

YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

VOL. I

# YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

VOL. I

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## CONTENTS

<b>Prologue</b>		<b>ix-xix</b>
<b>Introduction</b>		<b>1-21</b>
Objections against Sāṃkhya are not serious		1
Obeisance to Kapila		1
Tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers		1
Opponents controverted by pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa teachers		2
Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised the Sāṃkhya position		2
Topics in Sāṃkhya		3
Praise of the Sāṃkhyakārikā		4
Purpose of the Yuktidīpikā		5
Characteristics of a complete treatise		5
Definition of an aphorism		6
Means of knowledge		8
Components		8
Statement of uncertainty and decisiveness		16
Brief enunciation and detailed statement		17
Succession		17
Naming		17
Resultant		19
Other characteristics of complete treatise		19
Another proof for Sāṃkhyakārikā's being a philosophical treatise		20
<b>Kārikā 1</b>		<b>22-56</b>
Qualities of a disciple		22
Cause of the rise of desire to know		24
Object of desire to know		25
Use of 'duḥkha' in the beginning does not involve inauspiciousness		26
Significance of 'traya'		29

Desire to know through assault of misery	32
Syntactical relation of 'tat'	39
Perceptible means of alleviating misery	48
Lack of invariableness and finality in perceptible means	49
Proofs for lack of invariableness and finality in perceptible means	50
<b>Kārikā 2</b>	<b>57-101</b>
Invariableness and finality in revealed means	57
Revealed means are like perceptible means	59
Nature of revelation	59
Additional defects of revealed means	60
Impurity of revealed means	60
Actions are not compulsory	67
Nature of injunctions and eulogium	72
Decay in revealed means	78
Eternity of world in secondary sense	80
Need of interpreting śruti in secondary sense	82
Surpassability in revealed means	83
Path of knowledge is superior to revealed means	85
Knowledge forms the path of liberation	87
Knowledge and action	92
Combination of knowledge and actions	93
The view that actions are meant for everyone while knowledge for those debarred from actions	98
Praise of Path of knowledge	99
<b>Kārikā 3</b>	<b>102-123</b>
Sections of knowledge of categories	102
Original cause	103
Compound in mūlaprakṛti	103
Analysis of the term mūlaprakṛti	107
Theory of satkārya does not contradict it	108
Mention of 'avikṛti'	109
Causes and Modifications	112
Purpose of the term 'seven'	113
Only Modifications	115

Use of the term 'tu'	116
Conscious entity	121
Four kinds of character of cause and effect	123
<b>Kārikā 4</b>	<b>124-148</b>
Purpose and meaning of pramāṇa	124
Purpose of the term 'hi'	125
Number of means of knowledge	128
Other means of knowledge included in the three	131
Means of knowledge accepted in Sāṅkhya	133
Means of knowledge accepted by the others	133
Analogy and tradition included under verbal testimony	134
Presumption included in inference	140
Probability included in inference	141
Negation included in inference	142
Gesture included in inference	143
Imagination is not an independent means of knowledge	144
<b>Kārikā 5</b>	<b>149-179</b>
Definition of Perception	149
Means of knowledge and resultant	152
Use of the term 'determinate knowledge'	156
Use of the term prativṛṣaya	161
Use of the term prati	161
Three kinds of inference	166
Aposteriori	167
Direct inference and inference by elimination	169
Inference based on general observation	170
Verbal testimony	174
Verbal testimony cannot be included in inference	175
<b>Kārikā 6-7</b>	<b>177-211</b>
Scope of inference based on general observation	177
Direct inference and Inference-by-elimination	180
Component parts of Inference	181
Inquisitiveness	182
Probans	183

Example	184
Application	185
Conclusion	185
Direct Inference is mentioned first	197
Causes of Non-perception of existing objects	198
Scope of valid revelation	200
Valid testimony does not imply justification of all theories	201
Revelation cannot be included in Inference	203
<b>Kārikā 8</b>	<b>212-217</b>
Cause of non-perception of cosmic matter	212
Subtlety causes non-perception of cosmic matter	213
Existence of the Cosmic matter inferred through its effects	216
Relevance of mention of dissimilarity and similarity	217

## PROLOGUE

The system of Sāṃkhya is honoured in the ancient Indian literature and is considered to be an important system by the opponents of Sāṃkhya. The other systems have utilised the theories of Sāṃkhya in the course of their development. The *Yuktidīpikā* (= *YD*) serves as a decisive testimony for it. Basically, Sāṃkhya stands for the highest knowledge attained through intensive deliberation. It is derived from the word *sāṃkhyā* which is in turn derived from *saṃ* + *√khyā*. It comes to mean number or philosophical investigation. The system of Sāṃkhya explains the facts of experience through enumeration of categories and also culminates into the highest knowledge. In spite of its great antiquity it has suffered a lot for the gaps in literary continuity and finally is so much overpowered by other systems that no powerful author undertook the task of its defence from the onslaught of other systems. Its origin is oblivious and the pre-systematised form of it available in the references to it in the ancient literature suggests its rich tradition. It was considered necessary for all intellectuals and thinkers. The other systems with their stress on different specialised aspects invited the attention of the later thinkers interested in particular aspects and the Sāṃkhya giving a general framework was reduced to the position of the opponent in the development of many doctrines.

The earliest authentic work on Sāṃkhya available to us is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This text, however, systematises the theories of Sāṃkhya in such a brief that its import cannot be understood without a detailed commentary on it. The *YD* is the earliest commentary to satisfy this need. The other commentaries like *Māṅharavyṭṭi*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Jayamaṅgalā* and the

*Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, etc., are very brief and, hence, are not sufficient to provide the details required for the understanding of the Sāṃkhya system. The *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra is the only commentary which explains the kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in detail. The *Y D*, however, excels over it in many respects. Since it was not available for a very long time to the scholars of Sāṃkhya, its importance has not been fully realised.

The *Y D* adopts a most comprehensive approach to the kārikās as containing aphoristic statements and justifies it with all possible details. It regards the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* as containing all the excellences of a complete philosophical text, such as aphorisms, means of knowledge, components, completeness, statement of uncertainty and decisiveness, brief enunciation, detailed statement, succession, naming the objects and advice. It illustrates all these elements in the text of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, its approach to the wording of the kārikās is quite critical and analytical. It suggests amendment in the kārikās as in 28th that the reading should be *śabdādiṣu* instead of originally found *rūpādiṣu* terming the latter as reading adopted through carelessness. In this case, it can be rightly termed a *vārttika*. It justifies its another name as *Rājavārttika*. The propriety of such a name will be discussed later on.

Here, the author resorts to the grammatical rules to discuss the wording of the kārikās. He analyses the problem of compound in the expression *tadapaghātaka*.<sup>2</sup> The author gives the etymological meaning of the technical terms to justify their use by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The technical terms are used to expound the nature of the object denoted. The author of the *Y D* believes that the technical terms were coined by the *ācāryas* after having realised the nature of the objects. Thus, the author of the *Y D* explains *pradhāna* as the resorting place of all the evolutes (at the time of dissolution) and

1. *Y D* on Kārikā I.

2. *Ibid.*

puruṣa as the entity which rests in the body.<sup>3</sup> The later followers of these *ācāryas* use the same terms as these terms were enough to serve the purpose of the intended meaning.

The *YD* justifies not only the reading of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* but also the contents of the *Sāṃkhya* system. Such a purpose is served in two ways. It is the only text which saves the system of *Sāṃkhya* from the intellectual onslaught at the hands of the other systems. The *Sāṃkhya* system has been severely criticised by the other systems. There is no other existing text than the *YD* which undertakes the issue of defending the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine from such a criticism. Secondly, the *YD* adopts the method of criticising the theories of other systems also to justify the position of the system of *Sāṃkhya*. Such a unique approach makes the *YD* essential for the complete understanding of *Sāṃkhya*. Sometimes the text enters into so minute details that it becomes difficult to make out the statement of the opponent or of the *Sāṃkhya*. The *YD* does not leave the topic until it squeezes no more out of it. The author spares no argument to justify the tenets of *Sāṃkhya*. The name *Yuktidīpikā* is given with the same background. It is illuminator of (all possible) reasoning (to justify the system of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*). The *YD* recognises that such a task of refuting the contention of the opponents was shouldered by the authors of *Sāṃkhya* before *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* also. The controversy had become so subtle that its import could not be grasped easily.

तेषामिच्छाविघातार्थमाचार्यैः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ।

रचिता स्वेषु तन्त्रेषु विषमास्तकंगह्वराः ॥

Since such a purpose was not carried on by *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* or his followers, the *YD* undertakes the continuation of the same intelle-

3. प्रयत्नतो भगवतः परमर्षेण ज्ञानेन सर्वतत्त्वानां स्वरूपमुपलभ्य संज्ञां विदधतो नास्ति स्वरूपनिबन्धनः शब्दः । तद्यथा प्रधीयन्तेऽत्र विकारा इति प्रधानम्, पुरि शेते इति पुरुष इत्यादि ।

ctual warfare with the other systems. The appellation *Yuktidīpikā* also suggests the same as the author considers the text as proposing to dispel the darkness of the wrong doctrines through the light of reasoning by the noble persons of unconfused mind.<sup>4</sup> Thus, as the light serves twofold purpose of removing the darkness and revealing the objects, the *YD* also serves twofold purpose of discarding the opponent's stand and of throwing light on the doctrines of Sāṃkhya in a true perspective. It may casually be observed that *P. B. Chakravarti*<sup>5</sup> thinks that the *YD* proposes to reply to the hostile criticism of the *Paramāthasaptati* of Vasubandhu. Such a restriction, however, ignores the statement about various opponents of Sāṃkhya as

प्रतिपक्षाः पुनस्तस्य पुरुषेशाणुवादिनः ।

वैनाशिकाः प्राकृतिका विकारपुरुषास्तथा ॥

The author recognises in the introduction of the text that the *YD* proposes to expound the Sāṃkhyakārikā with an intention of justifying it with all possible arguments :

तस्य व्याख्यां करिष्यामि यथान्वायोपपत्तये ।

कारुण्यादप्ययुक्तां तां प्रतिगृह्णन्तु सूरयः ॥

This was also a practical need of the time. Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* without making the reference to the stories as also the theories of other systems.<sup>6</sup> The controversy between the Sāṃkhya and the other systems could not be grasped without having the knowledge of the doctrines of Sāṃkhya. Such a purpose was served by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He expounded the Sāṃkhya doctrines along with their technical details. He himself recognises that the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is a summary of the text called *Ṣaṣṭitantra* which dealt with

4. *YD* on kārikā 72

5. *Origin and development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, p. 160.

6. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 72

sixty topics.<sup>7</sup> The *YD* enumerates these sixty topics as existence of the cosmic matter, singleness, purposefulness, distinction, subservience, plurality, disunion, union, duration, lack of agency (forming the basic topics); and the fivefold error, nine kinds of contentment, twenty eight types of disability of organs, and eight types of attainment. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* deals with all these topics in his own way in very brief. Hence, the *YD* is an attempt to explain the *kārikās* in a right perspective.

The unique feature of the text which raises it to the height of importance is the reference to the views of pre-*Īśvarakṛṣṇa* Sāṃkhya teachers, the works of whom are lost to us. The *YD* is the only source to have a glimpse of various schools in the Sāṃkhya itself before the advent of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* during the gaps in its literary continuity. It mentions that the seers like *Pañcaśikha* experienced the existence of effect in the cause.<sup>9</sup> *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* followed thoroughly the views of *Pañcaśikha*. According to *Pañcādhikaraṇa* the sense-organs are elemental in nature<sup>10</sup> and ten in number.<sup>11</sup> Being elemental in nature these cannot function of their own. They are compared to the dry rivers and can operate only with the influx of the *Prakṛti*.<sup>12</sup> Regarding the transmigration of the subtle body, *Pañcādhikaraṇa* holds that the subtle body enters the organs of the father and the mother at the time of their intercourse and gets

7. *Ibid.*

8. प्रधानास्त्वमेकत्वमर्थतत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्ति रकर्तृत्वं चूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्यय पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥

9. *YD* on *kārikā* 9

10. *YD* on *kārikā* 22

11. *YD* on *kārikā* 32

12. *Ibid.*

merged into the semen and blood of the father and mother and grows in the womb.<sup>13</sup> The *YD* records the views of Patañjali also in various contexts. He believes that the sensation of I is by the intellect itself and, hence, he rejects the separate existence of egoism. The organs are, therefore, twelve in number according to him.<sup>14</sup> The senses operate of their own without any external influx. Patañjali holds a peculiar view about the subtle body and the transmigration. The subtle bodies, according to him, are many. These subtle bodies vary in each birth. It helps in uniting the organs to the womb suitable to the past impressions of acts. Having pushed the organs to the heaven or the place of torture, it vanishes. A new subtle body is produced which takes the organs to the womb and vanishes. Again, a new subtle body is produced which continues up to death.<sup>16</sup> The *YD* criticises Paurika's view of multiplicity of the Prakṛti. According to Paurika, there is a separate Prakṛti assigned to each Puruṣa. It creates the body, etc., for that particular Puruṣa. The activity and desisting from activity of this particular Prakṛti is governed by those attached to the divine personalities. When the Prakṛtis of the divine personalities create, or the Prakṛtis attached to divine personalities desist from activities, the others also do so.<sup>17</sup> The *YD* refers to the views of Vārṣaganya who defines perception as the functioning of the sense-organs, ear and the rest.<sup>18</sup> The manifest world deviates from its derived form and not from its existence at the time of dissolution.<sup>19</sup> The Puruṣa imitates the intellect existing as knowledge when commingled with the functioning of the intellect.<sup>20</sup> Vārṣaganya along with the other

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13. *YD* on kārikā 39
  14. *YD* on kārikā 32
  15. *YD* on kārikā 22
  16. *YD* on kārika 39
  17. *YD* on kārikā 56
  18. *YD* on kārikā 5
  19. *YD* on kārikā 10
  20. *YD* on kārikā 17

authorities does not subscribe to the view that some other element comes out of Prakṛti out of which the intellect comes forth.<sup>21</sup> To illustrate the unprompted spontaneous activity of the Prakṛti Vārṣaganya holds that the Prakṛti proceeds to activity as the insentient bodies of man and woman proceed towards each other (for sexual intercourse).<sup>22</sup> Vārṣaganya has beautifully explained the mutual relation of three constituents. One of them dominates the other two. Still there is no mutual contradiction between the dominant and the dominated. Those having intensity in form and function contradict, while the ordinary ones co-operate the dominants.<sup>23</sup> Unlike all other authorities Vārṣaganya holds that the subtle elements are not of a single form.<sup>24</sup> Vindhyavāsin is an important teacher specially for explaining the theory of knowledge. Unlike other authorities he holds that the egoism and the five subtle elements are produced from the intellect. Thus, the bifurcation into the elemental and psychological aspects takes place in the products of egoism according to others, while it happens so in the products of intellect according to Vindhyavāsin.<sup>25</sup> The sense-organs, according to him, are located at eleven points and are all-pervasive in nature. Unlike all other teachers, he holds that the knowledge of all the objects arises in mind. Vindhyavāsin does not feel the need of admitting the subtle body. He holds that the same organs are all-pervasive and the attainment of the state of their functioning is birth while its adandonment is death.<sup>26</sup> As regards the classification of the dispositions, Vindhyavāsin rejects the classification of natural (*prākṛta*) dispositions into three—*tattvasama* (arising in the intellect at the very time of its production), *sāmsiddhika* (existing innately in a composite body but requiring a

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21. *Y D* on kārikā 22

22. *Y D* on kārikā 57

23. *Y D* on kārikā 13

24. *Y D* on kārikā 22

25. *Ibid*

26. *Ibid*

stimulus). Vindhyavāsin holds that the dispositions cannot be *tattvaśama* and *sāmsiddhika*. They require the stimulus for their manifestation and, consequently, are of the nature of accomplished. That is why the knowledge in lord Kapila was manifested after hearing from the teacher.<sup>28</sup> Besides, there is a reference to many doctrines of other systems which require deep consideration separately.

