he also wrote on such famous topics of logic as inference-for-the-self and inference-for-others. the fallacies of the thesis, cause, homogeneous example and heterogeneous example and the resultant of the organ of knowledge.

The other work of Siddhasena, Sanmati prakaraṇa, describes the partial view point, knowledge and indeterminate intuition and the different schools from the point of view of non-absolutism. The inclusion of different non-Jaina schools in different partial view points was first initiated by Siddhasena1 (Cf. Text 2—11).

Samantabhadra in his Āptamimāṃsa has laid emphasis on non-absolutism and seven-fold statements. His definition of organ of knowledge is very much similar to that of our Text (1. 1).2 The main emphasis of Samantabhadra has been to show the irrelevance of absolutism. In this description he has shown the irrationality of the non-Jaina system as also the possibility of reconciliation of contradictory view points. Another important work from our point of view is the Viśeṣāväyaka bhāṣya of Jinabhadra Gaṇi who flourished from 484-588 A.D.3 Much of the description of 5 types of knowledge in our Text is nothing but a summary of the Viśeṣāväyaka-bhāṣya bhādvyāti. Similarly the portion on partial point of view is also influenced by it.

Another author who laid down the foundation of a regular system of Jaina logic was Akalaṇka who has been placed in about 760 A.D.4 Akalaṇka has the same place in the Jaina philosophy as Dinnāga and Dharmakirtti in the Buddhist philosophy. Akalaṇka’s influence on our author is seen specially in the description of partial point of view. It is also to be noted that the division of our Text into three chapters—organ of knowledge, partial point of view and symbols—is also taken from Akalaṇka’s Laghiyastrayī. After Akalaṇka came Vidyānanda who commented upon both—Samantabhadra and Akalaṇka. His influence on our Text is clear on the chapter on partial point of view. He has been placed in the 9th century A.D.5

1. Sanmati prakaraṇa, 3.47-49.
2. Svayambhūstotra, 63.
4. Ibid, p. 185.
Acarya Māṇikyanandī who wrote Parīkṣāmukha, a standard Text book on Jaina logic, came after Akalanka and is placed in 10th century A.D. Anantāvīrya who wrote Prameyaratna- māla, a commentary on Parīkṣāmukha, says that he churned the nectar of Logic—out of the ocean of the speech of Akalanka.

The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the division of Pramāṇa has been given in the same way as in our Text (1.24). The definition of inference of our Text (1.34) has been directly taken from Parīkṣāmukha. Māṇikyanandī has given like our Text many subdivisions of cause. He writes a different chapter on fallacy giving examples of fallacies of eight types of organs of knowledge. Our Text has followed Akalanka in dividing his chapter whereas in style it comes nearer to the Śūtra style of Parīkṣāmukha.

Māṇikyanandī is followed by great commentators Prabhācandra (11th century A.D.) who wrote Prameyakamalamārtanda on Parīkṣāmukha and Nyāyakumudacandra on Laghīyastrayī. These commentaries are very voluminous and deal with the non-Jaina systems in detail. Our author has a limited purpose of presenting Jaina logic in concise form in the new terminology of neo-logic and, therefore, he could not make much use of these commentaries in his work. Similarly the influence of the voluminous commentary (1000 A.D.) of Abhayadeva Śūri on Sanmati Tarka is also negligible.

The greatest influence on our Text is, however, that of Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra of Deva Śūri (1086-1159 A.D.). Our Text can, in fact, be said to be just a recast of this work. It may be argued that if it is so, our author cannot be said to be an original thinker. I would like to reproduce the words of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee in this connection. “As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of

1. Śāstri Kailāsaacandra, Jaina Nyōya p. 38.
2. Prakalpaḥvichāramadbhiggāyaḥ yeṣu śīmaṁśaḥ। śānyāvyādārthām tasmā namo māṇivayamadīne।
   —Prameyaratna-mālā, 2.
3. Śūtra 9.
4. Śāstri, Kailāsa Chandra, Jaina Nyōya, p. 39.
minor importance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work of philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculation. And what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the schools and originality was more or less suspect with adherence of the system as rather furnishing a pit for error and misconception. We must not, therefore, expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of the distinctive individuality.  

