains is the pure consciousness of blissful nature of the self. This is spoken of

1. यत्प्राप्तव्यं यदा येन यत्र यावद्यतोऽपि वा ।

तत्प्राप्यते तदा तेन तत्र तावत्ततो ध्रुवम् ॥

—*Padmapurāṇa*, Kāshī, 1959, 29.83.

2. तादृशी जायते बुद्धिर्व्यवसायश्च तादृशः ।

सहायास्तादृशाः सन्ति यादृशी भवितव्यता ॥

—Quoted by Sūri, Vidyānandī, on *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Rājāgar, Vik. Saṁ. 1993, 5.

3. परिणमदि चेदणाए आदा पुण चेदणा तिधाभिमदा ।

सा पुण णाणे कम्मे फलम्पि वा कम्मणो भणिदा ॥

—*Pravacanasāra*, 2.31.

as the real point of view. This is a state of complete freedom from attachment and aversion.

From practical point of view, however, it is action-consciousness (*karmacetanā*) which predominates. The aspirant has not as yet risen above the sense of being an agent of an action (*karṣṭvabhāvanā*). He has, therefore, not transcended moral obligations of life. He has not wiped away passions and has, therefore, always to choose between the good and bad. Herein comes the role of human efforts (*puṣārtha*). We cannot escape the responsibility of being overpowered by passions if we choose to follow the immoral path. A common man cannot be led by consideration of determinism, which is a feature of knowledge-consciousness (*jñānacetanā*) only. Knowledge-consciousness is not to be confused with action-consciousness, because both of them are exclusive of each other and cannot exist side by side. A man with action-consciousness aims at knowledge-consciousness, but it is not possible to attain knowledge-consciousness without perfect detachment. The path to supra-ethical plane of life is only through practical path of morality and not through immorality.

The doctrine of *karman*, therefore, does not license us to act in a wanton manner. The ultimate aim is the complete cessation of all activities and attainment of knowledge-consciousness and from this point of view determinism may be justified, but a man with action-consciousness has no knowledge of future and from his standpoint of view everything is indetermined. It is only his effort and exertion which brings him nearer his goal.

Paṇḍita Ṭoḍara Māla has put the problem in this way¹ : The self makes effort and brings about its liberation. Other factors of time or fate or subsidisation of delusive *karmans* synchronise with human efforts. Efforts on the part of self automatically imply that the time and fate is favourable and the delusive *karmans* have subsided. It is human efforts (*puṣārtha*) which leads to liberation ; the other two factors of time and fate are passive. In fact, we have no knowledge of our future ; and even though it may be determined we can depend only on our efforts.

1. Ṭoḍaramāla, *Mokṣamārgapṛakāśa*, Mathurā, 1948, pp. 279-280.

We have here tried to show that the doctrine of *karman* of which partial determinism is a corollary, neither teaches us to be immoral or idle nor does it deprive us of the right of improving our lot by overcoming the force of circumstances and past actions. Even an inherited character is the making of the agent and he can blame nobody for impairing his freedom of will except himself.

This problem of 'freedom of will' can be viewed from another angle also. No action takes place in seclusion. Human beings are also affected by circumstances and environment. The main factor, however, remains human effort (*puruṣārtha*). Here we accept the existence of freedom of will over circumstances. The position is like this : there are two types of causes, (i) substantial cause (*Upādānakāraṇa*) and (ii) instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). The inherent power of the agent is the substantial cause and every other factor is only an instrumental cause. It is the substantial cause which predominates and the instrumental causes merely subsidise. The reality is that no object can interfere with the working of another object, whether animate or inanimate. The self accordingly is the agent of its own psychic modifications (*paryāyas*). It is only from practical point of view that we speak of ātman as the agent of various activities. Jainism believes in the independence of each and every object. Our freedom implies freedom of others also. Therefore, *Kundakundacārya* favours *svakartṛvāda*, viz. the idea that the self is the agent of its own modification; but rejects *parakartṛvāda*, viz. that the self can interfere in the activities of others.¹

This attitude, which gives subsidiary position to instrumental causes, accepts the doctrine of freedom of will and glorifies human efforts. This attitude makes Jaina ethics inclined towards introversion also. 'The self, within self, satisfied with self' is the motto of all individualistic systems of philosophy. This has a far-reaching impact on Jaina ethics, as will be observed during our study at many places. Extroversion, whether it is due to our incapability of self-control or for the cause of social service, never leads us nearer the goal. It is

rather withdrawal from the outside world which takes us nearer to self-realisation.

Here again, we are faced with the danger of an immoral man defending himself on the ground that he is not the real agent of the action for which he is being blamed. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* refers to some schools of philosophy known as *akriyāvādins*.¹ The adherents of *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhists are reckoned as *Akriyāvādins*.² According to *Sāṅkhya*, the *puruṣa* or self is transcendental and does not participate in mundane activities. According to Buddhists, and *Śūnyavādins* also, either the self changes every moment or it does not exist at all. It is clear that these systems are faced with a dilemma. Either they have to accept that the self suffers for such actions which he does not perform or they have to deny the common-place experience that the self suffers.

The *Kriyāvādins* are those who ascribe the quality of activity or non-activity to soul (*ātman*).³ Jacobi thinks that they were perhaps the ritualists because *Śilāṅka* informs us that the *Kriyāvādins* held constructions of sanctuaries (*caityakarma*) to be the principal means of attainment of liberation.⁴ Sometimes, even the Jainas are mentioned as *Kriyāvādins*.⁵

We have explained above the position of Jainism in this respect. To take a concrete example, a murderer may try to get rid of the responsibility of the murder either by (i) saying that he is not the agent of the action or by (ii) contending that the death of the victim has been brought about by his own actions and that he is merely an instrumental cause in the murder. Both of these arguments can be counteracted, according to Jainism, effectively. As regards his first argument, he may not be an agent of death of the victim but he is an agent of entertaining the idea of murdering the victim and then he is also responsible for acting in a way which led to the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot escape the

1. Max Müller (ed.), SBE. Vol. XLV, p. 316.

2. Ibid., p. 316, foot-note 3.

3. Ibid., p. 83, foot-note 2.

4. Ibid., p. 242, foot-note 3.

5. Ibid., p. 319, foot-note 2.

cf. *Mahāvagga*, Bihar, 1956, 6.19.31.

moral responsibility. Similarly, we can answer his second argument : though he is an instrumental cause as far as the death of the victim is concerned, yet he is the substantial cause of the idea of violence in which the victim had no hand.

Thus the realisation of predominance of substantial cause should lead to self-absorption and not to wanton activities.

Conclusion

We have tried to discuss some fundamental problems of Jaina ethics in this chapter. From this discussion some of the chief characteristics of Jaina ethics can also be inferred. Here, below we mention a few of the salient features of Jaina view of life :

Firstly, Jaina ethics is based on the fundamental doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). This has saved Jaina-ethics from being one-sided. Jaina ethics always takes into account all the different views and tries to reconcile them. We have seen, for example, that various factors of time, nature, fate, accident and matter find their proper place in Jaina view of life. The approach of Jainism towards opponent schools of thought is constructive and not destructive. We can mention how non-absolutistic view led to the balanced view between such opposite conceptions as that of practical morality and transcendental morality, between fate and human efforts, between *karṭvāda*, and *akarṭvāda* and between the efficacy of substantial cause and instrumental cause. Many more instances can be added to the list. In fact, we shall feel the impact of non-absolutism at every step during the course of our study. All other characteristics of Jaina view of life may be said to be the corollary of this one main characteristic.

Secondly, Jaina ethics does not confuse the science of spirituality (*mokṣaśāstra*) with science of social righteousness (*dharmaśāstra*). It has thus been able to distinguish the essential nature of dharma from its non-essential beliefs, which change from time to time and place to place. The acts of public welfare (*iṣṭāpūrta*) can be dealt with separately in books of social sciences; but they should not be confused with the essential problem of ethics which is emancipation. On account of the influence of sister religions like Hinduism, the

Jainācāryas also spoke of social duties, including duties towards city, nation and family; but they never confused them with *Mokṣasāstra*, which—they are very clear on this point—deals with the conquest of animal passions (*kaṣāyavijaya*) in man.

Thirdly, Jaina ethics lays emphasis on the unity of faith, knowledge and conduct. Thus Jaina ethics is not merely a system giving certain code of morality, but it is a religion to be lived in practice. There are many adherents of Jainism, both among householders and monks, who scrupulously practise the rules of conduct in their lives. Thus, it is a living system of ethics. Its study becomes more fascinating if we compare the lives of the present Jaina householders and monks with the rules given in their scriptures. Equal emphasis on faith, knowledge and conduct saves Jaina ethics from being either a mere speculation of philosophy or merely a religion of rituals.

Fourthly, Jaina ethics assigns primary place to the life of a monk and the life of a householder occupies only a secondary place. It is due to this fact that Jaina ethics lays more emphasis on individual and ascetic virtues than on social and positive virtues. The ultimate aim of life being liberation, nothing short of complete renunciation of the mundane life could satisfy Jaina *ācāryas*.

Fifthly, Jaina ethics is based neither on oneness of life as in *Vedānta*, nor on momentary nature of self as in Buddhism. It is based on equality of life. Basically, all souls are equal. Therefore, no wonder that such precepts as non-violence in Jainism take into account not only the human beings or animals or insects but even plant-life or one-sensed elemental life, like water etc.

Sixthly, the social organisation as anticipated by Jaina ethics, does not make any distinction on the basis of caste, creed or colour. At present, however, the Jaina society has borrowed caste system from Hinduism and observes it as strictly as the latter.

CHAPTER II

THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

We have already spoken of the close relation of ethics and metaphysics in the foregoing chapter. The *Daśavaikālika sūtra* asks, "one, who does not know the self and the non-self, how can he know the path to self-control (*saṁyama*)".¹ In this connection, we have also referred to the seven predicaments of Jainism.² We propose to elaborate the following seven predicaments in the present chapter as they form the metaphysical background of Jaina ethics :

1. Self (*jīva*)
2. Non-self (*ajīva*)
- 3, 4. The inflow of *kārmic* matter (*āśrava*) and bondage (*bandha*).
- 5, 6. Checking (*saṁvara*) and shedding (*nirjarā*) of *kārmic* matter.
7. Liberation (*mokṣa*).³

The Nature of Self (jīva)

The first of these predicaments is 'self' (*jīva*). Self is subject as well as object of all meditation. The nature of self is, therefore, the most fundamental of all problems. Self is the stay of all our experience. It is the truth of truths. But for it, there is neither any reality nor any truth.

The Upaniṣads

According to the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* the basic problem of ethics—the removal of misery—can be solved only by self-realisation.⁴ The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* clearly says that it is

1. *Daśavaikālika*, 4.12

2. *Supra*, p. 13.

3. *Tatvārthasūtra*, 1.4.

4. तरति शोकमात्मवित् । *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. 7.1.3.

the self which we should perceive, hear, of which we should meditate.¹

The Cārvāka view

To the category of *Cārvāka* view philosophers, there is only one reality and that is 'matter'. Self is body, characterised by consciousness.² It is wrong to say that matter cannot possess consciousness. Just as the mixtures of certain ingredients give birth to the power of intoxication, similarly combination of certain material elements results in consciousness.³ On the dissolution of body, the self is annihilated.⁴

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view

The first and foremost to give proof of the existence of soul are the *Naiyāyikas*. They hold that the existence of a permanent *jīvātman* can be proved through inference and authority.⁵

Nyāyasūtra has given the following signs to prove the existence of *ātman* (i) desire, (ii) hatred, (iii) effort, (iv) pleasure, (v) pain and (vi) consciousness.⁶ *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* added the following to these : (i) The vital airs—*prāṇa* and *apāna* (ii) the closing and opening of eyelids, (iii) state of living (iv) the movements of mind; and (v) the affections.⁷

The *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* systems hold that *ātman* is essentially non-conscious and consciousness becomes manifest in it only by its association with mind, sense-organs and objects of contact.⁸ The state of liberation is, therefore, a state of complete non-

1. आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

—*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.5.

2. तच्चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एवात्मा ।

Sarvadarśanasamgraha, p. 3.

3. किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवच्चैतन्यमुपजायते ।

Ibid., p. 2.

4. न प्रेत्य संजास्ति । *Bṛhaspatīsūtra* 2.4.12. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 3.

5. *Vātsyāyana* on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.9.

6. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.10.

7. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 3.2.4.

8. Jayantabhaṭṭa on *Nyāyasūtra*, Benaras, 1934, pt. II, 1.1.9., pp. 4-7.

consciousness. *Vātsyāyana* clearly states that there can be no bliss in the state of liberation.¹

The Sāṅkhya system

The *Sāṅkhya* system believes in a permanent soul,² but all visible conscious activities of knowing, feeling and willing are attributed to the workings of three *guṇas* of matter attached to it.

The conception of *liṅgaśarīra* or subtle body is peculiar to the *Sāṅkhya* system. It is this subtle body which is the substratum of consciousness, which gets awakened by its association with soul. This subtle body is also the vehicle of merit and demerit. It accompanies the soul on its wanderings from one body to another.³ Conscious life is a bondage of pain which includes pleasure also. Salvation means the existence of soul individually in an isolated condition free from all conscious activities after the dissolution of the subtle body. Thus, according to *Sāṅkhya*, it is the *liṅgaśarīra*, which is bound; the soul remains detached.⁴

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The existence of *ātman* as distinguished from body, is implied in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system. Attainment of heaven by performing actions implies that *ātman* is different from body. In this connection, the arguments given by the *Vedāntist* are acceptable to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* also. But it does not believe in the unity of soul. It attributes the qualities of knowledge, activity and experience to the soul.⁵

The Vedānta school

All systems given above, except the *Cārvāka* system, are dualistic and realistic in nature. *Vedānta*, on the other hand, is monistic in nature. It believes that all reality is reduced

1. *Vātsyāyana* on *Nyāyasūtra*, I 1.22,

2. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. 17.

3. *Ibid.*, 40-42.

4. *Ibid.*, 62.

5. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, London. 1956, Vol. II, pp. 407-409.

to one in the ultimate analysis. This system is diametrically opposed to *Cārvāka* in as much as *Cārvāka* holds matter to be the only reality whereas *Vedānta* holds spirit to be the only reality. As far as its realisation is concerned, it is the substratum and subject of all knowledge, and therefore, self-evident.¹ *Śaṅkarācārya* in his commentary upon *Brahmasūtra* has explained the oneness of all souls. The reality of self is infinite, the unreality which is to be got rid of is finite.

Mention may also be made of the distinction of empirical self and transcendental self. Empirical self is a creation of illusion. The transcendental self is, on the other hand, free from all miseries. All moral responsibilities lie with the empirical self.²

The Jaina view

Neminātha Siddhānta Cakravartī gives the following nine attributes of self. According to *Brahmadeva's* commentary these nine attributes stand in contradiction to one or the other school of thought. We give these nine attributes and explain them according to the commentary of *Brahmadeva* :

(i) It is a conscious entity. Here self is conceived as distinct from matter. This, according to *Brahmadeva*, refutes the *Cārvāka* view of self.

(ii) It is endowed with apprehension and knowledge. This refutes the *Naiyāyika* view of self.

(iii) It is an intangible entity. By saying this the *Mīmāṃsā* school of thought is refuted.

(iv) It is the agent of actions. This quality is by way of refutation of *Sāṅkhya* system.

(v) It is co-extensive with the body which is animated by it. This view refutes the views of *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Sāṅkhya* systems.

(vi) It is the enjoyer of the fruit of its actions. This goes to refute the momentary theory of the Buddhists.

(vii) It passes through births and deaths. This view goes against the followers of *Sadāśīva* cult, which most probably

1. *Śaṅkara on Vedāntasūtra*, Bombay, 1917, 2.3.7.

2. Dasgupta, S., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1932, Vol. I, p. 476.

held the view that the phenomena of transmigration is merely an illusion and that the soul is ever liberated.

(viii) It gets liberation. This goes against the view of *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Cārvāka*.

(ix) It has a natural potentiality of upward motion. This quality has been stated by way of refutation of *Māṇḍalika* philosophy.¹

The nine qualities of self given above fairly summarise the Jaina view of self. It may be pointed out that even though the different systems of philosophy have many differences about the nature of self from the point of view of metaphysics, they do not differ regarding the basic moral principles which are the only means of self-realisation. For example the fifth quality, mentioned above, viz. whether the self is atomic in size or all-pervasive or it expands and contracts according to the size of body, does not affect the ethical behaviour and, therefore, need not detain us.

The fourth quality, mentioned above, viz., whether *ātman* is the agent or not is rather significant. Another question of importance is whether *ātman* is endowed with consciousness or not. Last, but not the least, is the question of oneness or otherwise of soul.

The empirical self and the transcendental self

The differences in various schools of thought regarding these problems, are not so important ethically. A clear distinction is to be made between the empirical self and transcendental self.² From empirical point of view, the self is the agent of actions and it undergoes such experiences as those of pain and pleasure. The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school seems to emphasise the empirical nature of self. From transcendental point of view, the self is pure, unalloyed and free from material pollution. The *Sāṅkhya* system seems to emphasise this aspect of self.

Jainism, true to its tradition of non-absolutism, takes both these aspects into consideration together. The empirical

1. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Delhi, 1956, 2.