The *Y D* classifies the text into four Prakaraṇas and eleven āhnikas. Such a division is not observed in any other commentary of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

The authorship of the *Y D* has posed a complicated problem still unsolved. The crux of the problem lies in the mention of Vācaspati Miśra as the author of the *Y D* in the colophon at the end of the manuscript as also the mention of some Rājā, the assumption of which is gathered from the statements of Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjari*.<sup>29</sup> The admittance of Vācaspati Miśra's authorship of the *Y D* involves a lot of valid objections. Firstly, the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra does not show any sign that he has already written a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. If it is presumed that he wrote it after the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, we do not understand the need of writing the two commentaries on the same at the hands of the author like Vācaspati Miśra. Secondly, there are some differences of interpretation of the kārikās in the *Y D* and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, which hinder the assumption of admitting the same author of the two. Thirdly, the style of the two is so different that one cannot accept the same author of the two when read side by side. Fourthly, there are ample evidences to prove that the *Y D* was written long before Vācaspati Miśra. The difference between them is not less than a century according to

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27. *Y D* on kārikā 39

28. *Y D* on kārikā 42

29. *Nyāyamañjari* p. 100, Varanasi 1936

## INTRODUCTION

(Objections against Sāṅkhya are not serious)

वीतावीतविषाणस्य पक्षतावनसेविनः ।

प्रवादाः सांख्यकरिणः सत्लकीषंडभङ्गुराः ॥१॥

Accusations against the elephant of Sāṅkhya possessing the direct inference (vīta) and inference by elimination (avīta)<sup>1</sup> as the tusks and rejoicing in the forest of subject (pakṣatā) are fragile like a group of the sallaki (boswellia thurifera) trees.

(Obeisance to Kapila)

ऋषये परमायार्कमरोचिमतेजसे ।

संसारगहनध्वान्तसूर्याय गुरवे नमः ॥२॥

Obeisance to the preceptor, the greatest seer who is lustrous like the rays of the sun and is (again) like the sun for (dispelling) the dense darkness of the world.

(Tradition of Sāṅkhya Teachers)

तत्त्वं जिज्ञापमानाय विप्रायामुरये मुनिः ।

यदुवाच महत्तन्त्रं दुःखत्रयनिवृत्तये ॥३॥

न तस्याधिगमः शक्यः कर्तुं वर्षशतैरपि ।

भूयस्त्वादिति संचिन्त्य मुनिभिः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ॥४॥

ग्रन्थेनाल्पेन संक्षिप्य तदार्षमनुशासनम् ।

निबद्धममलप्रज्ञैः शिष्याणां हितकाम्यया ॥५॥

1. For details see *Yuktidipikā* 4 and *Sāṅkhya-yoga Epistemology* pp. 148-67

- 3-5. Thinking that due to the vastness it is not possible to master even in hundreds of years that great system taught by the sage to Āsuri, a brahmin desirous of knowing the truth for the alleviation of threefold misery, the sages possessed of acute discernment and pure intellect summarised that archaic teaching and composed a small treatise with a view to doing good to the disciples.

(Opponents controverted by pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa teachers)

प्रतिपक्षाः पुनस्तस्य पुरुषेशानुवादिनः ।

वैनाशिकाः प्राकृतिका विकारपुरुषास्तथा ॥६॥

तेषामिच्छाविघातार्थमाचार्यैः सूक्ष्मबुद्धिभिः ।

रचिताः स्वेषु तन्त्रेषु विषमास्तर्कगह्वराः ॥७॥

- 6-7. The opponents of that (system) are the expounders of the theories of (one conscious entity (i.e.) the non-dualists), God (Īśvara, i. e. the theists), and the atoms (i.e., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the nihilists (i. e. the Buddhists), the materialists (i. e. the Cārvākas) and the perverted persons. To foil their desires, the teachers with an acute discernment have contrived in their philosophical treatises, the ditches of arguments, which are difficult to traverse.

(Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised the Sāṃkhya position)

शिष्यैर्दुरवगाहास्ते तत्त्वार्थभ्रान्तबुद्धिभिः ।

तस्मादीश्वरकृष्णेन संक्षिप्तार्थमिदं कृतम् ॥८॥

सप्तत्याख्यं प्रकरणं सकलं शास्त्रमेव वा ।

यस्मात् सर्वपदार्थानामिह व्याख्या करिष्यते ॥९॥

- 8-9. Those (subtle arguments) are difficult to be understood by the disciples whose intellects are confused in knowing the true nature of Reality. Therefore, Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed this text Saptati (by name)—a monograph or (so to say) a

complete treatise precise in meaning; all the categories would be explained therein.

(Topics in Sāṃkhya)

प्रधानास्तित्वनेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।  
 पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं विद्योगो योग एव च ॥१०॥  
 शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं चूलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।  
 विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥११॥  
 करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।  
 इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥१२॥  
 यथाक्रमं लक्षणतः कात्स्न्येनेहाभिधास्यते ।  
 तस्मादतः शास्त्रमिदमलं नानात्वसिद्धये ॥१३॥

- 10-13. (i) Existence of the cosmic matter, (ii) singleness, (iii) purposefulness (iv) distinction, (v) subservience, (vi) plurality, (vii) disunion (viii) union, (ix) duration and (x) the lack of agency are the ten basic topics;<sup>2</sup> (xi-xv) the fivefold

2. These verses inform of the sixty topics treated in the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra*, a text lost to us and supposed to be the source of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 72). Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (kā. 72) quotes these verses and ascribes them to the *Rijivārttika* which is, perhaps, another name of the *Yuktidipikā*. He further explains that out of ten basic categories singleness, purposefulness and subservience relate to the cosmic matter; distinction, lack of agency, and plurality to conscious entity; existence, disunion and union to both, and duration to the subtle and gross objects. R. C. Pandeya (cf. Appendix 2 to his edition of the *Y.D.*) follows Vācaspati except in case of duration which he relates to the conscious entity. In fact, existence is related with cosmic matter only. Subservience relates to cosmic matter alongwith

error<sup>3</sup> and (xvi-xxiv) contentment of nine kinds,<sup>4</sup> (xxv-Lii) twenty-eight types of disability of the organs,<sup>5</sup> (Lii-Lx) along with eight types of attainment<sup>6</sup>—these sixty topics<sup>7</sup> will be fully discussed with their definitions in this text in due succession. Hence, this text (lit. scripture) is competent to prove multiplicity.<sup>8</sup>

(Praise of the Sāṅkhyakārikā)

अल्पग्रन्थमनल्पार्थं सर्वैस्तन्त्रगुणैर्युतम् ।  
पारमर्षस्य तन्त्रस्य बिम्बमादर्शगं यथा ॥१४॥

the gross and subtle objects firstly because the *S. K.* (11) speaks of subservient nature of both the cosmic matter and its evolutes and secondly because while supplying the reasons for subservience the *Y. D.* itself gives the example of the evolutes stating that the fact that the objects functioning collectively are meant for other, leads to their subservience. In the light of this, the observation of Vācaspati that the subservience relates only to the cosmic matter appears to be insufficient specially because in case of duration he takes the subtle and the gross objects as a separate entity from the cosmic matter. For a different account of these topics see *Jayamaṅgalā* (p. 108), *Māṅṅharavṛtti* (p. 63) *Sāṅkhyasaptavṛtti* (p. 80), *Sāṅkhyavṛtti* (p. 39), *Sāṅkhyatattvavivecana* (*Sāṅkhyasaṅgraha* p. 16), *Tattvayāthārthya-dīpana* (p. 21) and *Tattvasamāsa-sūtravṛtti* (*Sāṅkhyasaṅgraha* p. 86)

3. Cf. *Y.D.* 46
4. Cf. *S.K.* 50
5. Cf. *S.K.* 49
6. *S.K.* 49
7. For a detailed account of sixty topics see *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* 12 20-29
8. Multiplicity refers to the plurality of the conscious entity, and the ultimate dualism of cosmic matter and the conscious entity may be an alternate meaning.

14. The text though small in size is great in import, endowed with all the characteristics of a philosophical treatise (and is) just like a reflection in a mirror of the philosophical treatise composed by the supreme seer (Kapila)<sup>9</sup>.

(Purpose of the Yuktidīpikā)

तस्य व्याख्यां करिष्यामि यथान्यायोपपत्तये ।

कारुण्यादप्ययुक्तां तां प्रतिगृह्णन्तु सूरयः ॥१५॥

15. With a desire to justify (Sāṃkhyakārikā) through proper argumentation I will explain that. Scholars are requested to receive it through compassion, even though it may be wrong.

(Characteristics of a complete treatise)

आह, करिष्यति भवान् व्याख्याम् । इदं त्वादावुपन्यस्तं सर्वेस्तन्त्र-  
गुणैर्युतमिदं तन्त्रमिति । के तन्त्रगुणाः, कियन्तो वेति ?

Opponent : You will explain (this treatise). It is stated in the beginning that the present text is endowed with all the characteristics of a complete philosophical treatise. What or how many are those characteristics of a philosophical treatise ?

उच्यते—

सूत्रप्रमाणावयवोपपत्तिरन्यूनता संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः ।

उद्देशनिर्देशमनुक्रमश्च संज्ञोपदेशाविह तन्त्रसम्पत् ॥

सूत्राणि च प्रमाणानि च अवयवाश्च, सूत्रप्रमाणावयवाः । तेषाम्  
उपपत्तिः सूत्रप्रमाणावयवोपपत्तिः । उपपत्तिः सम्भव इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।  
अनन्योऽर्थोऽनर्थान्तरम् । उपपत्तिशब्दः प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्यते सूत्रोपपत्ति-  
रित्यादि ।

9. The analogy suggests that it does not leave anything from the original text of the system and does not substantially add to the same. Hence, it represents the system in the true form.

Proponent : (i) adequacy of aphorisms, (ii) means of knowledge and (iii) components, (iv) completeness, (v) the statement of uncertainty and (vi) decisiveness, (vii) brief enunciation and (viii) detailed statement, (ix) succession (of the objects), (x) naming (the object) and (xi) the advice form the excellences of a philosophical treatise.

The (dvandva) compound term sūtrapramāṇāvayavāḥ denotes the three : (i) aphorisms, (ii) means of knowledge and (iii) components. The compound term sūtrapramāṇāvayavopatti denotes the adequacy of these three. The synonym of upapatti is possibility or adequacy. The term 'anarthāntra' stands for the same meaning. The word upapatti is to be attached to the end of every word. i. e., sūtropapatti, etc.

आह, लक्षणोपेतसूत्रोपपत्तिरिति वक्तव्यम् ।

इतरथा हि अलक्षणोपेतस्यापि सूत्रस्य तन्त्राङ्गभावः स्यादिति ।

Opponent : The statement should be as adequacy of an aphorism with characteristics. Otherwise an aphorism devoid of its characteristics would also be a part of the philosophical treatise.

उच्यते न, नान्तरीयकत्वात् । न ह्यन्तरेण लक्षणोपेतत्वं सूत्रत्वम् । अतो न वक्तव्यमेतदिति ।

Proponent : No, because otherwise it cannot be so. There cannot be an aphorism without possessing its characteristics. Hence, it should not be stated.

(Definition of an aphorism)

आह, अथ सूत्रमिति कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why is a sūtra so called ?

उच्यते—सूचनात् सूत्रम् । सूचयति तांस्तानर्थविशेषानिति सूत्रम् । तद्यथा—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् (का० १६), भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) । अत्र प्रतिज्ञाहेतु कण्ठोक्तौ । तयोरुपयोगि दृष्टान्तं साध्यसिद्धये समर्थमिति कृत्वा मूलशकलादयोऽत्रान्तरनभिहिता अप्येतस्मादवसीयन्ते । अथवा भिक्षोरुपसंहृतबहिष्करणान्तःकरणस्य

तेषु तेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु अपि प्रधानादिवर्षेषु बृद्धि सूचयतीति सूत्रम् । अथवा, सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिरिति (का० ८) सूत्रम् । तद्यथा—

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

अस्तोभमपुनरुक्तमित्यर्थः । तथा

लघूनि सूचितार्थानि स्वल्पाक्षरपदानि च ।

सर्वतः सारभूतानि सूत्राण्याहुर्मनीषिणः ॥

Proponent : Because it informs (sūcanāt). A sūtra (aphorism) is called so because it informs of the various particular objects. For example, 'unmanifest is the cause' (kā. 16), 'because of the finite nature of specific objects' (kā. 15). Here, the proposition and the reason are stated explicitly. In view of the fact that an example useful for them (i. e., proposition and reason) is capable of proving probandum, the original passage and their remaining portions though not stated here are deduced from it only. Or, (alternatively) a sūtra (aphorism) is that which informs of (sūcanāt) the knowledge of a mendicant who has withdrawn his internal and external organs (from their objects), with reference to even various super sensible objects like cosmic matter, etc.

Or, the example of an aphorism would be as 'non-perception of that (cosmic matter) is due to subtlety' (kā. 8). So, it has been stated :

“Those who are conversant with aphorism declare that an aphorism is that (statement) which has the minimum words, is beyond doubt, contains the quintessence, has a universal application, is not tautologous and is not faulty.”

The word astobham (tautologous) means that which has no repetition.

Moreover :

“The learned call those (statements) aphorisms which are short, informative of objects, have very few letters and words, and contain quintessence from every point of view.”

(Means of knowledge)

प्रमाणानि च प्रत्यक्षादीनि, तान्युत्तरत्र वक्ष्यति ‘दृष्टमनुमानमाप्त-  
वचनं च’ (का० ४), ‘प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमित्यादि’ (का० ५) ।

The means of knowledge are perception, etc., and the text will speak of them later on as ‘perception, inference and verbal testimony’ (kā. 4), and ‘perception is determination of an object caused through sense-object contact’, etc. (kā. 5)

(Components)

अवयवाः पुनर्जिज्ञासादयः, प्रतिज्ञादयश्च । तत्र जिज्ञासादयो  
व्याख्याङ्गम् । प्रतिज्ञादयः परप्रत्यायनाङ्गम् तानुत्तरत्र वक्ष्यामः ।

The components are desire to know, etc., and proposition, etc. Out of these, desire to know, etc., are essential requisites of explanation. Proposition, etc., are essential requisites of explaining (something) to others. We shall discuss them later on.

आह, अवयवानभिधानमनुपदेशात् । न हि यथा प्रत्यक्षादीनि  
प्रमाणान्युपदिष्टानि तथा अवयवा उपदिष्टाः । तस्मादवयवोपपत्तिरित्ये-  
तदसत् ।

भाष्यकारप्रामाण्याददोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । यद्यपि सूत्रकारेणा-  
वयवोपदेशो न कृतस्तथाऽपि भाष्यकाराः केचिदेषां संग्रहं चक्रुः । ते च नः  
प्रमाणम् । तस्माद्युक्तमवयवोपपत्तिरिति । एतच्चायुक्तम् ।  
कस्मात् ?