Deva Sūri also wrote an auto-commentary Syādvāda-ratnakara on Pramāṇanayatatvālokālankāra. The influence of Deva Sūri’s word on Jaina-Tarka bhāṣā can be very well known by looking at the footnotes of this work edited by Pandit Sukha Lal Ji.

 Except some other minor Jaina logicians who preceded Yaśovijaya mention may be made of Hemacandra Sūri and Haribhadra Sūri. Hemacandrāsūri’s work Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā (1088-11772 A.D.)² has been very ably commented upon by Pandita Sukhalalji and translated by Satakari Mookerjee. Haribhadra Sūri (about 1120 A.D.)³ is said to have written 140 works. He is said to have written a commentary on Anekānta Jayapatākā. Mention may also be made of Dharmaḥbūṣana (1600 A.D.)⁴ who is the author of Nyāyadīpīkā and has been mentioned by name in our Text (1.33. L.25).

And lastly comes our author Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-1688 A.D.)⁵ whose date and life history can be fortunately known from Sujaśāvelibhāsa, a work written in ancient Gujarati by his contemporary Kāntivijaya Gaṇi. He was born in Kanodum near Kalola in Gujarata and died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D. His father’s name was Nārāyaṇa and mother’s name was Sobhagade. He was a disciple of Naya Vijaya who was third in line to Harivijaya (1526-1595 A.D) who was contemporary of Moghul

1. Mookerjee Satakari, Preface, Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā, p. X.
Emperor, Akbar. Hari Vijaya’s disciple was Kalyāṇa Vijaya. Kalyāṇa Vijaya’s disciple was Lābhavijaya. And Yaśovijaya’s teacher Naya Vijaya was the disciple of Lābhavijaya. A businessman, Dhanaji Suri, sent Yaśovijaya to Kāśi for higher studies in 1626 A.D. He made a special study of logic there and got the titles of Nyāya Viśārada and Nyāyācārya. He himself says that he has written one hundred works. A list of seventy-two works of Yaśovijaya has been given by Pandit Sukhalal Ji. Forty of these works are fully available, seven works are partly available and twentyfive works are not available at all. Out of these works written by Yaśovijaya, it would be noticed that sixteen works are on Jaina logic, out of which only eight are available today. Out of these Nayarakhasa has been referred to in our text also (p. 29.6.8). Out of the remaining works, Nyāya-khanḍa-khādyā is written on the style of Khanḍana khanḍa khādyā and Aṣṭasāhasrī vṛtti is a gloss on the Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda. Nyāyakhanḍakhādyā deals with soul, emancipation, momentariness, origination, destruction, non-absolutism, class and individual, space and time, determinate concomitant and determinate concomitant etc. It mentions amongst others, Samantabhadra, Gandhahasti, Sammati, Miśra, Bhaṭṭa, Śridhara, Udayana, Nārāyanacārya, Śiromani, Didhiti-kāra Vardhamāna, and Guṇānanda. Similarly Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa mentions Vācaspāti, Maṇḍana Miśra, Prajñākara, Hemacandra, Vakakravarti, Vedānti-paśu, Kusumānjali, Gurumata, Murāribhāṭṭa, Murāri, Miśra, Gautamīya, Bhāttācārya, Jarannaiyāika, Raghu-deva Bhāṭṭācārya, Bhūṣaṇasāra etc. This shows the comparative and critical outlook of Yaśovijaya. It is remarkable that he wrote not only on Aṣṭasāhasrī which is a work by a Digambara author, who has been criticised in our text also (1.2), but also commented upon a non-Jaina work, Yogasūtra of Patañjali. This indicates his non-sectarian approach. Another work is Nyāyāloka, whose contents are given as follows by Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa: soul, emancipation, inference, testimony, direct knowledge, indirect knowledge, validity of internal things, inherence, negation, ether, substance, etc. This work also refers

2. Vidyābhūṣaṇa S. C. A History of Indian logic, p. 220.
to many Jaina and non-Jaina works.  

Coming to Jaina-tarka-bhasā we have already noted above that it takes its scheme from Akalanāka. The title of this book is common with the work of the same name of Mokṣākara and Kesava Miśra. The Buddhist-Tarka-Bhāṣā of Mokṣākara is divided in chapters. The names of the three chapters in Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā are, as already indicated, taken from Laghīyastrayī of Akalanāka, but the last chapter on symbol does not follow Laghīyastrayī but the Śvetāmbara tradition as given in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya. As regards the work of logic, two works —Nyāyakusumāṇjali the Tattvacintāmaṇi—have been made use of.