2. *Samayasāra*, 7.

self is the self with *kārmāṇa śarīra*. We have *adṛṣṭa* in *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *kāraṇa śarīra* (casual body) in *Sāṅkhyayoga* corresponding to *kārmāṇaśarīra* of Jainism. In *Vedānta* also, we have a conception of empirical self which, though an illusion, is to be accepted for all practical purposes.

As far as transcendental nature of self is concerned, it is, according to Jain view, possessed of only one distinguishing quality of consciousness, which distinguishes it from matter.¹ Here Jainism resembles more or less the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* systems and differs from *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* and *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* who, as already pointed out, do not consider consciousness as the essential quality of self. The transcendental nature of self means its state of pure existence. The self, which is bound, gets emancipated by efforts and shines in its pure intrinsic form.

Different Categories of empirical self

While making this distinction between the empirical and transcendental nature of self, we have seen that it is not possible to classify transcendental self into any categories. But the empirical self is classified into many categories from different points of view. A brief description of these categories of empirical self will be helpful in understanding the Jain doctrines of ethics, especially the doctrine of non-violence.

Based on intellect (manas)²

From the point of view of intellect, the *jīvas* are of two types : (i) Having a mind. *jīvas* of this class are possessed of a faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong. Some of the five-sensed *jīvas* are included in this category e.g. men. (ii) Having no mind. All the *jīvas* having one to four senses as also some of the five-sensed *jīvas* are included in this category.

Based on biology³

From the point of view of biology, the *jīvas* are of two

1. ...णिच्चयणवदो दु चेदणा जस्स ।

Dravyasaṅgraha, 3.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2. 11.

3. *Ibid.*, 2.12, 14.

types : (i) mobile and (ii) immobile. The latter include the four elemental-bodied *jīvas*, viz. (a) earth-bodied (*prthvikāyika*), (b) water-bodied (*apikāyika*), (c) fire-bodied (*tejasikāyika*), (d) air-bodied (*vāyukāyika*) and (e) vegetable-bodied (*vanaspatikāyika*).¹ All these immobile *jīvas* have only one sense of touch. These *jīvas* do not explicitly manifest the signs of life. But since they also show the tendency to grow and decay, they are supposed to be possessed of life. The Jaina doctrine of non-violence is, therefore, not confined only to men or animals but embraces these mute, immobile *jīvas* also.

The mobile souls, have two to five senses. The one-sensed (*ekendriya*) souls have four *prāṇas* (vitalities) viz. touch, power of body, age and respiration.² The two-sensed souls have six *prāṇas*, the above four plus the sense of taste and power of speech. The three-sensed souls add to these six, the sense of smell. The four-sensed souls add to the above seven, the sense of sight. All five-sensed souls add to the above eight, the sense of hearing; whereas the rational (*samanaska*) five-sensed souls have one more *prāṇa*, the power of mind.³

Thus, though all souls are equal in their transcendental form, they vary in degrees of *prāṇas* from empirical point of view. It is this distinction which makes taking of vegetable life less violent than taking away animal life or human life.

Western View Vs. Indian View

Though it is neither possible nor desirable to deal with Western view of self in detail here, yet some important points may be noted because Western thinkers have also contemplated on the problem of self with the same enthusiasm as Eastern thinkers have done.

The common-place view of man's personality, resembling more or less *Cārvāka* way of thinking, is put by W. James in these words :

"In its widest possible sense, however, a man's ME is the sum-total of all that he can call his; not only his

1. *Tatvārthasūtra*, 2.13.

2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Ibid.*, 2.30.

3. *Ibid.*, 2.24.

body and his psychic powers, but his clothes, and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and work, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down; not necessarily in the same degree for every thing, but in much the same way for all".¹

Obviously, W. James is enumerating the possessions of the self but not the possessor, who is the real self. This tendency of identifying the self with non-self is said to be the result of infatuation in Jainism. In this respect, Mr. Hume observes :

"For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself', I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 'myself' at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of 'myself', and may truly be said not to exist."²

W. James has identified the self with external objects whereas Mr. Hume has the inner ideas of love and hatred etc. identified with the self. This identification of the self either with the external possession (*bāhyaparigraha*) or with inner possession (*āntarikaparigraha*) is natural to man who is to get rid of them through knowledge and self-realisation.

Thus, there is a basic difference between the Eastern approach and Western approach to the problem of self and personality. This is how Zimmer has summarised this : The term 'personality' is derived from the Latin word 'persona' which means the mask that is worn over his face by an actor. Indian philosophy insists upon discriminating between the actor and the mask, which is not the true self, but only a veil that hides it. Western philosophy, on the other hand, has annulled this distinction. The 'self' and the mask of

1. James, William, *Psychology*, New York, 1920. p. 176.

2. Hume, David, *A Treatise of human Nature*, London, 1951, Vol. I, p. 239.

personality have become identical in the West. Indian philosophy, on the other hand, aims at piercing through the layers of manifest personality so as to arrive at the actor of life, who from times immemorial has been assuming various personalities.¹

This fundamental difference between the East and West makes it difficult to appreciate the ethical conceptions of each other. The West is engaged in developing means for full growth of personality whereas the East is concerned with the inner self, which is hidden behind the visible personality and is far beyond the limits of this short span of our life.

Non-self (ajīva)

The views about the matter can be summarised by classifying them into two categories. The first category of thinkers holds that every outer object is a projection of mind. *Vedānta* amongst orthodox systems and *Yogācāra* sect of Buddhism are of this view. The other group of thinkers holds that perception of mind is an image of the real, outside world. With the exception of the above mentioned two schools, all systems of Indian philosophy belong to this category.

The Cārvāka system

Amongst realists, the *Cārvāka* system holds the first place. They hold that the earth, water, fire and air are real and they are the only reality.² They attribute even consciousness to matter³

The Sāṅkhya system

Sāṅkhya system is dualistic. In addition to *Prakṛti*, it believes in *īśvara* also. But the conception of *prakṛti* in *Sāṅkhya* is that even such conscious objects as mind or intellect are the outcome of *prakṛti*. This *prakṛti* is subtler than the atoms of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system. It has three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is called *avyakta* because it is not manifest, *pradhāna* because it is the primary cause of universe. The effects (*vikṛtis*)

1. Zimmer, H., *Philosophies of India*, pp. 236-37.

2. *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, p. 2.

3. चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चेतन्यमुपजायते । Ibid., p. 7.

of this *prakṛti* are sixteen, the five *jñānendriyas*, five *karmendriyas*, mind and the five elements. The seven *prakṛtivyākṛti*, *mahattattva*, *ahankāra* and five *tanmātrās* are also the effect of *prakṛti*.¹ Thus excepting *puruṣa*, which is neither a cause nor an effect, *prakṛti* is the cause of every object in this world. The cause, according to *Sāṅkhya*, is not fundamentally different from effect.² This is known as *satkāryavāda*.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system

The *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system believes that effect is basically different from the cause. This is known as *ārambhavāda*.³ The matter or *prakṛti* is not held to be one in *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system. It is composed of atoms (*paramāṇu*). The sixth part of a dust particle which is visible in the rays of sun coming from a ventilation is called a *paramāṇu*. The combination of two such *paramāṇus*, form one *dvyāṇu*, three *dvyāṇus* form one *trasareṇuka* and four *trasareṇukas* form one *catureṇuka*. It is only *trasareṇuka* which can be perceived. It is from *catureṇukas* that the creation proceeds.⁴ Thus *Vaiśeṣika* is a pluralistic system which holds that matter has its own independent existence.

The Mīmāṃsā system

As far as *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is concerned, many of the thinkers believe in *paramāṇuvāda* but others do not.⁵ Even those who believe, differ from *Vaiśeṣikas* regarding its size. They believe that *paramāṇu* can be perceived and the dust particles are visible in the rays of the sun.⁶

1. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 3.

2. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9.

3. Bahaduri, S. *Studies in Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, Metaphysics. Poona, 1947, p. 82.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-81.

5. मीमांसकैश्चैव नावश्यमिष्यन्ते परमाणवः ।

Ślokavārtika, Madras, 1940, p. 348.

6. जालरन्ध्रविसरद्रवितेजो जालभासुरपदार्थविशेषान् ।

अल्पकानिह पुनः परमाणून् कल्पयन्ति हि कुमारिलशिष्याः ॥

Mānameyodaya, Madras, 1933, p. 164.

The Vedānta system

Vedānta believes that the cause, or *Brahman*, is real (*sat*) whereas the effect or the world is unreal. This is known as *vivartavāda*.¹

In the *Brahmasūtra*, it has been clearly brought out that *prakṛti* itself cannot act. How can insentient *prakṛti* change into this universe without the supervision of a sentient God? Thus *Sāṃkhya* view has been contradicted. Neither *Vaiśeṣika* view is upheld as right. How can insentient atoms combine into a systematic universe? Even *adr̥ṣṭa* which is supposed to govern the atoms, is insentient. The *prakṛti*, therefore, according to *Vedānta* is an effect of *Brahman* and has no independent existence.²

The Jaina view

Dr. Radhakrishnan presents the Jaina view with regard to materialism and monism in these words :

“To regard the intelligent subject as the product of five elements is as fruitless from the ethical point of view as to make out that the variety of world is a manifold presentation of the one intelligent principle.”³

The correctness of this view is upheld by the fact that materialism shows no regard for ethical principles, whereas *Vedānta* thinks monism correct only from philosophical point of view; for all practical purposes, where ethical principles are involved, it accepts the reality of material world as much as any other system.

According to Jainism, therefore, matter is as real as spirit. In this, Jainism agrees with realistic systems. It agrees with *Sāṃkhya* that self (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*) are two different entities. But it does not agree with *Sāṃkhya* regarding the inactivity of *puruṣa* and oneness of *prakṛti*. Matter consists, according to Jainism, of atoms. But the Jaina conception of atoms is different from *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* view. The atoms, according to Jainism, are far more subtler than conceived by *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*.

1. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhārtiyadarśana*, Benaras, 1948, p. 442.

2. *Śaṅkara on Vedāntasūtra*, 2.2.12-18.

3. Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 312.

Six substances (dravyas)

As regards non-self, Jainism holds that there are five non-sentient substances; *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of stay), *ākāśa* (space), *pudgala* (matter) and *kāla* (time). If we add self to it, we get the six *dravyas* (substances) in all.

Starting with matter, every atom of matter is possessed of touch, taste, smell and colour.¹ Matter, composed of these atoms, forms the basis of body, speech, mind and vital airs (*prāṇa*, *apāna* etc.).² Worldly enjoyment, pain, life and death are also caused by matter.³

As for sound, it is not held to be the quality of *ākāśa* as by the *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas*. Sound is produced by matter, but it is not its quality.

The other forms of non-self : *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* (space) have one substance each.⁴ All of them are motionless.⁵ The *dharma* and *adharma* occupy limited units of space⁶ whereas *ākāśa* occupies unlimited units.⁷

Out of these, *dharma* and *adharma* are the medium of motion and rest, respectively.⁸ They are said to be occupying the whole inhabited space of universe (*lokākāśa*).⁹ The idea of these two substances is peculiar to Jainism. No other system of philosophy ever conceived of these two. Just as space gives room, time effects change, similarly *dharma* and *adharma* are the medium of motion and rest. Space is infinite, but the universe is finite and it is due to these two substances. Beyond universe (*lokākāśa*) no object can move because of the absence of these two substances. Thus a limit is put on universe by these two substances.

The function of space is to give room to all substances.¹⁰

1. *Tattavārthasūtra*, 5.23.

2. *Ibid.*, 5.19.

3. *Ibid.*, 5.20.

4. *Ibid.*, 5.5.

5. *Ibid.*, 5.6.

6. *Ibid.*, 5.7.

7. *Ibid.*, 5.9.

8. *Ibid.*, 5.17.

9. *Ibid.*, 5.18.

10. *Ibid.*, 5.18.

Kāla or time is also a substance. The time-substance consists of many *samayas* (the smallest unit of time consisting of the period taken in going of the smallest particle of matter from one *pradeśa* to another *pradeśa*).

Nature of reality

Having discussed the general nature of the six *dravyas* or substances, we are faced with the question of definition of *sat* or reality. These six *dravyas*—the self, the matter, the time, the space, and *dharma* and *adharma*—are characterised by *sat*. What is *sat*? We have, on one hand, *Vedāntins* who define *sat* as unchangeable in all three times. According to this definition transcendental self or *Brahman* is the only reality, everything else being changeable. Buddhism, on the other hand, thinks that there is nothing permanent in this universe as everything, whether self or non-self, is undergoing change every moment. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy adopts a middle course and holds *puṛuṣa* to be of permanent nature without change whereas *prakṛti* is held to be permanent with change.

The Jaina view in this respect is based on its general principle of non-absolutism; and reality, according to Jainism, consists of continuity with change.¹ Substance is not only the constant substratum but also its changing modes.² The essence of a substance is never annihilated and that is the idea in saying that an object is permanent.³ Sometimes the unchangeable essence of the substance is taken into consideration (*dravyārthikanaya*) and sometimes its modification (*pariyāyārthikanaya*).⁴ Both of them are equally real.

The substance (*dravya*) does not change but the modes (*pariyāya*) change every moment. Thus, though the substance changes in appearance, it remains the same in essence, just as a piece of gold is permanent with regard to its substratum, even though it may be changing with regard to its modifications like necklace, anklet, ear-rings etc., just as the ocean is permanent with regard to its water but it is ever-changing

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.29.

2. *Ibid.*, 5.37.

3. *Ibid.*, 5.30.

4. *Ibid.*, 5.31.

with regard to its waves rising within it. Change means disappearance of previous state of modification (*pariyāya*) and appearance of a new one with continuity of the same substratum (*dravya*). We cannot, and should not, reject any one of the two—the continuity and the change—because one is impossible without the other.

Jainism reconciled the absolute permanency (*kūḷasthantiyatā*) of *Vedānta* with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) of Buddhism, holding that neither the change is sheer illusion nor the permanency underlying the change is unreal. Yamakami Sōgen has interpreted Buddhist view in a way which comes very near to Jainism. Answering the objections of Śāṅkara against Buddhists, he says :

The substratum of everything is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of a thing, so that it is erroneous to affirm that, according, to Buddhism, the thing of the first moment ceases to exist when the second moment arrives.¹

We may not go into philosophical discussion of this metaphysical problem of the definition of reality, for we are dealing with the metaphysics only in its relation to ethics. But it may be pointed out that any moral system can be easily based on the Jaina conception of reality.

The contact of the self with the non-self

Before we proceed to deal with the other predicaments of Jainism, it will not be out of place to consider an important problem of philosophy. The self and non-self are the two basic categories but they do not exist exclusive of each other. Had it been so, there would have been no problem of birth and death at all. All living beings are the combination of both the self and the non-self. All problems arise from this union and are solved with their disunion. Self, independent of matter, is as already stated, possessed of four infinite intrinsic qualities (*anantacatuṣṭaya*), and with the separation of the self from the non-self, every problem is solved.

So the question is how self comes into contact with non-self. Self is intangible, whereas matter is tangible. Can there

1. Sōgen, Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912, p. 134.

be a union of the intangible with the tangible ? When did this union between the self and matter first occur ? These are the questions which should be answered.

The question as to when the union of soul with matter occurred for the first time cannot arise, since this is a beginningless relation.¹ As for the relation of the tangible matter with intangible soul, just as knowledge in spite of its being non-tangible gets obliterated into the influence of wine, similarly self, though intangible, gets his qualities obstructed under the influence of tangible *kārmāṇa* particles. Moreover, the soul, in its state of bondage, is conceived to be tangible.²

The union between the body and soul is made possible by the medium of *kārmāṇaśarīra* which, though made up of tangible material, is very subtle.³

The cause of misery—the inflow of Kārmic matter and Bondage

The two predicaments, self and non-self, discussed so far, answer mainly such metaphysical curiosity as ‘who am I ?’ and ‘what is the nature of the universe ?’ The remaining five predicaments are mainly the results of thinking on such ethical problems as ‘what is the cause of misery ?’ and ‘how misery can be stopped ?’ The coming chapters will attempt to answer these enquiries. But, herebelow, we deal with these predicaments in a nut-shell so as to give a bird’s eye view of what we propose to discuss later on in some detail.

The Upaniṣadic view

Cārvāka represented a common man’s view that either lack of worldly possessions or some mental or physical disability is the cause of misery. This was the first answer that reason afforded to the question. It is, however, in the *Upaniṣads* that the limitations of this answer have been brought out. The real reason of misery lies deeper than it appears to be, at the surface. It is not finitude which can give us happiness; only infinitude can lead us to happiness.⁴ The transient world of birth, old

1. *Pañcādhyāyī*, Indore. Vir Nir-Saṁ 2444, 2.35-36.

2. *Ibid.* 2.57.

3. *Ibid.*, 2.60.

4. यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति ।

—*Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, 7.23.1.

age, and death is full of sufferings. It is this basic assumption of the *Upaniṣads* which brings Indian ethics out of the meshes of blind hedonism.