उत्सूत्रत्वात् । नह्युत्सूत्रं व्याचक्षाणा भाष्यकाराः प्रमाणं भवन्ति ।  
तथा चैतदुत्सूत्रितमिति ।

**Opponent :** *The components should not be mentioned as they do not occur in the (present) text.* The components are not mentioned in the (present) text in the manner the means of knowledge like perception are mentioned. Hence, the statement regarding adequacy of components is not correct.

*What if it is said it is faultless due to the authority of the commentator ?* It may be like this Though the author of the aphorisms has not mentioned the components, yet some commentators have collected them. They are the authority for us. Hence, (the statement regarding) adequacy of the components is justified.

This is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because it deviates from the aphorism.* The commentators who speak something deviating from the aphorism are not authoritative. This also deviates from the aphorism.

उच्यते, न लिङ्गात् । नैतद्युक्तमनुपदेशान्न सन्ति जिज्ञासादयः । किन्तु नुपदिष्टमप्येषामस्तित्वं लिङ्गात् प्रतिपद्यामहे यदयमाचार्यो दुःखत्रयाभिधाताजिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेताविति (का० १) जिज्ञासाप्रयोजनमाचष्टे । कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति (का० १६) प्रतिज्ञां करोति । भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) हेतुमुपदिशति । नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगमिति (का० ४२) दृष्टान्तं द्योतयति । क्षीरस्य यथा तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्येत्यु- (का० ५७) पसंहरति । तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारीति (का० ३५) निगमयति । न चानभिप्रेतैराचार्याणां शास्त्रे व्यवहारो लक्ष्यते । तेन वयं लिङ्गात्प्रतिपद्यामहे सन्ति जिज्ञासादयोऽवयवाः शास्त्र इति ।

**Proponent :** *No, it is not so because we have inferential mark.* It is not proper (to say) that the desire to know, etc., do not exist because they do not occur in the text. On the contrary, we know their existence through inferential mark, though not propounded in the text; as the teacher speaks of the purpose of

the desire to know in 'on account of the stroke of threefold misery, (there arises) a desire to enquire into the means of alleviating them' (kā. 1). The author makes proposition in 'unmanifest is the cause' (Kā. 16). He speaks of the probans in 'because of the finite nature of specific objects' (kā. 15). He suggests the illustration in 'the subtle body acts like an actor' (kā. 42). He states the application in 'the act of the cosmic matter is like that of milk' (kā. 57). He concludes in 'therefore, the threefold (internal) organ is the gate-keeper' (kā. 35). The teachers are not observed making use of that which is not acceptable to them in their works. Hence, we come to know from the inferential mark that the components like desire to know occur in the present work.

आह, सतामनुपदेशे प्रयोजनवचनम् । एवं चेन्मन्यसे—सन्ति जिज्ञासा-  
दयोऽवयवाः, शास्त्रे तेषामनुपदेशे प्रयोजनं वक्तव्यम्—अमुष्माद्वेतोरा-  
चार्येण नोपदिश्यन्ते, सन्ति च ते इति ।

Opponent : *The purpose of not stating them, which exist, should be mentioned.* If you hold that the components, like the desire to know, exist, the purpose of not stating them in the work should be mentioned as to for such and such reason the teacher does not mention them and yet they do exist.

उच्यते, प्रमाणान्तर्भावात् । प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भाव एषामित्ययमुपदिष्टो हेतुरस्माभिः । अनुमानाङ्गं हि जिज्ञासादयः, तष्मात्तदन्तर्भूतास्ते इति न पृथगुपदिश्यन्ते । किञ्च, तन्त्रान्तरोक्तेः । तन्त्रान्तरेषु हि विन्ध्यवासि—प्रभृतिभिराचार्यैरुपदिष्टाः । प्रमाणं च नस्ते आचार्या इत्यतश्चानुपदेशो जिज्ञासादीनामिति ।

Proponent : *Because of their inclusion in the means of knowledge.* They are included in the means of knowledge. This is the reason which we put forward. Desire to know, etc., are

essential constituents of inference. Therefore, they are included in it and, hence, are not separately mentioned. *Moreover, they are described in other philosophical texts.* They are mentioned in other philosophical texts by the teachers like Vindhyavāsin. And, as those teachers are authority for us, the desire to know, etc., are not mentioned here.

आह न, प्रमाणानुपदेशप्रसंगात् । यदि च तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशादेवाऽवयवानामनुपदेशः, प्रत्यक्षादीन्यपि च तन्त्रान्तरेषूपदिश्यन्ते । श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम् । सम्बन्धादेकस्माच्छेषसिद्धिरनुमानम् । यो यत्राभियुक्तः कर्मणि चाद्दुष्टस्तत्राप्तस्तस्योपदेश आप्तवचनमिति तेषामप्यनुपदेशप्रसङ्गः । अथ सति तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशे प्रमाणान्युपदिश्यन्ते नावयवा इति, नन्वेतदिच्छामात्रमिति ।

Opponent ; *It is not so ; otherwise there would arise the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of the means of knowledge (also).* If the components are not mentioned because they are mentioned in other philosophical treatises, perception, etc., have also been mentioned in other philosophical treatises, e.g., 'perception is the function of ear and other senses'<sup>11</sup>; 'inference is that by which the existence of the other (remaining) objects is known from the relation perceived

10. *Y.D.* 5

11. The *Y.D.* is perhaps the first extant text to refer to this view. It ascribes this definition to Vārṣaganya. Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* (p. 43) records this definition and refutes it. His commentator Vācaspati Miśra *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (p. 155) also ascribes the definition to Vārṣaganya and remarks that the functioning of the senses signifies the primary unqualified apprehension (ālocanamātra) through the five senses modified into the form of the object.

earlier in the case of some<sup>12</sup>; someone well versed in some action and not vitiated (by evil intention) is an authority and his statement is the verbal testimony'. And, therefore, there would arise the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of all of these (means of knowledge). And, if even having been (commonly) mentioned in other philosophical treatises the means of knowledge are mentioned (here) but not the components, it is surely nothing more than a matter of (one's sweet) will.

उच्यते, पूर्व एव तर्हि परिहारोऽस्तु । अथवा पुनरस्तु तन्त्रान्तरोक्ते-  
रित्ययमपि परिहारः । यत्तूक्तं प्रमाणानुपदेशप्रसङ्ग इति अत्र ब्रूमः—  
अयुक्तमेतत् । कस्मात् ? प्रयोजनवतामुपदेशस्यादोषत्वात् । अनुपदेशो हि  
प्रयोजनवतश्चोद्यत इति युक्तमेतत् । उपदेशमेव तु सदोष इति कृत्वा कः  
प्रत्याचक्षीत ? तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् । किञ्चान्यत्, प्रधानोपदेशे गुण-  
भूतान्तर्भावसिद्धेः । तद्यथा, तक्षणुहि चैत्र इत्युक्ते यावद्भिस्साधनविशेषै-  
र्विना तक्षणं नोपपद्यते सर्वास्तांश्चैत्र उपादत्ते । तथा प्रत्यक्षादिषु प्रमाणेषु-  
पदिष्टेषु यैरेषामविनाभावः सर्वाणि तान्युपादास्यामहे । किञ्चान्यात्,  
अन्यत्रापि तदनुष्ठानात् । न केवलमिह, अन्यत्राप्ययमाचार्यः प्रधानाना-  
मेवोपदेशं करोति । तदङ्गभूतास्तु तदुपदेशादेव प्रतीयन्ते । तद्यथा, कारण-  
मस्त्यव्यक्तम् (का० १६), भेदानां परिमाणादिति (का० १५) । इतरथा  
हि दृष्टान्ताभावादसाधनमेतत्स्यात् । पश्यति त्वाचार्यो नादृष्टान्तं साधनं

12. The *Y.D.* refers to this definition perhaps for the first time. Uddyotakara (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 57) raises objections against this definition also. Vācaspati Miśra (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (p. 194) ascribes the definition to the Sāṃkhya and explains that here the relation refers to that between the probans and the probandum. The definition, according to him, comes to this. Inference is that where the existence of the object is known from the concomitant relation with the probans when the probandum is supported by a stronger means of knowledge, viz., perception.

साध्यमाप्नोतीति कृत्वा प्रतिपादकाः प्रतिपादनकाले तन्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टानपि मूलशकलादीनाक्षेप्यन्ति इति । किञ्चान्यत्, अनुमाने भूतवदुपदेशात् । अतश्चैतदेवं यदयमाचार्यस्त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातमिति (का० ५) ब्रवीति कथं कृत्वा ज्ञापकम् ? आख्यातस्य हि प्रत्याम्नाये भूतवाचिना शब्देनोपदेशो भवति । नचानेन पूर्वं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् । आख्यातमिति चेत्, न तदाख्यातं क्वचिदिति शक्यं प्रतिपादयितुम् । सोऽयमनाख्यायापि यद्भूतवाचिनं शब्दमुपादत्ते तज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्यस्तन्त्रान्तरक्लृप्तानामपीह सन्निवेशोऽङ्गीक्रियते । किमेतस्य ज्ञापने प्रयोजनम् ? तन्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टोऽपि कर्मयोनीनाम् प्राणभेदादीनां च लक्षणोपदेशस्संगृहीतो भवतीति सिद्धं तन्त्रान्तरोपदेशादवयवानुपदेशः । तस्मात्सूक्तमेवावयवोपपत्तिरिति ।

Proponent : Here the answer offered earlier itself should be accepted. Or, again the reason that they are mentioned in the other philosophical treatises should also be accepted as an alleviation. As regards the objection that it will lead to the (undesirable) contingency of non-mention of the of means knowledge, our reply is : your statement is wrong.

Why ?

Because there is no fault in mentioning those which serve purpose. It is right that the non-mention of that which serves some purpose may incite someone to object. (But) who will object that their mention itself involves a fault. Therefore, it carries no weight, *Moreover, because in the mention of the principal, the inclusion of the auxiliaries is (automatically) proved.*

For example, when it is said, "Caitra, cut the wood", Caitra takes all the instruments without which the act of cutting is not possible. In the same way, when the means of knowledge like perception are mentioned, we take everything invariably required for these. *Moreover, this is the practice elsewhere too.*

Not only here, but elsewhere also the present teacher mentions only the principal while the auxiliaries of that are understood through the mention of that only. (Take) for example (the text) 'unmanifest is the cause' (kā. 16); 'because of the finite nature

of the specific objects' (kā 15). It would not have been otherwise (the case of) syllogism on account of absence of illustration. The authority realises that a syllogism of an illustration does not lead to the probandum,<sup>13</sup> and in view of this the propounder while propounding will imply the original or the part thereof even though mentioned in other philosophical treatise. *Moreover, in the context of inference the topic has been mentioned as if already dealt with in the past.* It is because of this that the present teacher states : 'the inference has been said to be three-fold' (kā. 5).

How does it indicate ?

When some proposition already stated is re-stated, only then it is mentioned in the words denoting past tense. (Obviously) the three-fold inference is not discussed earlier by the present author himself.

If it is said that it has been discussed earlier ?

It is quite possible to prove that it is not discussed anywhere. The fact that he uses the words denoting past tense even without discussing it earlier, indicates that the present teacher admits the inclusion of facts postulated in other philosophical treatises also.

What purpose is served by this indication ?

The teachings regarding the distinctive features of the sources of action as also regarding the classification of vital airs, etc., mentioned in other philosophical treatises are collected (admitted) by this text and, hence, it is proved that the components have not been discussed (in the present text) because they have been discussed in other philosophical treatises. Therefore, it is justified that the adequacy or components (form the excellence of a philosophical treatise).

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13. Here the author mentions only the probans and the probandum.

## (Completeness)

अन्यूनता । पदार्थकात्स्न्यमशेषताऽन्यूनतेत्यभिधीयते । पदार्थाश्च दश चूलिकार्थाः, पंचाशत्प्रत्ययाः । तत्रास्तित्वमेकत्वं पंचभिर्वीतैः सिद्धम् । अर्थवत्त्वं कार्यकारणभावः । पारार्थ्यं संहत्यकारिणां परार्थत्वात् । अत-  
एवान्यत्वम् । चेतनाशक्तेर्गुणत्रयाज्जन्ममरणकरणानामित्येवमादिभिः पुरुषबहुत्वम् । पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं इति संयोगः । प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे इति वियोगः । सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमादिति शेषवृत्तिः । तस्माच्च विपर्ययादिति पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वमित्येते दश चूलिकार्थाः ।

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अऽऽर्थाविशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाऽऽऽथा सिद्धिः ॥ (का० ४७)

इति पंचाशत्प्रत्ययाः । सैषा षष्टिः पदार्थानाम् । तदुपपत्तिरन्यूनता ।

The all inclusiveness of the categories is called completeness or exhaustiveness. The categories are : ten basic categories and fifty psychic dispositions. Out of these, (i) existence and (ii) singleness are proved by five (components) of direct inference. (iii) Perposefulness means to stand in relation of effect and cause. (iv) Subservience is due to the fact that the objects functioning collectively are meant for others. From this very fact (results) (v) separateness. (vi) The plurality of the conscious power inferred through the diversity of (proportion of) three ingredients of cosmic matter and the (definite adjustment of) birth, death and organs (kā. 18) means the plurality of the conscious entity. (vii) Union is known by the statement 'for the perception of the conscious entity' (kā. 21), etc., (viii) Disunion is known by the statement 'when the separation from the body is attained' (kā. 68), etc., (ix) Duration is known through the statement by the attainment of right knowledge' (kā. 67), etc. (x) The non-agency of the conscious entity is known by the statement 'and from that contrast' (kā. 19), etc. These are the ten basic categories.

"There are five forms of perversion,<sup>14</sup> twenty eight of disability

14. For five reasons see S.K. 15.

arising from the imperfections (defects) of the organs. Contentment has nine forms and attainment eight" (kā 47). These are the fifty Psychic dispositions. These (along with the ten basic categories) form the sixty categories. The adequacy of all these is the completeness.

(Statement of uncertainty and decisiveness)

संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः । संशयश्च निर्णयश्च तौ संशयनिर्णयौ तयो-  
रुक्तिस्संशयनिर्णयोक्तिः । सामान्याभिधानं संशयः । तद्यथा महदादि तच्च  
कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं चेत्युक्ते (का० ८) संशयो भवति केन धर्मेण कार्यं  
प्रकृतिविरूपं केन वा सरूपमिति । विशेषाभिधानं निर्णयः । स च द्विविधः;  
शब्दतोऽर्थतश्च शब्दतस्तावत् यथा हेतुमदादिभिः कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपम्,  
त्रैगुण्यादिभिः प्रकृतिसरूपमिति । अर्थतस्तत् यथा तेभ्यो भूतानि पंचभ्यः,  
एते स्मृता विशेषाः (का. ३८) । किं कारणम् ? यस्मात् शान्ता घोराश्च  
मूढाश्च (का० ३८) । अशान्तघोरमूढत्वात्तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः ।

The statement of uncertainty and decisiveness. The compound term *saṁśayanirṇayau* denotes uncertainty and decisiveness. And, the statement regarding them is the statement of uncertainty and decisiveness. Uncertainty means a general sort of description. For example, when it is stated that 'its effects, the great principle and the rest are dissimilar and similar to the cosmic matter (kā. 8), etc., there arises the uncertainty (doubt) as to in respect of what characteristics the effect is dissimilar to the cosmic matter and in respect of what it is similar to the cosmic matter. The statement regarding specification is decisiveness. It is twofold : verbal and through implication. Verbal (is exemplified) as—'the effect is dissimilar to the cosmic matter in respect of having a cause (kā. 10), etc., and 'it is similar to the cosmic matter in respect of being possessed of the three ingredients' (kā. 11), etc. That through implication is (exemplified) as—'from five of these proceed the five gross elements; these are said to be specific' (kā. 38).