I have separately assessed the value of those portions of Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā, where Yaśovijaya has contradicted the viewpoints of his opponent.  

My conclusion is this that Yaśovijaya has mastered not only the Jaina work but also the non-Jaina works. His representation of the viewpoints of his opponents is honest and faithful. His viewpoint is objective and his style is distinctively his own. His method is direct, and he does not believe in pedantry. While summarising, he leaves the non-essential and concentrates on the essentials. At places he has shown his originality also, even though his aim was to write a handy text book for beginners. As an instance, we may refer to the Text where validity of recollection has been established (1.24). At places we also find that in his zeal to summarise, he has not only made his work too difficult but also neglected the essential part of the original work from which he was summarising.

With these words I invite my readers to go through the work. I have tried to be as authentic as possible in my translation and notes and I do hope that the book, though small in volume, would prove a safe guide for the beginners and a study of this book alone would serve as a good introduction to other higher works of Jaina logic.

Dayanand Bhargava

महोपाध्याय श्री योगेश्वरज्ञक्ता

॥ जै न तर्क भाषा ॥

1. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः

प्रेमबुद्धिन नस्त जिन्न तत्त्वाध्येद्धिशिनम्।
प्रमाणनाथनिःप्रेषणस्तम्भोत्कथा तनोत्प्रयम्॥

[ 1. प्रमाणसारानंस्य त्यक्षनिर्लक्षणम् । ]

§ 1. तत्त्र-स्वप्रतिभवसापि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्-स्वम् आत्मा ज्ञानस्येव स्वरुपमित्वं
थः; परं तस्माद्योऽऽर्थं इति यथं, तौ व्यवस्थि यथास्यत्सेवन निभिनोत्तेऽवे-
बंधीं स्वप्रतिभवसापि। अनं दृश्येऽतिभवत्तत्वारणां ज्ञानपदम्। संज्ञाचर्ययानां-
ध्वसापेषु तदारणाय व्यवसायम्। परोक्षवृद्धिविवाहिनिः चीमाःसकादीनामुः,
बाधियाःपलापिनं ज्ञानादेवतचविन्यमं च मतनिरास्य स्वप्रस्य स्वरुपविद्यवाच्यंक्तम्।
नन्दु पतेऽस्माननेषु प्रमाणस्य धिष्टं तदा क्रिमिण्य तत्कलं वाच्यसिद्धि चेतुः;
सत्यम्; स्वारूपस्ितेऽवे तत्त्वात्वात्। नन्दु पतेऽप्रमाणेऽप्रतिभवसापितं न स्पात्,
प्रमाणस्य परत्त्वसापिस्वासं फलस्य च स्वारूपसायवाच्यद्विति वेदः । न । प्रमाण-स्पायः;
कथितिमेवेन तदोपधे्न। इत्ययां चालम्यायास्यपुपुषपोषेद्विषयेऽप्रमाणसिद्धि स्थितम्;
न द्वयाप्त आत्मा द्वयाप्तकास्यकोक्तं, निर्द्धारणं कार्यं क्रियाजनायो-भाषतुः,
भेदान्तुलक्षितसिद्धिकर्षणं सुपुस्पि तत्त्वसम्भवः।

§ 2. कैशिचुः

“तत्सार्प्रमाणकाराः शक्तिर्भाषानिविधतम्;
करणत्वेन निर्दिशा न बिक्रेत् कथवन ॥ १ ॥”

[ तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवाणः १.२.२२ ]

इति-लघुधिनित्रियमेवान्यप्रतिभवसंक्लितवाणं प्रमाण संहितंदेव; वद्येष्ठलम्; उपयोगात्मना