The Buddhist view

It was felt at the time of Lord *Buddha* that even though the *Upaniṣads* rejected the hedonism of *Cārvāka*, they have their own limitations. They could not, for example, openly challenge the authority of the *Vedas*, which preached performance of sacrifice, involving violence. It seems that the *Upaniṣads* were more concerned with the abstract metaphysical aspect of the whole problem, rather than concrete ethical path of liberation. This accounts for Lord *Buddha's* rejection of abstract metaphysics and emphasis on the moral character. He deeply felt the transient nature of everything in the universe. To him all objects of enjoyment seemed empty shows, unsubstantial and impermanent. He gave the following chain of twelve causes of misery :

(i) *Jarāmaraṇa* (ii) *Jāṭi* (iii) *Mada* (iv) *Upādāna* (v) *Tṛṣṇā* (vi) *Vedanā* (vii) *Sparśa* (viii) *Saḍāyatana* (ix) *Nāmarūpa* (x) *Vijñāna* (xi) *Samskāra* (xii) *Avidyā*.¹

The Sāṃkhya System

In *Sāṃkhya* nescience or *avidyā* is held to be the root cause of misery. Nescience means absence of distinction between the two categories of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Misery really belongs to *prakṛti* but we wrongly attribute it to self. It is this perversity of knowledge (*viprayaya*) which leads to the following five miseries :

(i) Nescience (*Avidyā*) (ii) Egoism (*Asmitā*) (iii) Attachment (*rāga*) (iv) Hatred (*dveṣa*) (v) Fear of death (*abhiniveśa*).²

All these afflictions are only the varieties of *avidyā* in as much *avidyā* pervades them all.³ This *avidyā*, according to

1. *Visuddhimagga*, Part II, Benaras, 1943, Chapter 17.

2. अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः ।

— *Yogasūtra* 2.3.

3. सर्व एवामी क्लेशा अविद्याभेदाः कस्मात् सर्वेष्वविद्यैवाभिप्लवते ।

— *Vyāsa* on *Yogasūtra* 2.4.

Yogasūtra, consists in taking transitory, impure, pain and non-self to be eternal, pure, happiness and self.¹

The Nyāya system

The immediate cause of misery, according to *Nyāya*, is birth (*janma*). This birth is the result of those activities which are prompted by attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and infatuation (*moha*).²

From attachment arise the following five defects which lead to misery :

(i) Love (*kāma*) (ii) Selfishness (*matsara*) (iii) Longing (*spṛhā*) (iv) Hankering (*trṣṇā*) (v) Greed (*lobha*).

Aversion also gives birth to the following five defects :

(i) Anger (*krodha*) (ii) Jealousy (*īrṣyā*) (iii) Envy (*asūyā*) (iv) Malice (*droha*) (v) Resentment (*amarṣa*).

Infatuation is the cause of the following four defects :

(i) Error (*mithyājñāna*) (ii) Suspicion (*vicikitsā*) (iii) Pride (*māna*) (iv) Negligence (*pramāda*).³

These fourteen defects, in short, are the causes of misery. Out of these, infatuation is the worst which breeds attachment and aversion.⁴

The Mīmāṃsā systems

According to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, any infringement of the duties, laid down by the *Vedas* leads to misery.⁵ *Vedānta*, on the other hand, allows only *nityanaimittikakarmans* and thinks that even performance of *kāmyakarmans* is a cause of bondage. The performance of *nityanaimittika karman*, however, is necessary for the purification of mind.⁶

1. अनित्याशुचिदु खानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्माख्यातिरविद्या ।

—*Yogasūtra* 2.5.

2. तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थन्तिराभावात् ।

—*Nyāyasūtra*, 4.1.3.

3. *Vātsyāyana on Ibid.*, 4.1.3.

4. तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ।

Nyāyasūtra, 4.1.6.

5. cf. *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, 1.1.2.

6. *Śaṅkara on Gītā*, Bombay, 1936, 18.10.

According to *Vedānta*, it is the deceptive nature (*Māyā*) of the universe which has held us in bondage. A mind, purified by *karman* and stabilised by *upāsana*, gets its veil of ignorance removed by knowledge. So, according to *Vedānta*, the root cause of misery is nescience.

The Jaina view

The cause of misery is dealt with under two heads in Jainism : (i) Inflow of *kārmic* matter (*āśrava*), and (ii) Bondage (*bandha*). We shall deal with both of them.

1. *Inflow of kārmic matter (āśrava)*

All activities of body, speech and mind, cause inflow of *kārmic* matter.¹ These activities, if good, cause the inflow of meritorious *karmans* leading to worldly happiness. If, these activities are bad they cause the inflow of demeritorious *karmans* leading to misery.² At first sight it would appear as if only bad activities are to be avoided since they lead to misery. But even good activities are to be checked ultimately. These good activities are, of course, preferable to bad activities from practical point of view, but from real point of view are as much bondage to the soul as the good activities. As we would discuss this problem separately in the following chapter, we leave it for present, and proceed to explain which activities are good and which bad.

It may be mentioned here that the force of holding the soul in bondage comes from four basic passions (*kaṣāya*), viz. anger, pride, hypocrisy, and greed.³ Some subtle activities force inflow of *kārmic* matter (*iryāpatha*) even in the advanced stages of spiritual progress. This is not important from the point of view of morality. It is only *sāmparāyika* inflow, backed by the four passions, which causes the cycle of births and rebirths.

The activities which lead to the *sāmparāyika* inflow of *kārmic* matter are 39 in all.⁴

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.1-2.

2. *Ibid.*, 6.3-4.

3. *Ibid.*, 6.5 and 8.2.

4. *Pūjyapāda* on *Ibid.*, 6.5.

These activities are given below :

I-V. Five activities of five senses.

VI-IX. Four activities of four *kaṣāyas*.

IX-XIV. Five activities arising out of the non-observance of five cardinal moral virtues of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession.

XV. Activities strengthening right belief e.g. worship (*samyaktvakriyā*).

XVI. Activities strengthening wrong belief e.g. superstition (*mithyātvakriyā*),

XVII. Physical activities (*prayogakriyā*)

XVIII. Tendency to neglect the vows which have been taken (*samādānakriyā*).

XIX. Walking carefully to avoid injury to the living beings by one's feet (*īryāpathakriyā*).

XX. Tendency to accuse others in anger (*prādoṣikikriyā*).

XXI. Tendency to hurt others (*kāyikikriyā*)

XXII. Having weapon of violence (*adhikaraṇikikriyā*).

XXIII. Having means of giving mental pain (*paritāpikikriyā*).

XXIV. Depriving others of their *prāṇas* (*prāṇātipātikikriyā*).

XXV. Desire to see a pleasing form (*darśanakriyā*).

XXVI. Touching a pleasant object (*sparsanakriyā*).

XXVII. Searching for new means of enjoyment (*prātyāyikikriyā*).

XXVIII. Answering call of nature in a place frequented by men, women and animals (*samantāpatanakriyā*).

XXIX. Throwing things on the ground without care (*anābhogakriyā*).

XXX. Doing oneself which should be done by other (*śvāhastakriyā*).

XXXI. Admiring what is wrong (*nisargkriyā*)

XXXII. Disclosing sins of others (*Vidāraṇakriyā*).

XXXIII. Misinterpreting the injunctions of the scriptures (*ājñāvyāpādikikriyā*).

XXXIV. Disrespect to the injunctions of the scriptures (*anākāṅkṣakriyā*).

XXXV. Engaging in harmful activities (*prārambhakriyā*).

XXXVI. Attachment to worldly objects (*parigrāhikī-kriyā*).

XXXVII. Deceitfully disturbing one's right faith and knowledge (*māyākriyā*).

XXXVIII. Admiring wrong belief (*mithyādarśanakriyā*).

XXXIX. Not renouncing what should be renounced (*apratyākhyānakriyā*).

This long list of thirty-nine activities is not exhaustive. The basic idea is that any type of activity is the cause of inflow of *kārmic* matter.

Now, to classify these activities into two categories of good and bad, we should know that there are eight types of *karmans* in all, having 148 sub-varieties. Those eight types of *karmans* are¹ :—

- (i) Knowledge—obscuring *karmans* (*jñānāvaraṇīya*).
- (ii) Connotation-obscuring *karmans* (*darśanāvaraṇīya*).
- (iii) Deluding *karmans* (*mohanīya*).
- (iv) Destructive *karmans* (*antarāya*).
- (v) Feeling-breeding *karmans* (*vedanīya*).
- (vi) Family-determining *karmans* (*gotrakarman*).
- (vii) Age-determining *karmans* (*āyusakarman*).
- (viii) Body-determining *karmans* (*nāmakarman*).

Sinful activities:

The inflow of the first two types of *kārmic* matter is caused by the following five moral lapses :

- (i) Condemnation of the learned in the scriptures (*pradoṣa*).
- (ii) Concealing the knowledge (*ninhava*).
- (iii) Envy (*mātsarya*).
- (iv) Obstructing the progress of knowledge (*antarāya*).
- (v) Denying the truth proclaimed by others (*āsādanā*).
- (vi) Refutation of truth purposely (*Upaghāta*).²

Coming to deluding *karmans* (*mohanīya*), they are of two types :

- (i) Right-belief-deluding (*darśanamohanīya*)
- (ii) Right-conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*).

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.5

2. *Ibid.*, 6.11

The right-belief-deluding *karmans* are the result of defaming the liberated persons (*kevali*) or the scripture (*śrūta*) or the church (*saṃgha*) or the religion (*dharma*) or gods (*deva*),¹ whereas the right-conduct-deluding *karmans* are the result of intense passionate feelings.²

The fourth type of inflow of *kārmic* matter results from disturbing others in their activity of charity (*dāna*), gain (*lābha*), enjoyment of consumable things (*bhoga*), enjoyment of non-consumable things (*upabhoga*) and making use of their power (*vīrya*),³

These above four *karmans* are called *ghātik armans* as they tend to obscure the real nature of self. The activities enumerated under these four heads, not only lead to worldly misery but also retard the moral progress of the aspirant.

The aghātī karmans

The remaining four types of *karmans* have good as well as bad aspect. The good activities lead to worldly happiness and bad activities to worldly miseries. But neither of these four *karmans* can retard the moral progress of a person in the absence of the *ghātikarmans*.

Vedanīya

Coming to the feeling-breeding *karmans* (*vedanīyakarmans*), those which lead to miseries are called *asātā* and those which lead to worldly happiness are called *sātā*.

The *asātāvedanīyakarmans* result from the following six activities :

(i) pain (*duḥkha*) (ii) sorrow (*śoka*) (iii) remorse (*tāpa*) (iv) weeping (*ākrandana*) (v) killing (*vadha*) (vi) pathetic moaning (*paridevanā*).⁴

The *sātāvedanīya* result from the following ten good qualities.⁵

(i) Compassion for living beings (*bhūtānukampā*).

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.14.

2. *Ibid.*, 6.15.

3. *Ibid.*, 8.14.

4. *Ibid.*, 6.12.

5. *Ibid.*, 6.13.

- (ii) Compassion for the vowers (*vratyānukampā*).
- (iii) Charity (*dāna*).
- (iv) Self-control with attachment towards worldly enjoyment (*sarāgasamīyama*).
- (v) Partial control (*saṁyamāsamīyama*).
- (vi) Equanimous submission to the fruition of *karman* (*akāmanirjarā*).
- (vii) Austerities not based on right knowledge (*bālataṭas*).
- (viii) Contemplation (*yoga*).
- (ix) Forgiveness (*Kṣamā*).
- (x) Contentment (*śauca*).

Gotrakarman

The following cause the inflow of low-family-determining *karmans*¹ :

- (i) Speaking ill of other (*paranindā*).
- (ii) Self-praise (*ātmapraśaṁsā*).
- (iii) Concealing the good qualities of others (*sadguṇācchādana*).
- (iv) Proclaiming those good qualities in oneself which one does not possess (*asadguṇodbhedana*).

The inflow of high-family-determining *Karmans* comes from the qualities opposite to those mentioned above, by showing humility towards one's superior (*nīcaīḥṛtti*) and by not being proud of one's achievements (*anutseka*).²

Āyusakarmans

The age-determining *karmans* may lead one either to hell or to sub-human life or to human birth or to heaven in the next birth. The inflow of that *kārmic* matter leading to birth in hell results from too much of sinful activity and attachment.³ Deceitfulness leads to subhuman birth.⁴ Less of worldly activity and attachments and humble indisposition leads to human birth.⁵ The activities from five to seven, enumerated in the list of *sātāvedaniya* lead to heavenly birth.⁶

1. *Tattvārthasūtra* 6.24.

2. *Ibid.*, 6.25.

3. *Ibid.*, 6.16.

4. *Ibid.*, 6.17.

5. *Ibid.*, 6.18.

6. *Ibid.*, 6.20.

Nāmakarman

Crookedness of the mind, body and speech (*yogavakratā*) and disintegrity (*visaṃvāda*) of character lead to bad body-determining *karman*,¹ whereas the opposite of them lead to good-body-determining *karman*.² Besides, excellent moral character leads to the birth of the soul in a *tirthaṅkara* body. Such excellent moral character includes the following sixteen virtues :

- (i) Purity of right belief (*darśanaviśuddhi*).
- (ii) Humbleness (*vinayasampannatā*).
- (iii) Faultless observance of the five vows (*śīlavrateṣvanaticāra*).
- (iv) Ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge (*abhikṣṇajñānopayoga*).
- (v) Apprehension of mundane miseries (*saṃvega*).
- (vi) Renunciation according to one's capacity (*śaktitastyāga*).
- (vii) Practising penance according to one's capacity (*śaktitastapas*).
- (viii) Service of the saints (*sādhusamādhi*).
- (ix) Service of the meritorious (*vaiyāvṛtyakaraṇa*).
- (x) Devotion to *Arhants* (*arhadbhakti*).
- (xi) Devotion to the *Ācārya* or the head of the orders of saints (*ācāryabhakti*).
- (xii) Devotion to the learned saint (*bahuśrutabhakti*).
- (xiii) Devotion to the scriptures (*pravacanabhakti*).
- (xiv) Carefulness in the six essential duties of a saint (*āvaśyakāparihāṇi*).
- (xv) Propagation of the path of liberation (*mārgaprabhāvanā*).
- (xvi) Affection for one's co-religionist (*pravacanavatsalatā*).³

Bondage (bandha)

As already pointed, only that inflow of *kārmic* matter, which is backed by passion, becomes effective. This is called

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.61.

2. *Ibid.*, 6.22.

3. *Ibid.*, 6.26.

bondage.¹ Without passion, the *kārmāṇa* particles may come and go but they do not affect the soul. This position can be compared to the *anāsakti-yoga* of the *Gītā*. To be more elaborate, the causes of bondage are five-fold :

(i) *Wrong-belief (mithyādarśana)*

It has five varieties (a) taking only one aspect of truth (*ekānta*) (b) perverse belief (*viparīta*) (c) scepticism (*saṁśaya*) (d) showing equal belief in all religions (*vinaya*) (e) nescience (*ajñāna*).²

(ii) *Vowlessness (avirati)*

It includes lack of compassion for six classes of embodied soul through lack of control over five senses and mind.³

(iii) *Negligence (pramāda)*

It includes talks about (a) food (*bhojanakathā*), (b) women (*strikaṭhā*), (c) politics (*rājyakathā*), (d) scandal (*deśakathā*), lack of control over five senses, four passions, affection and sleep.⁴

(iv) *Passion (kaṣāya)*

These include four degrees of intensities of four passions, viz. (a) pride (*māna*), (b) deceitfulness (*māyā*), (c) anger (*krodha*), (d) greed (*lobha*) and nine semi-passions.⁵

(v) *Yoga (activities)*

These activities are either mental or vocal or physical.

(A) Mental activities are either from (a) true mind (*satyamana*) (b) false mind (*asatyamana*) or (c) mixed mind (*ubhaya-mana*) or (d) neither true nor false mind (*anubhayamana*).

(B) Vocal activities are either (a) true or (b) false or (c) both or (d) none.

(C) Physical activities are possible by the seven bodies.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra* 8.2-3.

2. *Pūjyapada*, on *Ibid.* 8.1.

3. *Ibid.*, 8.1.

4. *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Calcutta, 1929, 8.1. (Hindi Translation, p. 806).

5. *Pūjyapada* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 8.1.

(a) Physical (*audārika*) (b) Physical and *kārmic* (*audārikamiśra*) (c) Fluid (*vaikriyaka*) (d) Fluid with *kārmic* (*vaikrayikamiśra*) (e) *Āhāraka* (f) *Āhāraka* with physical (*āhārakamiśra*) (g) *Kārmic* (*kārmāṇa*).

Thus we have fifteen *yogas* in all.¹

The Jaina conception of working of the law of *Karman* is based in the psychological theory of habit. We sow an action and reap a habit, we sow a habit and reap a character; we sow a character and reap our fate. Repetition of similar actions makes us habituated and we are forced by habit to repeat them. But, as already shown, this does not deprive us of our freedom.² Human efforts have their own part to play in the whole working of this process. The previous action can be altered, amended, aggravated or affected through exertion (*puruṣārtha*). That is why the *ācāryas* have asked us to exert and stop the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter and also to annihilate the previous *karmans*.

It may also be noted that these *karmans* have not only psychical impressions (*saṁskāras*) but also force physical molecules to be attached to the soul. The processes are known as psychic (*bhāva*) and material (*dravya*) inflow.³ These two aspects of the inflow of *kārmic* matter mutually influence each other. The various psychic modifications attract the *kārmic* matter, and give birth to fresh psychic modifications. In its impure state, the soul, overcome by attachment, aversion and delusion, attracts the *kārmic* matter as magnet attracts needles to itself. This chain of *kārmic* holds the self bound to the miserable worldly existence.