Why is it so ?

Because (these are) calm, turbulent and deluding (kā. 38). The subtle elements are non-specific because they are not calm, turbulent and deluding.

(Brief enunciation and detailed statement)

उद्देशनिर्देशम् । उद्देशश्च निर्देशश्च उद्देशनिर्देशम् । सर्वो द्वन्द्वो विभाषयैकवद् भवति इति द्वन्द्वैकवद्भावः । सङ्क्षेपवचनमुद्देशः । तद्यथा, एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धिचाख्यः (का० ४६) । विस्तरवचनं निर्देशः । तद्यथा, पंच विपर्ययभेदा भवन्ति (का० ४७) भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविध (का० ४८) इत्यादिः ।

Brief enunciation and detailed statement : The compound term *uddeśanirdeśau* denotes brief enunciation and detailed statement. Since all the copulative compounds are optionally treated as a single unit, this copulative compound is treated as a single unit here. *Uddeśa* means brief enunciation; for example, 'such is the creation from intellect called as perversion, disability, contentment and supernatural power (kā. 46). *Nirdeśa* is the detailed statement; for example, 'there are five types of perversion', etc. (kā. 47); 'there are eight types of (mental) darkness' (kā. 48), etc.

(Succession)

अनुक्रमश्च । पदार्थानामानुपूर्व्या सन्निवेशोपदेशोऽनुक्रमः । तद्यथा, प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशक (का० २२) इत्यनेन ।

And succession (is like this). Succession means the mention of arranging the objects in succession; for example, 'from cosmic matter issues the great principle and from it issues the 'I' principle and from that proceeds the set of sixteen' (kā. 22).

(Naming)

संज्ञोपदेशो । संज्ञिप्रत्यायनार्थः शब्दः संज्ञा । सा च द्विविधा । अर्थनिबन्धना स्वरूपनिबन्धना च । तत्रार्थनिबन्धनाऽर्थवशेनाऽर्थक्रियापेक्षा । जात्याद्यर्थस्वरूपान्तर्भावी यथाऽर्थस्तथाभूतमेव संज्ञिनं प्रत्याययति । तद्यथा

पाचको लावक इति । स्वरूपनिबन्धना पुनः संज्ञिप्रत्यायनोपायमात्रम् । स्वरूपमात्रोपकारिणी विनाऽवयवार्थं समयवशाद्तथाभूतमपि संज्ञिनं प्रत्याययति । तद्यथा, गजकर्णोऽश्वकर्ण इति । प्रयत्नतो भगवतः परमर्षे-  
रार्षेण ज्ञानेन सर्वतत्त्वानां स्वरूपमुपलभ्य संज्ञां विदधतो नास्ति स्वरूप-  
निबन्धनः शब्दः । तद्यथा, प्रधीयन्तेऽत्र विकारा इति प्रधानम्, पुरि शेते  
इति पुरुष इत्यादि । तन्मतानुसारिणामप्याचार्याणां ताभिरेव संव्यवहा-  
रान्नास्त्यपूर्वसंज्ञाविधानम्प्रत्यादरः ।

Naming (the object) and the resultant : Naming is the word used for indicating the object signified by it. It is twofold : dependent on etymological meaning and dependent upon its own form (conventional meaning). Dependent upon meaning is that where the purposeful activity of an object is in accordance with the (etymological) meaning. It denotes the object exactly as it is included (as a member) in the class, etc., in accordance with its denotation, e.g., a cook and a cutter. Again that dependent upon its own form serves only as means to convey the (individual) object (denoted by it). It is useful (in yielding the meaning) merely through its form, not caring for the meaning of its component and indicating an object which is not really like that on account of the convention or particular usage. For example, *Gajakaraṇa*<sup>15</sup> and *Aśvakaṛaṇa*,<sup>16</sup> etc. There is no word in the scripture which conveys its meaning merely through its own form (conventionally), used by the supreme sage who has with great efforts coined the names of all the principles after having seen their essential nature through direct knowledge. For example, the *pradhāna* (cosmic matter) is called so because its

15. Lit. having ears like an elephant.

16. Lit. having ears like a horse. The literal meaning here, as in the case of *gajakaraṇa*, is irrelevant because these names could be given to anybody, irrespective of the shape of the ears.

evolutes merge in it (pradhīyante) at the time of dissolution<sup>17</sup>; the Puruṣa is called so because it rests in the body (puri śete),<sup>18</sup> etc. The authorities also, who follow his views, are not eager to coin new names since they can better communicate through these very names.

## (Resultant)

उपदेशः । इतिकर्तव्यताफलसमाख्यानमुपदेशः । तद्यथा,  
 एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।  
 अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥

—(का० ६४)

Resultant : the statement of resultant is stating the fruit of process of the acts prescribed; for example,

“In this way, through the repeated study of the principles there arises the knowledge in the form ‘I am not’, ‘nothing is mine’ and ‘I am not that’, which is complete, pure on account of being incontrovertible and solitary” (kā. 64).

## (Other Characteristics of a Philosophical Treatise)

एते सूत्रोपपत्त्यादयस्तन्त्रगुणाः ।

इति करणं प्रकारार्थम् । एवम्प्रकारा अन्येऽपि द्रष्टव्याः । तद्यथा, उत्सर्गोऽपवादोऽतिदेश इत्यादिः । तत्रोत्सर्गः प्रकृतिविरूपं (का० ८) व्यक्तम् सरूपं (का० ८) चेत्यपवादः । तथा तद्विपरीत (का० ११) इत्युत्सर्गः, तथा च पुमान् (का० ११) इत्यपवादः । सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि व्यक्तं, तथा

17. *Pradhāna-pra* (excessively) *dhā* (to place, i. e., to merge absolutely). *Na in Pradhāna* is the remanent of the grammatical suffix *lyuṣ* in the sense of locus (*adhikaraṇa*).

18. *Puruṣa-puri* (in the body) *śete* (rests).

प्रधानम् (का० ११) इत्यतिदेशः । इत्येवमन्या अपि तन्त्रयुक्तयः शक्या इह प्रदर्शयितुम् । अतिप्रसङ्गस्तु प्रकृतं तिरोदधातीति निवर्त्यते । सिद्धं तन्त्रयुक्तीनां सम्बन्धोपपत्तेस्तन्त्रमिदमिति ।

These, viz., the adequacy of an aphorism, etc., form the characteristics of a philosophical treatise.

The mention of 'iti' is to suggest the other characteristics of this kind. The other characteristics of this kind should also be understood; for example, a general rule, exception and extended application. etc. Out of these, the general rule is laid down in 'the manifest is dissimilar to the cosmic matter' (kā. 8), etc. And, 'It is similar to cosmic matter' (kā. 8) is the exception. Similarly, 'the conscious entity is opposite to that' (kā. 11), etc., is the general rule, and 'the conscious entity is also similar to them' (kā. 11), etc., is an exception. Here is an example of extended application. 'The manifest is common, insentient and prolific and similarly is the cosmic matter' (kā. 11). In this way, it is possible to indicate some characteristics of a philosophical treatise, but as the excessive stress on a side issue conceals the relevant issue, we close (discussion) here. On the basis of the (above) justification of the relationship (of the text) with the characteristics of a philosophical treatise, it is established that the text at hand is a philosophical treatise.

(Another proof for Sāmkhyakārikā's being a philosophical treatise)

किञ्च तन्त्रान्तराऽविरोधात् । यदि खल्वपीदमपि प्रकरणं स्यात् तन्त्रान्तरे पातञ्जलपञ्चाधिकरणवार्षागणप्रभृतीनामन्यतमस्य शषभूतं स्यात् । तैश्चाप्यविरोधस्तत्र तत्रेति वक्ष्यामः । पूर्वतन्त्रशेषभावादिति चेत्, तुल्यम् । एतान्यपि । पूर्वतन्त्रशेषभूतानि, तेषामपि प्रकरणत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ मतम्—सकलपदार्थसंग्रहात्तन्त्रान्तराप्येतानि, एवमिहापि सकलपदार्थसंग्रहात्तन्त्रान्तरत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तस्माद्युक्तमेतत्तन्त्रमिदम् । इत्युपोद्घातः ॥

Moreover, it is not in contradiction with (the form of) the other philosophical treatises. If it also would have been a partial manual

of some philosophical treatise, it would have been secondary to any of the philosophical treatises, of Pātañjala, Pancādhikaraṇa, Vārṣaganya, etc. Its non-contradiction with them will be shown at pertinent places.

If it is argued that on account of its being a residual of the earlier philosophical treatise (it is a partial manual) ?

*It is equally applicable to all the cases (this and other texts).* These (the other texts) are also secondary to earlier philosophical treatises and, therefore, there would be an (undesirable) contingency of considering them also as partial manual. The principle, therefore is—just as others are philosophical treatises because of the inclusion of (the treatment of) all the categories, similarly this should also be accepted as an independent philosophical treatise as it also includes (the treatment of) all the categories. Therefore, it is proper to say that this is a philosophical treatise.

Here ends the Introduction

## KĀRIKĀ 1

(Qualities of a disciple)

आह, किंगुणविशिष्टाय शिष्याय पुनरिदं तन्त्रं व्याख्येयमिति ।।

Opponent : Again, to a disciple possessed of what qualities should this philosophical treatise be explained ?

उच्यते—जिज्ञासवे मतिमते मीमांसकायार्थिनेऽभ्युपगताय शिष्याय व्याख्येयं शास्त्रम् ।

Proponent : This philosophical treatise should be explained to a disciple who is desirous of knowing, intelligent, investigator (seeker of truth), needy and has approached the teacher.

कस्मात् ?

Opponent : Why (what is the proof for that) ?

परमर्षिप्रामाण्यात् । यस्माद् भगवान् विश्वाग्रजः परमर्षिर्भगवदासुरेजिज्ञासामुपलभ्योत्तरगुणविशेषसम्पदं च व्याख्यातवान् । रज एव दुःखं, तन्निराकरिष्णोविवेकोऽयं, सत्त्वात् । सत्त्वं चास्मान्नानेत्येवमादिना वचनप्रतिपाद्योऽयमर्थो महद्भिश्चोक्तः । तस्माद्रजोदुःखोपघातकजिज्ञासोः सत्त्वाद्धर्मादिकुशलमूलविपाकोत्पित्सोर्दुःखत्रयनिवृत्तय इदं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तम् । तदर्थत्परिणम्यते शिष्यस्येति । कथं नाम शिष्यस्य निःश्रेयसेन योगः स्यादित्येवमर्थमिदं व्याख्यानं क्रियत इति ।

Proponent : *On the authority of the supreme seer.* Because lord (Kapila) who was born first in the world expounded (the system) to Āsuri after knowing his desire to know and his

accomplishment of the successive particular qualities.<sup>19</sup> The stimulating and moving quality (*rajas*) itself is the misery. The discriminative knowledge is meant for the person who desires to alleviate it (*rajas*) since it (knowledge) is of the nature of buoyant and shining quality (*sattva*)<sup>20</sup>. This sense is expounded by the statement 'on account of this, the *sattva* becomes manifold', etc., and is also propounded by the great persons. Therefore, this scripture is engaged in the alleviation of the three-fold misery of the one who is desirous of (knowing) the means of alleviating the assault of misery in the form of stimulating and moving quality (*rajas*), and who desires to extricate the result yielding virtue, etc., which are rooted in (worldly) welfare because of buoyant and shining quality (*sattva*). Through comprehending the meaning of that (scripture) that (stock of miseries and virtues of a disciple) becomes ripe for fruition (i.e., comes to an end). How can liberation be acquired by the disciple—for this purpose commences this explanation.<sup>21</sup>

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19. It refers to the qualities of being intelligent and investigator and his approaching the teacher. Or alternatively the expression *Uttarottaraguṇaviśeṣāsāmpadam* may be understood as an object of *vyākhyātayāna*. In this case, it would mean that lord Kapila expounded the peculiar properties of each of the constituents of the cosmic matter successively in the order of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.
  20. Though knowledge is a quality or form of the intellect which is composed of the three constituents, yet it is spoken to be of the nature of *sattva* as it arises when the *sattva* dominates in intellect.
  21. The earlier statement proposes the removal of misery as the Sāṃkhya purpose of the philosophy. The present statement speaks of liberation. It does not involve contradiction since the liberation in Sāṃkhya is only of the nature of removal of misery.

(Cause of the rise of desire to know)

आह, यदुक्तं जिज्ञासवे व्याख्यानं कर्तव्यमिति तत्र कुतः पुनरियं जिज्ञासा कस्मिन् वाऽर्थे भवतीति ?

Opponent : As regards your statement that the scripture should be explained to a disciple desirous of knowing, (we ask) why and with regard to what object does this desire to know arise ?

उच्यते—यत्तावदुक्तं कुतः पुनरियं जिज्ञासा भवतीत्यत्र ब्रूमः

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा

दुःखं रज इत्यनर्थान्तरम् । दुःखयतीति दुःखं भवतीति । त्रयमिति संख्यापदं सर्वद्रव्यविषयं, दुःखशब्देन विशिष्यते । प्राधान्याच्च व्यतिरिक्त-बुद्ध्या गृह्यमाणं सम्बन्धित्वादाधारस्य भेदनिबन्धनायाः षष्ठ्या निमित्तत्वं प्रतिपद्यते—दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् ।

अभिहन्यतेऽनेनेत्यभिघातः ।

Proponent : As regards your question why does this desire to know arise, we reply :

ON ACCOUNT OF THE ASSAULT OF THREEFOLD MISERY  
THERE ARISES THE DESIRE TO KNOW

Misery and *rajas* are synonymous. That which afflicts is misery. The word three denoting number may refer to all the objects, but it is here qualified by the word *duḥkha* (misery). As that word is principal, it is grasped as different and as such as the substratum is related, it makes the genitive which indicates difference as an indicative of instrumentality. The triad of misery means threefold misery.

An assault is that through which affliction is caused.

कः पुनरियमभिघातो नाम ?

Opponent : What is, again, this assault ?

उच्यते—योऽसावुपर्युक्तदुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणेन चेतनाशक्तेरभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा ।

Proponent : It is close contact of the conscious power with the internal organ which is of the above mentioned three-fold misery. Therefore, on account of the assault of three-fold misery there arises the desire to know.

(Object of desire to know)

यदुक्तं कस्मिन्नार्थे भवतीति तत्राह—

तदपघातके हेतौ ।

अपहन्तीत्यपघातकः, तस्यापघातकस्तदपघातकः ।

As regards your question 'with regard to what object does the desire to know arise', the reply is :

WITH REFERENCE TO THE ALLEVIATOR MEANS OF THAT.

An alleviator is that which alleviates. The expression *tadapaghātaka* means the alleviator of that.

आह, तदपघातके इति समासाऽनुपपत्तिः, प्रतिषेधात् । कर्तरि यौ तृजकौ ताभ्यां सह षष्ठी न समस्यते । तस्मात्तस्यापघातक इति वक्तव्यम् ।

Opponent : *There is no possibility of compound in tadapaghātaka because of prohibition.*

(The word ending in) the sixth case affix is not compounded with the (words with) the *tṛc* and *aka* suffixes which are used in the sense of agent<sup>22</sup> Hence, the proper wording should be *tasyāpaghātaka*.<sup>23</sup>

उच्यते—न, शास्त्रे दर्शनात् । “तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्च” इति शास्त्रे दृष्टः प्रयोगः । पदकारश्चाह—जातिवाचकत्वात् । तथा कदाचिद् गुणो

22. Pāṇini 2.2.15.

32. I.e., the word without compound.

गुणविशेषको भवति, कदाचिद् गुणिना गुणो विशिष्यत इति चूर्णिकारस्य प्रयोगः । तस्मादनवचमेतत् ।

**Proponent :** *No, because (this sort of use) is observed in the scriptures.*

*Tatprayojako hetuśca*<sup>24</sup> is a use available in the scriptures. The commentator also stated *jātivācakatvāt*<sup>25</sup> (on account of being denoter of a genus). Here is an example of this type of use by the author of the *Cūrṇi* also. 'Sometimes the quality qualifies the object possessing that quality, sometimes the quality is qualified by the object possessing it'.<sup>26</sup> Hence, this use (of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*) is faultless.

अयं तु पिण्डार्थः । त्रिविधेन दुःखेनाभिहतो ब्राह्मणस्तदपघातकं हेतुं जिज्ञासते । को नामाऽसौ हेतुः स्याद्यो दुःखत्रयमभिहन्यादिति ।

The gist is that a brahmin attacked by three-fold misery desires to know the means of alleviating that as to what can be that means which can alleviate the three-fold misery.

(Use of *duḥkha* in the beginning does not involve inauspiciousness)

आह, दुःखशब्दावचनमादावमङ्गलार्थत्वात् । मङ्गलादीनि हि शास्त्राणि प्रथन्ते वीरपुरुषाणि च भवन्ति, अध्येतारश्च मंगलेनाभिहत-संस्काराः शास्त्रार्थानां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । दुःखमित्ययं चाऽमङ्गलार्थः शब्दः, तस्मान्नारब्धव्यः शास्त्रादाविति ।

**Opponent :** The word *duḥkha* (misery) should not be used in the beginning (of a text) because its meaning is inauspicious. The scriptures having auspicious word in the beginning become famous (lit. spread) and the persons who read them become eminent and with their (past) impressions smitten (through

24, Pāṇini 1.4.55

25. This is a *vārttika* discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* 4.1.14

26. It occurs in the *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.59

benediction) understand the meaning of the scripture quickly,<sup>27</sup> and the world *duḥkha* (misery) means something inauspicious. Hence, the scripture should not be started with this word in the beginning.<sup>28</sup>

उच्यते न, वाक्यस्यार्थे प्रयोगात् पदस्यानर्थक्यादमङ्गलार्थत्वानुप-  
पत्तिः । वाक्यमर्थप्रत्यायनार्थं प्रयुज्यते, विशिष्टार्थाभिधानात् । न पदम् ।  
तथा हि पदार्थव्यतिरेकेण विशिष्ट एव वाक्यार्थः प्रतीयते, केवलं तु पदं  
सामान्यार्थादप्रच्युतं विशिष्टार्थाभिधानासमर्थम् । अतएव न विवक्षितार्थ-  
प्रत्यायनयोग्यतयोपादीयते । तद्यथा—देवदत्तेत्ययं शब्दः कर्तृवाचकत्वेनो-  
पात्तः, सर्वक्रियाविषयत्वात्, नान्तरेण कर्मक्रियाशब्दौ विशिष्टार्थः प्रतीयते ।  
तथा गामिति कर्म, सर्वक्रियाकर्त्रभिधाननिमित्तत्वात् । तथा अभ्याजेति  
क्रिया, सर्वकर्मकर्तृविषयत्वात् । यदा तु देवदत्त गामभ्याज शुक्लामित्युच्यते  
तदा देवदत्तेन गोशब्देन कर्मान्तरेभ्यो विच्छिद्य स्वात्मन्यवस्थाप्यते । क्रिया  
च गोशब्दश्च सर्वकर्तृभ्यो देवदत्तकर्मतया व्यवस्थाप्यते । कर्तृकर्मणी  
चाभ्याजिक्रियायाः साधनभावेनैव नियम्यते । शुक्लशब्दो गोशब्दश्च गोशब्दं  
सर्वगुणविषयमाधेयान्तरेभ्यो व्यवच्छेद्य स्वात्मन आधारत्वे नियम्य,  
तद्विषयतां प्रतिपादयतीत्यनेन क्रमेण विशिष्टो वाक्यार्थः । केवलानान्तु  
पदानां सामान्यार्थात् प्रच्युतानाम्विशेषानभिधानादानर्थक्यम् । आह च—

पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानाम्पृथगर्थाभिधातिनाम् ।

इन्द्रियाणां यथा कार्यमृते देहान्न लभ्यते ॥

तथैव सर्वशब्दानाम्पृथगर्थाभिधायिनाम् ।

वाक्येभ्यः प्रविभक्तानामर्थवत्ता न लभ्यते ॥ इति

एवं सति कुतोऽयं निश्चयप्रतिलम्भो यद्दुःखशब्दोऽयममङ्गलार्थो  
यावता सन्दिह्यत एव अयं किं स्वार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपात्तोऽथ हेयत्वायेति ।

27. It is a common belief. A similar idea is found in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1.

28. The reading in the text implies the recurrence of beginning.

वाक्यस्य तु मङ्गलार्थत्वम्, दुःखप्रहाणार्थमुपादानात् । यद्धि दुःखप्रहाणार्थं वाक्यमुपादीयते तन्मङ्गलार्थं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा व्याध्यपगमः स्यादलक्ष्मीर्मा भूदिति । दुःखप्रहाणार्थं चेदं वाक्यमुपात्तं तस्मान्मङ्गलार्थमिदम् । तत्र यदुक्तं दुःखशब्दावचनमादावमङ्गलार्थत्वादित्येतदयुक्तम् ।

Proponent : No, it is not proper to say that its meaning is inauspicious because it has been used in the sense of sentence and the independent word as such has hardly any sense. The (complete) sentence is employed to convey some meaning since it conveys a particular meaning. And, independent word does not do so. A particular meaning different from the meaning conveyed by the constituent words is understood through a sentence. An independent word is not capable of conveying a particular meaning as it does not deviate from its general meaning. It is for this reason that it is not considered to be capable of conveying the desired meaning. For example, the word Devadatta is used in the sense of an agent for it can be related to any verb.<sup>29</sup> Without the help of other words—denoting object and verb—any particular meaning is not understood. Similarly, the word *gām* is denotive of an object because it is instrumental in naming all the agents and verbs. In the same way, *abhyāja* (you bring) is a verb for it can be put with all the agents and the objects. When it is stated—Devadatta, bring the white cow, Devadatta restricts for himself the activity to (the object conveyed by the word) *go* (cow) after distinguishing it from the other objects. The verb and the term *go* (cow) are also restricted to Devadatta as the predicate and all the other agents are eliminated. The agent and the object are restricted in the sense of the accessories only to the act of bringing. Among the words *sukla* (white) and *go* (cow) the words *sukla* restricts the cow which is the locus of all qualities,

29. The sense is that it can be related to all the verbs.

after distinguishing it from other attributes as its own substratum and thus establishing its objectivity. In this order ensues the particular meaning of a sentence. The independent words without deviating from their general meaning<sup>30</sup> are meaningless for they do not convey the particular meaning. It is stated also :

“Just as the operation of the senses which have their individual essential nature of particular objects and their own respective objects (to cognise), is not observed without the body, similarly, the meaningfulness of the individual words which are expressive of their own individual meaning is not observed when isolated from the sentence.”<sup>31</sup>

When such is the position, wherefrom do you ascertain that the meaning conveyed by *duḥkha* (misery) is inauspicious (specially) till you have the doubt whether the word is regarded as used to convey its (own) meaning or its avoidability. The meaning conveyed by the sentence is auspicious for it is employed in the sense of avoiding the misery. The sentence which is employed in the sense of avoiding the misery is observed as conveying auspicious meaning; for example, ‘let the disease vanish’, and ‘let there be no poverty’. And as this sentence is also employed in the sense of avoiding the misery, it conveys auspicious meaning. Your statement that the word *duḥkha* (misery) should not be used in the beginning (of a text) because the sense conveyed by it is inauspicious, is wrong.

(Significance of *traya*)

आह, त्रयग्रहणानर्थक्यं, गुणैकत्वात् । दुःखं रज इति प्रतिपन्नो भवान्, तच्चैकं शास्त्रे पठ्यते । तस्मात्त्रयग्रहणमनर्थकमिति ।

30. We have preferred the following reading given in Poona manuscript and accepted by *Chakravarti-padānām sāmānyārthādaprayutānām*.
31. A similar idea in similar words is found in the *Vākyapadīya* 2.426-7.

निमित्तभेदाद् भेदोपचार इति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् । यद्यपि एकं दुःखं तथापि निमित्तानामध्यात्माऽधिभूताऽधिदैवलक्षणानां भेदादस्य भेदोपचारः करिष्यत इति ।

तच्च नैवम् ।

कस्मात् ?

निमित्तानन्त्येन गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्गात् । आध्यात्मिकं हि द्विविधं, शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं तावद्वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम् । तथा मानसं कामक्रोदलोभमोहविषादभयेष्याऽसूयारत्यविशेषदर्शननिमित्तम् । आधिभौतिकं च मनुष्यपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तम् । आधिदैविकं शीतोष्णवातवर्षाशिन्यवश्यायावेशनिमित्तम् । तत्र निमित्तभेदात्त्रित्वप्रतिज्ञस्य गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः, स च नेष्टस्तस्मान्न निमित्तभेदात्त्रित्वम् ।

Opponent : *The mention of the word traya (i.e. triad, in the kārīkā) is useless because the ingredient of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and moving quality, rajas) is one only. You have ascertained that misery is the stimulating and moving quality, and that is mentioned in the scripture as one. Hence, the mention of the word traya (triad) is meaningless.*

If it is held that its difference is metaphorical due to the difference of its instruments? It can also be like this. Though the misery is one, yet on account of difference of its causes in the form of bodily elements and will of the Providence, it is also metaphorically differentiated.

That is also not correct.

Why ?

*Because there will be undesirable contingency of the infinitude of the ingredient of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and moving*

quality) on the ground of infinitude of the causes. The bodily misery is twofold : physical and mental. The physical misery is caused by the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm. And, the mental is caused by desire, wrath, avarice, infatuation, depression, fear, envy, displeasure at the happiness of others, repulsion (or anxiety) and the non-obtainment of a particular object. The elemental misery is caused by men, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles and the immovable objects. And, (the misery) arising out of the will of Providence is caused by anger (i.e., excess of) cold, heat, storm, rains, the planet Saturn and the dew drops. There arises the undesirable contingency of admitting the infinitude of the constituents of the cosmic matter (viz, the stimulating and moving quality) in case of the one who admits the triad (of misery) on the ground of difference of causes. This is obviously not desirable and, hence, there is no triad of misery on the ground of the difference of instruments.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं रजस एकत्वात् त्रित्वानुपपत्तिः, तस्य निमित्तभेदात् त्रित्वोपचार इति सत्यमेतत् । यत्तूक्तं निमित्तानन्त्येन गुणानन्त्यप्रसङ्ग इति तदयुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? भेदेऽपि सति वर्णसंख्यावद्वचस्थानोपपत्तेः । तद्यथा चत्वारो वर्णा इत्यस्याः संख्यायाः सति पैप्पलादादिभेदे तेषां ब्राह्मणत्वादि-व्यतिरेकाभावान्न संख्यान्तरहेतुत्वं नो खल्वपि वर्णव्यतिरेकादेकत्वं भवति । एवं त्रीणि दुःखानीत्यस्याः संख्यायाः सति शरीरादिभेदे तेषा-माध्यात्मिकादिव्यतिरेकासम्भवान्न सङ्ख्यान्तरहेतुत्वं नो खल्वपि दुःखा-व्यतिरेकादेकत्वं भवितुमर्हति । किञ्चान्यत्, निमित्तभेदाद् भेदोपचार इति भवानेव प्रतिपन्नः । न चोपचारः परमार्थ इत्यलमस्थाने यत्नेन ।

**Proponent :** Your statement that there is no propriety of the triad (of misery) because of the oneness of the stimulating and moving quality (*rājas*) but it (misery) is metaphorically stated to be three-fold on the ground of difference of causes, is correct. Your statement that there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting, the infinitude of the moving and

stimulating quality (rajas) due to the infinitude of the causes, is wrong.

Why ?

*Because inspite of difference, there is a justification for this sort of arrangement of classification as in the case of the number of castes. For, example, the castes are four and inspite of their difference in the form Paippalāda, etc., that difference does not cause additional number of the castes because of their non-difference from Brāhmaṇa, etc. Nor is there singleness in caste due to their non-difference from caste in general. Similarly, the number of misery is three inspite of their difference in the form of bodily, etc., it does not cause additional number because they are not different from that (misery) arising out of body. Nor does it lead to admit the oneness (of misery) because of its non-difference of misery in general. Moreover, you have yourself, substantiated that the difference is caused by the difference of causes and is metaphorical. And, the metaphorical is not real. (Hence), one should not insist on a wrong issue.*

(Desire to know through assault of Misery)

आह—अभिघाताज्जिज्ञासायामतिप्रसङ्ग, सर्वेषां सम्भवात् । यथासुरे-  
दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा भवतीत्येतदिष्टं तेन सर्वेषामभिघातोऽस्तीति  
सर्वेषां जिज्ञासाप्रसङ्गः । अथ मतं दुःखाभिघाते कस्यचिज्जिज्ञासा भवति  
कस्यचिन्नेति । नन्वेवमिच्छामात्रम् । प्राब्रप्रसङ्गाच्च । प्रागप्यासुरेजिज्ञा-  
साया दुःखत्रयाभिघातो न चास्यात्यन्तिके हेतौ जिज्ञासा बभूव । तेन किं  
प्राप्तम् ? पश्चादस्य यतो बभूव तद्वक्तव्यम् । यथाऽन्यत्र ब्रह्मणोऽभ्यास-  
निमित्तादधर्मक्षयात् पूर्वधर्मानुग्रहाच्च विविदिषा, तथाऽन्येषां कुशलमूला-  
भ्यासपरिपाकात् । न चापदिष्टमतो लघूक्तमेतत् । किञ्चान्यत्, तदपघ-  
ताच्चाऽनिर्मोक्षोऽकृत्स्नत्वात् । मोक्षो हि कामरूपाऽऽरूप्यघातुत्रयादिष्यते ।

दैवमानुष्यतिर्यग्योनित्रयाद्वा । एकदेशश्च संसारस्य दुःखत्रयम् । तस्मात् प्रयोजनमप्ययुक्तम् । किञ्च निमित्तान्तरसद्भावाद्दिव्यकामध्यानसुखान-  
पेक्षस्यापि विविदिषा सम्भवति, न केवलं तापोद्विग्नस्यापि । तस्मान्निमित्त-  
मप्ययुक्तम् । किञ्चान्यत् । उभयथा चाऽसम्भवात् । परिकल्प्यमाना खल्वपीयं  
जिज्ञासा पुरुषस्य वा स्याद् गुणानां वा । किञ्चातः ? तन्न तावत्पुरुषस्य  
सम्भवति । कस्मात् ? नैर्गुण्याभ्युपगमात् । इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखधर्मा-  
धर्मज्ञानसंस्काराणामात्मगुणत्वं न भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते । न गुणानाम्,  
आचेतन्यात् । न ह्यचेतना घटादयो हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारं जिज्ञासमाना  
दृश्यते । न च चेतना भवतां गुणाः, सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि प्रधानमिति  
(का० ११) वक्ष्यमाणवचनात् । किञ्चान्यत्, तत्त्वान्तरानुपपत्तेः । न च  
गुणपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तं वस्तुतस्तत्त्वान्तरमस्ति यस्य जिज्ञासा परिकल्प्यमाना  
परिकल्प्येत । तस्मादनुपपन्ना जिज्ञासा ।

Opponent : *The (admission of) rise of desire to know through the assault (of misery) involves the undesirable contingency of over pervasion because it could be possible in all. To explain, if the sense intended by you is that there arises the desire to know in Āsuri on account of the assault of threefold misery, there is the assault of misery over all; hence, there arises the undesirable contingency of rise of desire to know in all. If you hold that the assault of misery is common but the desire to know arises in case of some and not in others, it would indeed be a matter of mere sweet will. Moreover, it involves the undesirable contingency of rise (of desire to know) even earlier (in Āsuri). The assault of misery was there over Āsuri even earlier the rise of desire to know, but there arose no desire to know the means of complete removal of misery.*

What does it prove ?