The removal of misery

The Buddhist view

The third noble truth, *dukkhanirodha*, concerns the means of checking misery. The ethical teachings of Lord *Buddha* are summarised in the following triple jewels⁴ (*triratnas*) in

1. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhārtiyadarśana*, pp. 182-183.
2. Bhaṭṭa Akalanīkadeva on *Tattoārthasūtra*, 8.1. (Hindi Translation, p. 805).
3. *Supra*, pp. 32-37.
4. *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 29-31.

the *Hinayāna* tradition : (i) Conduct (*śīla*), (ii) Meditation (*samādhi*) (iii) contemplation (*prajñā*).

(i) Conduct includes the observance of the following vows : (a) non-violence (b) non-stealing (c) truth (d) celibacy (e) abstinence from intoxication.

These vows are meant for all. The mendicants are asked, in addition, to observe abstinence from (a) evening meals (b) garlands (c) valuable beds (d) music (e) gold and silver.

(ii) Meditation, in Buddhism, has been given a special status.

(iii) Contemplation includes (a) study (*śrutamayī*) (b) rational thinking (*cintāmayī*) (d) affirmed knowledge acquired by meditation (*samādhiḥjanyaniścaya*). These three stage of contemplation are strikingly similar to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* of *Vedānta* system.

The ethical principles of Buddhism can be described from another view-point also. It is the eight-fold path (*aṣṭāṅgika mārga*) which leads to liberation.¹ These include right attitude (*samyagdṛṣṭi*), determination (*saṃkalpa*), speech (*vāk*), action (*karmānta*), living (*jīva*) effort (*vīryam*).

The Sāṃkhya-yoga

According to *Sāṃkhya*, the discriminating faculty (*viveka-khyāti*), which makes clear distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, leads to liberation.

In *Yoga*, which deals with the ethical aspect of that very system, which is metaphysically represented by *Sāṃkhya* the cardinal moral virtues are said to be five *yamās* which literally resemble the five *vratas* of Jainism. Here the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* of *Yogasūtra* clarifies that truth is subservient to non-violence. A truth, which leads to violence, is said to be virtue in appearance but sin in reality.²

1. Ibid., pp. 181-182.

2. "वागुक्ता सा यदि न वञ्चिता भ्रान्ता वा प्रतिपत्तिवन्ध्या वा भवेदित्येषा सर्वभूतोपकारार्थं प्रवृत्ता न भूतोपघाताय यदि चैवमप्यभिधीयमाना भूतोपघातपरैव स्यान्न सत्यं भवेत् पापमेव भवेत्तेन पुण्याभासेन पुण्यप्रतिरूपकेण कष्टं तमः प्राप्नुयात्तस्मात्परीक्ष्य सर्वभूतहितं सत्यं ब्रूयात् ।

—*Vyāsa on Yogasūtra*, Allahabad, 1912, 2.30.

In addition to these five *yamas*, we have the following *niyamas* also :

(i) Purity (*śauca*). (ii) Satisfaction (*santoṣa*), (iii) Penance (*tapas*), (iv) Study (*svādhyāya*) and (v) Meditation upon God (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*).¹ In addition to *yama* and *niyama*, the other principles of eight-fold path of yoga (*aṣṭāṅgayoga*) are *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi*, which, respectively, mean mystic posture, control over vital air, withdrawal of senses from outward objects, concentration on one point, continuity of concentration, meditation and complete absorption.²

The Nyāyavaiśeṣika view

While dealing with the causes of misery under *Nyāya* system, we have enlisted fourteen moral faults. These faults get a man involved in worldly pursuits (*pravṛtti*), which lead to the circle of births and rebirths. On the renunciation of these moral faults, the worldly pursuits come to a stand-still and the self is released from miseries.

In *Vaiśeṣika* system, the moral duties are classified under two heads : (i) Common duties (ii) Special characteristic duties.

Common duties embrace the following virtues :—(a) Faith (*śraddhā*) (b) Non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) (c) Welfare of all living beings (*prāṇihitasādhana*) (d) Truth (*satya*), (e) Non-stealing (*asteya*), (f) Celibacy (*Brahmacarya*), (g) Purity of heart (*anupadhā*), (h) Absence of anger (*akrodha*), (i) Bathing (*snāna*), (j) Purity of food (*pavitradravyasevana*), (k) Devotion to deity (*devopāsanā*), (l) Fasting (*upavāsa*), (m) Alertness (*apramāda*).³

As far as the special duties belonging to particular caste or *āśrama* are concerned, the *Vaiśeṣika* system holds *smṛtis* to be the authority.

All these duties should be performed without any desire for the fruit. This leads to comprehension of reality (*tatt-*

1. *Yogasūtra*, 2.32.

2. *Ibid.* 2.29.

3. *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, Benaras, 1924, p. 640.

vajñāna), which is the means of liberation.¹ Thus desireless performance of the moral duties is the indirect means whereas the real knowledge is the direct means of liberation.²

The mīmāṃsā view

According to *pūrvamīmāṃsā*, *karman*s lead to bondage as well as liberation. There are two theories about the performance of *karman*. According to *Kumārila* *bhaṭṭa*, actions can be performed only when one is sure about their yielding the desired fruit (*iṣṭasādhana* *tājñāna*) whereas, according to *Prabhākara*, the knowledge that such and such action is prescribed by the *Vedas* (*kāryatājñāna*) is enough for engaging one in that duty. Thus, according to *Kumārila* *bhaṭṭa*, an action is always motivated by a desire whereas according to *Prabhākara* desire is not necessary. The theory of *Prabhākara* comes nearer to the *niṣkāmakarmayoga* of the *Gītā*.³

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, in any case, lays it down very clearly that the actions prescribed by the *Vedas* should be performed, but actions which have been prohibited (*niṣiddha*) by the *vedas* should be avoided. The actions prescribed by the *Vedas* are, again, of two kinds : (i) Wishfulfilling actions (*kāmyakarma*), which include those actions which are to be performed with certain desire in view e.g. *svargakāmo yajeta*. (ii) Daily and occasional (*niyānaimittika karman*), which include such actions as *sandhyā* and *śrāddha* which are to be performed without any particular motive.⁴

Coming so *Vedānta*, the *Śāṅkara* school believes that knowledge is the only means of liberation. This principle has been subsequently elaborated by two followers of *Śāṅkara*, *Vācaspati Miśra* and *Sureśvarācārya* who wrote *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* commentaries, respectively, on the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* of *Vedānta*. The main difference between the two can be summarised thus :

1. ...तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ।

—*Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, 1.1.4.

2. तत्त्वज्ञानकर्मणोर्मोक्षं प्रति तत्त्वज्ञानस्य साक्षाज्जनकता कर्मणस्तु परम्परये-
द्वयशयः ।

—*Kirṇāvalibhāṣaka*, Benaras, 1920, p. 21.

3. Upādhyāya, Baladeva, *Bhāratīyadarśana*, p. 394.

4. Ibid., pp. 394-395.

Vācaspati Miśra thinks that even after hearing (*śravaṇa*) of such *mahāvākya* as 'that thou art' (*tattvamasi*) one needs contemplation (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) also.¹ According to *Sureśvarācārya*, the sentence 'that thou art' is capable of imparting direct knowledge of *Brahman*.² This is the main difference between *Bhāmatiprasthāna* and *Vivaraṇaprasthāna*. In both the cases, however, action is subservient to knowledge.

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi has classified the objects attainable by actions into four : 1. *ulpādyā*, 2. *āpyā*, 3. *saṁskāryā*, 4. *vikāryā*. Since *ātman* is neither of these, therefore, it cannot be realised by action.³

The Jaina view

The Jaina view regarding the removal of misery is classified under two heads : (1) Checking of the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter (*saṁvara*) and (2) Annihilation of the *kārmic* matter already accumulated (*nirjarā*).

1. Checking of the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter (*saṁvara*)

The inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter can be checked best by not allowing those causes to work which effect the inflow. The means for this check are as follows :

- (i) Three-fold self-discipline (*triguṇī*)
- (ii) Five-fold path of vigilance (*pañca-samiti*)
- (iii) Ten categorical qualities (*daśa-lakṣaṇa-dharma*)
- (iv) Twelve-fold reflections on the nature of the universe (*dvādaśānuprakāśā*).
- (v) Equanimous fortitude of twenty-two hardships (*dvāvīṁśati-pariśahajaya*).

1. तस्मान्निर्विचिकित्सशब्द-ज्ञान-सन्ततिरूपासना कर्मसहकारिण्यविद्या-
च्छेदहेतुः ।

—*Miśra, Vācaspati*, on *Vedāntasūtra* Bombay, 1917, p. 55.

2. सकृत्प्रकृत्या मृदनाति क्रियावारकरूपभृत् ।

अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं सांगत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः ॥

—*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Poona, 1925, 1.67.

3. उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यञ्च क्रियाफलम् ।

नैवं मुक्तिर्यतस्तस्मात् कर्म तस्या न साधनम् ॥

—*Ibid.*, 1.53.

(vi) Five types of conduct (*pañcacāritra*).¹

I. Three-fold self-discipline means withdrawal of the mind, body and speech from the mundane activities.²

II. Five-fold vigilance means carefulness in walking, talking, eating, in handling the objects and in evacuating bowls.³

III. The ten categorical qualities are : (a) forgiveness, (b) humility, (c) straightforwardness, (d) contentment, (e) truthfulness, (f) self-control, (g) penance, (h) renunciation, (i) detachment, (j) chastity.⁴

IV. The twelve reflections are : Contemplations about—

(i) transitoriness, (ii) helplessness, (iii) mundane existence, (iv) loveliness, (v) distinctness, (vi) impurity, (vii) inflow of *kārmic* matter, (viii) checking of *kārmic* matter, (ix) annihilation of *kārmic* matter, (x) universe, (xi) rarity of right path and (xii) nature of right path.⁵

V. The twenty two hardships to be endured are :

(a) hunger, (b) thirst, (c) cold, (d) heat, (e) mosquitoes (f) nakedness, (g) disgust, (h) women, (i) too much of walking, (j) posture, (k) sleeping, (l) abuse, (m) beating, (n) begging, (o) failure to attain an object, (p) disease, (q) contact with thorns, (r) dirt, (s) respect or disrespect, (t) conceited knowledge (u) lack of knowledge (v) slackness of belief.⁶

VI. The five types of conduct are :

(a) equanimity (b) recovery of equanimity if one falls from it, (c) purity and completeness in non-violence, (d) freedom from passions except in some subtle form, (e) ideal state of complete freedom from passion.⁷

Here we have just given a list of moral virtues that check the inflow of *kārmic* matter. We propose to discuss them in detail while dealing with the conduct of the house-holder and

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.2.

2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Ibid.*, 9.4.

3. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.5.

4. *Ibid.*, 9.6.

5. *Ibid.*, 9.7.

6. *Ibid.*, 9.9.

7. *Ibid.*, 9.18.

a monk, separately. It may, however, be pointed out that the list of moral virtues given above mentions ascetic and spiritual virtues mainly. As already pointed out this is due to the fact that Jaina thinkers do not mix up the science of spiritualism (*adhyātmaśāstra*) with sociology (*saṃājāśāstra*) as some of the Hindu scriptures like *Manusmṛiti* have done.

Shedding of the accumulated kārmic matter (nirjarā)

Merely checking of the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter does not remove miseries unless the *kārmic* matter already accumulated is also shed away. This, the Jainism believes, can be done by austerities.¹ These austerities are in addition to what has been prescribed above under *saṃvara*. Austerities are external and internal. The external austerities include (i) fasting (ii) eating less than one's fill (iii) taking a secret vow to accept the food only if certain conditions, about which no one knows, are fulfilled, (iv) renouncing delicacies, (v) sitting and sleeping in lonely place and (vi) mortifying the body with mental equanimity.² The internal austerities include : (i) expiation (ii) reverence (iii) service (iv) study (v) detachment and (vi) renunciation.³ All these austerities are propounded mainly with the monk's life in view and we shall take them one by one at proper places.

To sum up, it is through the activities of mind, body and speech, tinged with passion, that the *kārmic* matter gets an inflow into the realm of soul. It is, therefore, obvious that when the self is absorbed in its own intrinsic, pure consciousness, shutting out the impure states of desire, aversion and delusion, the inflow of *kārmic* matter does not take place. It is an ideal stage. The aspirant, if he has to act at all, should be very much alert against sinful tendencies in his daily routine.

As regards shedding of the previously accumulated *karmans*, Jainism prescribes performance of penance. This is based on the psychological law of habit. An old habit can be broken only by acting against it forcibly and purposely. Our

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.3.

2. *Ibid.*, 9.19.

3. *Ibid.*, 9.20.

attachments are deep-rooted and can be uprooted only by hard austerities. It should not be thought that these austerities have any super-natural power of pleasing some gods who can forgive us for our previous acts of omission and commission. It is a simple question of resoluteness of will-power. Repeated blows of voluntary infliction break the old habits and efface those impressions (*saṃskāras*), which lead to further birth.

The state of liberation

The Upaniṣadic view

Except for *Cārvāka*, who does not believe in existence after death, all other systems of Indian philosophy have conceived of a liberated soul, which after having exhausted all *karmans* attains perfection. The *Upaniṣads* were the first to conceive of such a state. A soul in such a state, according to the *Upaniṣads* is indescribable. This is how *Tājñavalkya* attempts an answer to the question of the nature of a liberated soul :

Just as a lump of salt put in water loses its identity and cannot be taken out separately, but in whatever portion of water we taste, we find the salt; so, *Maitreyī*, does this great reality, infinite and limitless, consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences), becomes identical with them and there is no phenomenal knowledge.¹

The Buddhist view

Nirvāṇa, the name for liberation in Buddhist philosophy, means 'extinction'. It implies extinction of the five, viz. forms (*rūpa*), names (*saṃjñā*) the old impressions (*saṃskāra*), the analytical knowledge (*viññāna*) and the feeling of pain and pleasures (*vedanā*). That *nirvāṇa* is the state of highest bliss is proved by many passages of Buddhist scriptures.² Lord *Buddha*, however, was more concerned with the ethical problem of the removal of misery rather than indulging in such sub-

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 2.4.12.

2. निब्बानं परमानि सुखानि—

Pali-English Dictionary, p. 364.

tics of metaphysical problems as the nature of the liberated soul.¹

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga view

From what has already been said about the nature of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* according to *Sāṃkhya*, it can easily be concluded that in the state of liberation, when the self stands separated from *prakṛti*, there can be no happiness.² Happiness and misery are the workings of the *guṇas*. The liberated soul, having gone beyond these *guṇas*, shines forth in pure consciousness.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view

According to *Nyāya*, liberation is not a state of bliss but a state of perfect qualitlessness where the self remains in its mere existence. It is a state of complete freedom from pain.³ This state is compared to a deep dreamless sleep.⁴ *Nyāya* holds that since it is the state of complete freedom from pain, the scriptures speak of this state of happiness. In fact, liberation cannot be a state of happiness 'for happiness is always tainted with pain'. There is no consciousness in a liberated soul. Therefore, the self remains in a passive state of its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge and will.

The Mīmāṃsā view

The *pūrvamīmāṃsā* did not originally conceive of liberation but of heaven only. The heavenly state is not free from misery but one where all desires are fulfilled. The later authors

1. Dasgupta, Surendranath, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 108-109.

2. नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिनिर्धर्मत्वात् ।

—*Sāṃkhyasūtra*, 5.74.

3. तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ।

Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.22.

4. सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभावादपवर्गः ।

Ibid., 4.1.63.

have dealt with liberation also. They hold that release means freedom from pain where the self exists in its pure essence.¹

The Vedānta view

In *Vedānta*, liberation means removal of duality and merger of self with *Brahman*. In this state, the self shines forth in its intrinsic existence, intelligence and bliss (*sat, cit, ānanda*). Here everything, having name and form, vanishes as illusory.

The Jaina view

Liberation, according to *Tattvārthasūtra*, is a state free from all *karmans* due to absence of causes of bondage and shedding of the *karmans*.² The four *ghātins* (*destructive karmans*) are the main concern of the aspirant, because the other four *aghātins karmans* do not stand in the way of liberation.³ One gets freedom from these *karmans* gradually as he ascends the fourteen stages of spiritual development.⁴ At the end of the twelfth stage, all the *ghātins karmans* are destroyed and the aspirant gets perfect knowledge, perception, potency and bliss. This conception of liberation comes nearer to that of *Vedānta*, the only difference being that the self, according to Jainism, does not lose its identity in the emancipated state.

After the liberation, the self, which has a natural upward motion, goes right upto the end of the universe (*lokākāśa*)⁵ beyond which it cannot proceed due to the absence of *dharmāstikāya*, the medium of motion.⁶

Conclusion

To conclude, the following points may be noted regarding our discussion in this chapter :

(1) In the first place, even though, the different systems of Indian philosophy disagree about such problems as the

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 422-423.

2. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 10.2.

3. *Ibid.*, 10.1.

4. *Infra*, Chapter VIII.

5. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 10.5.

6. *Ibid.*, 10.8.

nature of self or the position of a liberated soul, yet as far as the practical side of morality is concerned, they seldom differ.

(2) Secondly in Jainism we find a combination of both types of systems of morality, those which emphasise on knowledge and those which emphasise on conduct and faith.

(3) The brief sketch of the fundamentals of Jainism—*āśrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*—in this chapter gives an answer to the question why most of the ethical principles of Jainism are negative in character. Any action prolongs rather than cuts short the mundane existence of the soul. If the actions are good, they lead to birth in favourable circumstances; if they are bad, they lead to birth in unfavourable circumstances. But since the ultimate aim is to get rid of the circle of birth and rebirth, all actions are in reality a source of misery. We shall elaborate this point in the following chapter.

(4) The Jaina *ācāryas* have a tendency to go on enumerating the varieties and subvarieties of a single fact. We shall have more occasions to meet with this tendency during the course of our discussion. This has made the discussion of problems more concrete and objective.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

Limitations of virtuous Life

We have spoken of some moral virtues in the foregoing chapter. These virtues lead to happiness and are to be preferred to vices which lead to misery. But is that the end of morality? We have already noted that worldly happiness is not the ultimate end of morality. Emancipation from mundane existence, which is the ultimate end of life, cannot be attained by mere observance of virtue.¹ An inner awakening followed by withdrawal from all activities of life, whether good or bad, is necessary for that. It is a state beyond vice and virtue. One may become worse or better by vicious or virtuous activities, but not perfect.

Practical path (vyavahāramārga)

This, however, does not mean total obliteration between good and bad. Perfection is a far cry for an ordinary man who has to discharge the normal duties of life. He has to choose between good and bad at every step. For him is prescribed a code of morality which may be called as practical path (*vyavahāramārga*). Here a clear distinction between good and bad is made. This path is a means and not an end in itself. It ultimately yields place to the supra-moral plane of life where one gets rid of normal duties of life.

What is necessary is a considered balance between the two, the supra-moral plane of life and the practical code of morality.² The practical code of morality serves no good if it does not lead to the higher supra-moral plane of life. Transcendental code of morality, on the other hand, should be no excuse for licentiousness. As long as one becomes perfect

1. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.56.

2. *Samayasāra*kalaśa, Delhi, 1959, 267.

and passes beyond his mundane consciousness completely, he does require a clear distinction between good and bad. The complete conception of morality, therefore, includes both, the practical as well as the transcendental morality, which are inter-related with each other.

With this background we proceed to examine this problem, first according to Jainism and then according to other systems of Indian Philosophy.

Vice and Virtue

The result of virtues are birth as *tirthaṅkara*, *gaṇadhara*, sage, universal monarch, *Baladeva*, *Vāsudeva*, god and *vidyādhara*s and supernatural powers. The result of vices are pain, birth amongst subhumans and bad men, old age, death, disease, misery and poverty etc.¹ It is the motive behind an action which is taken into account and not merely the outer action.² We have given a list of actions which lead to worldly happiness (*sātāvedanīya*) as well as those which lead to misery (*asātāvedanīya*).³ It may be mentioned that both types of these acts are actuated by attachment; in the case of the former it is mild, in the case of the later it is intense. In *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, therefore, vice has been defined as intense passion whereas virtue has been defined as mild passion.⁴ Attachment, however, is present in both the cases.

Transcendental morality (niścayamārga) :

The ultimate aim is to uproot even the subtlest form of passions. Therefore the relative life of vice and virtue is to be abandoned in favour of a life of pure consciousness (*śuddhopayoga*). The activities of soul can be classified under three heads : (i) The auspicious activities (*śubhopayoga*), (ii) The inauspicious activities (*aśubhopayoga*), (iii) The pure activities (*śuddhopayoga*). In *śuddhopayoga* the self remains absorbed in its own nature of consciousness. In *śubhopayoga* as well as *aśubhopayoga*, the self becomes extrovert and con-

1. Virasena on *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, Vol. I, p. 105.

2. न पापबन्धो बाह्यनिमित्तमात्रादेव भवति ।

—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 6.11.

3. *Supra*, pp. 59-60

4. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 90.

centrates on non-self. Thus from the point of view of *suddhopayoga*, *subhopayoga* and *asubhopayoga* are bracketed together under the common name of *asuddhopayoga*.

From transcendental point of view, therefore, it is said that ultimately the distinction of good and bad cannot be held.¹ Vice and virtue, bind the soul by effecting the inflow of foreign *kārmic* matter. All the eight types of *karmans* are *pudgala* (non-self) and yield a fruit which is miserable in the ultimate analysis.² Both of them cause bondage.³ Therefore, both types of *Karmans* are to be condemned equally. Just as a skilful elephant does not get attached either to an ugly or to a beautiful she-elephant, meant for his capture, similarly a wise man does not get attached either to good or to bad actions, because both cause bondage.⁴ Those who have a yearning for good actions, wander in this world in delusion.⁵ How an action, leading to bondage, can be called good?⁶

A person should transcend the duality of good and bad actions. "The meritorious action leads to wealth, wealth to pride, pride to infatuation and infatuation to sin; let, therefore, be no good actions for us"⁷ It is said that even good

1. ततः परमार्थतः शुभाशुभोपयोगयोः पृथक्त्वव्यवस्था नावतिष्ठते ।

—*Amṛtacandra* on *Pravacanasāra*, Bombay, 1935, 1.72.

Also न खलु परमार्थतः पुण्यपापद्वैतमवतिष्ठते ।

—*Ibid.*, 1.77.

Also *Samayasāra*, 145.

2. *Samayasāra*, 45.

3. *Pañcāstikāya*, 147.

4. *Amṛtacandra* on *Samayasāra*, 148-149.

Also कर्म सर्वमपि सर्वविदो यद्बन्धसाधनमुशन्त्यविशेषात् ।

तेन सर्वमपि तत्प्रतिषिद्धं ज्ञानमेव विहितं शिवहेतु ॥

—*Samayasāra* *kalaśa*, 103

5. *Pravacanasāra*, 1.77.

Also *Paramātmaprakāśa*, Bombay, 1937, 2.53-55.

6. कहं तं होदि सुसीलं जं संसारं पवेसेदि ?

—*Samayasāra*, 145.

7. पुण्णेण होइ विहवो विहवेण मओ मएण मइ-मोहो ।

मइ—मोहेण य पावं ता पुण्णं अम्ह मा होउ ॥

—*Paramātmaprakāśa*, 2.60

actions lead to hell in future.¹ Rare is a wise man who considers even a virtue to be a vice.² A man should not be thus satisfied by anything less than self-realisation.

With this ultimate aim of transcendental morality in view, we are asked to be moral in the practical sense of the term till the achievement of that aim. Vice and virtue are chains of iron and gold, respectively, and as such are equally bad.³ But is it not better to wait in the shade rather than in the hot sun?⁴ It is from his point of view that good actions are approved.⁵ If the ultimate aim is not lost sight of, good actions are also indirectly helpful in the achievement of liberation.⁶

To conclude, though good and bad actions are equated from transcendental view-point, yet from practical point of view good actions are to be preferred to bad action for the following reasons:

1. For a man, engaged in worldly affairs, it is not possible to remain absorbed in pure consciousness.⁷ So when he turns to activities under compulsion it is wiser to indulge in *śubhōpayoga* which leads to happiness rather than in *aśubhōpayoga*, which leads to misery⁸. Worldly happiness and misery, both dwindle into insignificance before the ecstasies of blissfulness of self-consciousness, but given a choice between the two, happiness is naturally preferable to misery.⁹

1. तेन निदानबद्धपुण्येन भवान्तरे भोगान् लब्ध्वा पश्चान्नरकादिकं गच्छन्ति ।

—*Brahmadeva on Paramātmaprakāśa*, Bombay, 1937, 2.58.

2. जो पुण्य वि पाउ वि भणइ सो बुह को वि हवेइ ।

—*Togasāra*, 71.

3. *Samayasāra*, 146.

4. *Iṣṭopadeśa*, 3.

5. जोण्हाणं णिरवेक्खं सागारणगार चरियजुत्ताणं ।

अणुकंपयोवयारं कुव्वदु लेवो जदि वि अप्पो ॥

—*Pravacanasāra*, 3.51.

6. *Bhāvasaṃgraha*, Bombay, Vik. Sam. 1978, 610-618.

7. गृहव्यापारयुक्तस्य मुख्यत्वेनेह दुर्घटम् ।

निर्विकल्पचिदानन्दं निजात्मचिन्तनं परम् ।

—*Ibid.*, 607.

8. *Ibid.*, 611, 612.

9. *Iṣṭopadeśa*, 3.

2. Secondly, good activities are governed by self-denial and negation of passions. Liberality, for example, implies greedlessness and is a sort of penance.¹

3. Man is a social animal. He wants to preserve and promote the interest of the society in which he lives. Thus good acts which benefit the society are preferable to bad ones which cause its disintegration. It is from this point of view that the *Jaina ācāryas* have asked their adherents to follow those general customs of the society which are not contrary to spiritual teachings².

Thus we see that even though a man with right attitude will not attach much importance to the performance of good actions from the point of transcendental morality, yet at the same time while he is acting as a practical man, he will be a moral man in the ordinary sense of the word. The higher an aspirant ascends, the greater his devotion to *śuddhopayoga*. But in the interim period he tries his best to avoid *aśubhopayoga* and to devote to *śubhopayoga*.

Non-Jaina Systems

The Upaniṣadic View

Jainism shares this attitude with other systems of Indian philosophy. The chief interest of the Vedic seers lies in this world rather than the other world. They do not sing of the emptiness of this world and the futility of worldly pleasures. But by passage of time, mankind became introvert. In the later portions of the *R̥gveda* itself, a recluse is described roaming fearlessly from one forest to another, remaining detached from the villages and fearing none³. It is, however, in the *Upaniṣads* that we find a clear distinction between the mundane good (*preyas*) and transcendental good (*śreyas*). In the *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad*, the old sage *Yājñavalkya* gave up all his worldly possessions in favour of higher spiritual life.

1. *Bhāvasaṃgraha*, 616, 617.

2. सर्वं एव हि जैनानां प्रमाणं लौकिको विधिः ।

यत्र सम्यक्त्वहानिर्न यत्र न व्रतदूषणम् ॥

—*Yāśastilakacampu*, Bombay, 1901, 8.34.

3. *R̥gveda*, 10.146.1.

When he was distributing his wealth amongst his wives, one of them, *Maitreyī*, pondering over the temporary nature of worldly possessions, refused her share of it with these words : 'What are these to me, if I am not thereby to gain life eternal'¹.

This anti-hedonistic tendency is brought out more clearly in the story of *Yama* and *Naciketas* in the *Kāthopaniṣad*. *Yama* tempted the youthful imagination of *Naciketas* and placed all human and divine pleasures at his disposal. There is a colourful description of the damsels and long life that were promised to him. Chariots ringing with divine music were offered.² But none of these could budge him from his keen desire of knowledge of the self because he knew that all worldly pleasures would wither away by to-morrow.³

Thus when it was established that *Naciketas* was really a deserving candidate for spiritual knowledge, *Yama* began his discourse with a clear distinction between the good (*śreyas*) and the pleasurable (*preyas*). He made it clear that both of these were diametrically opposed to each other and lead a person to diverse ends.⁴ The path of good has the prerequisite of freedom from the allurements of environment.

Modern scholars have also emphasised the supra-moral nature of the ethical teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Dr. Radhakrishnan, while discussing the ethics of the *Upaniṣads*, remarked, "Duty is a means to the end of the highest perfection. Nothing can be satisfying short of this highest condition. Morality is valuable only as leading to it."⁵ Deussen has also very clearly pointed out this. He observes that when "the knowledge of the *Ātman* has been gained, every action and, therefore, every moral action also has been deprived of meaning".⁶

Buddhist View

According to Buddhism it is meditation, which is beyond

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad*, 2.4.2.

2. *Kāthopaniṣad*, 1.1.25.

3. *Ibid.*, 1.1.26.

4. *Ibid.*, 1.2.1.

5. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 208.

6. Deussen, Paul, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Edinburgh, 1919, p. 362.

good or bad, which leads to Arhat-ship. From the point of view of meditation all acts, whether good or bad, are impure.¹

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System

The *Naiyāyikas* hold that 'so long as we act we are under the sway of attachment and aversion and cannot attain the highest good.'² According to the *Vaiśeṣika* system also the ceremonial piety can lead simply to worldly prosperity whereas spiritual insight (*tattvajñāna*) leads to liberation.³ Whether it is *dharma* or *adharmā*, both lead to embodied existence.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga System

In *Sāṃkhya*, the heaven which is the result of *sāttvika* activities, is considered undesirable in comparison to liberation.⁴ Unselfish activities are, no doubt, the indirect cause of liberation.⁵

In the *Yoga* system our actions are classified under four heads : (1) The black or wicked deeds, as speaking ill of others; (2) The white or virtuous deeds, as wisdom; (3) The white and black or mixed deeds, as performance of sacrifice, which involves violence also; (4) The neither-white-nor-black or supra-moral deeds, as meditation of the self.⁶ It is only this last-mentioned type of action which leads to liberation.

The Mīmāṃsā system

Even in *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, which is the strongest votary of action, it is held that liberation, which lies in absolute cessation of the body, comes only when not only the virtuous (*dharma*) but vicious (*adharmā*) actions also are exhausted.⁷

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 419.

2. Ibid., p. 162.

3. Candrakānta on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Allahabad, 1924, 1.1.2.

4. *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. 3.52-53.

5. *Vijñānabhikṣu* on *Sāṃkhyadarśana*, Calcutta, 1936, 1.82, 85.

6. *Vyāsa* on *Yogasūtra*, 4.7.

7. आत्यन्तिकस्तु देहोच्छेदो निश्शेषधर्माधर्मपरिक्षयनिबन्धनो मोक्ष इति युक्तम् ।

—*Prakaranapañcāśikā*, Benaras, 1961, p. 341.

In *Vedānta*, Śaṅkarācārya makes it clear while commenting on the *Upaniṣads* that since self is neither āpya (to be attained) nor utpādy (to be generated) nor vikārya (to be modified) nor saṃskārya (to be refined), it cannot be realised by *karmans*.¹ Wherever Śaṅkara finds a plea for action in the *Upaniṣads* he interprets it as an injunction for those who are still at a lower plane of existence and who cannot follow the path of renunciation.²

It is this common attitude of all systems of Indian philosophy towards ethics which makes it basically different from Western ethics. This is why Mckenzie remarks : "it can be at least maintained with full assurance that Hindu ethical thought and practice have rested on pre-suppositions of a different kind from those on which the ethical thought and practice of the West have rested."³

Christian View

Mckenzie is right to some extent. But we cannot say that such ideas are absolutely lacking in Christian ethics. The Bible says, "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him."⁴ Asked by a young man as to what he should do to inherit eternal life, Jesus Christ said, "Go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in heaven."⁵ Jesus teaches us complete non-possession (*aparigraha*) when he says, "...So likewise, whosoever he be of you that foresaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple."⁶ Dr. Radhakrishnan has rightly remarked, "The only ethics that Jesus can preach is a negative one, to enable man to free himself from the world and fit himself for the Kingdom."⁷ He further adds that 'the eschatological teaching of Jesus that the end of the world

1. Śaṅkara on *Īsopaniṣad*, Gorakhpura, Vik. Saṃ. 1994, 1.

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, 2.

3. Mckenzie, John, *Hindu Ethics*, p. 205.

4. I John, 2.15.

5. Mark, 10.21.

6. Luke, 14.33.

7. Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, London, p. 69.

was at hand reveals an attitude of world and life negation so far as He did not assume that the Kingdom of God would be realised in this natural world but expected its sudden and startling inauguration by supernatural power.”¹

Conclusion

Thus we see that—

(1) The lofty ideal of social service is also motivated by subtle self-interests. We indulge in good activities either for name and fame here or for heavenly happiness hereafter. Even the so-called desireless actions (*niṣkāmakarmans*) can be at the best rated as action motivated by the noblest desire of alleviating the miseries of others or by the higher desires of following the teachings of the scriptures and performing the duty for the sake of duty. But can it lead to liberation without self-realisation? Perhaps not, for both—to dive deep into the realm of the self and to indulge in worldly activities—cannot go together.

(2) Good activities are to be deemed as a means and not as an end in itself. Even the subtlest form of passion in the form of ego is to be swept away. The moral virtues should be observed with the ultimate end in view without a tinge of egoism.

(3) The transcendental morality is not an excuse for moral slackness. The enlightened rise above the ordinary duties of life in the awareness of a higher purpose of life. The ordinary man should fulfil his duties with a detached view.

1. Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 68.

CHAPTER IV

THE PATH OF THREE JEWELS

We have seen that some systems of Indian philosophy like *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* hold knowledge (*tatvajñāna*) to be the means of liberation, Other systems like *Mīmāṃsā* hold *karman* or right action to be superior to any other thing. The followers of *bhakti*-cult hold devotion and faith to be the only way to liberation.

The position of Jainism here also, as elsewhere, is reconciliatory.¹ In fact, right faith, right knowledge and right conduct cannot exist exclusively of each other. It is true that right conduct is the direct means of liberation,² but right conduct with right faith and right knowledge only can lead to liberation.³

From real point of view right attitude, right knowledge and right conduct can be summarised in one word 'self-absorption'.⁴ From practical point of view right faith means faith in seven predicaments of Jainism,⁵ whereas right knowledge consists in a knowledge thereof.⁶ Right conduct is the conduct based on detachment.⁷

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.2.