The cause due to which it arose later only should be explained. As at other places the desire to know arose in a Brāhmaṇa by means of destruction of vice through the (constant) practice and through a favour of virtues acquired earlier and in the case

of others it (the desire to know) arose through full development (fruition) of the practice of virtue and it has not been refuted by you,<sup>32</sup> your surmise is insignificant.<sup>33</sup> *Moreover, the assault of misery implies the lack of liberation because of incompleteness.* Liberation is desired to be attained from the triad of sensuous activity, material elements and sphere of non-corporeality or from the triad of birth in the form of gods, men and beasts, The triad of misery is a part of the world (while liberation ensues from the world altogether). Hence, the purpose is also wrong.<sup>34</sup> *Moreover, because of the existence of some other means (for the rise of desire to know).*<sup>35</sup> The desire to know is possible in case of one who does not long for the fulfilment of the divine desire and pleasure of concentration. It is not found only in those tormented by miseries. Hence, your opinion regarding the cause of that (rise of desire to know) is also wrong. *Moreover, it is impossible in both ways.* The desire to know, even if postulated in this way, may belong either to the conscious entity or to the constituents of the cosmic matter.

So what ?

That is not possible in case of the conscious entity.

Why ?

*Because you have admitted that it is devoid of qualities.* You do not admit desire, envy, effort, pleasure, pain, virtue, vice,

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32. The sense is that it is not clear whether the desire arose out of this assault or the fruition of virtue.
33. Rendered into one sentence following *Chakravarti's* edition.
34. If the purpose is to remove misery which is identical with the word itself, such a purpose is wrong since the removal of the world is not possible.
35. A full stop is desirable after *bhāvāt*.

knowledge and (past) impressions are the qualities of the soul.<sup>36</sup> Nor can it (desire to know) belong to the constituents of the cosmic matter because they are insentient. The insentient objects like the pithier, etc., are not observed desiring for attaining beneficial and for avoiding the harmful; And, the constituent of the cosmic matter, as conceived by you, are not sentient because you have stated later on that 'the cosmic matter is common, insentient and productive' (kā 11). Moreover, there is no possibility of another (third) entity.<sup>37</sup> There is indeed no entity additional to the constituents of the cosmic matter and the conscious entity to which the desire to know postulated (by you) may be supposed to belong to. Hence, the desire to know is not possible.

उच्यते । यदुक्तमभिघाताज्जिज्ञासायामतिप्रसङ्गः, सर्वेषां तत्सम्भवादिति अत्र ब्रूमः न, अभिघातत्वेनाऽप्रतिपत्तेः । यद्यप्यविशिष्टोऽभिघातस्तथापि सर्वे नैनमभिघातत्वेन प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तथाहि, सत्स्वाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखे-स्वर्जनरक्षणक्षयसंगर्हिंसासु च प्रीत्यभिष्वङ्गादेषां न विषयेषूद्देगापद्वेषौ । न च विषयपरित्यागो भवति । तस्मान्नाऽविशिष्टोऽभिघातः । विशेषेऽभिघात-बुद्धेर्निमित्ताभिधानमिति चेत् ? अथापि स्याद्येयमसति विशेषे सर्वप्राण-भृतामासुरेरेव भगवतो दुःखत्रयाभिघातबुद्धिर्भवति, न पुनरन्येषामित्यत्र निमित्तमभिधानीयम् । न ह्यन्तरेण निमित्तमसौ विशेषोऽवस्थापयितुं शक्यत इति । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? प्रश्नाऽसम्बन्धात् । कुतो जिज्ञासा भवतीत्येवं चोदकेन पूर्वमकारि प्रश्नस्तस्याश्च साक्षात् कारणम-भिघातः कारणान्तराणामनभिधानादित्यस्यैव निर्देशः कृतः । यत्तु खल्विदानीं कारणकारणमपि पृच्छ्यते तदनवस्थाप्रसङ्गभयान्नोच्यते । अथ निबन्धः क्रियते तेन पूर्वधर्मानुग्रहस्य कुशलमूलाभ्यासपरिपाकस्य

36. This is in contradiction with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems which ascribe them to soul.

37. It is so because there is no ultimate reality other than the two.

कारणकारणत्वमस्माभिर्न प्रतिषिध्यत इति तदेव किं न गृह्यते ? एतेन प्राक्प्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः । यत्तूक्तं तदभिघाते चाऽनिर्मोक्षोऽकृत्स्नत्वा-  
दित्येतदप्ययुक्तम् । कस्मात् ? शास्त्रार्थाऽनवबोधात् । अष्टविकल्पो देवस्-  
तैर्यग्योनिश्च पञ्चधा भवति, मानुष्यश्चैकविध (का० ५३) इत्येतावान-  
स्माकं संसारः । न तु तद्व्यतिरिक्ताः कामरूपारूप्यधातवः क्वचिदपि  
सिद्धाः । चतुर्दशविधे च संसारे या सुखमात्रा सा दुःखभूयस्त्वात्तच्छब्द-  
वाच्या भवतीति । तथा चोक्तम्—

अत्र जन्मजरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं समासेन ॥

(का० ५५)

दृश्यते च लोके भूयसा ग्रहणम् । तद्यथाऽऽम्रवनमिति । तस्मात् कृत्स्न-  
विकल्पप्रतिषेधोऽयम् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं दिव्यकामध्यानसुखाऽनपेक्षस्यापि  
विविदिषासम्भवान्निमित्तमयुक्तमिति तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? उत्तरत्र  
प्रतिषेधात् । इष्टमेवैतत्सङ्गृहीतम् । तथा चोत्तरसूत्रेण प्रतिषेत्स्यत्याचार्यः  
“दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः” (का० २) । तस्माद्दि-  
व्यसुखानपेक्षस्यापि युक्ता विविदिषा । ध्यानसुखमपि क्षयातिशयौ नाति-  
वर्तते । तदप्यत्रैव सङ्गृहीतम् । तस्मात्प्रतिषेध्य एवायं पक्ष इति न  
किञ्चिदभिधीयते । यदप्युक्तमुभयथाऽसम्भवाज्जिज्ञासाऽनुपपत्तिरिति अस्तु  
गुणानां जिज्ञासा । यत्तूक्तमाचेतन्यादसम्भव इति सत्याचेतन्ये बुद्धेरिच्छादि  
सद्भावमुत्तरत्र प्रतिपादयिष्यामः । तस्मादुपपन्ना जिज्ञासा ।

**Proponent :** In response to your objection that the rise of desire to know due to the assault of threefold misery involves undesirable contingency of over pervasion because it could be possible in case of all, we say—no, because the others do not understand it as an assault. Though the assault is a like to all, yet all the persons do not understand it as an assault. For example, inspite of the misery like the bodily one, and the (pains in) earning, protecting, decay, attachment and the violence involved in

(case of) the objects of enjoyment, there is no repulsion and repugnance in these (common men) on account of the pleasure (arising out of them) as also attachment to them. And, they do not abandon the objects of enjoyment. Hence, the assault (of misery) is not alike to all.

*If someone asks the reason for the understanding of this assault in particular cases only?* Let it be that in spite of absence of dissimilarity (in assault), among all the living beings the understanding of assault of three-fold misery arises only in Āsuri and not in others, you should mention the reason here, because without reason such a particularity cannot be mentioned.

This is also wrong.

Why?

*Because of the irrelevance of the question.* Inspired by the query as to why does the desire to know arise, you have put the question, and the direct cause of that desire to know is the assault (of three-fold misery). It is (clearly) pointed out without mentioning any other reason. Now as the cause of this cause is asked, we do not reply on account of the fear of the undesirable contingency of infinite regress. If you insist upon, we have not rejected the favour of the virtues acquired in past and the full development of the practice of virtue (lit. the cause of happiness) as the cause of this cause, why don't you accept that? By this only the objection regarding the undesirable contingency of the rise of desire to know even earlier (in Āsuri) is also answered.<sup>38</sup> The objection that the removal of misery will involve (the undesirable contingency of) the impossibility of liberation because of incompleteness is also wrong.

Why?

Because you have not fully understood the meaning of the scripture

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38. The desire did not arise earlier in Āsuri in absence of such a preparation.

'the divine beings are of eight sorts, the animal class is five-fold and the human order is of only one kind, etc.' (kā. 54). This is the extent of our world. The elements like activity, material elements or sphere of non-corporeality are not proved as additional to it.<sup>39</sup> In this world of fourteen kinds the quantity of pleasure is also denoted by that word (misery) itself because of the greater quantity of misery.<sup>40</sup> It is stated also : 'here the man experiences misery arising from old age and death up to the time the subtle body retires. Therefore, misery is, in brief (the nature of the worldly objects)' (kā 55). It is also observed in worldly usage that the mention is made through the (object found in) greater quantity. For example, the forest of mangoes.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, this is the rejection of the alternate expression 'complete'. Your statement that the cause of rise of desire to know is because of the possibility of (rise of) desire to know in case of the one who does not long for fulfilment of divine desires and pleasure of concentration, is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because these means are rejected later on.* You have included what we wanted to include. In the next aphorism the author rejects them thus—'the revealed (scriptural) means (of removing misery) is like perceptible means for it is connected with impurity, decay and surpassability' (kā. 2). Hence, the (rise of) desire to know is proper in the one who does not long for the divine pleasure. The pleasure arising of concentration does not transcend destruction and

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39. Being non-existent they cannot serve as the cause of the rise of desire.
40. Though there is pleasure also in the world, still the quantity of misery is so much that the world can be held to be full of misery.
41. It is not that there are mango trees only in the forest, but they are more in quantity.

surpassability. That is also included here only. Therefore, since this opinion is to be rejected; nothing is stated in this regard here. As regards your statement that there is no possibility of (rise of) the desire to know because it is impossible in the case of both, (we reply) let the desire to know pertain to the constituents of cosmic matter. As regards your statement that it is impossible on account of their being insentient, we will establish later on the existence of desire, etc., in the intellect, though it is insentient. Hence, the (rise of) desire to know is possible.

(Syntactical Relation of *tat*)

आह—तच्छब्दानर्थक्यं प्रतिपदमसम्बन्धात् । योज्यमाचार्येण तच्छब्दः सूत्रे पठितोऽस्य खलु प्रतिपदमसम्बन्धात् स्वल्पामप्यर्थवत्तां नोपलभामहे । तस्मान्नैनमपुष्कलार्थमध्येष्यामहे इति ।

Opponent : *The word tat (that) is meaningless because it cannot be related with all (i.e., any of) the words.* We do not find even a slightest meaning of the word *tat* (that) which is mentioned by the teacher in the aphorism, because it cannot be related to all (i.e., all of) the words. Hence, we will not read it which carries no use.

उच्यते—कथं हि नाम प्रयोक्तृपारतन्त्र्याच्छब्दस्य शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धो न स्यादिति ?

Proponent : Since the word is dependent upon the speaker, how is it that one word is not related to the other ?

आह, न ब्रूमोऽविद्यमानसम्बन्धोऽसम्बन्धः किन्तु ह्ययुक्तसम्बन्धो यः स खल्वसम्बन्धः । तद्यथा अनाचारो माणवक इति द्रव्येण क्रियाशक्तित्वान्न शक्यं किञ्चिदनाचारवता क्षणमप्यवस्थातुम् । अयुक्तं त्वाचरन्ननाचार इत्युच्यते । तथा चास्य तच्छब्दस्य प्रतिपदं सम्बन्धो न युक्तस्तस्मादनर्थकस्तच्छब्दः ।

आनन्तर्याज्जिज्ञासाशब्दस्येति चेत्, स्यान्मतम् । अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा

भवति प्रतिषेधो वेत्यनया युक्त्या जिज्ञासाशब्दस्य तच्छब्देनाभिसम्बन्धः शक्य इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? तदपघाते प्रयोजनासद्भावात् । न हि जिज्ञासापघाते किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमस्तीति सत्यपि सम्बन्धे न तच्छब्देनार्थः ।

अभिघातस्येति चेत् ? अथापि स्याद्यदि जिज्ञासापघातेन किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमस्तीति । अतस्तत्सम्बन्धो नेष्यते । तेन तर्ह्यभिघातशब्देनास्याभिसम्बन्धः करिष्यते । तथा चाऽपि तच्छब्दोर्थवान् भविष्यतीति । एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? निमित्ताऽवस्थाने पुनः पुनरुत्पत्तेः । नैमित्तिकोऽयमभिघातस्तस्य निमित्तवत्त्वादात्यन्तिकोऽपघातो न स्यात् । इतरथा ज्वरनिमित्तको दाह इव शीतद्रव्यसंस्पर्शात्प्रशान्तोऽपि निमित्तावस्थानात्पुनः पुनः प्रवर्तते इत्यफलत्वमस्य व्यायामस्य ।

त्रयशब्दस्येति चेत् न, पारतन्त्र्यात् । आश्रयपरतन्त्रा हि संख्या, तस्या नाऽन्तरेणाश्रयोपघातमपघातः शक्यः कर्तुम् । आनर्थक्यञ्च समानमिति सुतरां तच्छब्देन नार्थः ।