2. चारित्रमन्ते गृह्यते मोक्षप्राप्तेः साक्षात्कारणमिति ज्ञापनार्थम् ।

—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 9.18.

3. अतः सम्यग्दर्शनं सम्यग्ज्ञानं सम्यक्चारित्रमित्येतत्त्रितयं समुदितं मोक्षस्य साक्षान्मार्गो वेदितव्यः ।

—*Ibid*, 1.1.

4. आदा खू मज्झणाणं आदा मे दंसणं चरित्तं च ।

—*Samayasāra*, 277.

5. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.

6. येन येन प्रकारेण जीवादयः पदार्था व्यवस्थितास्तेन तेनावगमः सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ।

—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.1.

7. रायादी परिहरणं चरणं ।

—*Samayasāra*, 155.

The necessity of combining the three is brought out in many passages. Just as a person knowing a man to be king, and having faith in him, follows him for money, similarly a person knowing the real path and having faith therein should follow it for liberation.¹ Conduct without faith and knowledge is as futile as faith and knowledge without conduct.

Right faith (*samyagdarśana*)

The meaning of samyagdarśana

Samyagdarśana, which has been rendered as 'right attitude', 'right faith', or 'right conviction', indicates complete saturation of mind with a principle or idea. From real point of view, *samyagdarśana* means a sense of feeling—realisation of self.² From practical point of view, *samyagdarśana* means a firm belief in the fundamental principles of Jainism. The *vyavahāra-samyagdarśana* may be said to be the means of *niscaya samyagdarśana*. Different *ācāryas* have expressed the same idea in different words. We give below some of the representative descriptions of the nature of *samyagdarśana* :

(1) The Uttarādhyayana defines *samyaktva* as belief in the nine categories.³ In his *Darśanapāhuḍa*, Kundakunda also defines *samyagdarśana* as a firm belief in the six substances and nine categories.⁴ In *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, he expresses the same idea in different words by defining *samyagdarśana* as belief in the *dharma* devoid of violence, in faultless deity and in the way of life, prescribed by the omniscients.⁵ In *Niyamasāra*, *samyagdarśana* is explained as a belief in liberated souls, Jaina scriptures and Jaina principles.⁶ In *Mūlācāra*, the *samyagdarśana* is defined as belief in nine categories.⁷

(2) *Svāmikārtikeya* added belief in non-absolutism as a condition for *samyagdarśana*.⁸ He held that the nature of nine

1. *Samayasāra*, 17-18.
2. *Darśanapāhuḍa*, Delhi, 1943, 20.
3. *Uttarādhyayana*, 28.14, 15.
4. *Darśanapāhuḍa*, Delhi, 1943, 19.
5. *Mokṣapāhuḍa*, Delhi, 1943, 90.
6. *Niyamasāra*, Lucknow, 1931, 5.
7. *Mūlācāra*, 5.6.
8. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 311, 312.

categories cannot be rightly ascertained without the help of *Pramāṇa* and *naya*.

(3) *Umāsvātī*, who is followed by *Amṛtacandrācārya* and *Nemicaṇḍra Siddhāntacakravartī*, defines *samyagdarśana* as belief in the seven predicaments of Jainism.¹

(4) *Samantabhadra* defines *samyagdarśana* as a belief in true deities, true scriptures and true teachers as against the three follies of belief in pseudo-deva, pseudo-belief and pseudo-teacher. *Samantabhadra* also speaks of the eight essentials of right faith and the necessity of freedom from eight types of pride for a right believer.²

(5) *Vasunandī* in his *Śrāvakācāra* says that, in addition to belief in the seven predicaments, *samyagdarśana* includes belief in liberated soul and Jaina scriptures.³ Here *Vasunandī* follows *Niyamasāra* of *Kundakunda*.

Transgressions and blemishes of samyagdarśana

The *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of following five transgressions of *samyagdarśana* :

- (i) *Śaṅkā* (doubt)
- (ii) *Ākāṅkṣā* (desire)
- (iii) *Vicikitsā* (repulsion)
- (iv) *Anyadr̥ṣṭiprasāṃsā* (admiration of followers of other creeds)
- (v) *Anyadr̥ṣṭisaṃstava* (praise of followers of other creeds).⁴

The fourth transgression differs from the fifth in as much as the former means secretly thinking admiringly of wrong believers, whereas the latter means announcing the praise of wrong believers loudly.⁵

Banārasī Dāsa in his *Nāṭakasamayāsāra* has given a different list of transgressions of right faith :

- (i) Fear of public censure.
- (ii) Attachment towards worldly pleasures.

1. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.

2. *Ratnakaraṇḍasrāvakācāra*, Delhi, 1955, 4.

3. *Vasunandīśrāvakācāra*, 6.

4. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, 1.40. Also *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.18.

5. *Cāritrasāra*, Shri Mahaviraji, Vira Nir. Sam. 2488, p. 7.

- (iii) Thinking of attainment of worldly pleasures in the next birth.
- (iv) Praise of false scriptures.
- (v) Service of wrong believers.¹

Eight essentials of sāmāyagdarśana

An aspirant should be firm in his belief. Any doubt or scepticism hampers moral progress. The firmness of his belief is indicated by the following eight qualities which are essential characteristics of *sāmāyagdarśana*. All these characteristics together make the right faith complete and effective.

1. *Niṣṣaṅkita* (Absence of doubt about scriptures). The right believer, because of this quality, is free from the seven fears of (1) this world (2) another world (3) death (4) pain (5) accident, (6) absence of protector and (7) absence of forts, etc.² This shows a state of complete fearlessness, which is obviously necessary for a moral life.

2. *Niḥkāṅkṣita* (having no desire for the worldly pleasures). It comes from the firm belief that worldly enjoyments are impermanent, fraught with miseries, root of sins and evils.³ A right believer, therefore, has a detached view of life. According to *Aṃṭacandrācārya*, he has non-absolutistic attitude and avoids one-sided view.⁴

3. *Nirvicikitsā* (absence of doubt about the attainments of spiritual path). A right believer should not have any repulsion from the impurity of the body of a person possessed of three jewels.⁵

4. *Amūḍhadṛṣṭi* (no confusion about the ideal). A right believer does not follow the wrong path even if it may sometimes lead to seemingly favourable results. He disassociates himself from those persons who follow the wrong path.⁶ This is not out of any hatred for them but because of the possible

1. *Nāṭakasamayasāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṁ. 1986, 13.38.

2. *Mūlācāra*, 2.52, 53.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra*, 12.

4. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, Agas, Vik. Sam. 2022, 23.

5. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra*, 13.

6. *Ibid.*, 14.

dangers of deviating from right path by their association.¹ He should not recognise violence as right under any fear of greed.² He should avoid pseudo-guru, pseudo-deva, pseudo-scripture pseudo-conduct and common false conceptions.³

5. *Upabṛhaṇa* (Augmenting the spiritual qualities). The right believer should perpetually endeavour to increase his spiritual qualities.⁴ Another name for this characteristic is *Upagūhana*, consisting in concealing one's own merit and demerits of others.⁵

6. *Sthirīkaraṇa* (Re-establishing those who deviate from truth). Any time any one may be tempted by passions to follow the wrong path. It is the duty of the aspirant to re-establish himself and others also on the right path by reminding him of its glory.⁶

7. *Vātsalya* (Sense of brotherhoods towards the followers of the right path). It includes respect for spiritual principles and for those who follow them.⁷ One must be devoted to meritorious persons, show respect to them and speak nobly.⁸

8. *Prabhāvanā* (preaching the importance of truth). One should try to propagate the truth to others also by means of charity, austerity, devotion, profound learning and by such means as are suited to the time and place.⁹

It would be observed here that the first five characteristics pertain to the individual life of the aspirant whereas the last three pertain to the social aspect of religion. A true aspirant is not satisfied with his progress only but tries his best to help others also in self-realisation.

1. माध्यस्थ्यभावं विपरीतवृत्तौ ।

—*Sāmāyikapāṭha*, Delhi, 1566, 1.

2. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 418.

3. *Puruṣārthsiddhupāya*, 26.

4. *Ibid.*, 27.

5. *Ibid.*, 27.

Also *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 419.

6. *Ibid.*, 28.

7. *Puruṣārthsiddhupāya*, 29.

8. *Ibid.*, 421.

9. *Ibid.*, 30.

Also *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 18; *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, 422.

Kundakunda on the eight essentials

Kundakunda in his *Samayasāra* explains the above eight characteristics from a different point of view. *Niṣṣaṅkita* according to his interpretation, means freedom from fear of seven types.¹ *Niṣkāṅkṣita* means having no yearning for the fruits of one's actions.² *Nirvikitsā* stands for non-abhorrence towards the natural qualities of objects.³ *Amūḍhadṛṣṭi* means that one should have no confusion about the nature of things.⁴ *Upabṛhaṇa* means covering the pseudo-characteristics of self by devotion to *Siddhas*.⁵ *Sthirīkaraṇa* means re-establishing one-self on the right path.⁶ *Vātsalya* is love for three jewels and monks.⁷ *Prabhāvanā* means devoting oneself to the self-knowledge.⁸

The means of attaining samyaktva :

Some people attain *samyaktva* through intuition (*nisarga*) others by a study of scriptures (*adhigama*).⁹ The persons having right faith can be classified into ten categories according to the means they adopt for the attainment of *samyaktva* :

1. *Nisarga*—Those who have an inborn spontaneous inclination towards righteousness.

2. *Upadeśa*—Those who learn truth from somebody by instruction.

3. *Ājñā*—Those who, being free from love and hate, follow the path of righteousness by command.

4. *Sūtra*—Those who obtain righteousness by the study of *sūtras*.

5. *Bija*—Those who comprehend the truth just by

1. *Samayasāra*, 228.

2. *Ibid.*, 230.

3. *Ibid.*, 231.

4. *Ibid.*, 232.

5. *Ibid.*, 233.

6. *Ibid.*, 234.

7. *Ibid.*, 235.

8. *Ibid.*, 236.

9. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.3.

having a suggestion about it, just as a drop of oil expands on the surface of the oil.

6. *Abhigama*—Those who comprehend the truth by the study of the eleven *Āṅgas*, the *Prakīraṇas* and the *Diṣṭivāda*.

7. *Vistāra*—Those who understand the truth by undergoing the full course of study by means of all *pramāṇas* and *nayas*.

8. *Kriyā*—Those who believe in performing all the duties prescribed by the scriptures under right knowledge, faith and conduct.

9. *Samkṣepa*—Those who understand the truth by a brief exposition only though ignorant of other systems of philosophy.

10. *Dharma*—Those who believe in the law, or the words of the Jinas.¹

The classification shows that human disposition differs from person to person but if the aim is correct we should make an allowance for the different methods of attainment of truth in accordance with one's own nature.

Moral corollaries of right faith :

It is clear from the above description that right faith implies such moral qualities as fearlessness, detachment, firmness, absence of scepticism, alertness, selflessness, sincerity of purpose, single-minded devotion, and propagation of truth. Besides, *Pūjyapāda* gives the following four essential virtues of a right believer :

(i) Calmness (*praśama*), (ii) detachment (*saṃvega*), (iii) kindness (*anukampā*) and (iv) self-realisation (*āstikya*).²

Somadeva says that 'just as virility of a man, which cannot be perceived with the senses, can be ascertained from his relations with women, or the generation of children, or his fortitude in danger, or the execution of his designs, similarly the existence of the jewel of right faith, although

1. *Uttarādhyaṇa*, 28.26-27. Also *Dharmasaṃgraha*, Palitana, 1905, 2.23 (p. 144).

2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.2.

extremely subtle owing to its being a condition of soul, may be inferred from the qualities of *praśama*, *saṁvega*, *anukampā* and *āstikya*.¹

In the first place, an excited person, who becomes the victim of his own ill-considered actions, and is overcome by such negative ideas as that of rage, hatred and jealousy, cannot focus his energies with a single-minded devotion to the purpose of liberation. The calmness comes from the realisation of the true aim of life.

Secondly, a true aspirant of liberation is not only detached from all worldly pleasures but is also afraid of them because these allurements can take him away from the right path. This is called *saṁvega* and comes from the realisation of the fact that happiness comes from within and not from without.

Thirdly, right believer is not a bigoted, hard-hearted and bitter man but he has respect for all, willing to let others lead a happy life, and has tendency of proving helpful in the miseries of others.

Fourthly he understands the equality of all. He has friendship for all (*maitrī*) but feels special bondage of kinship for those who are spiritually advanced (*pramoda*). Those who are away from truth, he tries to improve their lot (*karuṇā*). But if they do not listen to him, he does not develop any hatred for them; he rather becomes indifferent to them (*mādhyaṣṭhya*).²

Beside these four primary moral qualities, a right believer is asked to renounce eight types of pride of (i) the position of relatives on the maternal side (*jātimada*), (ii) the position of relatives on the paternal side (*kulamada*), (iii) beauty (*rūpamada*), (iv) wealth (*vibhūtimada*), (v) scholarship (*dhīmada*), (vi) strength (*śaktimada*), (vii) austerities (*tapomada*) and (viii) honour (*arcanāmada*).³ The following five vices vitiate his right faith : (i) pride of knowledge, (ii) dullness of intellect, (iii) harsh speech, (iv) cruelty and (v) idleness.⁴

1. Handiqui, K. K., *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture*, Solapura, 1949, p. 255.

2. *Sāmāyikapāṭha*, 1.

3. *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*, Bombay, 1919, 2.87.

4. *Nāṭakasamayāsāra*, 13.37.

On the other hand, the five qualities that adorn his right faith are as follows : (i) The eagerness to propagate right faith (ii) knowledge of right and wrong (iii) Steadfastness, (iv) happiness at the attainment of right attitude, (v) dexterity in thinking over metaphysical problems.¹ The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* brings out the moral significance of right faith with great emphasis when it says, "He who has right faith commits no sin."²

Position of faith in Indian Culture

Faith marks the start of the journey towards the ultimate goal. It indicates the first glimpses of truth. Faith has been praised as a great moral virtue and necessary for all spiritual progress by all.

The *R̥gveda* praises faith (*śraddhā*).³ The *Chāndogyo-paniṣad* asks us to be faithful.⁴ The *Gītā* says that only the faithful attains knowledge.⁵ We find a further development of this idea of faith in the *Bhaktisūtra* of *Nārada* and *Śaṅḍilya* which are solely based on the idea of faith and devotion. In *Vedānta*, *Rāmānujācārya* held that salvation is not possible by knowledge, as held by *Śaṅkara*, but by *bhakti*.⁶

Thus we find that the importance of faith has been impressed throughout the history of Indian culture.

Some points on Samyagdarśana

In the above description of the nature, characteristics, types and means of right faith, the following points are discernible :

(1) Right faith is not something dogmatic. The way in which a man may fall and regain the right attitude⁷ proves that it is a dynamic quality and not mere conversion from

1. *Nāṭakasamayāsāra*, 13.31.

2. सम्मतदंसी न करेइ पावं—

—*Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1.3.2.1.

3. *R̥gveda*, 10.151.1-5.

4. *Chāndogyo-paniṣad*, 6.12.3.

5. श्रद्धावांलभते ज्ञानम् ।

—*Gītā*, 4.39.

6. Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 703.

7. Cf. infra chapter VIII.

one faith to another faith in the missionary sense of the term.

(2) In Jainism, as in other religions of India, only acceptance of a code of principles is necessary but we need not accept the over-all supremacy of a particular person. There can be no Mohammedan without accepting Mohammad as the messenger of God and no Christian without accepting Christ as the son of God. No person is assigned such super-human position by Jainism. The *Tirthankaras* were as human as we are; only they conquered their passions which we can also do and attain the same status which they did.

(3) Jainism realises the direct comprehension of truth as a landmark in the life of an aspirant. But it is only the beginning of the journey, not the end. Belief does affect our conduct but old habits do not break instantaneously. Right faith must lead to right conduct. Our conviction must compell us to act accordingly. Hence right faith, from which the ethics begins, can lead to perfection only when followed by right conduct.

(4) Mere conduct and knowledge are impotent without right faith. It means that all moral virtues should be deeply rooted in the spiritual realisation. Without right faith, the moral virtues remain merely means of attaining selfish motives like name and fame. Right faith implies that duty is to be performed not for some petty immediate gain but for the attainment of the highest goal of perfection. This saves the aspirant from being entrapped in the allurements of worldly pleasures which he may easily come across as a result of his good activities.

(5) To some extent, the position of a right believer may be compared to that of a *niṣkāma karmayogī* of the *Gītā*. He has no desire, no attachment, still he engages himself in activities under the influence of previous *karmans*. These activities are not always good. But the inner detachment of the right believer weakens the force of *karmans* remarkably.

We shall have more occasion to deal with the character of a *samyagdarśī* while dealing with the stages of spiritual development (*guṇasthāna*). Suffice it to say for the present, that right faith means an inner conversion and not merely verbal acceptance of certain truths. The truth of truths is the self. Therefore from real point of view, *samyagdarśana* means

realisation of the self. The description of *samyagdarśana* from practical point of view is to be interpreted in the light of this *nīścayasamyagdarśana*. Now we turn to the second jewel of right knowledge with special reference to its ethical value.

Right knowledge

The *Uttarādhyayana* clearly says that without knowledge, there is no virtuous conduct.¹ In the history of mankind the word 'knowledge' has been considered to be very sacred. In Jainism, a utilitarian view of knowledge has been taken. Knowledge is a means to something higher, which is emancipation. Knowledge should not only be right epistemologically but should be backed by right faith as to be spiritually useful.

Right faith and right knowledge

Though right faith and right knowledge emerge simultaneously on the removal of *mithyātva* as heat and light simultaneously rise from sun on the removal of clouds,² yet the two are to be distinguished from each other. Right faith is the result of removal of vision-deluding *karmans* (*darśanamohaniya*) whereas right knowledge is the result of removal of knowledge-obscuring *karmans* (*jñānāvaraṇī*). For liberation, right attitude should be free from all blemishes, whereas it is not necessary to know more than the bare fundamental truths of spirituality. We have a story of *Śivabhūti* in *Bhāvapāhuḍa*, who attained liberation even though he had little knowledge of scriptures.³ On the other hand, not an iota of scepticism can be tolerated with regard to right attitude. What is comparable to *avidyā* of other systems, is *darśanamohaniya* in Jainism. Ignorance or *ajñāna*, in the ordinary sense of absence of mundane knowledge, is not a great hindrance in the realisation of truth.

While discussing the stages of spiritual development in

1. नाणेण विणा न हुंति चरणगुणा—

—*Uttarādhyayana*, 28.30.

Also पढमं गाणं तओ दया—

—*Daśavaikālikasūtra*, 4.10.

2. *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.1.

3. *Bhāvapāhuḍa*, 53.

a subsequent chapter, we shall see that as the aspirant ascends upwards, he has to fight against vision-deluding (*darśana-mohanīya*) *karmans* and conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*) *karmnas*, whereas the *jñānāvaraṇī karmans* continue to the last till he attains the highest stage of omniscience. As far as moral progress is concerned, only the knowledge of basic principles of spiritualism is essential. Therefore, the knowledge-obscuring *karmans* are not considered detrimental (*ghātins*) for moral progress.

What is right knowledge ?

To know the jar as a jar does not make the knowledge right. A right knowledge is that in which a clear distinction is made between the self and the non-self.¹ The real knowledge is the knowledge of the self. The word *jñānī* may be used in three different contexts :

1. A man possessed of knowledge is called *jñānī*. From this point of view all are *jñānīs*.

2. A man possessed of right faith is called *jñānī*. All overcome by wrong belief are *ajñānīs* from this point of view, even though their knowledge may be epistemologically right.

3. A man having perfect knowledge is called *jñānī*. All souls in bondage are *ajñānīs* from this point of view.²

It is only the second type of *jñānī*, whose knowledge leads him to liberation.³ Right knowledge is that which leads one towards his goal. The knowledge of the scriptures is valuable only if it leads to detachment and self-realisation.⁴ Right knowledge should help in the realisation of truth and in controlling the mind and purifying the self.

1. ...स्वपरान्तरं जानाति यः स जानाति ।

—*Iṣṭopadeśa*, 33.

2. *Jayacanda* on *Samayasāra*, Delhi, 1959, 177-178.

3. सम्मत्तरयणभट्टा जाणता बहुविहाइं सत्थाइं ।

आराहणाविरहिया भमति तत्थेव तत्थेव ॥

—*Darśanapāhuḍa*, 4.

4. एवं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं कियाणित्ता ।

जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुक्खपरिमोक्खं ॥

—*Pañcāstikāya*, 103.

The special position of right knowledge according to Jñānasāra

Jñānasāra lays greater emphasis on knowledge. There seems to be an influence of *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Vedānta* on the author of the book. He defines *avidyā* or ignorance, after the fashion of *Patañjali*, as miscomprehending non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure and non-self as self¹. Obviously, *Jñānasāra* includes *mithyādarśana* and *mithyājñāna*, both in *avidyā*. "If the knowledge, capable of cutting the Gordian knot, exists what is the use of strange *tantras* and *yantras*? "If the sight itself is dispeller of darkness why use the lamps?"² The book continues to speak in poetic tones, "The wise declare knowledge to be a nectar, which does not arise from ocean, a tonic, without being a medicine, a glory which does not depend on others."³ Knowledge of scriptures is to be distinguished from inner knowledge. A man, intoxicated with penance and scriptural knowledge etc. even though devoted to religious rites, gets attached; whereas a man possessed of the inner knowledge, even though not devoted to religious rites, does not get attached.⁴ The wise cuts, with the sickle of knowledge, the creeper of the poison of desire, which yields the fruits of drying up of the mouth, attachment and helplessness.⁵ Knowledge makes a man fearless.⁶ It is the real penance (*tapas*) because it burns (*tāpanāt*) the *karmans*.⁷

All this praise which *Jñānasāra* showers on knowledge is justified in case of the broader sense of the term, which it attributes to it.

Right knowledge Vs. wrong knowledge :

All knowledge of a wrong believer is wrong because it does not lead to liberation. Even otherwise, if a man does

1. *Jñānasāra*, Bhavanagar, Vik. Sam. 1969, *Vidhyāṣṭaka*, 1.
(For other *Aṣṭakas* also see *Jñānasāra*)

cf. *Yogasūtra*, 2.5.

2. *Jñānāṣṭaka*, 6.

3. *Ibid.*, 8.

4. *Nirlepāṣṭaka*, 5.

5. *Nirbhayāṣṭaka*, 3.

6. Cf. *Nirbhayāṣṭaka*.

7. ज्ञानमेव बुधाः प्राहुः कर्मणां तपनात्तपः ।

—*Tapoṣṭaka*, 1.

not know even the substratum of all knowledge, how can his knowledge be right? The truth is that one who knows one, knows all and who knows all, knows one.¹ Knowledge to be right should be relative. This implies non-absolutism which is another name for right faith. Absence of bookish knowledge or wrong perception arising out of the weakness of senses is not real ignorance.

Limitations of knowledge

Some of the systems of Indian Philosophy hold that knowledge alone can lead to liberation. *Vidyānandī* has refuted this view in the beginning of his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*. His arguments can be summarised thus : A man, even after acquisition of knowledge remains embodied for some time. This is also accepted by *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Vedānta* as necessary for the enjoyment of residual *karmans*. Now the question is this that a person who has acquired right knowledge will not be re-born; then how does it become possible for him to exhaust all his residual *karmans* before leaving his body? The soul must put some special efforts for it. This effort in the form of meditation is a form of conduct, which annihilates the residual *karmans* by the process of *nirjarā*.³ Therefore, right knowledge combined with right conduct brings emancipation.

The position of right knowledge in Indian culture

Knowledge occupies a very significant position in the history of Indian philosophy. By the term 'knowledge', two psychological phenomena are indicated : (1) Knowledge of the external objects, which may be called 'mundane knowledge', (2) Knowledge of the self, which directly comes through self-realisation.⁴ This is the latter type of knowledge, called *tattvajñāna*, which according to *Vedānta*, *Nyāya* and *Sāṅkhya* systems of philosophy, directly leads to liberation.

In Jainism, which is mainly an ethical system, know-

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 1. 4.1. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 34.

2. *Vidyānandī* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Bombay, 1918, 1.1. (verses 50-51).

3. *Ibid.* 1.1. (verses 52).

4. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 1.1.5.

ledge occupies only a subservient place to conduct. It believes that knowledge is a power which can be rightly utilised only by a man possessed of right attitude (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). Even the mundane knowledge, in Jainism, is held to be leading towards liberation provided that it is utilised for developing a detached view of life. Since Jainism is a realistic system, it does not look upon mundane knowledge as false, as is the case with *Vedānta* system which holds this world and knowledge thereof to be illusory.

Coming to the *Brāhmaṇical* attitude, we find prayers for knowledge and intelligence at many places.¹ Knowledge occupies such an important position in the *Upaniṣads* that they are called *jñānakāṇḍa* (portions dealing with knowledge) of the Veda. *Īsopaniṣad* says that through knowledge one gets immortality.² The *Gītā* says that there is nothing purer than knowledge.³ According to *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Vedānta*, knowledge is the only means of liberation.

Some points on right knowledge

From the above discussion it may be concluded that :

(1) Jainism places ethics above metaphysics and epistemology. To believe that 'to know the jar even as a jar' is wrong if the knowledge is not accompanied by right faith, is a clear indication of the above fact. The motto is not 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' but 'knowledge for the sake of liberation.'

(2) Jainism and other systems of Indian philosophy make a distinction between verbal knowledge and knowledge acquired through direct spiritual experience. The former, even though much in quantity, cannot save whereas a little of the latter can lead us to liberation.

(3) Knowledge without faith and conduct is impotent, Knowledge without faith is a mere pedantic gymnasticism whereas knowledge without conduct is a futile burden on the head. It is the union of the three that brings real bliss to the soul.

1. *Śukla Yajurveda*, Bombay, 1929, 32.15.

2. विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ।

—*Īsopaniṣad*, 11.

3. *Gītā*, 4.38.

Right Conduct

Right faith precedes right conduct.¹ No conduct or knowledge without right faith can be said to be right.²

Transcendental conduct

From transcendental point of view, right conduct consists in self-absorption. We have spoken of this conception in the foregoing chapter. From this point of view conduct has only one variety viz., self-absorption. Conduct is *dharma*, *dharma* is equanimity (*sāmya*), and equanimity means that condition of *ātman* which is free from delusion and agitation.³

Conduct from practical point of view

It is only in the background of this transcendental conception of conduct that all religious conduct is to be justified.⁴ Persons are purified by the purification of mind, all austerities are mere torturing of body without that.⁵ A person who is inwardly detached, is detached in the real sense of the term; he who is detached only outwardly does not get emancipation. Right conduct is something spontaneous, it is not forced. The vows, the three-fold path of self-discipline and the five-fold path of vigilance are the constituents of practical conduct.⁶ Without conduct all knowledge is futile.⁷

1. तत्र सम्यक्त्वस्यादौ वचनं तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चारित्रस्य ।

—*Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 2.3.

2. यत्पुनर्द्रव्यचारित्रं श्रुतं ज्ञानं विनापि दुक् ।

न तज्ज्ञानं न चारित्रमस्ति चेत्कर्मबन्धकृत् ॥

—*Pañcādhyāyī*, 2.771.

3. चारित्तं खलु धम्मो, धम्मो जो सो समो त्तिणिददट्ठो ।

मोहक्खोहविहीणो परिणामो अप्पणो हु समो ॥

—*Pravacanasāra*, 1.7.

Also *Pañcādhyāyī*, 2.764.

4. *Amṛtacandra* on *Samayasāra*, 307.

5. मनःशुद्ध्यैव शुद्धिः स्याद्देहिनां नात्र संशयः ।

वृथा तद्व्यतिरेकेण कायस्यैव कदर्थनम् ॥

—*Jñānārṇava*, Bombay, 1907, 22.14.

6. *Brhaddaravyasaṃgraha*, Bombay, Vir. Nir. Saṃ. 2433, 45.

7. *Ārāhanāsāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṃ. 1973, 54.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have observed that according to Jainism the main cause of bondage is perversity of attitude. The right faith, therefore, occupies the most important position.

At the same time, right conduct is no less important. The soul has to exert itself in order to check the inflow of fresh *kārmic* matter and also to annihilate the previously accumulated *kārmic* matter. This is, as given in the second chapter, called *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*.

Now we proceed to deal with the rules of conduct, which form the main part of Jaina ethics. As attainment of right conduct is a gradual process, the aspirant may not be able to achieve the highest ideals of conduct at the first stage. He, therefore, can observe only partial self-control at the stage of householder, whereas at the advanced stage of monkhood he becomes capable of observing the rules of conduct more comprehensively and completely. So we have two sets of rules of conduct : one for the householder, another for the monk. We shall deal with both of them in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER V

THE CONDUCT OF A HOUSEHOLDER

Who is a householder ?

The Jaina word for a householder, *śrāvaka*, covers all those persons who have attained right faith but have not adopted monkhood. These persons either observe the vows partially (*aṇuvrata*) or do not observe them (*aviratasamygdṛṣṭi*). But pure right faith is the necessary condition for a *śrāvaka*. This purity of right faith comes from its eight essentials¹ and from freedom from eight prides² and three follies.³

Having conquered the vision-deluding *karmans* (*darśana-mohanīya*), the *śrāvaka* continues to struggle against another enemy, the character-obstructing (*cāritramohanīya*) *karmans*. He adopts the twelve vows prescribed for a laity and then proceeds to limit his desires till he is able to take the absolute vows (*mahāvratā*) and adopt the life of a monk. This is generally a gradual process. At the higher stage of spiritual development a *śrāvaka* is called *Naiṣṭhika* who renounces the worldly life and takes to a life that resembles the life of a monk (*śramaṇabhūtapratimā*). Thus *śrāvakācāra* includes not only the conduct of a *gṛhastha* but also the conduct of one who is known as *vānaprastha* in *Hindu-dharma-śāstras*.

The position of a householder:

Jaina ethics is primarily ascetic. The life of a householder is meant to be a short stay, only for those who are still incapable of enduring the hardships of the life of a monk. The morality of a householder, therefore, occupies a secondary place to the morality of a monk. We, therefore, find that the older books like *Ācārāṅga* of the *Śvetāmbaras* or *Mūlācāra* of the *Digambaras*, deal primarily with the life of a monk.

1. Supra, pp. 86-87.

2. Supra, pp. 90.

3. Supra, p. 85.

In Brāhmaṇism, the position is just the reverse. The older books of Brāhmaṇism conceive primarily of a householder's life. It is only in the later books that the institution of ascetics came to its own and occupied that prominent place which it does to-day. The *Manusmṛti* represents the Brāhmaṇical thinking on the whole when it says that just as all rivers find shelter in ocean, similarly all *āśramas* find shelter in *grhasthāśrama*.¹

The position of an aviratasamyagdṛṣṭi :

The first stage of a Jaina householder begins with right attitude. This right attitude should be perfect in respect of eight essential limbs. Just as a *mantra*, short of even a single letter, does not remove the pain of poison similarly right attitude, devoid of any of the essentials, does not pierce the line of births.² Even a pariah, having right faith is like god and is like the lustre of a live charcoal covered by the ashes.³ Right faith acts like a pilot in the path of liberation.⁴ A householder with right faith is better than a monk without it.⁵

Even if a person does not observe the vows, but if he is blessed with right faith, he is not reborn in hell or as animal, bird, eunuch or woman or in a low family, and does not suffer from deformity, or short life or poverty.⁶ Those who are purified by right faith become lords of splendour, energy, wisdom, prowess, fame, wealth, victory, and greatness and are born in great families and are very prosperous.⁷

Jainism emphasises both, an inner detachment and renunciation of the worldly objects. The latter is the result of former and has no spiritual significance without it. Right attitude signifies inner detachment. It may not be possible for a man of right faith to renounce the worldly objects instantaneously, but once he has developed inner detachment

1. *Manusmṛti*, 6.90.

2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra*, 21.

3. *Ibid.* 28.

4. *Ibid.*, 31.

5. *Ibid.*, 33.

6. *Ibid.*, 35.

7. *Ibid.*, 36.

the *karmans* cannot hold him in bondage for long. It is said that he attains liberation within a maximum time-limit of an *ardhapudgalaparāvarta*. He performs actions but they have so little influence on him that the *karmans*, it is said, do not bind him. This position can be compared to the *niṣkāma karmayoga* of the *Gītā*. The person with an inner detachment performs actions, but is not attached to their fruits or results.

But the aspirant is not satisfied with anything short of liberation, which requires not only inner detachment but a complete renunciation of worldly activities. As his right faith gains ground, he proceeds towards monkhood by adopting small vows which are less strict than the great vows of a monk.

The vows of a householder :

According to *Upāsakadaśāṅga* as well as *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, the householder should observe the following twelve vows :

(1) Five partial vows. (2) Three *guṇavratas* (3) Four purificatory *śikṣāvratas*.¹ According to *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra* the eight essentials of a *śrāvaka* are the five small vows and renunciation of wine, meat and honey.² The five small vows include partial observance of the five moral principles of non-violence, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-possession. These vows are supplemented by the *guṇavratas* which discipline the external movements and the *śikṣāvratas* which emphasise inner purity of heart.

The five vows and Caturyāmadharmas:

The number 'five' seems to have some special significance for ancient Indian thinkers. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* gives the following five qualities as constituents of the life of a good man.

(1) Penance (*tapas*) (2) Liberality (*dāna*) (3) Simple dealing (*āṛjavam*) (4) Non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) (5) Truthfulness

1. *Upāsakadaśāṅga*, Rajakota, 1961, 1.11 (pp. 201-244).

Also *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 51.

2. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 66.

(*satyavacana*).¹ The last two of these qualities are the same as the first two vows of Jainism. The third of these may be interpreted as non-stealing.² Thus these moral qualities of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* very much resemble the Jaina vows.

Baudhāyana gives the following list of cardinal moral virtues :

1. Abstinence from injuring the living beings.
2. Truthfulness.
3. Abstention from appropriating the property of others.
4. Continence.
5. Liberality³

This description has replaced penance of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* by continence, thus bringing these moral virtues still nearer to Jaina vows. The fifth vow of liberality, which was a cardinal virtue of Brāhmaṇism was a misfit in the Jaina view of morality. It was, therefore, replaced by non-possession. This was, however, done only at the time of the last *Tīrthaṅkara*, *Mahāvīra*. *Pārśvanātha* the *Tīrthaṅkara* prior to him, conceived, only of four vows (*caturyāmas*).⁴

The five vows (*pañcaśīla*), which are binding on a Buddhist laity, include the vow of abstinence from intoxicants as the fifth vow. The Jaina view of non-possession is more comprehensive than this. Thus we see that the first four of these vows are unanimously accepted by Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism. The fifth vow was, however, modified by each religion according to its own requirements.⁵ Later on, the Brāhmaṇical tradition also adopted the same vows as those of Jainism when *Yogasūtra* of *Patañjali* replaced the original vow of liberality by the ascetic vow of non-possession.⁶

The reason why *Mahāvīra* replaced the four *Yamas* of

1. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 3.17.4.