दुःखशब्दस्येति चेत्स्यान्मतम्—यद्येतेषाम्पदानामभिसम्बन्धे यथोक्तदोषोपपत्तिः, दुःखशब्दं तर्हि तत्-शब्देनाभिसंभन्त्स्यामः । तस्मिन्नेष निषेधो विशतीति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? अनेकपदव्यवधानात् । कथमनन्तरवृत्तिना सर्वनाम्नाऽनेकपदव्यवहितस्य दुःखशब्दस्याभिसम्बन्धः शक्येत् प्रतिपादयितुम् ? तस्मान्न किञ्चिदेतत् । किञ्चान्यत् । उपसर्जनत्वात् । अयं खल्वपि दुःखशब्दः समास उपसर्जनीभूतः । न चैकस्मिन्काले शब्दस्य प्रधानत्वमुपसर्जनत्वं च युक्तितः सम्भवति । प्रधानस्य च पदान्तरेणाऽभिसम्बन्धः । तस्माद्विवादास्पदमेवैतत्सूत्रम् । किञ्चान्यत् । नित्यानामपघातानुपपत्तेः । इह नित्यानामपघातः कर्तुं न शक्यते । तद्यथा पुरुषाणाम् । अनित्यानाञ्चापघातो दृष्टः । तद्यथा, ज्वरादीनाम् । नित्यञ्च दुःखम् । तस्मात्तदपघातेऽभ्युत्थानानार्थक्यम् । वृत्त्यपघाते तदपघात इति चेत्, स्यात्पुनरेषा बुद्धिः । सत्यं नित्यानामपघातो न युक्तितः सम्भवति । न तु वयं गुणलक्षणस्य दुःखस्यापघातं ब्रूमः, किन्तर्हि वृत्तिरस्याभिभूयत इति । तच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? उक्तोत्तरत्वात् । उक्तमत्रोत्तरं निमित्तावस्थाने पुनः पुनरुत्पत्तेरिति । तस्मादयमप्यमार्गः ।

किञ्चान्यत् । अविशेषात्कल्पयित्वाऽपि वृत्त्यपघातं वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरन्यत्वाद्  
 वृत्त्यपघाते वृत्तिमदपघातः प्राप्त इति नास्ति कश्चिद्विशेषः । तस्मात्  
 कृशोऽयं परिहार इति नार्थस्तच्छब्देन ।

Opponent : We do not consider non-relation as the absence of relation. On the contrary, the non-relation is there where the relation cannot adequately be established. For example, we take the expression 'the disciple does not act'. Here, since the substance is (naturally) endowed with the power of action, no one can remain without action even for a single moment. Hence, not acting is said to be the one acting inadequately (or having bad conduct). Similarly, the relation of the word *tat* with all the words cannot be adequately established. Hence, it is considered to be meaningless.

If it is said that it can be related with the word 'desire to know' because the former follows it? It may be like this. That which follows can either be an injunction or prohibition. By this reasoning there is the possibility of relation of the word *tat* with the word desire to know.

That is not so.

Why ?

*Because there is no purpose served by the alleviation of that (desire to know).* There is no purpose served by the alleviation of the desire to know. Hence, inspite of the relation (between *tat* and desire to know), the word *tat* does not serve some purpose (or convey some meaning).

If it is argued that there is relation of the word *tat* with the word *abhighāta* (assault)? (It is right) it can be as stated above only if the alleviation of desire to know serves some purpose. The relation of *tat* with desire to know is not desirable. In that case its relation with the word *abhighāta* (assault) is established. Thus, the word *tat* will be meaningful.

This suggestion is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because of the repeated rise when the cause remains.* The assault is the result and, hence, when its cause will remain, there would not be its final alleviation. It is like this. The heat caused by fever which is in turn caused by something else, though quenched with the touch of cold substances, takes place again and again because its cause remains. Hence, this kind of (intellectual) exercise is fruitless.

If its relation is established with the word *traya* (triad) ?

*No, because of the dependence (of the word triad).* The number depends upon its substratum<sup>42</sup> and its alleviation is not possible without the alleviation of its substratum.<sup>43</sup> And, the objection of meaninglessness applies here also.<sup>44</sup> Hence, by no means can we attach some meaning to the word *tat*.

If it is argued that its relation can be established with the word *duḥkha* (misery) ? It can be like this. If there is the possibility of the above mentioned faults in establishing the relation (of the word *tat*) with these words, we will relate the word *duḥkha* (misery) with the word *tat*. In this case, the above mentioned objection will come to an end.

It is also not so.

Why ?

*Because of the intervention of many words.* How is it possible to establish the relation of the pronoun occurring afterwards (in the sentence) with the word misery which occurs (before) as intervened by several words ? Hence, it carries no force. *Moreover, because of its being secondary.* The word *duḥkha* is indeed the secondary

42. Since it is a quality, it cannot remain without a substratum.

43. The meaning demands the reading *āṣṛayāpaghātam* instead of *āṣṛayapoghātam*.

44. It is because its relation is not possible.

member in the compound. And, it is not possible to accept reasonably the principal and the secondary character of a single word at the same time. The principal member (in the compound) is related to other words. Therefore, this aphorism is controversial. *Moreover, there is no possibility of destruction of eternal (objects).* It is not possible here to destroy the eternal objects; for example, the conscious entities. And, the destruction is observed in case of non-eternal objects only; for example, that of fever, etc. And the misery is eternal. Hence, it is useless to go for its destruction.

If the destruction of that (misery) is (understood as) the destruction of the function of misery? This understanding may be like this. It is true that the destruction of the eternal cannot be possible logically. We do not speak of the destruction of misery in the form of the constituents of the cosmic matter (viz., stimulating and the moving quality). On the contrary, (we propose) that the function of misery is alleviated.

That is also not correct.

Why ?

Because of the answer given earlier. We have already replied that the effect will arise again and again when the cause remains. Therefore, this is also not a (right) way (to explain the destruction of misery). *Moreover, it makes no difference.* Even considering the destruction of the function, because of the non-difference of the function from its locus, the destruction of the function implies the destruction of its locus and, hence, this argument is in no way different (from the earlier).<sup>45</sup> Hence, the above mentioned alleviation is very weak and, thus, the word *tat* is *meaningless*.

उच्यते—यदुक्तं तच्छब्दानर्थक्यम्, प्रतिपदसम्बन्धादित्यस्तु दुःख-  
शब्देनाभिसम्बन्धः । तत्सम्बन्धे यथोक्तदोषोपपत्तिरिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् ।  
यदि तर्हि तच्छब्दस्य दुःखशब्देनैवाऽभिसम्बन्धोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेन येऽस्माभिः

45. Here the reading *kiñcānyadaviseṣāt* is preferable.

पूर्वमभिहिता दोषास्ते प्रसज्यन्ते । तस्मात् प्रतिषिद्धस्य पक्षस्य परिग्रहे साहसमात्रमिति । एतच्च नैवं, कस्मात् ? प्रतिविधानात् । सत्यमसति प्रतिविधाने साहसमात्रं स्यात् । प्रतिविधीयते तु, तस्माददोषोऽयमिति ।

किन्तदिति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । उच्यतान्तर्हि किन्तत् प्रतिविधानं यस्यावष्टम्भेनानेकदोषव्याहतोऽप्ययं पक्ष आश्रीयते । न ह्यनुक्तमस्माभिराकारमात्रेण शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुमिति ।

उच्यते—बाढम् । यत्तावदुक्तमनेकपदव्यवधानान्न दुःखशब्दस्य तच्छब्देनाऽभिसम्बन्ध इत्यत्र ब्रूमः न, अनभ्युपगमात् । यो ह्यनन्तरकृतं शब्दस्य शब्दान्तरेण सह सम्बन्धमाचष्टे तम्प्रत्ययमुपालम्भः स्यात् । वयन्त्वर्थकृतं सम्बन्धमाचक्ष्महे । तथा चोक्तम्—

**यस्य येनाभिसम्बन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तस्य सः ।**

**अर्थतस्त्वसमानामानन्तर्येऽप्यसम्भवः ॥**

किञ्चान्यत्—शास्त्रे दर्शनात् । शास्त्रे च व्यवहितानामपि सर्वानाम्नामभिसम्बन्धो दृश्यते “यस्य गुणस्य हि भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस्तदभिधाने त्वतला” वित्यत्रार्थकृतश्च सम्बन्धः शब्दानामभ्युपगतः । इयाप्रातिपदिकात्, बहुषु बहुवचनम्, सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः, अलुगुत्तरपदे इत्येवमादीनां सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमः । तथा “अनड्वाहमुदहारिणि भगिनि वहसि या त्वं शिरसि कुम्भमवाचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति वार्तिके दृष्टान्तः । न ह्यत्र सत्यानन्तर्ये शिरसाऽनडुहो वहनं कुम्भस्य वा सरणमुपपद्यते । यथा चाऽत्र व्यवहितानामभिसम्बन्धस्तथेहाऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तमुपसर्जनत्वात्पदान्तरेणाऽनभिसम्बन्ध इति एतदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? समासादपोद्धारे बुद्ध्या व्यवस्थितस्य स्वातन्त्र्योपपत्तेः । सत्यमुपसर्जनस्य पदान्तरेणाभिसम्बन्धो नोपपद्यते । न तु वयं समासवृत्तेरेव तच्छब्देनाभिसम्बन्ध इति प्रतिपद्यामहे, किन्तर्हि समासादपोद्धतस्य बुद्धिव्यवस्थितस्थोपजनितस्वातन्त्र्यस्य शब्दान्तरेण सम्बन्धमिच्छाम इति । अर्थतदनिष्टम् “योगप्रमाणे च तदभावे दर्शनं स्यात्” “अथ शब्दानुशासनं, केषां शब्दानाम्” इति चैवमादीनाम्प्रयोगाणां विरोधः प्राप्नोति । अनिष्टञ्चैतत् । यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम्—  
नित्यानामपधाताऽनुपपत्तेर्वृत्त्यपघाते च तदपघातप्रसङ्गादिदि, एतदप्यनुप-

पन्नम् । कस्मात् ? गुणशक्तेः प्रयोजनोपरमे सत्यात्मकल्पेन व्यवस्थाना-  
भ्युपगमात् । नैतदभ्युपगम्यते गुणस्योच्छित्तिर्भवति, वृत्तिर्वाऽस्याऽभि-  
भूयते । किन्तर्हि पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना चरितार्था शक्तिरस्य पुरुषार्थप्रवृत्तौ-  
प्रयोजनासद्भावादात्मकल्पेन व्यवतिष्ठन् इत्येतद्विवक्षितम् । तस्मा-  
द्युक्तमेतत्तदपघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा प्रवर्तत इति ।

Proponent : As regards your objection that the word *tat* (that) is meaningless since it cannot be related to all the words (in the aphorism), our reply is that let it be related to the word misery.

If it is argued that there is the possibility of the faults mentioned above in supposing the above relation ? It can be like this. If the relation of the word *tat* (that) with the word *duḥkha* (misery) is accepted, the faults mentioned above by us will surely involve. Therefore, it is mere boldness to accept the opinion which is already rejected.

It is not like this.

Why ?

*Because of its refutation.* It is true that it would have been a mere boldness to accept without the refutation (of opposing arguments), but the refutation is supplied here. Hence, it is faultless (to accept it).

If it is asked as to what is the refutation ? It may be like this. State what is the point of refutation on the basis of which you are resorting to an opinion even when obstructed by many faults. We cannot understand that merely by gesture without putting in words.

It is right. As regards your objection that the word *tat* cannot be related to the word *duḥkha* on account of intervention of many words, our reply is—*no, because of (our) disagreement (over the issue)*. This reproach applies to the one who establishes the relation of a word with a word occurring afterwards. On the other hand, we speak of the relation based on meaning. It is stated also :

“The relation of one word with the other through meaning exists even when the words occur at a distance. On the other hand, the relation of the words dissimilar to them (i.e., not related through meaning) is impossible even if there is proximity.”<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, because it is observed in the scriptures. In the scriptures also the pronouns are observed to be related (with some noun) with an intervention too. As for example, “the suffixes *tva* and *tal* (*tā*) are added to express that quality the existence of which causes a certain expression for a certain object.”<sup>47</sup> Here also the relation of words as based on meaning is accepted (by all). The same relation is admitted in the following cases : ‘It should be understood as enjoined after what ends in *ni* or *āp* or after a crude form (from here upto the end of book V)<sup>48</sup> : ‘In the expression of similarity the plural case affix is enjoined’ ‘There is the elision of the case suffix when it occurs after the name of a root or a crude form : the phrase that the elision does not take place before the second member of the compound, should be supplied (iii. 6.1)’. Similarly, it is observed in the *vārttika* ‘O sister, you who are carrying water in a pot on your head, did you see a bull running towards south?’<sup>49</sup> In this case, inspite of proximity, there is no possibility of carrying a bull on the head and the running of the pot. As there is the relation of the words intervened by others, in the present case also it should be understood

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46. Cf. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* 1.1.5. The original sources is not found.

47. *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.119. The example very well proves the point in question. *Tat*, a pronoun, in *tadābhidhāne* is here related not with the words immediately preceding it, but with the word *guṇaṣya* which is intervened by so many words. The relation is by force of meaning.

48. Pāṇini 4.1.1

49. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.57

similarly. Your statement that the word *tat* cannot be related with some other word due to its being secondary member of the compound, is also wrong.

Why ?

*Because that is possible in case of a word which is mentally assumed and can be independent when taken out of the compound.* It is true that a word which is a secondary member in compound cannot be related with some other word. We do not propound the relation of the word *tat* lying in a compound. On the contrary, we intend (to establish) the relation of a word which is taken out of compound, is mentally assumed and in which (in this way) independent status is established. If it is not desirable, there would be the contradiction with the uses like 'in case the etymological meaning is held to be authoritative and when such meaning is absent, (the word) should also disappear (P. 1.2.55)', and 'here commences the teaching about the words ; of which words ? (M. Bhāṣya 1.1.1). There arises the contingency of contradiction in these usages. And, it is not desirable.

And, again your arguments that because there is no possibility of the destruction of that which is eternal and because the alleviation of the function of that involves destruction of that itself, are wrong.

Why ?

Because we hold that the power related to the constituents of the cosmic matter continues to exist in its own form when its object is fulfilled and there is no purpose to act for the Puruṣa. We do not hold that the constituents of cosmic matter are destroyed or their function is suppressed, but what we intend is that the power of the constituents of cosmic matter which is meant for fulfilling the purpose of the conscious entity has fulfilled its purpose, and continues to exist in its own form for at that time it has no purpose to act for fulfilling the purpose of the conscious entity. Hence, it is

right (to say) that there arises the desire to know the means of alleviation of that (misery).<sup>50</sup>

(Perceptible Means of alleviating Misery)

दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत्

स्यादेतत् प्रत्यक्षो दुःखप्रतीकारहेतुरस्ति । तस्य समतिक्रमे किं प्रयोजनम् ? तद्यथा शारीरस्य तावदयमपगमहेतुरनेकद्रव्यरसायनोपभोगः । मानसस्यापि मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानविलेपनभोजनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिः । आधिभौतिकस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासः, शस्त्रास्त्रकुशलता, विषमस्थानानध्यासनं च । आधिदैविकस्यापि यथाकालं विविधनिवसनास्तरणगर्भगृह-प्रासादजालान्तरचन्दनव्यजनमणिहारदिसेवा विविधौषधमंगलस्तुतिमन्त्र-प्रयोगानुष्ठानमिति दृष्टे हेतौ सा जिज्ञासाऽपार्थेति चेत्—

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT THE DESIRE TO KNOW IS SUPERFLUOUS BECAUSE THERE ARE PERCEPTIBLE (MEANS OF ALLEVIATING MISERY) ?