Also *Taittiriyaopaniṣad*. 1.9.

2. *Ācārāṅga* mentions three vows also. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. 63.

3. *Baudhāyana*, 2.10.18. quoted from SBE, Vol. XXII, Introduction, p. XXIII.

4. *Sthānāṅga*, 4.1.266.

5. SBE, Vol. XXII, Introduction, p. XXIV.

6. *Yogasūtra*, 2.30.

Pārśvanātha by five vows is given as follows in the *Uttarādhyayana*. The followers of *Pārśvanātha* were simple and wise whereas the followers of *Mahāvīra* were prevaricating and slow of understanding.¹ So *Mahāvīra* had to make it clear to his followers that celibacy and non-possession were equally important and, therefore, he split one vow into two. From yet another reference to nakedness of the followers of *Mahāvīra* in contrast to the wearing of clothes by the followers of *Pārśvanātha*² it may be inferred that perhaps *Mahāvīra* was more strict on the observance of absolute vow of non-possession. This is, however, a tradition of the *Śvetāmbara* sect. *Kundakunda* of the *Digambara* sect, has clearly prohibited use of clothes for all monks.³ It may also be pointed out that in the Brāhmaṇical tradition, these vows for mendicants were nowhere prescribed for a householder till perhaps *Yogasūtra* first of all thought of having small vows (*apuvratas*) for the householder. Originally, the life of a householder, according to Brāhmaṇism, was guided by such social virtues as sacrifice, study and liberality rather than by the ascetic virtues. The life of a householder according to *śramaṇa* tradition is, however, only a preparation for monkhood and, therefore, he was expected from the very beginning to practise the same virtues on a smaller scale which a monk was expected to follow with perfection.

Thus it is a long journey from the list of five cardinal moral virtues given by *Chāndogyopaniṣad* to the five *Yamas* of *Yogasūtra*. We see that the ascetic tradition of Jainism influenced the Brāhmaṇical tradition also, which replaced the social virtue of liberality by the ascetic virtue of non-possession. The emphasis on non-possession may be considered to be a contribution of *Mahāvīra* to the Jaina tradition itself.

Originally, the Brāhmaṇical tradition, again, did not favour the idea of renouncing the world in the prime of youth. It was only after the duties of worldly life were fulfilled that a person could adopt monkhood to lead a retired life in the

1. *Uttarādhyayana*, 23.26-27.

2. Cf. *Uttarādhyayana*, XXIII.

3. *Mūlācāra*, 1.30.

forest, devoted to meditation. The *śramaṇa* tradition influenced the Brāhmaṇical tradition in this respect also. The old division of āśramas continued; but the new idea of renouncing the world, the very day one attains detachment, was also introduced.¹

The vow of non-violence : its background

The Vedic people seem to have been more inclined towards worldly engagements than spiritual attainments. They glorified the institution of war as means of destroying enemies.² This glorification of war is repeated in the later Brāhmaṇical literature also.³ At the time of *Mahāvīra*, animals were mercilessly killed in sacrifices.

But this does not mean that Brāhmaṇical literature has no mention of non-violence. *Āśādhara* tells us that the animal sacrifice was started by *Vasu* by misinterpreting such sentences as 'ajairyasṭavyam'.⁴ The *Manusmṛti* praises avoidance of meat-eating.⁵ The famous sentence that non-violence is the supreme duty (*ahiṃsā paramo dharmah*) occurs in the *Mahābhārata* itself. The *Mahābhārata* declares that the sum-total of duties is contained in the maxim : "Thou shalt not do to others what is disagreeable to thyself."

Thus two distinct currents can be seen from the very beginning of Indian culture. *Manusmṛti* has beautifully summarised the position by saying that human nature is inclined towards meat-eating but a check on this natural inclination yields immensely favourable results.⁶ There is great truth in the saying that life lives on life.⁷ Still justice demands that we should not inflict misery on others, if we do not want others to inflict misery on us. Between these two facts, the inevitability of violence on one hand and the demand of our inner-

1. *Jābālopaniṣad*, 4.

2. *Rgveda*, 1.166.10.

3. *Gītā*, 2.37.

4. *Sāgārādharmāmṛta*, 8.84.

5. *Manusmṛti*, 5.45-55.

6. *Ibid.*, 5.56.

7. जीवो जीवस्य जीवन्म् ।

most heart of being non-injurious to others, we are to fix our duty of non-violence.

Non-violence in Jainism :

Thought is the father of action. We commit violence in thought (*bhāvahiṃsā*) before we commit it in action (*dravyahiṃsā*). It is the former, violence in thought, which is real violence (*niścayahiṃsā*). Therefore, merely taking away of life does not constitute complete definition of violence. Violence has been defined as injury to one's vitalities out of negligence (*pramāda*). Negligence means, in short, the passionate ideas of attachment and aversion. These ideas have been classified under fifteen heads.¹ Entertaining such ideas is violence, whereas absention from such ideas is non-violence.²

Violence in thought

Bhāvahiṃsā, violence in thought, has predominated in the discussion of *ahiṃsā* by Jaina thinkers. Even before *Umāsvāti* defined *hiṃsā*, *Ācārya Kundakunda* had declared that whether one was killed or not, a negligent person certainly committed violence.³ A vigilant person, on the other hand, who acted with care, did not suffer bondage by mere (material) injury. The commentator *Amytacandrācārya* says that the inner violence is the impure state of self, whereas the injury to vitalities is the external manifestation of violence.⁴ He is clear about it that the material vitalities of others are sometimes injured and sometimes not; a person gets the bondage of *karmāns* because of defilement of his abstract vitalities (*bhāvaprāṇa*) by attachment.⁵ *Jayasenācārya* made the sense clearer by means of a metaphor. "Just as a person desirous of killing others by a burning iron bar burns his ownself first, similarly an ignorant person first afflicts his own pure-self by getting influenced by the ideas of infatuation etc., which are like the burning iron bar; there is no rigid rule

1. Supra, p. 62.

2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 44.

3. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.17.; also *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 45.

4. *Amytacandra* on *Pravacanasāra*, 3.17.

5. *Ibid.*, 2.57.

for the affliction of others.”¹ The *Daśavaikālikasūtra* declares that to one who walks, stands, sits, sleeps, eats and speaks with vigilance, no sin accrues.² *Kundakundācārya* also says that a *śramaṇa* who is negligent is said to be violent with regard to all the six *kāyas* but if he behaves vigilantly, he remains unattached, just like lotus in water.³ This is how absolute non-violence is made possible.

Coming to the commentaries of *Tattvārthasūtra*, *Sarvārthasiddhi* of *Pūjyapāda* repeats the same thing and says that a negligent soul afflicts the self by self and it is not important whether others are killed or not.⁴

Akalaṅkadeva in his *Rājavārtika* defines *pramatta* as a person who loses all sense of discrimination under the influence of passions.⁵

The objection that if a person cannot be held responsible for happiness and miseries of others, how could he be held responsible for any act of violence, has been answered on the basis of predominance of *bhāvahiṃsā*. True that a person is not responsible for the miseries of another person⁶, yet he cannot escape responsibility of defiling his pure nature by entertaining the ideas of attachment and aversion, which is the real sin.

Violence in action (Dravyahiṃsā) :

Non-violence in thought should be translated into action also. To say that if internal mind is undefiled external purity of actions is unnecessary, would be denying the unbreakable relation between thought and action. Non-violence is not merely an abstract idea but also a concrete way of life. What has been said about the importance of *bhāvahiṃsā* and *nīścayahiṃsā* does not mean negligence in outward behaviour.

1. *Jayasena*, on *Pravacanasāra*, 2.57.

2. *Daśavaikālika*, 4.8.

3. *Pravacanasāra*, 3.18.

4. स्वयमेवात्मनात्मानं हिनस्त्यात्मा प्रमादवान् ।

पूर्वं प्राप्यन्तेराणान्तु पश्चात्स्याद्वा न वा वधः ॥

—Quoted by *Pūjyapāda* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, 7.10.

5. *Akalaṅka* on *Tattvārthasūtra*, Calcutta, 7.13.1.

6. *Samayasāra*, 266.

"The wheel of different view-points (*nayacakra*) is extremely sharp-edged and difficult to ward off; when it is used by misguided intellect it cuts off one's own head quickly."¹ Hence avoidance of external violence is as necessary as the avoidance of feelings of attachment or aversion.

From practical point of view, any kind of injury to any of the ten vitalities of a living being is violence. These ten vitalities are five senses : three powers of mind, speech and body; age and respiration.² Violence thus includes not only killing or physical injury but also curtailing the freedom of thought and speech of others. None should be forced to do anything against his wish. Thus it would be wrong to restrict non-violence only to the limited field of non-injury to living beings; it should also be extended to the higher plane of independence of thought and speech, which is the very basis of democracy and free society.

Amṛtacandra has shown the importance of the intention of the agent. He has pointed out that, on account of intensity or mildness of passions, trifling violence may yield serious results and grievous violence may yield trifling results.³ Thus the same violent action may yield different results on account of variation in the intensity of passion.⁴ Sometimes violence leads to benefits of non-violence and non-violence to the harms of violence.⁵

Non-absolutism and non-violence

When we extend non-violence from respect for life to respect for thought, we are automatically led to non-absolutism. That is why non-absolutism is held as important as non-violence by Jaina thinkers. All statements or points of view are relative and, therefore, every one of them has a grain of truth. Every object has complex nature and unity can be found in diversity. Given two contradictory statements, it is not necessary to reject one of them, for the

1. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 59.

2. *Gaṇin*, *Siddhasena on Tattvārthasūtra*, Surat, 1930, 7.8.

3. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 52.

4. *Ibid.*, 53.

5. *Ibid.*, 57.

contradiction may be superficial and not real. A wider outlook is necessary to avoid quarrels which lead not only to mental conflicts but to so much of bloodshed in the name of religion and ideologies. It is a matter of daily experience that contradictory attributes can be assigned to the same object from different points of view. The same tree which is said to be movable from the point of view of branches, is said to be immovable from the point of view of root and trunk. We do not like to listen to the view-points of others on account of our prides and prejudices. But a non-violent person, who is free from attachment and aversion, will dispassionately look at every problem and would be able to arrive at the truth by reconciling different points of view by putting them in their proper perspective. In fact, most of the so-called ideological conflicts are motivated by selfish interest. Non-violence teaches us to be master of our passions and accept objective views on all problems.

Types of violence

From real point of view violence is only of one type; but from practical point of view it can be classified into many varieties. Jaina thinkers have classified violence into 108 varieties so that the aspirant can detect even the minutest form of violence.¹ The violence is three-fold in as much as it can be (1) committed by the person himself (*kṛta*) or (2) got committed by others (*kārita*) or (3) got committed by others by giving consent (*anumodanā*). This three-fold violence becomes nine-fold as it can be committed by either of the three agencies of mind, speech and body. This nine-fold violence becomes twentyseven-fold as it has three stages : (1) thinking of violent action (*saṃrambha*), (2) making preparation for violence (*Samārambha*) and (3) actual committal (*ārambha*). This twentyseven-fold violence becomes one hundred and eightyfold as it could be inspired by either of the four passions. This classification shows that *Jainācāryas* took a comprehensive view of non-violence.

Avoidance of violence in all its varieties is possible only

1. *Amitagatiśrāvakācāra*, Bombay, Vik. Saṃ. 1979, 6.12-13.

for a monk who observes absolute non-violence. We shall deal with the absolute non-violence in the following chapter while dealing with the conduct of a monk. Herebelow we deal with the vow of non-violence as it is observed by a householder.

Limitations of the small vow of non-violence¹

The conception of the vow of non-violence for householder is based on two considerations : (1) The householder has certain responsibilities towards his family of earning livelihood and procuring necessities of life for them. (2) He has to safeguard himself and his country against enemies.

For the first requirement, the householder has to adopt a certain profession. He should be careful to choose a profession which involves the least violence. The violence that he commits under compulsion of professional circumstances is called *Udyamihiṃsā*; and it can be avoided only at the higher stage of spiritual progress in the eighth *pratimā*. Unintentional violence is also involved in such daily routine of a householder, as cooking etc. It is not possible to abandon such violence in the initial stages.² This is known as *ārambhahiṃsā* and is abandoned only in the eighth *pratimā*.

As regards the second requirement of self-defence, the householder takes a defensive attitude in wars. He is never offensive, but he can take part in defensive wars. When compelled by circumstances, he accepts the challenge of war as a necessary evil (*virodhihiṃsā*).

It is only the fourth type of *hiṃsā*, called intentional violence (*saṃkalpihiṃsā*), which can be and should be absolutely avoided by a householder.³ *Saṃkalpihiṃsā* includes violence for the sake of fun or violence performed under intense passion. Avoidance of this type of violence interferes neither with his duty of earning his livelihood nor with discharging his responsibilities of self-protection as a self-respecting citizen of his country.

This, however, does not mean that other three types of

1. Muni Nathamāla, *Ahiṃsā-tattva-darsana*, CII, 1960, IF. 85-86.

2. *Amitagatiśrāvākācāra*, 6.6-7.

3. *Ratnakarṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 53.

violence that the householder commits under compulsion are not to be abandoned ultimately. As the aspirant ascends the steps of spiritual progress, he minimises all types of violence in his conduct. In the meantime, he has a constant feeling of self-condemnation (*nindana*, *garhaṇa*) for the violence that he commits.¹

Eight mūlaguṇas :

Amytacandra has considered the renunciation of wine, meat, honey and five types of *Udumbara* fruits as necessary for a householder, who wants to observe the vow of non-violence.² These are called basic qualities or *mūlaguṇas* of a householder. The earlier writers like *Samantabhadra* included the five *aṇuvratas* also in the *mūlaguṇas*. *Samantabhadra* had five *aṇuvratas* and abstinence from wine, meat and honey as the eight *mūlaguṇas*.³ *Ācārya Somadeva* introduced altogether a different tradition by replacing five *aṇuvratas* by abstinence from five *Udumbaras*.⁴ This must be considered as concession, since observance of five *aṇuvratas* is much more difficult than avoidance of five *Udumbaras*. *Amytacandrasūri* followed *Somadeva* in this respect.

The number of these basic qualities has not remained constant. *Ācārya Amitagati* added to the eight basic qualities given by *Amytacandra*, the avoidance of eating at night.⁵ *Vasunandī* added, the avoidance of gambling, hunting, prostitution, adultery and stealing.⁶ *Pandita Āśādhara* gives another list of these basic qualities in which he has added devotion to the adorable five, viz. *Arihanta*, *Siddha*, *Ācārya*, *Upādhyāya* and *Sādhu* ; use of only that water which is strained through a cloth and a compassionate attitude towards the sentient beings.⁷

It may be observed from these different lists of basic qualities of a householder that non-violence predominates in

1. *Amitagatiśrāvākācāra*, 6.8.

2. *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, 61.

3. *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra*, 66.

4. *Handiqui, K. K., Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, p. 262.

5. *Amitagatiśrāvākācāra*, 5.1.

6. *Vasunandīśrāvākācāra*, 59.

7. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, 2.18.

every list. These lists also show that *Jaina Ācāryas* were particular about non-violence not only towards fellow human beings but towards small insects and animals also.

Dietic prohibition :

Food is the basic necessity of life. The necessary violence involved in the preparation of food is unavoidable for a house-holder and is considered as *ārambhī himsā*. But violence for food should be restricted within certain limits. Meat, for example, which is obtained by merciless killing of innocent animals, is not allowed for eating in any case. Vegetables and animals are endowed with life alike but it will be wrong to argue that just as we take vegetable life for food, we can also kill animals for food. To use a simile of *Āsādhara*, though both mother and wife are possessed of womanhood, yet only wife is used for gratification of sex and not mother.¹ Killing of a five-sensed animal causes hardening of heart and involves much more callousness than is required for preparing food out of vegetables. Not that violence to vegetable life is not a sin but that is lesser of the two evils, and perhaps an unavoidable one, for a householder.

Wine is another item which should be avoided by a house-holder. Wine stupefies the mind; the man whose mind is stupefied forgets righteousness; and he who forgets righteousness, commits violence.² Moreover, a man who takes wine necessarily commits violence because he destroys many creatures which are generated in liquor. Pride, fear, hatred, ridicule, disgust, grief, passion for sex and anger are concomitants of wine.³

Besides wine and honey, five *Udumbaras* are also prohibited for food purposes. Even though the living beings in these five fruits may not be present on account of their being dry, their use involves violence in as much as it indicates strong attachment for them.⁴ Butter, even though not included in the above list of eight *mūlaguṇas*, should also be avoided as

1. *Sāgaradharmāmṛta*, 2.10.

2. *Puruṣārthasidhyupāya*, 62.

3. *Ibid.*, 64.

4. *Ibid.*, 73.