It may be argued that the perceptible objects serve as means for alleviating misery. What is the purpose in transgressing that ? For example, the means of alleviating the bodily misery is the use of many medicines and many other things. (The means of alleviation) of mental misery is the attainment of the objects of enjoyment like lovely women, desirable drinks, unguents, food, dress, ornaments, etc. The means of alleviating the misery arising of beings are the practice of politics, proficiency in using weapons and missiles, and not staying in an unsafe place. The means of alleviating misery caused by will of Providence are—to resort to the various kinds of habitations, carpets, houses, mansions and other kinds of nets as

50. Here, it may be observed that the *Y.D.* improves nothing in relating the pronoun *tat* to misery. On the other hand, it has to face the grammatical difficulty as also the problem of reconciliation with the theory of pre-existence of effect. This intellectual exercise could easily be avoided by relating the term *tat* with *abhighāta*.

well as sandal-wood, fanning, jewel and garland of pearls, various kinds of herbs, and the practice of various auspicious panegyric and the sacrificial formulas. What if that (desire to know) is considered to be) superfluous on account of (these) perceptible means (of alleviating misery) ?

(Lack of Invariableness and Finality in Perceptible Means)

नैकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥

एतच्च नैवम् । कस्मात् ? एकान्ताऽत्यन्ततोऽभावात् । एकान्तो नाम नियमेन भावः । अत्यन्तं भूतस्याविनाशः । एकान्तश्च अत्यन्तं च ते एकान्तात्यन्ते तयोरभाव एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावः तस्मात् । षष्ठीस्थाने पञ्चमी । षष्ठ्या एव वा तसिः षष्ठ्या व्याश्रय इति योगविभागात् । असमासकरणं वृत्तपूरणार्थम्, मानसस्य च दुःखस्य प्रतीकारे दोषान्तरोपसंग्रहार्थम् । तथा हि, स्त्रियादीनां सत्येतस्मिन् दोषद्वयेऽशक्यमर्जनं कर्तुमस्वाभाविकत्वात् । सत्यर्जने रक्षणमशक्यं, साधारणत्वात् । सति च रक्षणे क्षयः, कृतकत्वात् । सङ्गाच्चानुपशमो भूतोपघातमन्तरेण चासम्भव इत्येते दोषाः ।

NO, BECAUSE (THE ALLEVIATION THROUGH THESE MEANS) LACKS IN INVARIABLENESS AND FINALITY.

It is not so.

Why ?

Because of the lack of invariableness and finality. The word invariable means certainly. Finality means the absolute destruction of something.<sup>51</sup> The words *ekānta* and *atyanta* while compounded result into *ekāntātyanta* and the absence (*abhāva*) of both of them is signified by the compound *ekāntātyantato abhāva*. 'Because of this' (is conveyed through the whole expression *ekāntātyantato abhāvāt*). Here the fifth case is used in the place of sixth case affix. The suffix

51. The reading should be *bhūtasyavināśah* in place of *bhūtasyāvināśah*.

*tasi* is added optionally to a word ending in sixth case. Here it is through splitting the aphorism into two : *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ* and *āṣraye*, i. e., *tasi* is optionally added to words ending in sixth case affix and in case of one siding with somebody.<sup>52</sup> The absence of compound is for the purpose of completion of the metre and for including the additional defects in the means of alleviating the mental misery. For example, inspite of these means like lovely women and others, there are two defects (involved in them also) : (1) It is difficult (lit. impossible) to procure them because it is not natural. Even if procured, it is difficult (impossible) to protect them for these are common to all. Even if protected, they are bound to be destroyed because they are produced. (2) And, on account of attachment (towards them) it is impossible to extinguish the desire regarding them and that also without harming other beings. These are the additional defects.

(Proofs for lack of invariableness and finality in Perceptible means)

आह, कथमेतदवगम्यते यद् दृष्टस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वमनात्यन्तिकत्वं चेति ?

Opponent : How is it known that the perceptible means involve the lack of invariableness and finality ?

उच्यते—प्रत्यक्ष एवैतदुपलभ्यते । यदायुर्वेदविहितस्य क्रियाक्रमस्याभियुक्तमात्मवन्तं भेषजभिषक्परिचारकसम्पन्नं प्रत्यानर्थवयम् । आह च—

52. Pāṇini 5.4.48. In the present context *tasi* cannot be justified in the sense of genitive case because as per regular rule *tasi* can be used only in the sense of genitive case provided it is a case of somebody siding with somebody. The Y. D., therefore, suggests, that the aphorism be splitted into two, thereby allowing *tast* even where the provision is not fulfilled, i.e., reading the aphorism simply as *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ* as a separate unit in *ṣaṣṭhyāḥ vyāṣraye*.

सर्वेषां व्याधिरूपाणां निदानं त्रिविधं स्मृतम् ।  
 आहारश्च विहारश्च कर्म पूर्वकृतं तथा ॥  
 तत्राहारविहारोत्थान् रोगान् द्रव्यमपोहति ।  
 यस्तु कर्मकृतो व्याधिर्मरणात्स निवर्तते ॥

पुनरप्याह—

सोपद्रवः सर्वरूपो बलमांसेन्द्रियापहः ।  
 सारिष्ठश्चैव यो व्याधिस्तं भिषक् परिवर्जयेत् ॥

इत्येवमनैकान्तिकत्वम् । अनात्यन्तिकत्वं तु निवृत्तानामपि व्याधीनाम्पुन-  
 र्हुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । महता खल्वपि प्रयत्नेन निवर्तिता व्याधयः पुनरुत्पद्यन्ते ।  
 तथा चोक्तम्—

पुनर्ज्वरे समुत्पन्ने क्रिया पूर्वज्वरानुगा । इति

तस्माद्यथैवास्यायुर्वेदादेः प्रतीकारहेतुत्वं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेवमेकान्ताऽ-  
 त्यन्ततोऽभावोऽपि । तथा मानसस्य च । यथा च शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारहेत-  
 वोऽनैकान्तिकाः तथा स्त्र्यादयोऽपि । कस्मात् ? तत्सन्निधाने विषयान्त-  
 राभिलाषदर्शनात् । यदि हि स्त्र्यादयो विषयाः सर्वदा दुःखप्रतीकारसमर्था  
 भवेयुः, किमिति तेषु सन्निहितेषु विषयिणो विषयान्तरजिघृक्षा स्यात् ?  
 एवमनैकान्तिकत्वम् । अनात्यन्तिकत्वमपि । निवृत्तेच्छानामपि भूयः  
 प्रार्थनासम्भवात् । यदि हि विषयोपभोगोऽत्यन्तमेव मानसं दुःखमपहन्त्यात्  
 किं प्राप्तं येन भूयस्तं प्रति विषयिणोऽभिलाषः स्यात् ? किं कारणम् ?  
 यस्मान्न ह्यविद्यमाने तमसि देवदत्तस्य प्रदीपं प्रत्यपेक्षा भवति । दृश्यते च  
 निवृत्तेच्छानामपि विषयोपभोगाद्विषयिणां भूयो विषयाभिलाषः । तेन  
 मन्यामहे नायं दृष्टो हेतुर्दुःखमपहन्ति । किन्तुहि सुतरां वृद्धिं करोति । आह  
 च—

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ।  
 हविषा कृष्णवत्सर्वं भूय एवाभिवर्धते ॥

अपर आह—

सवेद्यत्वाद् गुरुत्वाच्च निन्दितत्वाच्च साधुभिः ।  
सर्वत्रासन्निधानाच्च न दृष्टो हेतुरिष्यते ॥

सवेद्यत्वात् । भोगसाधनविकलानामर्थिनां मध्ये विषयिणोपयुज्यमानास्तैस्सवेद्यन्ते । तेषामप्रदायोपयुज्यमानं नैर्घृण्यमाविष्कुर्यात् । विषयिणा प्रदीयमानो वाऽर्थिभ्यः परिमितत्वादवच्छिद्येतेत्यनुपायोऽयं दुःखापघाते बुद्धिमताम् । किं च गुरुत्वात् । भोगानां विविधनिवसनस्त्रीपानभोजन-विलेपनालंकारादीनां समग्र्ये सुखमुत्पद्यते । नाऽन्यतरवैकल्ये । सामग्र्यं चैषां स्वाभाविकत्वादानुपपन्नम् । आह च—

नाभिजातिं न विज्ञानं न च शौर्यमपेक्षते ।  
लक्ष्मी संस्कारयोगाच्च क्वचिदेवावतिष्ठते ॥

इत्येवमनेकार्थाश्रयत्वाद् गुरुविषयभोगः । किं च निन्दितत्वाच्च साधुभिः । निन्दितः खल्वपि साधुभिर्विषयोपभोगः । यस्मादाह—

आयासाश्च विघातश्च विप्रलम्भभयानि च ।  
यच्चान्यदशिवं लोके तत्कामेभ्यः प्रवर्तते ॥

पुनरप्याह—

अयं सक्षेत्रियो व्याधिरयमात्यन्तिको ज्वरः ।  
इदमास्पदमोतीनामेष योनिः सपाप्मनाम् ॥  
अगाधमेतत्पातालमेष पङ्क्तो दुरुत्तरः ।  
क्लेशव्याधिभयाकीर्णमेतच्छ्वभ्रं भयावहम् ॥  
विविधायासशोकानामेतदायतनं महत् ।  
दैन्यश्रमविषादानामेतत्क्षेत्रमपावृतम् ॥  
यस्माद्विषयसम्भोगाद्विहगः पञ्जरादिव ।  
गतो वनेषु रमते स सुखानि समश्नुते ॥

तस्मात् साधुभिरपाकृतत्वादसाधुविषयोपभोगः । किं च सर्वत्राऽसन्निधानात् । न हि सुप्रतिनिविष्टस्यापि कामिनः सर्वत्र विषयसन्निधानेन भवितव्यम् । नो खल्वपि एकस्मिन् देशेऽवस्थानं सम्भवति, विषयाभाव-प्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादवश्यं वियोगेन भवितव्यम् । वियोगे च सति ध्रुवोऽ-

निष्ठानुबन्ध इति कोऽर्थो विषयपरिग्रहेण ? तत्र यदुक्तं दृष्टस्य हेतोः  
सद्भावादपार्थका जिज्ञासेति एतदयुक्तम् ॥१॥

*This is known through direct perception.* The course of action of medicine prescribed in the science is futile for the one who is prosecuted for his acts, self-controlled as also for the one already having medicine, the doctor and the attendant. It is stated also :

“The cause of all kinds of diseases is said to be threefold—food, conduct and the acts done in previous births. The medicinal substance cures the diseases arising out of food and conduct. The diseases arising out of the acts (done in previous births) are removed by death.”

It is further stated :

“The doctor should avoid treating all kinds of calamitous repelling of power, flesh and organs as also the disease having the symptoms of death.”

Thus is the lack of invariableness.

The lack of finality (is proved) on the ground that the disease once cured is observed to appear again. So it is stated :

“If the fever takes place again and again, its remedy should be the same adopted in curing its previous (attack)”.

Therefore, just as the instrumentality of curing the disease in case of the science of medicine is proved through perception (i.e., is obvious), similarly the lack of invariableness and finality are also proved through perception (i.e., are obvious).

*In the same way, (the lack of invariableness and finality is observed in the case of means of alleviating) mental misery. Just as the means of alleviating bodily misery lack in invariableness, similarly, the lovely women, etc., (serving as the means of alleviating mental miseries lack in invariableness).*

Why ?

*Because we observe the (existence of the) desire for other objects of enjoyment even in the presence of the former.* If the objects of enjoyment like lovely women are always capable of alleviating misery, why should a worldly person (lit. sensualist) long for other objects of enjoyment even in the presence of them (i.e. lovely women, etc.) ? This is the non-invariableness.

It lacks in finality too. *There is possibility of request (for the objects of enjoyment) by those who have (once) satisfied the desire (for those objects).* If the enjoyment of the objects would have finally removed the mental misery, what is that on account of which the worldly (lit. sensualist) person desires for them again and again ?

What is the reason ?

Because Devadatta does not desire for lamp in absence of darkness. The desire to enjoy the objects of enjoyment again and again is observed in case of the persons who have (once) satisfied this desire, through enjoying these objects of enjoyment. Hence, we hold that the perceptible means does not alleviate the misery. On the contrary, it increases (the desire) still more. It is stated also :

“The desire is never extinguished through the enjoyment of the desired objects. It increases more (through enjoyment) just as fire (increases) with oblation.”<sup>53</sup>

Someone else has also stated :

“The perceptible means (of alleviating misery) are not desirable because they are understood, because they are difficult (to be collected together), because they are criticised by the noble persons, and because they are not available everywhere.”

*Because they are understood.* In the middle of the libiduous persons destitute of the means of enjoyment, a worldly (lit. sensualist) person enjoying them is known by them. The use of these objects (by the worldly person) without sharing with others would have displayed pitilessness. (The objects) if shared with the libiduous

persons by the wordly persons, would have been divided because of their finiteness. Hence, it is not a (proper) means to alleviate the misery for the intelligent persons.

*Moreover, because of its being difficult.* Pleasure arises from the objects of enjoyment like many places for inhabitation, (lovely) women, desirable drinks, food, unguents, dress, etc., only when all of them are collected together and not in the absence of some of them. Their collection is, however, impossible because it is unnatural.<sup>54</sup> It is stated also :

“Riches do not have regard for (noble) descent, skill and bravery. And, it stays somewhere only due to its connection with the (past) impressions.”

Thus, being dependent upon many objects, the enjoyment of the object is very difficult.

*Moreover, because it is censured by the noble persons.* The enjoyment of the objects is criticised by the noble persons also, because it is stated :

“All troubles, all impediments and all sorts of fear of deception and whatever other kinds of inauspicious (acts) are there in the world, all are caused by desire.”

It is stated again :

“It is the incurable disease; it is eternal fever; it is the abode of all distresses; it is the cause of all sinful things.

“It is unfathomable, lowest region or hell, (it is) the dire difficult to cross, it is the dreadful hell full of distresses, diseases and fears.”

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54. Chakravartī reads *eṣāmasvābhāvi.....Pāndeya* remarks that the reading accepted by *Chakravartī* is not available in the manuscripts. We have, however, rendered the sentence according to *Chakravartī*'s reading because of its propriety in the context. In case we accept *Pāndeya*'s reading, the sentence would have to be translated in a round about way as follows : these objects cannot be brought together, guided as they are by their own nature (of remaining separate, etc.).

It is the vast abode of various troubles and sorrows. It is the open field of depression, exertion and afflictions. Therefore, one who after (relinquishing) the objects of enjoyment goes to the forest and rejoices (there) obtains happiness, just as a bird (after being released) from a cage (goes to the forest and rejoices.)” Hence, the enjoyment of the objects, being shunned by the noble persons, is not well.

*Moreover, it is not possible to get (these objects) everywhere.* Even a well known libiduous cannot get (all) the objects of enjoyment everywhere. Nor is there the possibility of their presence at one place only because it would involve the undesirable contingency of the non-existence of the objects (after these are consumed). Therefore, the absence of these objects is certain. And, when the absence takes place, the attainment of (connection with) the undesirable is also certain. Hence, what is the use of hoarding the objects of enjoyment? Therefore, it is wrong to say that on account of the existence of the perceptible means (of alleviation of misery) the desire to know is useless.